30. The prosecution introduced a long list of affidavits containing testimony of some 90 British internees who related the events which occurred since the British prisoners captured in the hot and steaming climate of Singapore had been transferred to the frigid climate of Hokkaido in northern Japan.

It was shown that the prisoners were housed in quarters "rotten with lice, worked from 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. in weather 20 to 30 degrees below zero, ate rotten stinking food for a long time and some had to walk as long as an hour and a half to work".

The statements described in detail the starvation, beatings, tortures and deliberate attempts to freeze the inmates of the camp. They told how two British prisoners died "horrible deaths from gangrenous frozen legs suffered in a guardhouse". In one affidavit a British soldier stated that he was forced to work in the snow with no footwear and that when he protested he was "beaten across the face 30 times with a heavy leather belt".

31. The defense succeeded in excluding a number of the affidavits on the ground that they were merely cumulative hearsay.

32. All of the evidence for the prosecution consisted of affidavits or statements except that of the camp interpreter. He testified personally on the witness stand saying that he had seen the accused strike a British Private who afterwards had been placed in the guardhouse and then removed to the hospital where he died. The interpreter was unable to name this victim but he did corroborate the beatings of other prisoners by naming the camp personnel responsible.

The prosecution finished its case in three and one-half days.

33. The defense introduced a Japanese doctor who testified that he had signed death certificates for three deceased prisoners but had seen only two of the bodies. He stated that Reymond Suttle, a British soldier, died of croup pneumonia but that malnutrition was also included in the record of death. The witness denied that the death certificates had been signed on "standing orders" from the camp commander and said that he had made the records on reports of an American doctor interned as a prisoner of war.

34. Counsel for the defense closed his argument by presenting the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. He asserted that the rules of the trial of Class 1 criminals who will be tried before the Tribunal are more lenient than the SCAP rules for Class 2 and 3 criminals such as Hirate.

35. The prosecution in answer to this argued that the position of a commander of a POW camp is distinguished from a commander in the field in that a camp commander is charged with a special responsibility. His mission is to insure proper care and treatment of prisoners of war under his custody at all times whereas the primary mission of the commander in the field is combat.

It was pointed out that the Rules of Land Warfare, the Public Law of Japan, and the Rules and Regulations prescribed by the War Ministry of Japan for the treatment of prisoners of war place direct responsibility on the camp commander. It is his duty at all times to insure the proper care and treatment of prisoners in his custody. He has the authority to handle the affairs of the camp and to control all personnel having contact with prisoners of war.

36. The Commission announced a verdict of guilty and imposed the death sentence on 25 January 1946.

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Trials in Progress

37. The trial of three cases was in progress at the close of the month. The case against Hiroji Honda commenced on 18 January, that against Isao Fukuhara on 29 January and that against Kitaro Ishida on 30 January.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

38. A special prosecution staff which includes civilians has been designated to investigate and prosecute those individuals who are charged with planning, preparing, initiating or waging a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances.

This action was taken to implement the term of the Japanese surrender contained in the Potsdam Agreement (Article 10) providing that stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals.

39. The prosecution staff has developed its organization and is actively engaged in gathering data for prosecutions, in questioning prospective defendants and witnesses and in reviewing material previously collected in anticipation of these trials.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

40. The Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was issued as General Orders No. 1 on 19 January. It establishes the International Military Tribunal as the fact determining agency with which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will carry out his responsibilities under the terms of surrender to ascertain and punish the major war criminals of the Far East. The seat of the Tribunal is in Tokyo.

This document sets forth certain acts which if committed by those charged as major war criminals will subject them to stern justice. It provides simple rules of procedure and empowers the Tribunal to determine whether the individuals charged as major war criminals are guilty of the acts charged and to assess penalties for those found guilty. The Supreme Commander will enforce the penalties.

Membership of the Tribunal

41. The Tribunal will consist of not less than five nor more than nine members appointed by the Supreme Commander from the names submitted by the Signatories to the Instrument of Surrender. The Supreme Commander will appoint a member to be President of the Tribunal. The Secretariat of the Tribunal will consist of a General Secretary and such assistants, including interpreters, as may be necessary.

Quorum and Voting

42. The presence of a majority of all members is necessary to constitute a quorum. Decisions and judgements of the Tribunal, including convictions and sentences, require a majority vote of the members present. When the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the President is decisive.

Jurisdiction of the Tribunal

43. The Tribunal has the power to try and punish war criminals in the Far East who as individuals or members of organizations are charged with individual responsibility for the commission of the following three offenses:

Crimes against Peace: The planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements of assurances, or participation in a common plan of conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

Conventional War Crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war.

Crimes against Humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

44. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such a plan.

45. Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to orders of his government or of a superior will, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility of any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

Counsel

46. The Chief Counsel will be designated by the Supreme Commander. Any United Nation with which Japan has been at war may appoint an associate counsel. The responsibility of the Chief Counsel assisted by the associates includes the investigation and prosecution of charges against war criminals within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the giving of appropriate legal assistance to the Supreme Commander.

47. The accused will be represented by counsel and will file with the General Secretary of the Tribunal the name of the counsel of his own selection or of counsel whom he desires the Tribunal to appoint. The Tribunal may disapprove the counsel selected by the accused at any time. If the accused is not represented by counsel, the Tribunal will designate counsel for him.

Procedure for Fair Trial

48. The Tribunal may draft and amend rules of procedure consistent with the provisions of the Charter. In order to insure fair trial for the accused, the procedure will be:

Indictment: The indictment will consist of a plain, concise and adequate statement of each offense charged. Each accused will be furnished, in adequate time for defense, a copy of the indictment including any amendment and a copy of the Charter of the Tribunal in a language understood by the accused.

Hearing: During the trial or preliminary proceedings the accused will have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him.

Language: The trial and any related proceedings will be conducted in English and in the language of the accused. Translations will be provided as needed and requested.

Evidence for the Defense: The accused will have the right through himself or counsel to present evidence at the trial in

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support of his defense and to examine any witness called by the prosecution, subject to such reasonable restrictions as the Tribunal may determine.

Production of Evidence for the Defense: The accused may apply in writing to the Tribunal for the production of witnesses or of documents. The application will state where the witness or document is thought to be located. It will state the facts proposed to be proved and the relevancy of such facts to the defense.

Pre-Trial Motions

49. All motions, applications or other requests addressed to the Tribunal prior to the commencement of the trial will be made in writing and filed with the General Secretary for action by the Tribunal.

Powers of the Tribunal

50. The Tribunal will have the power to: summon witnesses to the trial, require them to testify and to question them; interrogate each accused and permit comment on his refusal to answer any questions; require the production of documents and other evidentiary material; require the witness to take an oath, affirmation, or such declaretion as is customary in the country of the witness; and appoint officers to execute work of the Tribunal, including the power to have evidence taken on commission.

Conduct of Trial

51. The Tribunal will confine the trial to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charge and will take strict measures to prevent unreasonable delay. It will provide for maintenance of law and order at the trial and deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including exclusion of any accused or his counsel, but without prejudice to the determination of the charges.

52. The Tribunal will determine the mental and physical capacity of any accused to proceed to trial.

53. The transcripts of proceedings, exhibits and documents submitted to the Tribunal will be filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal and will constitute part of the record.

Evidence

54. The Tribunal will not be bound by technical rules of evidence but will adopt non-technical procedure and admit any evidence it deems to have probative value. All purported admissions or statements of the accused are admissible. Without limiting the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be admitted:

Documents: A document, regardless of its security classification and without proof of its issuance or signature, which appears to the Tribunal to have been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of any government.

Reports: A report which appears to the Tribunal to have been signed or issued by the International Red Cross or a member thereof, or by a doctor of medicine or any medical service personnel, or by an investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person who appears to the Tribunal

to have personal knowledge of the matters contained in the report.

Statements: An affidavit, deposition or other signed statement.

Diaries or Letters: A diary, letter or other document, including sworn or unsworn statements, which appear to the Tribunal to contain information relating to the charge.

Copies: A copy of a document or other secondary evidence of its contents, when the original is not immediately available.

55. The Tribunal will not require proof of facts of common knowledge, nor of the authenticity of official government documents and reports of any nation or of the proceedings, records and findings of military or other agencies of any of the United Nations.

Judgment and Sentence

56. The Tribunal will have the power to impose upon an accused, on conviction, death or such other punishment as may be determined by it to be just.

57. The Tribunal will announce judgment in open court and will give the reasons on which it is based. The record of the trial will be transmitted directly to the Supreme Commander for his action. The sentence will be carried out in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander who has the power to approve, reduce or otherwise alter sentences but may not increase the severity of the punishment imposed.

Personnel of the Tribunal

58. Members of the Tribunal have been nominated by the participating countries. The Supreme Commander will appoint the Tribunal and designate the President from among these and other nominations. The list of the individuals nominated by their respective countries follows:

Commonwealth of Australia	Sir William Flood Webb, Chief Justice Supreme Court of Queensland.
Dominion of Canada	E. Stuart McDougall, King's Bench, Quebec.
Republic of China	Mei Ju-Ao, Acting Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, Leglislative Yuan.
Kingdom of the Netherlands	Prof. Bernard Victor A. Roling, Professor of Law, Utrecht University, Judge of the Utrecht Court.
Dominion of New Zealand	Erima Harvey Northcroft, Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	I. M. Zaryanov, Military Collegium of Supreme Court, Major General of Justice.
United States of America	John P. Higgins, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.

59. Associate prosecutors have been chosen and their arrival with their staffs to assist the Chief Counsel is expected in February. The names of the countries now participating in the prosecution with their respective representatives are:

Commonwealth of Australia	Mr. Justice Mansfield
Dominion of Canada	Brigadier Henry Gratton Nolan
Republic of China	Hyiang Che Chun
Dominion of New Zealand	Brigadier R. Quilliam
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Minister S. A. Golunsky, Director of Judicial Science.
United Kingdom	Arthur S. Comyns, K. C.

Site of Trials by the Tribunal

60. The selection of the War Ministry Building as the site for international trials was announced on 21 January. The auditorium will be used as the court room and the conference rooms will be utilized as chambers for the judges. Work has been commenced on the renovation and redecoration of the building and on the reinstallation of heating facilities. The office once occupied by former Premier Hideki Tojo is near the court room.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION
of
NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES
in
JAPAN AND KOREA

Number 4. January 1946

PART III

ECONOMIC - JAPAN

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0052-2.

SECTION 1

AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

CONTENTS

1. Food collection, vegetable seed supply, agricultural research, agricultural associations and land tenure are some of the problems confronting the agricultural economy of Japan.

2. The demobilization of the Japanese armed forces has returned many former fishermen to their civilian occupation. Considerable activity in construction and repair of fishing craft is taking place. The operation of these boats will further increase supplies of fish.

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATIONS

3. Japan has 377 public and approximately 35 private agricultural experiment stations and laboratories according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. About 48 farms operate under the direction of the experiment stations to supply farmers with seeds and plants of superior varieties produced by the stations. Of the 377 stations, 110 are classified as main central government or prefectural stations and the remainder as branch stations, experimental farms or experiment stations for special purposes.

4. The number of experiment stations in proportion to the number of farmers served is greater than in the United States. The Japanese have established special stations to study a single crop or a restricted set of problems instead of providing facilities in one locality for the study of all or most of the problems peculiar to the area as is done in the United States.

5. Most of the agricultural experiment stations deal with problems of production or processing of grain crops, fruits, vegetables, tea and silk. The crossing of improved varieties of important crops, cultural experiments with manures and fertilizers, and control of insects and diseases are among the chief subjects for investigation.

Research on livestock is concentrated at a few stations because variations in climate and soil are relatively unimportant to stock raising and because the livestock population in Japan is small.

VEGETABLE SEED

6. Japan produced practically all of its vegetable seed requirements prior to 1942 and normally exported considerable amounts to Korea and other areas within the Japanese Empire. Figures are not available for years prior to 1942 but data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry show that in 1942 and 1943 total production was 8,216 and 8,577 metric tons respectively, of which approximately 16 percent was exported.

In 1944 production was more than 7,000 metric tons, of which only a small amount was exported. In 1945 production dropped sharply with shortages developing in the supplies of seeds of some vegetables.

7. Commercial stocks of eggplant, cucumber and squash seed now stand at only half to two-thirds the normal amount. Tomato and snap bean stocks are 10 to 20 percent of the reported for 1942 through 1944. Daikon seed supply was only 50 to 70 percent, and Chinese cabbage, greens, peas and broad bean supplies were 30 to 50 percent of normal at planting time. Cabbage and spinach stocks were down slightly. Stocks of turnip, carrot, edible burdock, Japanese leek and onion compared favorably with earlier years.

8. Expected reduction in commercial vegetable plantings in favor of staple crops will result in reduced demand for certain seeds. For commercial planting the Ministry has estimated surpluses of carrot, burdock, greens, cabbage, spinach and onion. These estimates do not take into consideration the unknown and possibly great demand of town and city residents who may want to plant emergency gardens during 1946.

9. Although the vegetable seed situation in Japan appears unfavorable on the whole, it is critical for only tomato, eggplant, snap bean and squash. The harvesting by farmers and gardeners of increasing quantities of home-grown seed during the past three or four years will help supplement commercial supplies.

FOOD COLLECTIONS

10. The state of the present food purchase program of the Japanese Government is shown in current figures on the collection of rice. The quantity purchased up to 10 January 1946 from the 1945 harvest was 1,118,701 metric tons according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. This is only 28 percent of the total rice scheduled for purchase by the government from the 1945 crop. On the same date in 1945 the government had collected 52 percent of the amount to be purchased from the 1944 crop.

11. Because of the poor rice harvest in 1945, the current collections of rice were not expected by Japanese officials to come up to those made from the harvest of 1944. While the 1945 production is estimated at approximately 75 percent of 1944 rice production, the amount of rice purchased by the government up to 1 January 1946 was less than 40 percent of the amount purchased by the same date in 1945.

12. Widespread hoarding of foodstuffs by farmers and others, and the flow of large amounts of food into the black market are blamed for the inadequacy of food purchases by the government. Farmers are reported to be reluctant to sell rice to official agencies because of the lucrative alternative outlet provided by the black market, the inability of the government to provide

them with farm supplies and consumer goods in exchange for crops sold to the government and the prevalence of payment by farmers for goods and services in foodstuffs rather than money.

THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION

13. A reversal of the long historical trend toward centralized governmental control of the rural cooperatives and agricultural associations was embodied in amendments to the Agricultural Association Law passed by the Imperial Diet on 17 December 1945. The primary objective of these amendments, according to the Japanese Government, was to provide for democratic election of local prefectural and national officials of the Agricultural Cooperative Association (Nogyo-kai).

14. The Agricultural Cooperative Association is an outgrowth of both the rural cooperative movement and agencies of the Japanese Government concerned with the enforcement of national agricultural policy. Agricultural cooperatives which had been separate and autonomous up until 1900 were consolidated under an act of that year into the Central Union of Cooperative Societies (Sangyo-Kumiai Chuo-kai).

Membership in the cooperatives was voluntary, officials were elected at the local levels and the central organization was federative in nature. The cooperatives were encouraged by the government as a method to improve the economic condition of the farmers.

At approximately the same time, under the Agricultural Societies Act of 1899, the government created a centralized structure of village and prefectural agricultural societies (No-kai), under control of the national government for the collection of agrarian statistics, the distribution of agricultural information and the execution of governmental policies. Officials were appointed from above and membership by farmers was obligatory.

15. Because of the importance of the processing, marketing and credit functions performed by the cooperatives, the central government exercised an increasing influence in their activities, particularly after the Manchurian "incident". Finally all semblance of popular control over the cooperatives was abandoned in 1943 when, under the pressure for rigid wartime regulations of agriculture, the cooperatives were consolidated with the agricultural societies into the present Agricultural Cooperative Association.

Since 1943 this association has been the governmental organ for the maintenance of centralized control and the enforcement of national policy throughout rural Japan. Membership of all farmers is compulsory and, until the passage of the recent amendments, leaders of the local associations had to receive prior approval of the prefectural governor before taking office. This approval was based on their ability to maximize the compulsory food purchases by the government at ceiling prices, rather than their support of the interests of farmers. Consequently there was considerable resentment and lack of support of the present leadership of local and prefectural agricultural cooperative associations.

16. In view of the importance of the role played by the agricultural association in almost every phase of Japanese Agriculture, its development as a representative farm organization is of great significance for the future of rural Japan.

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It is through the association that crop quotas are established at village levels; that foodstuffs are collected from farmers for distribution by the government; that seed, fertilizer and other supplies as well as consumer goods are sold to farmers; and that foodstuffs are allocated for processing.

The association also acts as a savings institution and provides farm credit; it disseminates technical information to the rural population; and performs a wide variety of other economic, social and cultural functions in rural Japan.

AGRICULTURAL TRENDS

Production Trends of Food Crops

17. Rice, wheat, barley, naked barley, sweet potatoes and white potatoes are the most important food crops in Japan in terms of production and crop area. These six crops normally account for over 80 percent of the caloric value in the Japanese diet.

From 1926 to 1945 the production of rice, wheat, sweet potatoes and white potatoes showed increases, while the production trends of barley and naked barley have been downward as shown in Charts No. 1 and No. 2.

18. Production of rice varied considerably from year to year although crop area was practically constant as shown in Charts No. 3 and No. 4. Weather conditions are the principal cause of this variation.

The average production for the period 1936-40 was about eight percent higher than for period 1926-30. This is attributed by Japanese officials to improvement through crop breeding and improved fertilizer application. This upward trend continued through 1943.

Production dropped in 1944 and 1945 because of adverse weather conditions in 1945 and fertilizer and labor shortages in both years.

19. Wheat production during the past 20 year period shows a definite upward trend. For the period 1936-40 average production was over 70 percent higher than for the period 1926-30 because of the great increase in crop area.

In the war years 1942-45 the production of wheat continued on a high level except in 1945 which was a year of unusually bad weather and destructive storms.

20. Barley production during the past twenty years has decreased. The average 1936-40 production represents about a 10 percent decrease below that of the 1926-30 period. The average of the 1941-45 crop shows an additional decrease of 10 percent. This may be attributed to poor crops in 1943 and 1945 since the crop area was greater than during the previous five-year period and only slightly below the 1926-30 period.

21. The average production of naked barley in 1936-40 was about 15 percent less than the 1926-30 average. For 1941-45 production increased over the preceding five-year period. Because of the extremely small crop in 1945 average production for 1941-45 is only about one percent higher than for the 1936-40 period and is about 14 percent less than the 1926-30 average.

22. Production of sweet potatoes shows an upward trend

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
RICE
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0


BARLEY
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
800
600
400
200
0


WHEAT
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1,600
1,200
800
400
0


SWEET POTATOES
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0


COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CEREAL CROPS & POTATO CR
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
TOTAL CEREAL
TOTAL POTATO











SIX MAJOR FOOD CROPS

PRODUCTION 1926-1945

JAPAN

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2/2

JANUARY 46 GHQ·SCAP NUMBER 1


TOTAL PRODUCTION OF SIX MAJOR
1926 – 1945
THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
THIS CURVE REPRESENTS TOTAL PRODUCTION OF SIX MAJOR FOOD CROPS FOR ALL JAPAN.
SWEET PO
WHE
NAKED BARLEY
BARLEY
LEGEND
POTATOES
SWEET POTATOES
WHEAT
NAKED BARLEY
BARLEY
RICE

00588


OF SIX MAJOR FOOD CROPS – JAPAN
1926 – 1945
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
POTATOES
SWEET POTATOES
WHEAT
RICE
005822
JANUARY 46
GHQ · SCAP
NUMBER 2

ACREAGE DEVOTED TO SIX MAJOR F

1926 – 1945









NOTE:

1 HECTARE = 2.47 ACRES

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X MAJOR FOOD CROPS — JAPAN

926 – 1945









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
TOTAL ACREAGE DEVOTED TO SIX MAJ(
1926–1945
THOUSANDS OF HECTARES
ONE HECTARE = 2.47 ACRES
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THIS CURVE REPRESENTS TOTAL ACREAGE DEVOTED TO SIX MAJOR FOOD CROPS IN JAPAN.
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SWEET POTATOES
WHEAT
NAKED BARLEY
BARLEY
RICE

) TO SIX MAJOR FOOD CROPS-JAPAN

1926-1945



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over the twenty-year period because of the increase of crop area with little change in yield per unit area. Increases in average production for 1936-40 and 1941-45 over the average 1926-30 are eight and 27 percent respectively.

23. White potato production showed a marked increase of 94 and 113 percent for the 1936-40 and 1941-45 periods respectively over the 1926-30 average. The crop area in 1941-45 had increased to about twice that of 1926-30.

Tea Trends

24. Although Chart No. 5 indicates a marked decrease in 1930 in the area devoted to tea plantings, the adoption of a new method of measuring areas subjected to intercropping, accounts for the apparent decline. The areas and production remained approximately constant from 1926 to 1932. In the latter year the tea area was 37,925 hectares and production was 40,388 metric tons of refined tea.

25. After 1932 a slight but continuing increase in areas and production of black and green tea took place. This was principally due to an increased foreign demand for the Japanese product.

By 1940 the total area planted to tea was 40,407 hectares and refined tea production was 58,180 metric tons. Total production of refined tea reached a peak of 61,865 metric tons in 1941 but had declined to 46,617 metric tons by 1944 and to an estimated 24,569 metric tons in 1945 when many tea areas were diverted to the production of critical food crops.

26. The increasing foreign market for Japanese black tea caused manufacture of this product to rise from an annual average of 22 metric tons during 1925-33 to 1,051 metric tons in 1934 and to an average of 2,500 metric tons for the period 1934-41. Production was negligible after 1941 due to loss of foreign market.

27. Figures for domestic consumption shown in Chart No. 5 are essentially all for green tea since the use of black tea in Japan has always been limited.

Consumption of tea was fairly constant from 1926 to 1939 averaging 30,713 tons annually. In 1940 it increased and averaged 48,718 tons for the period 1940-44. Increased consumption in those years may be accounted for by the continued high production and abundant availability of tea at very low cost during the war.

28. With the creation of a foreign market for black tea after 1932 and the subsequent increases in the demand for green teas, exports averaged 17,522 metric tons annually from 1933 to 1940 as compared to an average annual export of 10,640 metric tons for the period 1926-32.

Loss of foreign markets accounted for the drop in exports from 24,956 metric tons in 1939 to 12,686 metric tons in 1940. With further reduction caused by losses in shipping from 1941 to 1945, only 5,021 metric tons were exported in 1944 and none in 1945. Stocks available for export now are 1,626 metric tons of green tea and 601 metric tons of black tea.

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
TEA - ACREAGE, PRODUCTION, CO
JAPAN 1926
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CONSUMPTION
EXPORT
PRODUCTION
ACREAGE
NOTE: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TOTAL OF CONSUMPTION PLUS EXPORTS AND PRODUCTION IS ACCOUNTED FOR BY TEA IMPORTS AND CARRY-OVER FROM PREVIOUS YEAR.
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY.
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
ON, CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS
1926-1945
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AND PRODUCTION FIGURES
IOUS YEAR.
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FISHERIES

REACTIVATION OF THE FISHERY INDUSTRY

Fishing Craft

29. Many of the fishing boats now in operation are old and unseaworthy. Boatyards throughout Japan are actively engaged in repairing or rebuilding damaged and obsolescent craft. When these vessels come into operation, the fishing fleet will be in better condition than it has been for many years.

30. Eight steel vessels under construction by large fishing companies are scheduled for completion in September. They will make a sizeable contribution to the fish production of the nation. The new vessels are:

1 Refrigerated fish carrier, 100 gross tons

1 Whale killer, 370 gross tons

1 Trawler, 320 gross tons

1 Tuna clipper, 135 gross tons

4 Trawlers, 100 gross tons each

31. Fishing interests are planning to construct additional vessels in all sizes of both steel and wood. The prospective builders claim to have the necessary material and engines for all vessels they wish to build.

In order that the construction of new vessels will proceed in an orderly fashion and to prevent building of excessive numbers of craft, the Japanese Government must submit a comprehensive boat building plan for the approval of SCAP.

Most of the former Japanese naval craft that the government planned to convert into fishing boats are now engaged in minesweeping operations. These vessels will be converted as soon as their present duties are completed. Those not in use as mine sweepers are too badly damaged to warrant conversion.

32. Twenty-four fishing vessels owned by the Formosan subsidiary of a Japanese company were laid up in Kyushu ports while their status was clarified. These vessels have now been released to the parent company and will soon be in operation. Two of the released craft are steel trawlers of over 500 gross tons and are among the finest ships in the Japanese fishing fleet.

Petroleum Products

33. Because distribution commenced so late in the month, only 1,576 kiloliters of the December allotment of 6,683 kilo-

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liters of diesel oil reached the several prefectures. Little of this was distributed to the fishermen in December.

34. Distribution of the January allotment of 6,840 kiloliters of diesel oil is being made along with that portion of the December allotment which was delivered to the Japanese.

35. With the allotment of over 6,800 kiloliters of diesel fuel oil and adequate supplies of kerosene to the fishing fleet, one serious handicap to full scale operation of the fisheries has been eased.

36. It is expected that increased allotments of fuel oil will be necessary in March and April because of the herring season and the offshore fisheries conducted during those months.

The heavy herring catches made in Hokkaido in the spring play an important part in the fishery production of Japan. Both the long trips necessary for the springtime pelagic fisheries and the long hauls involved in transporting the herring to consumption centers require considerable quantities of fuel.

Estimated additional requirements for March amount to 3,705 kiloliters of diesel fuel oil and 108 kiloliters of light oil. Additional requirements for April consist of 1,710 kiloliters of diesel fuel oil.

37. When the original allocations of petroleum products were determined, it was decided that priority would be given to the fishing industry in the event that the fisheries should require additional allotments.

38. The new official prices of petroleum products, effective 15 January, are approximately five to seven times the old prices.

Salt

39. The shortage of salt in Japan is steadily becoming more serious because of the failure of expected imports to arrive. The Monopoly Bureau is not able to allocate salt to the fishing industry at the present time because the supply of salt for consumption in homes is practically exhausted.

It is expected that 67,000 metric tons may be imported from Tientsin, China and another 40,000 tons from Tsingtao, China during early 1946.

40. The Monopoly Bureau has promised to make an allotment of 5,000 metric tons to the fishing industry for the first quarter of 1946, provided that household needs have been met. The Bureau reports a stock of 140,000 metric tons in Tsingtao. The Ministry of Transportation claims to have adequate shipping to handle this amount.

41. Total imports of salt for 1946 are expected to reach 455,000 metric tons. It is essential that as much of this amount as possible be allocated to the fishing industry to avoid losses of fish from lack of means of preservation.

Nets

42. Recent field investigations have revealed that net factories are not in as good condition as previously reported. Most of them were damaged by bombing and some suffered additional damage

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from earthquakes. During the war some of these plants were converted to aircraft construction and the net-making machines were scrapped. Some of the factories are again in operation, with an output of about one-third of their former capacity. Damaged machinery is being repaired.

43. Before 1941 Mie Prefecture produced 40 percent of the fish nets made in Japan, about half of which were exported. The principal buyer was the United States. Other importers were Canada, Philippines, Norway, Portugal and Thailand. Net factories reactivated to half the former extent could supply all domestic needs.

44. Stocks of cotton in the hands of the net manufacturers are low. Approximately 80 percent of the cotton yarn or raw cotton was formerly imported from the United States. The remaining 20 percent came from India.

A serious shortage of all kinds of cotton and other material from which nets can be made may soon occur.

45. Supplies of finished netting are low. Nets now in use are rapidly deteriorating and must be replaced. The net shortage may be the next critical item of the fishing industry.

Fish Prices and the Black Market

46. Since the distribution of fuel oil began through the accepted channels of the fish-marketing system, a plan has been formulated by the Japanese Central Federation of Cooperative Fishermen's Associations to encourage the delivery of fish to accredited markets and to make an equitable allocation of fuel oil to the fishermen.

47. It was hoped that by making fuel oil available and by issuing an additional rice ration, the fishermen would be forced to deliver their entire catch to the port associations in the various areas, thereby breaking the grip the black market held on the industry.

This was accomplished to some extent. The amount of fish required to balance the amount of fuel oil allocated in the designated proportion is being delivered. This fish must be sold at a specified price.

48. It now remains for the Japanese government to clear up a misinterpretation of the operation of the system. The ratio of the amount of fuel oil allocated to the amount of fish delivered was established as the basis of fuel oil distribution to the various prefectures and to the ports within the prefectures. Allowances were made for the fact that sometimes fishermen make good catches and sometimes they return to port with little or no fish; hence an average was set.

It was intended that all of the fish caught while using oil received through the regular channels would be turned over to the Central Federation for distribution at an agreed price, rather than only that amount of fish required by the stipulated ratio. Consequently, excess catches made on any one day would be sold through the regular channels to balance those days when the quota is not met. The whole purpose of distributing the oil is to make possible the sale of more fish at low prices.

As soon as this fact is made plain to all of the fishermen as well as the local associations and shipping bodies in the ports, the large amount of fish represented by the difference be-

0065

tween that required for the fuel oil ratio and that actually caught will also be distributed at a reasonable price through the regular channels.

49. An example of the manner in which the fish has been distributed is expressed by the following table, which shows the proportion of fish that was allotted to the Central Federation in fullfillment of the quota for the port of Ito, Shizuoka Ken, on 13 January. It will be noted that after the amount of fish allocated to the Central Federation was sold at the regulated price, the balance of the day's receipts was sold at a free price.

ALLOCATION OF FRESH FISH
Ito, Shizuoka Ken, 13 January 1946

Species	Total Deliveries (Kan) a/	Allocation to Central Federation (Kan)	(Price per Kan)	Allocation to Local Retailers (Kan)	(Price per Kan)
Horse mackerel	1000	500	¥ 20	500	¥ 50
Squid	4000	2000	15	2000	35

a/ One Kan - 8.27 pounds.

SOURCE: Ito Fisherman's Cooperative Association.

50. There is still considerable black-market activity at the fishing ports. The black-market supply of fuel will soon be exhausted. With the perfection of the "link" system, or allocation of oil only upon delivery of fish, the black market at the ports will cease except for sales by operators of small non-powered boats that fish from small villages. These fishermen will always be a source of trouble for the legal channels and will require close control.

51. The controlled distribution of fuel has not completely eliminated the ills of the fish distribution and rationing system in the large consuming areas where the black market still flourishes.

52. At a recent meeting of the Fishermens' Union the officers voted in favor of a resolution asking for the immediate dissolution of the Central Federation. The union did not offer a remedy for the ills of the present distribution system.

53. A further example of the necessity of a practical plan to control the price of all fish instead of just that which is received through the "link" system is the wide disparity between prices paid in Tokyo for fish which is exchanged for oil allotments and fish from other sources. The amounts landed and prices paid are shown in the accompanying tables.

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PRICES OF FRESH FISH

Tokyo Public Market, 1 January to 20 January 1946
(Average price per kilogram)

Species	Public Market Price		Retail Price	
	Linked with Fuel Oil	Not Linked with Fuel Oil	Linked with Fuel Oil	Not Linked with Fuel Oil
Sardine	¥ 3.79	¥ 9.34	¥ 4.16	¥ 11.20
Tuna	-	59.55	-	71.46
Squid	4.32	12.06	5.18	14.47
Yellowtail	10.66	24.53	12.79	29.43
Cod	3.46	5.60	4.15	6.72
Kichiji a	2.66	6.73	3.19	8.07
Mackerel	5.97	15.46	7.16	18.55

a/ A species of rockfish.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Bureau of Fisheries.

DISTRIBUTION OF FRESH FISH FISH AND SHELLFISH

Tokyo Public Market, 1 January to 20 January 1946

	Total Quantity Distributed (Metric tons)
Fish, linked with fuel oil	169.15
Fish, not linked with fuel oil	992.42
Shellfish	38.09
Total	1199.66

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Bureau of Fisheries.

The average daily per capita purchase was 16.7 grams.

54. In Yokohama about 56 percent of the fish landings are handled by the local fishermen's association. Many fishermen prefer to deliver their catches to the association at lower prices since it is only through the association that they can obtain legal fuel and extra rice rations. About 14 percent is sold to the fish control company which pays higher prices although it does not distribute oil and rice. The remaining catches are sold to the black market.

Retailers in the Yokohama area, as elsewhere, fail to adhere to the maximum commission allowance of 20 percent. Excessive profiteering is prevalent with retail commissions ranging as high as 60 percent.

FISHERIES PRODUCTION

Current Fishing Conditions

55. More fish is reaching the consumer than has been the case

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for many months. One small area reports greater catches than have ever been made before, but reports from most localities are more modest.

56. Several factors contribute toward an improvement in fishing conditions. More fuel oil is being made available to fishermen; demobilization of Japanese armed forces has allowed many former fishermen to return to their occupation; the boatyards have completed repairs on large numbers of damaged vessels; mine sweeping operations continue to remove hazards to fishing; the high prices which prevail are an inducement to increased activity.

Although the high prices are a boon to the fishermen they prevent the masses of the population from purchasing fish so that distribution is not on an equitable basis. Transportation difficulties hinder distribution to the larger cities.

57. Many prefectures reported that bad weather held down their catches but landings of fresh fish have continued at a satisfactory level. The trend of catches in six representative prefectures located in widely separated parts of Japan is shown in the accompany table.

FISH LANDINGS FOR SIX REPRESENTATIVE PERFECTURES OF JAPAN

19 November to 30 December 1945
(in pounds)

Prefecture	Nov 19-25	Nov 26-Dec 2	Dec 3-9
Aomori	1,791,632	1,806,504	1,654,177
Iwate	3,792,734	4,719,018	6,351,056
Chiba	100,245	363,287	822,279
Niigata	610,633	258,203	255,284
Hyogo	364,169	494,407	177,266
Oita	451,816	376,396	499,839
Total	7,111,229	8,016,815	9,759,901
	Dec 10-16	Dec 17-23	Dec 24-30
Aomori	1,479,404	1,620,604	3,035,725
Iwate	4,269,922	3,523,132	2,350,192
Chiba	374,643	342,584	762,225
Niigata	173,003	121,987	156,236
Hyogo	103,387	153,212	317,014
Oita	538,884	219,712	388,474
Total	6,939,243	5,986,231	7,009,866

SOURCE: Bureau of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

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Stockpiles of Processed Marine Products

58. Because Japanese fishing activities were seriously hampered during the latter stages of the war, no significant stockpiles of processed marine products were accumulated.

59. No stocks of fish meal are available for export at present. All the fish meal which can be produced is needed in Japan for food and fertilizer. During the present food shortage fish meal is required as an ingredient in flour.

60. No fish livers nor fish liver oil are available for export although a small surplus may be expected before the end of 1946. Large quantities of vitamins A and D, which are derived from fish livers, will be required by the Japanese people.

61. Present stocks of whale oil in Japan amount to only 336 metric tons, according to the Bureau of Fisheries. As Japan is short of supplies of both animal and vegetable oil, it will not be possible to export any whale oil at present.

The most important uses of whale oil in Japan are in the manufacture of soap and glycerin and as a fuel in place of diesel oil. Recent experiments proved the practicability of using whale oil in manufacturing margarine for cooking purposes. This use will be expanded in the future because of the lack of vegetable oils and fish oil.

62. Approximately 6,000 metric tons of canned seafood held in storage will help to alleviate the shortage of food.

HOLDINGS OF CANNED SEAFOOD
(30 December 1945)

Species	Cases a/
Salmon	171,117
Sardine	17,939
Tuna	14,574
Mackerel	6,148
Other fish	9,004
Whale meat	12,039
Crab meat	10,000
Total	240,821

a/ 48 pounds each.

SOURCE: Canned Goods Control Company.

63. Total salted fish stocks in Japan as of 30 December 1945 were 2,871 metric tons.

Cold storage Holdings in Japan on 30 December 1945

0069.

were 2,871 metric tons.

Cold storage holdings in Japan on 30 December 1945 amounted to 9,034 metric tons. Of these stocks, 8,191 tons were frozen fish and 843 tons were iced fresh fish. Figures were supplied by the Bureau of Fisheries.

FISHING AREAS

64. Japan's bid for world domination by strength of arms was preceded by an equally determined bid for supremacy in the field of worldwide fisheries. Japanese fishing vessels operated at great distances from the Home Islands, exploiting the fisheries of half the world as indicated on Map No. 6. As World War II reached its climax Japanese fishermen were driven from some areas but conducted operations in every available region until forced to retreat.

Much of the production of the overseas fisheries went to foreign markets. In many cases the sale of the fish taken in the heavily subsidized operations provided credit for the purchase of war material abroad. In conducting these fisheries the Japanese learned much about the waters in which they fished which proved useful in waging war. The large vessels and experienced crews of the overseas fishing fleet played important parts as components of the Imperial Navy.

65. At the time that the overseas operations were being conducted, fishing in home waters was providing enough fish for domestic consumption. The restricted area now authorized for Japanese fishing operations (see map) is adequate to meet present domestic food needs and at the same time safeguard security.

SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

66. Because of the extreme importance of fish in the economy of Japan, the Japanese Government has placed a great deal of emphasis on fisheries education and research.

Nearly every prefecture with fishery interests supports one or more Prefectural Fisheries Schools (Kenritsu Suisan Gakko). These schools are designed primarily to give training in practical fisheries matters, although theory and science subjects are also included in the curriculum.

Students who have completed the regular elementary or trade schools are eligible to enter the prefectural fisheries schools. Most of these schools continued to operate during the war and during the occupation with even greater student bodies than before Japan embarked on the Greater East Asia War.

Wakayama and Shimane Prefectures have announced the opening of new fisheries schools since the occupation. Another is currently being requested for Hiroshima Prefecture.

67. Two fisheries colleges exist in Japan. The Hakodate Fisheries College, in the city of Hakodate, Hokkaido, operates under the Ministry of Education. The Imperial Fisheries Institute in Tokyo is one of the few schools in Japan free from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. It operates under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Graduates of the prefectural fisheries schools or the middle schools are eligible to enter the fisheries colleges. The colleges teach such subjects as biology, chemistry and oceanography, as well as such practical subjects as seamanship and fishing vessel design.

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JAPANESE FISHING A

PRE-WAR AND POST-W



NOTE: AREA IN RED DENOTES POST-WAR FISHING AREA 0071 ½

FISHING AREAS
AND POST-WAR



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Graduates of the colleges are qualified to fill positions as government civil servants in fisheries, as cannery managers, master fishermen, research scientists or teachers according to the courses taken. Some courses take three years to finish, others five years.

Since 1941 both colleges have accepted more students than before. The two colleges together graduate between 200 and 300 students annually.

68. Recently the Japan Fishermen's Union has presented a request to the Ministry of Education for the establishment of a third fisheries college. This college is to be situated in Kyushu, thus making this level of fisheries education more easily available to prospective students in the south of Japan.

69. Three of the seven Imperial Universities in Japan Proper have fisheries departments in the faculties of Agriculture. These universities are the Hokkaido Imperial University in Sapporo, the Tokyo Imperial University and the Kyushu Imperial University at Fukuoka.

These universities give the highest level of fisheries training in theory and practice which is available in the country. A three-year course leads to the degree of Suisangakushi, about the equivalent of a master's degree. Graduate schools in fisheries are also provided. These lead to the Hakushi or doctor's degree.

Each of these universities graduated about 10 students a year prior to the war. Under a wartime accelerated educational program the number of entering and graduating students was doubled. The present number of students is at the wartime level.

Research Stations

70. One hundred twelve government-supported fisheries and marine products research stations and branch stations operate in Japan Proper. The Japanese Government supports a Central Imperial Fisheries Experimental Station in Tokyo. This station has six branch stations situated strategically throughout the country.

Forty-three of the 47 prefectures, including Okinawa, have research and experimental stations doing biological and technological research in fisheries. Some of these stations have one or more branch stations within the prefecture for special problems.

71. In addition there are about 12 marine biological stations which are associated with other universities and colleges. Several research laboratories are privately operated by the large fishing companies and at least one station is financed by a philanthropic industrialist interested in furthering pure research in marine biology.

SECTION 2

FORESTRY AND MINING

C O N T E N T S

1. Charcoal remains the principal fuel for cooking and heating in Japan. Lumber and plywood are basic materials upon which reconstruction is dependent. Shortages of certain critical items are adversely affecting the production of these commodities.

2. With the increase of coal production in January, and the prospect of further rise shown by revised quotas announced by the Japanese Coal Board for the first quarter of 1946, mining and cement production should improve.

3. While no petroleum exploration is being done at present, subsidies proposed by the Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the fiscal year 1946 - 1947 in the amount of ¥ 6,400,000 are designed to encourage prospecting for oil. This is part of the plan of expending ¥ 16,000,000 during the next two fiscal years in subsidizing the drilling of 100 wells.

FORESTRY

CLIMATIC TIMBER ZONES

4. The effect of climate and elevation upon the distribution of original forest types on the four main islands of Japan is shown in Chart No. 7.

The warm regions of Kyushu below 850 meters, Shikoku below 750 meters, and southern Honshu below 500 meters and south of 36° north latitude were covered originally by evergreen hardwood forest, consisting of such species as oak, chestnut, camphor, Zelkowa, Paulownia, and the coniferous species, red pine, black pine, fir, hemlock and Cryptomeria. Bamboo grows abundantly in this region.

The temperate regions of Kyushu above 850 meters, Shikoku between 750 and 1800 meters, central Honshu below 1400 meters,

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northern Honshu below 1000 meters, and Hokkaido below 500 meters and south of 43°30' north latitude were forested originally with deciduous hardwoods consisting of such species as beech, oak, maple, ash, chestnut, elm, cherry and such conifers as cedar, Cryptomeria, red pine, black pine, larch, fir, spruce and hemlock. Bamboo also grows well here.

The cold regions of Shikoku above 1800 meters, southern and central Honshu above 1400 meters, northern Honshu above 1000 meters and Hokkaido north of 43°30' north latitude were covered originally by conifers, fir, spruce, larch, yew and such hardwoods as birch, alder, aspen and willow.

5. Most of these areas have been cut over and planted several times, principally to Cryptomeria, cedar and red and black pine, so that the original forest types are not necessarily present on the ground as shown on the map.

CURRENT CHARCOAL SITUATION

6. Critical shortages of charcoal exist in urban areas, particularly Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry planned to furnish these three cities about 160,000 metric tons in the fiscal year 1945 - 1946. Only 70,000 metric tons or less than half the required amount were provided.

7. Approximately 84,000 metric tons of charcoal are stockpiled in prefectures but as shown in Chart No. 8 only a small part of this is available for use in the large cities. Much of it is needed or held by prefectures for local use and transportation difficulties prevent the ready flow of this bulky commodity from producing to consuming areas. The prefectures which have surpluses of charcoal are distant from large cities.

8. Production of charcoal declined from 1,071,056 metric tons in 1944 to 730,720 metric tons in 1945, a drop of 32 percent, as indicated by the following table. Estimates of the Japanese for production of charcoal for the first three months of 1946 are also shown.

CHARCOAL PRODUCTION
(in metric tons)

Forest District	1944 a/	1945 a/	1946 Jan. - Mar.(incl) b/
Hokkaido	78,798	57,873	33,727
Tohuku	252,537	190,357	121,743
Kanto & Shinetsu	152,569	111,106	117,194
Tokai & Hokuriku	128,822	87,893	59,807
Kinki	65,181	53,625	63,375
Chugoku	178,523	101,661	95,739
Shikoku	76,805	46,930	62,170
Kyushu	137,821	81,275	105,525
Total	1,069,356	730,720	659,280

a/ Calendar year
b/ Estimate

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 26 Dec 1945.

0074

TIMBER — CLIMATIC TYPE





LEGEND: ZONE 1, COLD ZONE 2, TEMPERATE ZONE 3, WARM

SOURCE: CASA, PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CALIF. AUG. 1945

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C TYPE ZONES – JAPAN





HONSHU HOKKAIDO

ZONE 3, WARM

0075 2/2

JANUARY 46 GHQ·SCAP NUMBER 7



SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, 26 DEC 1945

0076 1/2


T III – KANTO
DUCTION
OCKPILES
DISTRICT I – HOKKAIDO
PRODUCTION
METRIC TONS
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
STOCKPILE
HOKKAIDO
DISTRICT II – TOHOKU
PRODUCTION
METRIC TONS
550,000
500,000
450,000
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
STOCKPILES
AOMORI
IWATE
YAMAGATA
FUKUSHIMA
TOCHIGI
NAGANO
I
II
III
IV
V
DISTRICT VII – SHIKOKU
PRODUCTION
METRIC TONS
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
STOCKPILES
TOKUSHIMA
KOCHI
EHIME
LEGEND
PRODUCTION 1944
ACTUAL PRODUCTION 1945
UNREALIZED BALANCE OF PLAN FOR 1945 PRODUCTION
FUTURE ESTIMATED PRODUCTION JAN–MAR 1946
STOCKPILE ON 26 DEC 1945 1,000 METRIC TONS
CHARCOAL
PRODUCTION BY DISTRICTS AND STOCKPILES BY MAJOR PRODUCING PREFECTURES
JAPAN 0076
JANUARY 46 GHQ·SCAP NUMBER 8

9. The Japanese Government's goal of supplying one bale (15 kg) of charcoal to each family in Japan each month is not being attained. At present only 35 percent of the required amount is being delivered to consuming areas. Although firewood is used to supplement charcoal, both firewood and charcoal are meeting only 50 percent of minimum requirements.

10. Charcoal production is a seasonal occupation and normally reaches its peak in the months of November to March. During the last three months of 1944, 404,000 metric tons of charcoal were produced. This figure dropped to 191,000 metric tons during the last three months of 1945.

According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the reduced production was caused by lack of food for charcoal workers and lack of transportation for the finished product. The charcoal producers add a third reason in the low price they are receiving for charcoal. One worker stated that he nets three yen per bale of charcoal. He and his wife produce three bales per day which provides a joint income of nine yen per day.

Workers generally agree that lack of food is the biggest block to production. In spite of food bonuses, the average worker is subsisting on much less than his normal amount of food. Since charcoal production requires strenuous physical exertion, this smaller ration of food is immediately reflected in the amount of charcoal produced. Many charcoal workers have left their kilns to work on farms where they have a much better chance of getting food.

11. Officials of the ministry, prefectural charcoal inspectors and charcoal workers all agree that the charcoal production situation is slowly improving. In December 20 carloads of charcoal were received in Tokyo daily. This figure increased to 30 carloads per day in January, and from present indications will reach 45 carloads per day in February. Minimum requirements are 75 carloads daily.

The Tokyo supply of charcoal is being supplemented by 40 carloads of firewood. This is an improvement over December when 20 carloads were received daily.

LUMBER PRODUCTION, STOCKPILES AND NEEDS

12. The monthly production of logs from 1930 to 1940 averaged 500,000,000 board feet and was increased to a peak of 600,000,000 board feet during the war. The principal use was for lumber, veneer, poles, mine timbers, railroad cross-ties and pulp.

Lumber production increased from an average of about 250,000,000 board feet per month during 1930-1940 to a wartime high of 417,000,000 board feet per month.

To obtain this relatively high rate of production Japan over-cut its forests, cut the most readily accessible timber, and caused its machinery to become worn out.

13. In September 1945 production based on normal pre-war years was only 44 percent for logs and 66 percent for lumber. By December 1945 production of logs had declined further to about 40 percent of pre-war levels.

Lumber production in December had increased to 67 percent of normal as a result of an attempt by the Japanese to convert as many of the logs as possible into lumber at the expense of other

0077

forest products. Even at 67 percent of normal production Japan is only manufacturing 167,000,000 board feet of lumber per month or about 2,000,000,000 board feet yearly.

14. Stockpiles of logs and lumber have declined almost to the vanishing point. In December according to the Bureau of Forestry total stocks of lumber amounted to only 127,000,000 board feet and represented a decline of 36 percent since 1 November. Stocks are so small that practically all lumber is now used green as soon as it is sawed.

With reduced production of lumber and practically no stocks, Japan is in no position to embark upon a large scale home-building program. According to Japanese sources 4,000,000 homes are needed. To build these, at least 10,000,000,000 board feet of lumber are required. This figure presupposes that only the 216 square feet rehabilitation house, which requires 2,400 board feet of lumber, will be constructed.

15. How this lumber is to be provided poses one of Japan's big problems in domestic production. Based on the present rate of production of 2,000,000,000 board feet per year of all sawed products, and on the assumption that all lumber or sawed products could be used for home building, five years would be required to provide the necessary lumber.

PLYWOOD

16. Plywood is one of Japan's most important forest products. From 1940 to 1945, most plywood produced went into airplanes, boats and other war material. Now plywood is urgently needed for peace-time uses. The majority is going into building construction.

Most plywood is of three-ply construction but it is sometimes made up into five and seven-ply where strength is needed for special uses.

Maximum production was reached in 1941 when 600,000,000 square feet were made. Present annual capacity is 240,000,000 square feet. Production is far below capacity, being about 8,000,000 square feet per month.

Planned production for the first three months of 1946 is only 7,000,000 square feet per month or about 35 percent of capacity. About one-half of the production is expected to come from Hokkaido.

Stockpiles of plywood have dwindled to almost nothing. At the end of 1945, only 4,000,000 square feet of plywood were in stock. This is one-half of one month's production. Three-fourths of the present stocks are in Hokkaido. Many difficulties are encountered in shipping plywood from Hokkaido to war-stricken areas where this material is urgently needed.

Estimated production figures for January to June 1946 are shown in the following table and Chart No. 9. All figures on plywood production are based on three-ply (three sheets of veneer bonded together with crossed grain).

0078



PLYWOOD

PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILES BY DISTRICTS

JAPAN

0079

JANUARY 46 GHQ·SCAP NUMBER 9

PLYWOOD

PRODUCTION AND REQUIRED MATERIALS FOR INCREASED PRODUCTION
Jan - June 1946

	Jan-March 1946	April-June 1946	Total
Planned production with available materials (1000 sq. ft.)	22,575	13,043	35,618
Additional production if materials available (1000 sq. ft.)	37,845	47,377	85,252
Materials required for increased production (metric tons)			
Soy beans	870	1,090	1,960
Silicate of soda	321	403	724
Caustic soda	32	40	72
Kraft packing paper	22	28	50
Special dextrine	4.5	5.7	10.2
Japanese glue	20.8	26.1	46.9

SOURCE: Bureau of Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

CRITICAL ITEMS IN FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES

17. Certain items are urgently needed by all forest products industries to increase production. Shortages of food and warm clothing, and lack of adequate transportation retarded activities in this field.

18. Transportation facilities were relatively poor from the tree to the consumer. In Hokkaido, the "woodyard of Japan", a scarcity of rails prevented the extension of the narrow-gauge railroads into merchantable timber stands; a scarcity of horses and feed for horses cut down the number of logs that could be skidded to the railhead; a shortage of locomotives, freight cars, coal and efficient handlers delayed movement of the products to the ports; a scarcity of ships curtailed the amount of products that could be brought from Hokkaido, where a surplus existed, to Honshu, where forest products were critically needed.

19. Specific shortages are noted for each industry. In sawmills, saw blades, motors, belts, grindstones and lubricants are needed. In the pulp and paper industry shortages are apparent in fiber, coal, grinder stones, metal screens, electrical motors, felts, machinery, replacement parts and lubricants.

In the veneer and plywood industry glue, soda, dextrine and Kraft paper are needed, in addition to motors, machinery parts and lubricants. One shortage which the veneer industry recently overcame was the need for lathe knives. These were furnished by Germany during the war, but now are made by Japanese plants which formerly manufactured Samurai swords.

0080

Even in a relatively simple activity like the distribution of charcoal, shortages peculiar to the industry such as that of rice-straw packages appear.

20. The larger forest products industries are having difficulty in coordinating various parts of their plants. Efficiency during the war was sacrificed by scattering parts of the large plants to prevent complete loss in event of bombing. Now the companies are trying to consolidate their machinery and re-establish production-line methods. Former sources of supplies to Japan's forest industries are closed. Imports of pulp from Karafuto, of veneer logs from the Philippines, and of machinery from the United States are no longer made.

Because of the shortages mentioned above, Japan's prospects for increasing her production of lumber, plywood, pulp and charcoal are exceedingly poor for the immediate future. It is expected that natural readjustment trends will cause a slight increase in production as a result of more efficient utilization of existing facilities of manufacture, transportation and distribution.

WOOD PULP AND PAPER

21. Prior to the war Japan imported a large portion of her wood pulp, but the difficulty of getting imported pulp during and after the war led to development of a large pulp industry in Hokkaido and Karafuto. Expansion of the rayon pulp industry was especially rapid. Production of rayon pulp grew from 3,620 metric tons in 1932 to a high of 297,000 metric tons in 1941. Imports of this type of pulp also increased rapidly reaching a maximum of 296,000 metric tons in 1937.

22. Average production of paper and paperboard for the Japanese Empire from 1935 to 1940 was about 1,274,000 metric tons and for Japan Proper about 1,092,000 metric tons. Average per capita consumption was about 30 pounds or approximately 10 percent of that of the United States.

Capacity to produce paper before the bombing attacks is illustrated by 1941 results when the Japanese Empire produced 1,516,000 metric tons and Japan Proper, 1,280,000 metric tons. An estimated one-thifd of this capacity was lost by bombing. Current production is well below estimated present capacity.

23. Pulp production capacity in Japan before the bombing raids is typified by actual production for the year 1941:

PULP PRODUCTION IN JAPAN FOR 1941
(metric tons)

	Japanese Empire	Japan Proper
Rayon pulp	265,000	199,000
Chemical pulp	614,000	247,000
Mechanical pulp	420,000	373,000
Total	1,299,000	819,000

SOURCE: Oji Paper Mfg. Co.

According to the Japanese authorities bombing reduced the pulp-making capacity of Japan Proper by about one-fourth.

0081

24. About 35 percent of the pulp producing capacity of pre-war Japan was located outside of Japan Proper. Of the rayon pulp produced by the Empire in 1941 almost one-third was made in Karafuto and Korea, sources now lost to Japan. These facts, coupled with loss of imports, show that the paper and dissolving pulp industries (such as rayon) have been drastically reduced. While bomb damage is appreciable, some paper machines now in operating condition are shut down for lack of pulp or are running at reduced rates to conserve small remaining stocks. Some machines are unable to run because of lack of coal.

25. Paper is therefore a scarce commodity and no great amount of surplus stocks is known to exist. Production has fallen off rapidly; it is now only a fraction of what Japan considers her civilian needs. The same situation is true of rayon pulp for textile production. One of the more important obstacles to increased production is the shortage of fibrous raw material. Other serious contributing factors would include shortages of coal, labor, transportation and machine parts.

MINING AND GEOLOGY

COAL

Production

26. Preliminary reports on coal production in January indicate a total of 1,187,300 metric tons, or 41 percent higher than December production; which in turn was 53 percent higher than November. The latter month had the lowest production of the century. The details of production changes in the fiscal year of 1945 - 1946 are shown on Chart No. 10.

January production suffered from the three-day celebration of the New Year holidays, but the daily rate of production has continued to rise as rapidly as it did in December.

27. December production was 26 percent above the quota. On this basis and in response to an order from SCAP, the Japanese Government, through the Coal Board, presented a revision of the coal production quotas for January, February and March 1946:

0082



NOTE: NOVEMBER, DECEMBER AND JANUARY FIGURES ARE ESTIMATED

COAL PRODUCTION BY DISTRICTS

BY TEN DAY PERIODS

JAPAN

0083

JANUARY 46

GHQ-SCAP

NUMBER 10

COAL PRODUCTION QUOTAS
(metric tons)

Month	Original Quota	Revised Quota	Capacity a/
Jan	990,000	1,050,000	1,200,000
Feb	1,050,000	1,100,000	1,500,000
Mar	1,250,000	1,400,000	2,000,000

a/ Estimate by SCAP, 31 December 1945.

28. Field investigations revealed that Kyushu promises to produce 1,000,000 metric tons in March, instead of 780,000 metric tons scheduled by the Coal Board.

29. The number of mine employees increased from 232,310 at the end of December to 261,684 at the end of January and absenteeism decreased from 26 percent to 18 percent. Many more skilled workers are needed to re-open haulage ways and working places which slumped for lack of maintenance last fall when Koreans and Chinese ex-miners were hindering Japanese activity.

According to the Coal Association only 40 percent of wartime working places are now accessible. This would suggest a present capacity of at least 1,500,000 tons; probably 2,000,000 metric tons could be attained within three months if all desired underground laborers were at work.

30. At present the greatest stimulus to coal production is the increased food ration. In January the miner's war-time ration was restored, but its effectiveness is somewhat weakened by the natural tendency of the miner to divide his portion with his family.

31. The present selling price of coal is fixed by the Japanese Government to average ¥ 58 per metric ton at the mines, but actual cost of production is reported by the Coal Association to average ¥ 256.

The Japanese Government advocates making up the difference by continuing the subsidy system. The Coal Association has estimated that at that rate the coal subsidy total would be ¥ 3,981,000,000 in the fiscal year of 1946 - 1947.

Stockpiles

32. Preliminary reports on coal stockpiles in the hands of producers and the Nippon Sekitan Company, national coal distributing agency, showed a drop of 395,000 metric tons from 2,211,000 metric tons on 31 December 1945 to 1,816,000 tons on 31 January 1946. Additional data are shown on the accompanying table and Chart No. 11.

33. Certain factors indicate that there is some doubt as to the accuracy of current stockpile figures and an inventory is being made for verification.

0084



COAL STOCKPILES BY DISTRICTS

FISCAL YEAR-1945

JAPAN

0085

JANUARY 46

GHQ·SCAP

NUMBER 11

STOCKPILES OF COAL IN JAPAN PROPER 1945-1946
(1000 metric tons)

Date	Hokkaido	Honshu and Shikoku	Kyushu	Total	Percentage of Change
Mar 31	2090	307	1634	4031	
Apr 30	1870	296	1646	3812	- 5
May 31	1750	298	1762	3810	-
Jun 30	1747	326	1963	4036	+ 6
Jul 31	1738	314	2061	4113	+ 2
Aug 31	1517	344	2234	4095	-
Sep 30	1270	318	2143	3731	- 9
Oct 31	1046	294	1847	3187	-15
Nov 30 b/	921	263	1554	2738	-14
Dec 31 b/	761	292	1158	2211	-19
Jan 31 b/	662	263	889	1814	-18
Dec 10 b/	814 a/	345	1379 a/	2538 a/	
20 b/	761 a/	335	1242 a/	2338 a/	- 8
31 b/	761	292	1158	2211	- 5
Jan 10 b/	735	265	1049	2049	- 7
20 b/	714	280	971	1965	- 4
31 b/	662	263	889	1814	- 7

a/ Revision of preliminary figures submitted last month.
b/ Reports for the last three months are incomplete.

SOURCE: Japanese Coal Control Association.

Consumption

34. Although true figures for coal consumption since October are not yet available, current allotment plans give an indication of the present situation.

COAL ALLOTMENTS
(1000 metric tons)

Dec	1,066
Jan	1,321
Feb	1,491

SOURCE: Coal Bureau, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

35. Comparison of recent coal production and allotment figures shows a planned withdrawal from stockpiles that is far less than the actual reported decline in stockpiles. Much of this is probably the result of a re-appraisal of inaccurate, inflated stockpile inventories.

MINERALS AND METALS

Nonferrous Metal Industries

36. Pertinent data on a number of nonferrous smelting and refining industries are given in the following table. On 1 January 1946, 11,400 men were employed by industries covered in the table.

0086

NONFERROUS METAL INDUSTRIES
January 1946

	No. of Plants In Operation	Total	Production (metric tons) Dec a/	Jan b/	Capacity (tons/month)	Stock (metric tons) Ore/Concentrate	Metal
Copper Smelting	4	14	370	500	12,672	241,000	1,620
Copper Refining	3	12	150	400	9,665	c/	3,550
Zinc Refining	4	8	856	1000	7,035	24,100	5,960
Lead Refining	3	5	155	130	3,650	3,060	4,100
Tin Refining	0	1	0	0	50	0	0
Nickel Refining	0	2	0	36	320	0	153
Antimony Refining	0	3	0	13	70	2,100	43

a/ Estimated in part.
b/ Estimated.
c/ Not covered.

SOURCE: Bureau of Mines, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Zinc and Lead

37. Japanese production of zinc and lead is closely related since the major proportion of both metals is recovered from the same ore. Average ratio of zinc to lead in the ore is about 5 to 1. Japan uses approximately the same quantity of each of these metals. The apparent annual average consumption of zinc for period 1925-1929 was 50,852 metric tons, and of lead 56,856 metric tons.

Domestic production of zinc in the future should be about adequate for home needs but domestically produced lead will be inadequate. The maximum attainable production of zinc and lead for the coming fiscal year as estimated by the Bureau of Mines, is 35,000 tons of zinc and 8,500 tons of lead. These figures are probably considerably higher than actual production will be.

38. Around 1938 approximately 70 percent of the lead and zinc production of Japan came from the Kamioka Mine, and a large part of the remainder from the Hosokura Mine. The rest was by-product from copper and gold-silver mining.

During the war a large number of zinc-lead mines was opened and operated on a subsidy basis. Most of these are now closed and will not reopen because of the submarginal grade of the ore. Zinc-lead mine production reached a peak in 1943 when ore containing 93,316 metric tons of zinc and 22,706 metric tons of lead was mined.

According to Bureau of Mines figures, refinery production reached a peak for zinc in 1943 when 61,473 metric tons were produced and for lead in 1944 when 34,929 metric tons were produced. The rated zinc refinery capacity for 1944 was 178,600 tons. Approximately 52 percent of zinc produced in the last few years was electrolytically refined and had an average purity of 99.98 percent; the remaining 48 percent was distilled and had an average purity of 98.7 percent. Rated lead refinery capacity for 1944 was 53,800 metric tons.

0087

Copper

39. Copper is the only metal of which Japan has an adequate supply within the Home Islands. In 1936 she produced about five percent of the world's supply. Japan was a substantial exporter of copper until 1933 when the policy of great expansion of Japanese industries for war preparation began to take effect. After 1932 the only important movement of copper out of the Home Islands was to Japanese-occupied territory except for one shipment of 1,820 tons to Germany in 1940.

Charts No. 12, No. 13 and No. 14 indicate the essential features of Japan's copper industry.

Ferro-alloys

40. The supply of ores of ferro-alloy metals in the Home Islands is: chromium, moderate; manganese, poor; tungsten, slight; nickel, vanadium and molybdenum, extremely small.

41. Chart No. 15 illustrates Japan's progress in becoming independent of heavy imports of manganese ore, although the chart itself does not tell the whole story. Japan is strongly deficient in manganese ores of normal commercial grade and her accomplishment during the war in securing a large supply of manganese is remarkable. This was done by mining extremely low-grade ore; the balanced average grade of all ore mined in 1944 was about 31 percent.

42. The great expansion of the ferro-alloy industry is indicated by chart No. 16. Japan has electric furnace capacity in excess of that necessary for a peacetime steel industry.

CEMENT

43. The cement industry developed to such a degree that Japan was a substantial exporter. The chief raw materials are available in adequate amounts. Limestone, the main requirement, is not a common rock in Japan but substantial deposits do occur in a number of places and supplies are adequate. Coal resources, a major requirement for cement manufacture, are widely distributed and abundant.

Gypsum is a minor, although essential, requirement and was largely imported before the war. During the period from 1942 to 1945 a substantial amount of low grade gypsum was produced. Although most of this material is not suitable for higher-grade uses, it is satisfactory for use in making cement.

It now appears that supply is sufficient to meet demands of the cement industry; it is even possible that gypsum of a grade suitable for cement may be available for export. Such material is urgently needed by the cement industry of the Philippines.

Controls

44. All production and distribution of cement in Japan is controlled by the Portland Cement Control Association in cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Prices are fixed by the ministry on recommendation of the Control Association.

Distribution and Ownership of Factories

45. Cement factories are well distributed throughout Japan. Of a total of 37 there are two on Hokkaido, 22 on Honshu, one on Shikoku and 12 on Kyushu, as shown in Chart No. 17.


MITSUBISHI OSAKA
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TAKEHARA
NIKKO
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KYUSHU

0089 ½



SOURCE: BASIC MATERIALS DIVISION, U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
DATA IN METRIC TONS FROM JAPANESE MINING BUREAU

NOTES : DATA FOR 1945 INDICATES CAPACITY
M.T. = METRIC TONS

COPPER

PRODUCTION BY PRINCIPAL REFINERIES

JAPAN 0089 2/2

JANUARY 46 GHQ·SCAP NUMBER 12


REFINED COPPER PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, EX
METRIC TONS
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
LEGEND
PRODUCTION
IMPORTS
EXPORTS
APPARENT CONSUMPTION
*APPARENT CONSUMPTION

0090 ½


N, IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND CONSUMPTION
34
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946


MITSUBISHI
SHINSHIMOKAWA
METRIC TONS
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
FURUKAWA
ASHIO
OSARIZAWA
KUNE
IKUNO
IIMORI
AKENABE
MAKIMINE
OKUKI
BESSHI
MIKAMITANI
KUNO
KISHIO
ASHI
SAKUMA
IRUKA
ASAUTSU
HIIHAMA
ISOZAKI
KITAKATA

0091 ½