

Hospitals in Japan, including Army and Navy facilities now available for civilian use, total approximately 3,335 with 356,143 beds. On 15 September 1945 an estimated 248,126 Army, Navy and civilian patients were hospitalized.

Hospitals in Japan during September 1945 were operating at approximately two-thirds of total capacity. The Japanese hospital capacity is adequate and their professional personnel is ample at present. Weekly hospital strength reports show little change in the number of persons hospitalized.

VETERINARY AFFAIRS

15. A survey of animal disease control and meat and dairy inspection in Japan, conducted immediately after surrender, revealed the fact that the war had curtailed such activities almost to the point where they were nearly non-existent in many parts of the country. There are four government veterinary laboratories where sera, vaccines and biologicals were manufactured for all types of animals.

Governmental Organization

16. Veterinary affairs in Japan are administered by two ministries. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry through the Animal Husbandry Section administers animal disease control, port quarantine and licensing of veterinarians and through the Veterinary Laboratory Section has administrative control of experimentation, manufacture of biologicals and diagnosis.

The Ministry of Health and Welfare contains the Preventive Medicine Division. The Veterinary Hygiene Section of this Division is responsible for meat and dairy inspection.

Animal Industry

17. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry reports the number of animals (1944 census) to the nearest thousand:

Horses	1,191,000
Cattle	2,403,000
Swine	310,000
Sheep	181,000
Goats	252,000
Rabbits	3,227,000
Poultry	22,879,000

Animal Disease Control

18. The Japanese Government has been directed to establish measures for the control of animal diseases; preserve all statistical records on animal diseases; and submit an immediate report of each initial case of anthrax, black leg, and foot and mouth disease. It will submit a monthly statistical report of all animal diseases by prefecture; an annual report on the results of examination for bovine tuberculosis; and an annual report on the preparation and distribution of veterinary sera, vaccines and biologicals.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry reports communicable diseases for the period of 1 January to 31 October 1945 as follows:

<u>Disease</u>	<u>Outbreaks</u>	<u>Cases</u>
Blackleg	3	5
Anthrax	11	25
Texas Fever	3	61
Swine Cholera	9	519
Swine Erysipelas	3	25
Swine Plague	9	352
Scabies	2	9
Bovine Inf. Abortion	17	937
Fowl Pest	1	685
White Diarrhea, chicks	19	13,109

Tuberculosis eradication in dairy cattle showed 3 percent affected in 1942, date of last report.

Meat and Dairy Inspection

19. The Japanese Government has been directed to inaugurate or reestablish measures for the inspection of meat, meat food or dairy products; preserve all statistical records on meat, meat food or dairy inspection; and submit a monthly milk and meat inspection report by prefecture. The Ministry of Health and Welfare reports as follows (1941 figures):

Slaughter Houses	712
Cattle slaughtered	382,340
Calves slaughtered	35,817
Sheep slaughtered	5,317
Goats slaughtered	12,035
Swine slaughtered	603,180
Horses slaughtered	36,415
Number cattle condemned	
Ante Mortem	51
Post Mortem	
Total carcasses	147
Partial carcass	4,702
Viscera only	73,667
Number swine condemned	
Ante Mortem	127
Post Mortem	
Total carcasses	249
Partial carcass	3,274
Viscera only	203,673
Number horses condemned	
Ante Mortem	42
Post Mortem	
Total carcasses	52
Partial carcass	2,550
Viscera only	4,720

Statistics are being brought up to date as the disrupted veterinary service is reestablished in the various prefectures. At present animal slaughter is about 10 percent of normal because animals are not available. The quality and condition of slaughtered animals are comparatively low. Meat inspection methods in general parallel those in the United States with the exception of sanitary

requirements. Veterinary inspectors appear to be efficient and interested in their jobs but their methods leave much to be desired.

Dairy production is almost at a standstill except in Hokkaido. Sanitation in all establishments visited was found to be substandard. Pasteurization of milk is hampered by faulty temperature control devices. Many establishments contain modern dairy equipment not in use because of shortages of personnel, power, spare parts or milk supply. The 1941 reports on milk consumption indicate that approximately 2,840,000 liters of pasteurized and 242,830,000 liters of raw milk were consumed.

The normal routine functioning of the two ministries administering the veterinary service in Japan has been interfered with by the war to such an extent that the reestablishment of pre-war standards is going to be slow and difficult.

DENTAL AFFAIRS

20. All phases of dentistry in Japan were impaired during the war. Dental hygiene programs were curtailed, practitioners were burned out, manufacturing was devastated and dental education handicapped. Records were incomplete and the general dental health of the people was on a rapid decline. Dental educators and the Education Ministry have agreed on a plan for raising the standards of dental education.

Dental Administration

21. Industrial dental hygiene is controlled by the Sanitary Bureau of the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare. This service was impaired during the war but plans are under way for its rejuvenation.

Dental licensure comes under this bureau but examinations are conducted only for foreigners and self-educated applicants. Graduates of recognized schools are permitted to practice without examination. Dental health insurance is incorporated in the health insurance programs which are controlled by the Insurance Bureau. School dental hygiene is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education which also controls the dental colleges.

The Departments of Army and Navy until two years ago provided dental care by attaching civilian dentists to military organizations. From then until surrender service was rendered by a corps of approximately 400 dentists plus attached civilians.

Dental Supplies and Equipment

22. Manufacture of supplies and equipment is estimated to be at 50 percent of the required capacity, with normal capacity expected within a year. Supplies are rationed and prices controlled through the Dental Materials Control Company whose president is appointed by the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare.

Sales from October 1942 to March 1943	¥ 3,627,319
Sales from October 1944 to March 1945	1,854,927
Proposed production for 1946	54,000,000

Accurate figures for dental health are difficult to obtain but it is safe to say that 75 percent of the pre-adolescent children are dental cripples. Malnutrition, low flourine content of the water, a disrupted dental service and high prices are contributing factors.

Practitioners

23. There are approximately 23,000 dentists in Japan. About 3,600 were in the Army as soldiers and an additional 400 in a professional status. Of the nearly 7,000 displaced from the larger cities by the air raids an estimated 30 percent can be rehabilitated in the near future.

Most dentists practice in their own homes under adverse conditions. They believe it is economically unsound to practice in large office buildings. Some traveling dentists are giving service to rural areas where evacuees have augmented the population.

NURSING AFFAIRS

24. Nursing had reached its lowest point about the time of the termination of the war. Before the war there had been a trend toward standardization of training and practice but during war years standards had gradually been lowered by reducing the age requirements for entrance to training schools, shortening courses from two years to one and absorbing approximately 34,000 nurses into the Army and Navy. Standards of education, registration and organization varied greatly.

Nursing Education

25. In spite of specific regulations, nursing education was found to be far below the standard. Nurses with no practical experience in one or two of the major services of medicine or surgery were able to get licenses. Public health or clinical nurses may take the examination for midwife without specific training for it. Since "accredited schools" do not require a prefectural examination a nurse may practice midwifery simply by making an application for a license.

Licenses for medical personnel in each of the prefectures are issued by a board composed of lawyers, officials of cities, politicians and a few doctors. There are no nursing representatives on the boards.

At the present time there are approximately 166,300 graduates of the 605 training schools. Of these graduates 93,270 are classified as clinical nurses, 13,070 are in public health and approximately 60,000 are midwives.

The 13,071 public health graduate nurses are employed as follows: official work 536; health centers 4,423; school nurses 1,036; industries 1,098; health insurance 5,907; and miscellaneous 71.

Nurses in training number 39,727 and are classified as: clinical 19,011; public health 7,745; midwives 3,695; and Red Cross hospital students 8,376.

Nursing Associations

26. Japanese nurses have no control over their training, licensing or practice. The Nurses Association representatives, Public Health Association members and prefectural heads of nurses are all men. Full power is placed in the hands of the presidents and first vice-presidents of boards, composed of lawyers, politicians and "health officers" of the lower level.

Midwifery

27. The standards of the midwifery program always low have

been reduced even further during the war. After six months of training a girl may take a prefectural examination and if she is successful she receives a license on payment of ¥ 0.50. She practices without supervision or inspection.

MEDICAL SUPPLY

28. During September and October extensive studies were made concerning the requirements of medical, dental and veterinary supplies for Japan and Korea with a view to determining whether stocks and manufacturing facilities were adequate.

Surveys have been made of medical supply manufacturing installations in the Tokyo area and Japanese officials have submitted reports and statistics showing stocks on hand, previous consumption and amounts required to maintain normal standards of medical care and treatment.

Supply Operation

29. Under the initial supply plan a reserve of medical and sanitary supplies was set up for shipment to Japan. This was to be used to supplement Japanese stocks if necessary. Shipment of that reserve was cancelled when a policy was established that no civilian relief supplies would be imported. Further study of the subject at the time indicated the possibility of a need for importation of certain medical supplies as a protection to the health of the Occupation Forces and to alleviate acute suffering and distress among the civilian population. Accordingly limited requirements have been reestablished.

Typhus control equipment and supplies have been shipped and additional quantities have been requisitioned for shipment to Japan for use in the event of emergency. Recommendations have been submitted for establishment in U. S. depots of a reserve of basic medical, sanitary, dental and veterinary civilian relief supplies which would be available for immediate shipment upon call.

Upon movement of the Occupation Forces to Japan the SIXTH and EIGHTH Armies, XXIV Corps and the V Amphibious Corps were each issued limited quantities of medical and sanitary supplies. Practically none of these supplies have been used. Instructions prohibit the issue of any such supplies for civilian relief without authority of this Headquarters.

Two shipments of civilian relief supplies consisting of approximately 4,000 boxes of medical supplies have been received by the EIGHTH Army and are now stored in Yokohama. These shipments were originally destined for the Philippines but were diverted en route due to the fact that the vessels contained considerable amounts of military supplies urgently required by the Occupation Forces.

On 6 September approximately 12 tons of medical supplies were dispatched to the International Red Cross Delegate at Hiroshima for use in the relief of Japanese persons injured in that area. Distribution of the supplies was under direction of the International Red Cross and that agency submitted a detailed report to this Headquarters showing disposition made of individual items.

Under date of 24 September the Japanese Government was directed to initiate necessary action to inventory, receive and distribute for civilian use stocks of medical supplies held by the Japanese Armed Forces.

The Home Ministry has been designated to perform this mission for all classes of material including medical. The procedure

as set up requires the responsible Japanese officials to submit an inventory to Occupation Force Commanders who are authorized to accept the inventory, if considered accurate. A physical transfer is then made to the Home Ministry.

The distribution for civilian use represents a considerable task. Locations of all sources of supply are not known and records are incomplete in that respect. Distribution has to be determined according to needs in the various prefectures and accurate figures of need do not appear to be available.

Manufacture

30. The manufacture of medical, dental and veterinary supplies is practically at a standstill. All plants visited in the Tokyo-Yokohama area have suffered extensive damage and no comprehensive plan of rehabilitation has been inaugurated. Extensive reports have been received covering requirements of medical supplies but it has been very difficult to determine just what is necessary to reestablish the industry and the extent of manufacturing required to maintain normal standards of medical care and treatment.

The Japanese had a very complex system of control over both production and distribution but the Army and Navy, which were the largest consumers during the war, were not required to secure materials through the established control agencies.

Narcotics

31. A directive to the Japanese Government of 12 October 1945 prohibited the planting, cultivation or growth of narcotic seeds or plants and the exportation of narcotics. Importation also was prohibited except as authorized by SCAP.

All stocks of crude, semi-processed or smoking opium, crude or semi-processed cocaine, heroin and marijuana have been frozen and the removal, destruction, use or sale thereof or of any books or records are prohibited. All stocks of crude or semi-processed narcotics will be transferred to the custody of Occupation Forces.

Finished products now in normal channels of distribution except heroin and marijuana will be left in the hands of the Japanese for medicinal use unless the inventory which is submitted discloses amounts in excess of any normal requirement. Heroin and marijuana are being turned over to Occupation Forces for destruction. Studies are being made of Japanese laws and regulations pertaining to the handling of narcotics with a view to determine whether present controls are adequate.

LEGAL

32. Examination was made of existing Japanese laws, ordinances and regulations concerning public health, welfare and sanitation and recommendations made for supplementation and modification. Study is being made of the regulations for manufacture of sera and vaccines. It appears that no present legislation in Japan affords any assurance that the potency or strength of sera is as advertised.

Veneral Disease Control

33. Study of existing laws and ordinances relative to control of communicable diseases and veneral disease examinations indicated that they were inadequate to meet current needs and that enforcement was lax and inefficient.

A directive to the Japanese Government was issued placing venereal diseases in the same legal category as other communicable diseases with reference to periodical health examinations and other preventive measures. As a result a standard Venereal Disease Control Ordinance is being adopted in each prefecture specifying weekly medical examinations for all persons whose occupations are such as to make them potential transmitters of infection. The Japanese authorities are also enlarging the scope of treatments and initiating penicillin techniques for venereal disease patients.

Ministry of Health

34. A study is being made of the legal structure of the Ministry of Health with a view to encouraging wider use of professional men and qualified technicians in health activities and communicable disease control. Civil service regulations which favor general administrative personnel in technical positions are receiving particular attention.

Associations

35. Study is being made of the corporate structures of the Japanese Nurses Association and various professional and medical manufacturers associations to ascertain the degree of governmental control present therein.

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

36. Observation of current activities and organization and the study of current and past reports indicate that the Japanese public health service does not measure up to functional standards reported in the past.

The public health program is seriously handicapped by the so-called "civil service" system which protects a small group of legally trained administrators who are the only eligibles for major administrative positions in the ministry despite their lack of experience and training in medical and related fields.

The present staff contains a few well-trained professional men and others with some ability. However, the staff is too small, the pay too little and the opportunity for advancement too slight under current conditions to encourage many competent men to seek public health work as a career.

Despite the apparent desire to cooperate and carry out suggestions made, the enormity of the problems, the limited personnel and material resources, and the lack of public information on preventive medicine make a none too bright picture for the near future.

Major problems aside from personnel and financial needs include: (1) Control of such acute communicable diseases as diphtheria, venereal diseases, typhoid fever and other filth-borne diseases; (2) Control of tuberculosis; (3) Environmental sanitation matters; (4) Clinical and sub-clinical nutritional conditions; and (5) Lack of basic health education program.

Communicable disease reporting has been incomplete and inaccurate in the past. The current reporting system does not include all communicable diseases that constitute major public health problems for which there are effective and specific preventives. Current Japanese knowledge and practice in public health fields are outdated. Too much time is devoted to research on relatively unimportant problems to the neglect of major problems for which specific preventive measures are available.

Communicable Diseases - General

37. The reporting of communicable diseases in Japan has been ineffective since 1942. Data prior to that time are subject to question. Control measures appear to have been largely hypothetical except in cases of epidemics when national, prefectural and local resources were pooled to control the situation. Cholera, diphtheria, plague, dysentery, epidemic cerebro-spinal meningitis, para-typhoid fever, smallpox, typhoid fever, epidemic louse-borne typhus fever and scarlet fever are reportable under current Japanese laws. Communicable diseases reported in 1945:

SUMMARY REPORT OF NOTIFIABLE DISEASES IN 1945
(Includes all reports through 13 October 1945)

Disease	Jan-Jun (Inc)	Jul	Aug	Sep	1 Oct to 13 Oct	Total
Diphtheria	41,263	2,847	2,539	2,324	1,904	50,877
Dysentery	15,947	7,849	18,520	10,778	4,617	57,729
Meningitis (Spith, C-S)	3,363	126	45	72	18	3,624
Para-typhoid	2,417	739	971	1,247	581	5,955
Scarlet fever	1,268	146	135	142	46	1,737
Smallpox	791	139	343	50	15	1,318
Typhoid	10,993	3,822	5,094	5,742	3,136	28,787
Typhus fever	1,457	236	71	122	12	1,900

No cases of cholera or plague were reported. All data are subject to question as to accuracy but positive data are significant in that they indicate local or area trends.

Veneral Diseases

38. Veneral diseases are not reported under previous Japanese law. The Japanese Government has recently received a directive requiring the inclusion of veneral diseases (syphilis, gonorrhoea and chancroid) in the list of reportable diseases.

Surveys of licensed and unlicensed prostitute groups show infection rates of at least the following: syphilis in excess of 50 percent, gonorrhoea in excess of 20 percent and chancroid in excess of 8 percent. There is every reason to believe that correspondingly high rates exist in other groups not classed as prostitutes but equally as promiscuous.

Legal measures for the control of veneral diseases have been vague and not subject to enforcement. Recent regulations formulated as result of a directive for more effective control of known cases of veneral disease bridge the gaps used to dodge halfhearted enforcement measures in the past.

Typhus Fever and Port Quarantine

39. Epidemic louse-borne typhus fever was prevalent in epidemic proportions in Hokkaido, Kyushu, North Honshu and Korea early in 1945. Sporadic cases are currently reported in all these areas. Special and energetic measures including delousing and selective vaccination are required at the earliest possible time. DDF powder and equipment in adequate quantities to meet anticipated needs are in transit. The major problems reported are among the mining and labor camp groups, largely Koreans, who were "invited" to Japan when special labor groups were needed.

A Port Quarantine Officer is responsible for technical directions to the Japanese officials carrying out required quarantine procedure for non-Japanese returning to their homelands and Japanese repatriates returning from the Pacific and other areas.

The U. S. Typhus Commission staff is responsible for all technical instructions to Japanese officials regarding typhus control measures. The typhus situation in Korea is potentially more serious than in the Japanese Home Islands. Similar steps for clearance of repatriates and handling of endemic conditions are being formulated on a basis more intensive than is anticipated for foci areas in Japan.

Sanitary Engineering

40. The Japanese report that water supply and waste disposal plants are functioning more or less at prewar standards except in such heavily bombed areas as Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Stocks of water treatment material are inadequate throughout the islands. It is estimated that Japanese industries are in a position to meet domestic demands for water treatment materials on basis of Japanese prewar standards, provided raw materials are available.

While reports state there has been continuous chlorination of certain public water supplies in the past, current information indicates that many were chlorinated only during epidemics of enteric disease. There is also evidence that the dosage of chlorine was inadequate to meet American standards. Dosage was at source of supply with little or no attention being paid to chlorine residual of the tap water.

All public water supplies are considered unsafe for military use. Data are not available on the special treatment procedures for night soil prior to use as fertilizer. No reports have been received indicating any special problems due to rodents or insects except for typhus fever.

Laboratories

41. Despite encouraging reports from the Japanese on biologicals production and surplus stocks, steps have been taken to appraise more thoroughly the current stock situation and production potential for the future. The extremely high incidence of certain diseases indicates that ineffective and inadequate measures are employed for the control of diseases for which active immunization materials are available.

Diagnostic techniques for venereal diseases require special attention. It is anticipated that special measures in process of development in Tokyo may be used as the "proving ground" for more effective programs elsewhere in Japan.

Nutrition

42. Consideration has been given to types of foodstuffs and per capita caloric requirements. Current estimates indicate that 1,550-1,600 calories per capita per day can be provided in 1946 with very limited importation of foodstuffs. The current ration in Tokyo is estimated at nearly 1,500 calories per day with the rice issued supplying approximately 50 percent of the caloric intake.

It is believed that an average diet of 1,800 calories per person per day will be adequate to the extent that health will be maintained and that sub-clinical evidences of malnutrition will not develop if a balanced diet of that caloric value is provided.

The possibility of a special supplement for heavy workers and selected persons including nursing mothers are the only exceptions considered likely at this time. Little or no new data of consequence have been procured from special groups of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, National Nutrition Laboratory, Tokyo Municipal Hygiene Laboratory and various groups of researchers. There is no concrete evidence of malnutrition to date.

SECTION 2

EDUCATION, RELIGION AND MEDIA OF EXPRESSION

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GENERAL

1. All media of information dissemination in Japan including education and religion had been mobilized for purposes of national defense during the war period. To that end the government propaganda machine utilized the psychological motivations of patriotism, religion, Emperor worship and tradition. In the hands of the militarists it produced a social unity beneficial to the continuance of the war. The propaganda machine was controlled by a highly centralized administration operating in Tokyo, an administration that affected all shades of expression by direct or indirect intervention.

2. Radio was controlled by two governmental agencies; the Board of Information which determined broadcast programming, flow of propaganda and "controlled" news; and the Bureau of Communications which exercised a rigid censorship to prevent the real facts from disturbing "normal tranquility".

The press fed by a semi-official news agency was controlled by governmental censorship and by government allocation of newsprint stocks. A sameness marked the appearance of all newspapers and little opportunity for even the simplest expression of a free press existed.

The motion picture industry was controlled by three major producers cooperating with the government. Film stocks were tightly rationed and the pictures produced were propaganda vehicles designed to maintain and restrain public morals. Newsreels were largely exhortations to live a Spartan life and contained little news. Educational films were sheer propaganda and had no relations to the teaching process.

The Japanese theater was in a condition of stagnation. Expression of new ideas was not permitted and plays were either propagandistic or escapist in nature. Troupes touring the country presented nothing but obviously official materials.

3. Education had been mobilized for prosecution of the war. Most schools failed to reopen in the spring of 1945 because a great majority of students were conscripted for the fighting services, munitions plants or food production. Textbooks had been rewritten and carefully edited to serve the purposes of the military. Teachers were trained and directed to function as mouthpieces of the government.

4. Religion was closely supervised and the Religious Bodies Law strengthened governmental control. The practices of State Shintoism were greatly emphasized and efforts were made to turn

the religious sentiment more strongly to the service of the state.

EDUCATION

General

5. Surrender Day found the Japanese educational system at a virtual standstill with 18,000,000 students idle, 4,000 schools destroyed, 20 percent of the necessary textbooks available, military officers occupying responsible educational positions, textbooks permeated with militaristic propaganda, teachers dispersed, the Ministry of Education a tool of the militarists and liberal educators in hiding from the Thought Police.

Between the time of Japanese capitulation and establishment of Allied General Headquarters in Tokyo the Japanese voluntarily undertook many reforms. They conducted a rough school survey, initiated censorship of the existing official textbooks, reorganized the Ministry of Education and reopened the schools. They abrogated the laws, orders and regulations which had been the basis of authority for militaristic and ultra-nationalistic indoctrination in the schools.

6. During September and October the Japanese under SCAP guidance closed the military schools, provided for the transfer of displaced students who had previously been in military academies, war industry or evacuation areas and disposed of school military supplies and weapons. They issued directions for the guidance of teachers in using existing textbooks until they could be censored and dissolved the Youth Corps which had been a tool of militaristic propaganda.

On 22 October a SCAP directive was issued to serve as a charter for future educational reform and a supplementary directive on 30 October directed the investigation, screening and certification of teachers. An effective method of procedure embodying unofficial SCAP technical advice has been evolved. It is to insure that when the Japanese plans are officially submitted they will be in a form that can be approved.

7. Positive progress has been made in implementing the 10 basic policies enunciated in the Basic Directive on Administration of the Educational System of Japan. All militaristic orders have been revoked, military schools have been closed, weapons have been impounded and certain objectionable subjects have been eliminated from the curricula.

A beginning has been made on censoring the textbooks, the radio is being used both to teach and to reorient the teachers, a start has been made on the production and distribution of educational films to supplement the textbooks and some objectionable teaching personnel have been eliminated.

All demobilized military personnel are barred from teaching until investigated and a plan is in progress for the screening of all teachers. Religious education is again permitted in private schools. A plan for the equitable absorption of ex-military students and war-work students is nearing completion and plans are under way for the bringing to Japan of an educational mission to advise on the rehabilitation of the system.

Student strikes, transfer of ex-military students and resignation of former militaristic leaders occupy primary attention in the press.

Background and Voluntary Reform

8. The Japanese educational system at the beginning of the war provided the ideal instrument for the diffusion of militaristic indoctrination. It included 16,000,000 students, 400,000 teachers, 50,000 schools and an estimated budget of ¥ 600,000,000. Noteworthy is the fact that until 1932 the education budget was larger than that of the Army and Navy combined. Thirty-seven percent of the population was included in the elementary school and pre-school age level and 99.6 percent adult literacy was claimed by the Japanese Government.

The highly centralized educational system emanating from the Education Ministry facilitated the speedy introduction of uniform propaganda. The adoption of the National School Plan in April 1941 marked the first swing toward wartime militarism with an intensification of ultra-nationalism.

9. The period of the war brought a complete revision of all textbooks in use in the elementary and secondary schools with the insertion of a positive and inflammatory militaristic word campaign in the 1942 and 1943 editions. The 1944 editions indicate a recognition of the inevitability of defeat by supply lines and superior science. On 13 July 1945 revision of educational policy designed to prepare the schools for the approaching homeland battle was announced by the Ministry.

Virtually all schools above the elementary level had been closed to divert the students to productive war labor. Military officers who had been distributed among the schools as instructors were made members of the school staffs on 17 July 1945.

10. Prior to the establishment of SCAP in Tokyo the Japanese conducted a survey which indicated that 4,059 schools had been destroyed by bombing and that approximately 39,053 were usable. They initiated a censorship of the existing official textbooks, reorganized the Education Ministry, reopened the schools and abrogated many of the laws, orders and regulations which had been the basis of authority for militaristic and ultra-nationalistic indoctrination. These changes coincided with the outbreak of strikes by students demanding full recognition of their rights.

Directives and Results

11. For the purpose of patterning Japanese thought and education in conformity with standards considered essential to develop democracy, a basic directive was issued in the form of a charter for future educational reform. A supplement directed the investigation, screening and certification of teachers.

12. Under SCAP direction the Ministry of Education has issued orders providing for the return of all categories of displaced primary and secondary students to schools, closing down of military schools, education of war orphans and inauguration of democratized youth organizations in place of the dissolved Youth Corps. They further provided for intensification of education in food production and in reconstruction of devastated areas and deletion of undesirable material from textbooks.

13. In pursuance of directives the Japanese Government abrogated all wartime regulations concerning military, naval and aviation training; closed the military academies; eliminated military affairs training from schools; impounded school arsenals; reoriented teachers training; inaugurated radio education for the 21,770 schools

which had radio receivers; and reinstated liberal educators who had been removed from service.

Discrimination against any student, educator or groups for race, nationality, or creed was prohibited. It was ordered that known militaristic and ultra-nationalistic teachers be removed from their posts. Censoring of textbooks was undertaken and official school texts were translated and checked to eliminate objectionable portions. Other texts are now under examination. The Education Ministry has completed its censorship of existing textbooks.

14. Orders have been issued to give utmost encouragement to the inculcation of concepts and establishment of practices in harmony with representative government, international peace, the dignity of the individual, and such fundamental human rights as the freedom of assembly, speech and religion.

Procedures Used

15. Two distinct procedures have been used in reopening schools and encouraging Japanese education. The first consists of technical guidance and suggestion to the Japanese educational authorities. The second consists of directives which have the force of law and is accordingly reserved for fundamental issues. An amalgamation of the two processes has proven effective and will probably be used extensively in the future.

The Japanese authorities, non-governmental as well as governmental, wherever possible are informally briefed on the general character of contemplated directives and any practical suggestions they have to offer are taken into consideration. When the formal announcement of a directive is made, the governmental authorities have had time to complete such of the preliminary work necessary to carry it out satisfactorily. They are then given technical advice and their plans for carrying out the provisions of the directive are evaluated.

By this procedure it is possible to ensure that the finished plan when officially submitted will be in approved form. The long period of isolation from democratic procedures and western knowledge has made it inevitable that all officials, however willing, will fail through ignorance unless given technical assistance. This method of guidance maintains their effectiveness by avoiding their public humiliation.

RELIGION

General

16. Throughout the war period the Japanese people regardless of the faiths they professed were committed to an acceptance of State Shintoism. Though the government had repeatedly declared that it was not a religion, anyone so bold as to express doubt of the validity of the official mythology was in danger of persecution for "dangerous thoughts". Religions other than State Shintoism were closely supervised by the Education Ministry under authority of the Religious Bodies Law of 1939.

17. Soon after occupation all restrictions of freedom of religion were rescinded in a directive to the Japanese Government. Such restrictions were the result of political rather than religious causes, and they aimed at binding the Japanese people into a single unit.

Among the laws specifically ordered abrogated was the Religious Bodies Law. Apparently the Japanese Government has followed

the spirit as well as the letter of the directive. There is no evidence of discrimination or pressure of any kind on the part of the government against any person because of his religious beliefs. Press and public reactions to the new freedom have been uniformly favorable. Plans are in preparation for the elimination of Shintoism from schools and for the separation of Shintoism from the state.

State Shintoism

18. The officially sponsored State Shintoism required every Japanese to believe: Japan is a land divinely created; in a family of emperors descended in unbroken line from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu Omikami; and in a people descended from gods collateral with the ancestors of the Imperial family. Anyone openly expressing disbelief was liable to prosecution as a "dangerous thinker".

19. It was the Japanese official view however that State Shintoism was not a religion but a civic institution for instilling patriotism. It was held that it was no violation of religious freedom to teach it in the schools while excluding other religions or to compel people to observe it by visiting shrines. In 1936 the Catholic Church despite a long period of opposition formally accepted the official definition. The Protestant groups had already acceded in practice. No religious group could do otherwise and continue to exist.

Religious Bodies Law

20. In April 1940 when the Religious Bodies Law of 1939 was put into effect, further restriction was placed upon the freedom of religion. The Ministry of Education declared that no sect would be recognized as a religious group with the privileges of a juridical body unless it could claim at least 50 churches and 5,000 adherents. This interpretation was the beginning of official pressure for the consolidation of the Christian sects into one religious body.

21. At the time of occupation all Christian groups except the Roman Catholics, about two-thirds of the Anglican Churches and a few small independent churches had been joined together as the Church of Christ in Japan. Those Protestant sects which did not join were not recognized as religious bodies and as a result had to pay taxes and were subject to police control although all other religious denominations (except State Shintoism) were under the supervision of the Ministry of Education.

Accomplishments

22. On 4 October 1945 the directive on "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties" was issued to the Japanese Government ordering the abrogation and immediate suspension of all laws, decrees, ordinances and regulations which establish restriction on freedom of religion. Specifically named for suspension and abrogation was the Religious Bodies Law. Prior to the issuance of the directive a conference was held with prominent Japanese Christians to discuss the question of religious freedom in general and the Religious Bodies Law in particular.

23. A study of State Shintoism has been prepared for the purpose of determining how a separation of Shintoism from the state can be effected without interfering with Shintoism as a religion or philosophy of individuals. Authorities from the leading universities have been consulted.

24. By order of 16 October the Ministry of Education instructed

prefectural and local officials to permit private schools to give instruction in religion. This action superseded the Japanese order of 1899 forbidding the teaching of religion.

25. The Religious Bureau in the Ministry of Education has been abolished. A new Religious Affairs Section has been created in the Bureau of Social Education of the Ministry of Education. It acts largely as a records section and has no regulating power over religion. Requirements of SCAP have been complied with and the Japanese Government has shown a spirit of cooperation. No oppressive action against religion has been taken since the start of the occupation.

Shrine and Sect Shintoism

26. Shintoism is divided into two major branches, State or Shrine Shintoism and Sect Shintoism. The former claims to perpetuate the authentic and traditional rituals and beliefs of the Japanese race and declares that it has developed "spontaneously" in the national life without aid of individual historical founders.

The latter which centers largely on the faith itself was originated in the modern period by the historical founders. All Shinto sects were, before occupation, under the Religious Bureau of the Ministry of Education. Shinto shrines are still supervised by the Bureau of Shrines of the Home Ministry. There are 221 state rank and 110 prefectural and village rank Shinto Shrines.

27. The income of Imperial and National Shrines in 1942 was:

Imperial Household	¥	45,755.00
National Treasury		824,000.00
Public Contributions		7,543,205.00
Revenue from properties		<u>2,490,022.00</u>
Total	¥	10,903,054.00

The revenue of the Ise Shrine amounted to ¥ 988,324.00 in 1943. Offerings from the public accounted for about two-thirds of the total.

The prefectural governments, municipalities, town or village offices make offerings ranging from ¥ 20 to ¥ 100 to shrines within the area under their jurisdiction. The bulk of the revenue comes from private contributions.

The Thirteen Sects of Kyoha (Sect or Church) Shinto

<u>Sect</u>	<u>No. of Adherents</u>
Fuso-kyo	648,000
Kenko-kyo	1,120,000
Misogi-kyo	343,000
Shinshu-kyo	775,000
Shinto-kyo	1,272,000
Taisei-kyo	723,000
Tenri-kyo	4,335,000
Jikko-kyo	436,000
Kurozumi-kyo	566,000
Ontake-kyo	2,048,000
Shinri-kyo	1,489,000
Shusei-kyo	430,000
Taisha-kyo	3,373,000
Total	17,613,000

ARTS AND MONUMENTS

28. Measures of protection have been taken to protect Japanese works of art and antiquity, cultural treasures, religious buildings and articles, museums, libraries, archives, and historical monuments. The protective measures which became effective at the start of the occupation have prevented vandalism.

Total destruction of arts and monuments in areas subject to severe air raids has been estimated at more than 50 percent and partial destruction at more than 90 percent. A file of information on monuments and sites is being maintained and a record of estimated damage is made as the information is obtained.

Conditions at Surrender

29. The Japanese Government estimates that there are 85,000 art works, monuments and related holdings under its supervision. Of these, some 8,000 are considered to be of national importance. Movable objects of art in the leading public collections had been removed to places of safety. The following table based upon 148 installations and sites damaged by war indicates extent of loss:

Totally destroyed	78 percent
Partially destroyed	19 "
Extent of damage not stated	3 "

A report at the time of surrender in the area of the EIGHTH Army indicates the following damage:

Totally destroyed	43 percent
Partially damaged	51 "
Not damaged	6 "

These figures represent damage in areas of intensive bombing and cannot be considered as indicative of the nation as a whole.

Measures for Protection

30. From the start of occupation the commands have been charged

with the protection of arts and monuments. On 28 August 1945 instructions were given that Commanding Generals of Armies were responsible for seeing that historical, cultural and religious objects and installations were carefully preserved and that Imperial palaces and all shrines be given special protection. On 26 September Commanders of Armies and Fleets were directed that religious and educational institutions and properties occupied by members of the Imperial Family would not be requisitioned or occupied except with express approval of SCAP.

Available information on monuments and sites has been arranged for filing and maintenance as a working record. Military Police guards have been posted at the most important shrines, temples, and Imperial properties. There has been no evidence of vandalism.

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PRESS

31. At the time of occupation the Japanese press was closely controlled by the government. Early in the occupation liaison was established with the Japanese press and the policies to be put into effect by the Allied Forces were explained. It was emphasized that freedom of the press would be established and maintained.

The first move toward establishing press freedom came with the issue of a directive on 4 October, subject "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties". This lifted the controls the Japanese Government had been exerting over all freedoms. The liberalizing of the press was further stimulated on 24 October when the editors of the Tokyo dailies were called to SCAP and told to carry out their obligations to establish a free press. A further though indirect result of the SCAP policy was a spontaneous movement toward reorganization within the Japanese press.

Reorganization of one leading Tokyo daily has been effected and preparations for similar reorganizations in three other Tokyo dailies are under way. Japanese newspapermen have begun discussion of formation of a newspaper guild. Domei, the government monopoly news agency, has been dissolved. Two independent news agencies have been established.

32. An immediate problem upon occupation and one which was a potential means of press control was that of paper supply. Paper had been distributed through private organizations of publishers which could refuse paper to non-members or to those whom it wished

to suppress. Control was also exercised by the government over the distributors as it rationed the paper. A directive issued on 26 October removed paper rationing from the hands of private groups and placed it under a Japanese Government commission with SCAP supervision.

Newspapers at Time of Occupation

33. During the war the newspapers of Japan had been reduced to the use of a single sheet printed on both sides because of the paper shortage. Their content was directly government controlled and they were used as propaganda media up to the time of surrender. Control over content was exercised by the forced use of government press releases and pre-publication censorship.

The Domei agency was a "cannery" of news. It was a monopoly under strict governmental supervision and control. Throughout the country many of the smaller newspapers had suspended publication because of the paper shortage.

Reaction to Surrender

34. Even after surrender the newspapers continued to be under governmental control but in the general confusion it was not enforced. At the beginning of the occupation, stories of "incidents" appeared only as minor news items. There was a tendency to handle occupation news cautiously as bare news. A need for a limited amount of censorship also became obvious.

Censorship

35. A directive of 19 September entitled "Press Code of Japan" set forth a 10-point program of censorship requiring all news to adhere strictly to truth, forbidding criticism of the Allied Powers and penalizing the distortion of news for propaganda purposes. In addition, the security of troop movements was maintained.

Political, Civil and Religious Freedom

36. On 4 October a directive was issued which abrogated all laws, orders, decrees, ordinances and regulations restricting freedom of thought, religion, right of assembly and speech. It permitted unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Japanese Government. All restrictions on the collection and dissemination of information were ordered lifted except the Press Code promulgated 19 September.

Laws which discriminated against persons because of race, nationality, creed or political opinion were revoked. The Japanese Thought Police and other similar restrictive agencies were discontinued. All those detained or imprisoned under "protection or surveillance" or otherwise restricted in freedom under these laws or charged under pretext with minor offenses or held without charge were ordered released. By this measure the officials primarily responsible for control of speech and press were ousted and any apparent direct governmental restriction of the press and speech ceased to exist.

Dissolution of Domei

37. The Domei News Agency had exercised a monopoly so powerful that no paper could exist without its services. It was government controlled and was a powerful weapon of the militarists during the war. On 14 September Domei was placed under censorship and immediately suspended. The following day it was reopened as a purely

domestic news agency under strict censorship. The statement of occupation aims made Domei's position appear precarious and on 30 September its Board of Directors voted dissolution of the agency. The dissolution became effective 31 October.

Kyodo, a news agency, began functioning 1 November replacing Domei. It now supplies news to 60 Japanese newspapers and to Radio Tokyo. It has a contract with AP and is negotiating with UP and Reuters.

The Jiji agency publishes a home news service.

Lexity in News Treatment

38. On 24 October, after many informal discussions, leading editors and publishers were summoned to this Headquarters. They were told of their failure to establish a free and independent press. Many important developments were cited that had practically been ignored by them. Directives of far reaching significance were printed without comment.

It was pointed out that the responsibility of the press and radio was to explain and interpret these directives to the people. The press had indirectly attempted to justify the thought control laws by leaving the impression that they had been aimed at the suppression of "communism".

39. Attention was called to the lack of full and frank discussion of war criminals and Japan's wartime leaders. Foreign news was not being adequately reported and discussion of the Imperial household avoided.

Demand was made that press and radio report domestic and foreign news fully and truthfully, that they permit and encourage free discussion of all issues which have a bearing on the welfare of the Japanese people and that they provide all segments of responsible public opinion with equal access to channels of public expression. The result of the conference became apparent a few days later. Analysis of the daily Japanese newspapers revealed better coverage of foreign news and efforts to explain the significance of events which had taken place under the occupation.

Newspaper Circulation

40. The total circulation of daily newspapers in Japan is approximately 9,500,000. Circulation figures for the ten leading newspapers are as follows:

NEWSPAPERS WITH LARGEST CIRCULATION IN JAPAN

Mainichi Shinbun (Tokyo-Osaka)	2,412,663
Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo-Okura)	1,572,444
Yomiuri-Hochi (Tokyo)	1,456,322
Chubu-Nippon Shinbun (Nagoya)	641,595
Hokkaido Shinbun (Sapporo)	587,642
Osaka Shinbun (Osaka)	393,400
Nippon Sangyo Keizai (Tokyo)	162,854
Sangyo Keizai Shinbun (Osaka)	155,182
Kobe Shinbun (Kau)	111,169
Niigata Nippo (Niigata)	100,584

The remaining circulation is divided among 52 other dailies distributed throughout the main islands.

Magazines

41. Before the war, 1,200 magazines were published in Japan. At the beginning of the occupation, only 32 were still in existence. Now 306 children's, women's, technical, educational, agricultural, fiction, political and news magazines are being published.

Conferences have been held with magazine editors to explain to them how they would be affected by the Allied occupation policies. Freedom of expression was encouraged. Difficulties about fair rationing of newsprint were solved when the rationing of paper was transferred from the Japanese Publishing Association to the Japanese Government.

RADIO

Broadcasting Corporation

42. From its inception in 1926 until surrender the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, organized as a public utility organization, served as a propaganda medium for the government. Since the cessation of hostilities the broadcast facilities consisting of three networks totaling 120 stations have been closely supervised by SCAP for the purpose of expediting the occupation mission.

43. Two networks are now in use to insure public understanding of all directives, policies and plans for the political, economic and social rehabilitation of Japan. This is being accomplished by broadcasting complete news coverage and explanations of all directives, by giving voice to sound Japanese political and reconstruction thought and by taking steps to minimize government control of radio, thereby establishing it as a reliable and trustworthy source of news, information, education and entertainment for the Japanese people. SCAP program control of Japanese broadcasting includes the censoring of scripts and monitoring of all broadcasts.

Organizational Structure

44. Under provisions of the Wireless Telegraph Law all officers, financial matters and operational plans of the Broadcasting Corporation must be approved by the Japanese Government. Revenue of the Corporation which amounted to approximately ¥ 45,500,000 for 1945 is derived by payment of an original license fee of 50 yen and a listening fee of 12 yen per year from every radio set owner in Japan.

Facilities

45. The Broadcasting Corporation operates three networks. Number one network of 100 stations covering the entire nation broadcasts 15 hours daily. Number two network of seven stations covering the major metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kumamoto, Sendai, Hiroshima and Sapporo broadcasts four evening hours a day. Number three network of seven stations, now being used exclusively by Armed Forces Radio Service for the information and entertainment of American troops, broadcasts 16 hours a day. This network is supplemented by nine Army installed stations completing radio coverage of all occupational areas.

46. The Japanese Government estimates that there are 5,000,000 radio receivers at present in operation. Radio manufacturers have been instructed to expedite production of tubes, parts and new sets to satisfy the heavy demand for receiver equipment. The Corporation is increasing the power of its major stations thereby extending coverage and improving reception.

Programming

47. SCAP has stimulated the initiation of new programs to carry out the occupational mission. Among these are:

(1) "The Man on the Street" is a fifteen minute program three days per week. Recorded on the streets of Tokyo and pre-censored by SCAP, these broadcasts give the average citizen an opportunity to express his opinion on current problems and demonstrate to the listening audience the fact that Japan at last has freedom of thought and speech on the air.

(2) "The Voice of the People" is a ten minute program twice daily. This broadcast of letters from the people in which they discuss problems of public interest has a large following and indicates public reaction to SCAP operations.

(3) "The Woman's Hour" is a half hour program twice daily. Dealing primarily with the feminine point of view, these broadcasts feature music, news and talks aimed at developing social and political consciousness and responsibility in the women of Japan.

(4) "Freedom of Thought" is a quarter hour program daily. It brings to the microphone Japanese professional and political leaders presenting their ideas and opinions as to what should be done in the reconstruction of Japan.

(5) "The Farm Hour" is a full hour program once a week. This program is designed to tell the farmer what is going on in the agricultural world and to impress him with his personal responsibility in rehabilitating Japan.

MOTION PICTURES

48. During the war and at the time of occupation the motion picture industry was under strict governmental control. This control has now been removed and a trend toward liberal themes and films dealing with the problems facing Japan has been stimulated. Old propaganda films have been withdrawn from circulation. Newsreel production, at a low ebb both in quality and quantity during the war, is reviving and is being supplemented by the importance of American newsreel footage. Educational films which were devoted entirely to the Japanese war effort are being assembled and destroyed. New films are being prepared.

Effective cooperation under SCAP supervision of this medium of information and entertainment can be expected during the next few months. Many producers and exhibitors are already planning rehabilitation and reconstruction of war damaged properties and three new companies have been organized following repeal by directive of the oppressive motion picture laws.

Condition at Occupation

49. From a peak of 2,548 motion picture theaters in 1943 the number decreased to 845 in operation on 1 September. The principal cause of this decrease was loss by bombing and fire, although high taxes closed many picture houses and put small producers out of business. It is expected that 100 more motion picture theaters will be opened during the early part of 1946.

50. Production and distribution of Japanese moving pictures from January to March 1945 included: features 12, documentary films 13, newsreels 8 and educational 16. Table of motion picture theaters in Japan from 1937 to March 1945 follows:

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TOKYO</u>	<u>OUTSIDE TOKYO</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1937	267	1,482	1,749
1938	296	1,579	1,875
1939	303	1,715	2,018
1940	316	2,047	2,363
1941	327	2,145	2,472
1942	319	2,011	2,330
1943	300	2,248	2,548
1944	271	2,135	2,406
1945 (to March)	234	942	1,176

Production Capacity

51. Before the war Japanese motion picture companies had produced nearly 500 features per year but due to shortage of film this decreased during the war to less than 100. Although every motion picture company in Japan did produce propaganda films, there were many in the industry who rebelled against the government policy. Anticipating peace as early as July 1945, two studios began preparing scenarios of innocuous musicals with "western" music as their theme.

After the industry-wide conference held in September all studios submitted motion picture scenarios to this Headquarters. At that time three major "feature" producers stated that they planned to complete a total of six features per month. To date this figure has not been achieved. The present rate of production has reached four and a half per month and by January, seven pictures per month are anticipated.

Action Taken to Free Motion Picture Industry

52. SCAP on 16 October issued a directive to the Japanese Government which ordered it to eliminate government control of the motion picture industry. The provisions for freedom of speech which were contained in the SCAP directive of 27 September and those of the directive titled "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties" were extended to apply to motion pictures. Procedures for the enforcement of restriction on freedom of expression were ordered inoperative.

The Japanese Government was further ordered to take no punitive action against the industry or any firm or individual in it for exercising lawful freedom of expression. Some 17 specifically mentioned laws were ordered abrogated and the government was ordered to take steps to repeal them. All instructions to enforcement agencies were ordered cancelled.

53. Government subsidies to Eiga Kosha, the only distributor of motion pictures in Japan, and the Nippon Newsreel Company, the only newsreel company in Japan, were discontinued.

54. To insure removal of propagandistic, anti-American and highly nationalistic films from motion picture channels it was necessary to check nearly 300 feature length films. Half of these were removed from circulation and all prints and negatives are

being assembled for destruction. Still to be checked are more than 2,000 negatives in order to make certain that no undemocratic propaganda films remain in Japan.

55. By 1 December 1945 it is anticipated that producers of features will establish their own distribution facilities and Eiga Kosha, the company founded by governmental decree, will go out of business. It is also anticipated that Asahi Newspaper Company will take over Nippon Newsreel Company and with its established news service will be able to get greater coverage.

56. Recently the industry submitted a draft of a proposed plan for a Motion Picture Producer's Association. Although this was free of any hint of government control, the stated aim of this association was to establish a monopoly which would limit production of films to its original membership. Since competition in Japan is necessary for some time to come and in order to encourage new writers and producers, this proposal was disapproved.

Motion Picture Industry Guide

57. The following production guide has been given to the motion picture industry: abolition of Japanese militarism and military nationalism themes and encouragement of liberal tendencies and processes in Japan including the basic freedoms of religion, speech and right of assembly.

Some of the ways in which the film industry can assist these objectives are by producing pictures which:

- (1) Show Japanese in all walks of life cooperating to build a peaceful nation.
- (2) Deal with the resettlement of Japanese soldiers into civilian life.
- (3) Show Japanese prisoners of war formerly in our hands being restored to favor in the community.
- (4) Demonstrate individual initiative and enterprise solving the post-war problems of Japan in industry, agriculture and all phases of the national life.
- (5) Encourage the peaceful and constructive organization of labor unions.
- (6) Develop political consciousness and responsibility among the people.
- (7) Approve free discussion of political issues.
- (8) Encourage respect for the rights of men as individuals.
- (9) Promote tolerance and respect among all races and classes.
- (10) Dramatize figures in Japanese history who have stood for freedom and representative government.

THEATER

58. The Japanese theater was under strict external control of the government and was further strangled by the internal control of the "big three" producers. It was solely a militarist propaganda medium. All liberal theater people kept silent or were jailed.

Since the occupation, government control has been removed although some laws which tend to restrict theater freedom still remain. The production of plays dealing with the new problems facing Japan are being contemplated and encouraged.

Occupation and Present Situation

59. At the time of the occupation the Japanese theater had been reduced from a peacetime norm of approximately 500 major productions a month to 50. Bombing, taxes and government pressure to close down expensive amusement centers were responsible for the reduction. Characteristic of the industry at that time was iron-clad government control exercised through the Home Ministry. All but the cheapest escapism and propaganda was discouraged among the new writers, and great emphasis was laid on "historical" plays such as Kabuki "classics". No new plays of merit were written and the modern theater was completely emasculated.

60. The following table gives information about the Japanese theater in general:

Major legitimate theaters in Japan before bombing	50
Major theaters wrecked by bombing	10
Tokyo October production	23
Percentage of liberal plays in October	0
Estimated Tokyo November productions	33
Estimated percentage of liberal plays in November	10

("Liberal means saying something, however little, against war or for democracy." No truly liberal scripts have appeared yet.)

Theater tax	200 percent
Percentage of population attending legitimate theaters	20 percent

Current Activities

61. Conferences have been held with the Producer's Association, the Drama Association, the Theater Arts Committee and the Writer's Association. The position of SCAP has been clearly explained: that an increasing number of plays dealing with the problems of the new Japan and the expression of new liberal ideas are sought. Producers have been given liberal themes from which new educational plays can be drawn. At the request of Japanese producers, plans are being made to make appropriate American plays available in Japan.

Production Schedules

62. Arrangements have been made with the producers to furnish synopses of all current plays and all plays to be produced. Bi-weekly reports are to be submitted showing the schedule of each producer. With this report will come a synopsis of each play to be produced, a copy of the script in Japanese and a copy of an English translation of the script.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

63. Problems of information and public relations require comprehensive planning and the use of all media. The aim of the occupation that the Japanese people should know the facts about the war and the guilt of their war-leaders and war criminals is being met by furnishing all media factual evidence which can be disseminated. A factual series of articles on the war with Japan will be released shortly by press and radio.

64. The introduction of new freedom in Japan required that a coordinated campaign of information be developed to guide the activities of the press, radio and other media. Keystone of this program is the task of explaining the meaning and implications of the 4 October memorandum on the "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties."

65. The attempts of the Japanese Government to claim that food would have to be imported by the Allied Powers were countered by a campaign to present the facts to the people of Japan. Evidence was made available to all media to show that Japan was in a position to feed herself and that importation of food was not necessary.

66. Japan's returning soldiers from overseas needed a program of information to prepare them for their return home. A tabloid weekly newspaper has been started and is receiving distribution in Korea and the Philippines.

War Guilt Campaign

67. When the Occupation Forces entered Tokyo there was little if any consciousness of war guilt among the Japanese people. They did not know the steps which led Japan to war, the causes of her defeat, or the atrocities committed by her soldiers and there was little feeling of moral culpability. There was widespread belief that Japan's defeat was due solely to industrial and scientific inferiority and to the atomic bomb. The Imperial Rescript announcing the cessation of hostilities was chiefly a reaffirmation of Japan's war aims, and if allowed to stand unchallenged would have provided the Japanese people with moral justification for a future war of aggression.

68. An extensive information and education program has been undertaken to bring the true facts before the people. Documentary material on Japanese atrocities in the Philippines has been released to the press and radio. This includes photostats of Japanese army orders and diaries, photographs of atrocities and articles. There are numerous indications that the truth of these is now being accepted.

69. A series of twenty articles on the war in the Pacific has been prepared and is being distributed to newspapers, magazines and radio. The articles show in detail the steps which led Japan to war and the reasons for her military defeat. These articles have been designated a "must" for all newspapers in Japan. This material will be presented also in motion pictures and on the radio.

70. With notable exceptions Japanese papers during the first six weeks ignored the subject of war criminals despite widespread public discussion. Leading Japanese press and radio executives were therefore summoned to SCAP on 24 October for a conference on the subject. There has been fuller and franker discussion since that time.

71. A series of radio broadcasts by prominent Japanese liberals has been devoted to war criminals. This problem has also been treated on other programs. Japanese film companies are being stimulated to produce a series of documentary and feature films stressing the war guilt program.

72. Cultural, economic, professional and other groups have been encouraged to hold discussions of the subject and many have passed resolutions calling for punishment of war criminals. A labor advisory group set up by SCAP and consisting of four nationally known labor leaders has instituted a series of talks on the subject of war leaders in local unions. A Committee for the Total Abolition of Oppressive Laws, consisting of representatives of numerous organizations, was formed with the assistance of SCAP. One of its objectives is to explain the importance of punishing war criminals.

73. A poll of prominent Japanese leaders taken at the end of October shows that there is growing consciousness of Japan's war guilt. Conservative, liberal and radical leaders questioned on the subject stated that Japan should bear responsibility for the war and the following groups should be prosecuted as war criminals:

- Members of the Tojo cabinet
- Certain members of succeeding cabinets
- Members of secret societies
- Financial backers of militarists
- War profiteers
- Political leaders who advocated aggression
- High ranking military leaders
- Those who committed crimes against the Japanese people (such as suppressing civil liberties)
- Those who committed atrocities against Allied prisoners of war and subject peoples.

"Freedom of Thought" Information Program

74. In the course of 20 years, Japanese militarists had constructed effective machinery for controlling the speech, thoughts and movements of the people. This was accomplished through legislation, the police, censorship regulations, centralized control over newspaper and ownership of radio broadcasting facilities.

75. On 4 October the first major step was taken to sever Japan from the practices of the past when a memorandum was issued to the Japanese Government ordering it to "abrogate and immediately suspend the operation of all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations" which restricted "political, civil and religious liberties".

76. The memorandum called for unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Japanese Government. Restrictions on the collection and dissemination of information were eliminated and all laws which "by their terms or their application operate unequally in favor of or against any person by reason of race, nationality, creed or political opinion" were ordered repealed. Freeing of all political prisoners was ordered. The Thought Police was abolished and the Home Ministry and high police officials were dismissed from office.

An immediate aftermath of the directive was the resignation of the Higashikuni cabinet. The document also gave new impetus to the liberal movement. Japanese press comment in no way reflected popular reaction to the document.

After it became obvious that no change was forthcoming, lead-

ing newspaper and radio executives were summoned to this Headquarters on 24 October and told to explain the meaning of the directive to the people. At the same time newspaper employees began to express open dissatisfaction with the policies of their papers. They asked for "clarification of the management's war guilt" and for "democratization" of newspaper policies, and called upon the publishers to turn over direction of the editorial policies to employee committees. This movement was undoubtedly related to the activities of this Command on behalf of a free press.

77. The dispute in the newspaper industry demonstrated sharply the need for an interim labor policy. This Headquarters and the Welfare Ministry have worked out a formula for labor arbitration which is acceptable to both the government and the organized labor movement.

Radio programs, including talks by prominent Japanese liberals and a series of broadcasts by released political prisoners on the radio to explain the Allied directive were initiated. Arrangements were made with a studio for the production of a feature entitled "Now You Can Speak".

78. Work was also initiated with organizations. The Committee for the Total Abolition of Oppressive Laws was formed to "wipe out feudalistic and bureaucratic influences and pave the way for democratic evolution". A program has been announced to carry out propaganda for the masses through lectures at organization meetings, radio and liberal newspapers, and use of motion pictures and theatrical activities for public entertainment. A public rally in Tokyo's largest auditorium, which will be broadcast over a national hook-up, is scheduled. A series of talks will be given to trade union members on the rise and fall of the thought control laws.

79. Freedom of the press was advanced with the elimination of the big publisher and the government control over the paper supply. Previously paper had been allocated to publishers on basis of 70 percent of their pre-war circulation. There was no provision in this procedure for starting of new publications.

In a memorandum dated 26 October the Japanese Government was directed to assume responsibility for distributing newsprint and foreign-type paper by 1 November or as soon thereafter as practicable. This function was removed from the control of the Japan Newspaper League and the Japan Publishers Association.

The government was directed to set up paper rationing sections composed of government officials, representatives of large and small publishers and at least three well-known disinterested individuals. Thus it is hoped that all publishers will get fair and equal access to the available paper supply.

80. After an initial period of apathy following the surrender the Japanese people are beginning to cast aside old fears and are awakening to the possibilities for self-expression afforded them by the occupation. The movement to utilize the newly found rights has gained increasing momentum. All types of discussion groups are being formed. Trade unions are organizing. Formerly "taboo" subjects such as the future of the Imperial Institution are being discussed openly on the street, at public meetings and in the various information media.

"Food" Information Program

81. Very soon after the Occupation Forces arrived in Japan it

became evident that the single most pressing problem facing the Japanese people was the critical shortage of food. More space has been devoted to this question in the newspapers than to any other.

82. A singular similarity in approach by all of the newspapers indicated that a pattern for the treatment of the food problem had been set. The newspapers were content to indulge in aimless castigation of inefficient bureaucrats and exhortations to the people to "improve their lot". In addition, with increasing frequency, releases were prepared by the Japanese press giving heavy play to the severity of the food shortage. Stories on anticipated starvation totals were given prominent space. A survey of the newspaper treatment of the food problem was made and the following conclusions were reached:

The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had published reports showing the food position as of 31 August 1945. These reports indicated that there was going to be a critical shortage of food in Japan during 1946 and consequently the Japanese pleaded for 4,616,000 m/tons of imported rice and 500,000 m/tons of fodder to guarantee an average diet of 2,123 calories per person per day.

An analysis prepared by this Headquarters showed that there was in fact enough food in Japan for 1945, and that by importing 2,144,000 m/tons of rice or its equivalent in 1946, a per capita consumption of 1,800 calories per day per person could be achieved with equitable distribution. Statistics provided for release by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry showed that all shortages were computed on the basis of 2,160 daily caloric intake. However, an examination of the diet record for the years 1931 to date revealed that the diet of the average Japanese in Tokyo in June 1945 was far beneath this figure.

There was a marked absence in the Japanese press of explanations for the critical food shortage. The newspapers devoted much space to the aggravated conditions arising from the shortages, but not one newspaper went into the underlying causes of the situation. In some especially notable cases there was inference that the presence of the Occupational Forces contributed to the trouble.

83. It was felt that as hardships accumulate this winter, the people's unrest might be directed against the Occupation Forces. It became imperative that the Japanese people, and particularly the government, recognize the food problem as one of their own making and one which would require their own efforts for correction and relief. This Headquarters undertook a program of information on the following themes:

Releases on the true caloric needs of the Japanese, tying in with the theme of the present food problems of the Allies and the United States' first obligations to these Allies. Prominent Japanese dietary experts were reached and statements have been secured from them for publication that 1,800 caloric intake is a liberal minimum subsistence diet.

Japanese editorials were asked to supply easily understood stories on the underlying reasons for the food shortage. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was asked to circulate information on actual crop estimates with an unbiased analysis.

Releases are being made through Japanese newspapers encouraging the Japanese people to report hidden food dumps created from former military and naval supplies and stored by the Jap-

anese officers and men during the initial days of demobilization. It is pointed out that recovered food will be returned to the people.

The amount of newspaper space devoted to the food problem has increased. There is currently however an attempt to get at the core of the problem. Farm-peasant unions, agriculturists and dietary experts are all contributing "letters-to-the-editor", and other material for publication. Radio forums on the food problem have also been arranged.

84. While the Japanese masses may remain indifferent to political affairs, this is not true in regard to their nation's economy. Poorly paid and overworked peasants who for many years entertained a vague hostility to the forces of oppression are beginning to come forward. It is quite possible that the pressing problem of food will speed the awakening of the Japanese people to their political and economic consciousness.

Japanese "POW" Information Program

85. When the war with Japan ended on 15 August there were more than 4,000,000 Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees outside the limits of the Japanese homeland. The large majority of these were in China, Korea, Formosa and the Philippines.

It was recognized that this group would present an important problem in the reconstruction of the country. Removed from communication with their families and homeland, they would require considerable mental reconditioning before returning to Japan.

86. For this purpose a tabloid weekly newspaper was especially designed for the orientation and information of prisoners of war. On 5 October at the suggestion of SCAP the three leading Japanese newspapers, Mainichi, Yomi Iuri and Asahi, agreed to publish such a weekly newspaper with the following aims:

- (1) To inform demobilized troops overseas on present conditions in Japan as a defeated nation.
- (2) To show the steps that led Japan to war.
- (3) To show the progress of the occupation regarding food, elections, revision of the Constitution, labor unions, women's suffrage and democratization of the country.
- (4) To show reasons for delay in returning Japanese troops.
- (5) To report on the interest of the people at home in troops overseas.
- (6) To report on world news in order to acquaint the troops with the progress toward a secure world.
- (7) To demonstrate that militarism is ended and that Japan is turning to ways of peace into which demobilized troops must fit in order to live useful and productive lives.

87. Three issues of each of the tabloids have been published to date. Forty thousand weekly copies each are being sent by courier plane to the Philippines and Korea for distribution through the Commanding Generals of these areas. The newspapers are distributed

on the basis of one copy for each 10 POW's.

Since the request for POW's reaction on this operation has not yet been answered, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this program. If reactions are favorable, suggestions will be made to the Commanding General of the China Theater to distribute these papers among the POW's in that area.

ORGANIZATIONS

88. There were no independent organizations in Japan when the American Forces entered the country. Political, social and economic groups were used primarily as vehicles for propaganda. There was no organized liberal movement. Most liberal leaders were either in jail or had faded into obscurity during the war years. Some of the former liberal leaders had yielded to the pressure of the militaristic regime and had become vigorous proponents of the "new order".

The arrival of the American Army brought no immediate change. Pre-war leaders dazed by 15 years of suppression were unsure of themselves and after being subject to years of jingoist and racial propaganda were even unsure of the Allies. Their forces were scattered. The great mass of people were still harrassed by fear of the police and thought control laws.

89. On 4 October the budding liberal movement was given impetus by SCAP through the issuance of the "Magna Charta" directive ordering the removal of all restrictions on civil, religious and political liberties and the freeing of political prisoners. Since that time, organizational activities have developed with ever increasing vigor. SCAP has not attempted to influence the new political groups in any way but steps have been taken to insure that they are given the opportunity to express themselves freely.

90. Although no "political" time has been allocated on the radio, leaders of various political groups have been allowed to go on the air to explain their views on current problems. Newspaper and radio have been instructed to permit and encourage free discussion of all issues which have a bearing on the welfare of the Japanese people, and provide all segments of responsible public opinion with equal access to the channels of public expression. Press and radio have been warned to stop repressing the discussion of the Imperial Institution.

Political Parties

91. At the close of the war the political scene was dominated entirely by the Greater Japan Political Association, a party which was formed along characteristically totalitarian lines. The prewar political parties were dead. The old leaders who were not in jail had been absorbed in the GJPA. New leaders had not yet emerged. Unlike the other Axis countries where at least a spark of democratic resistance to militarism had been kept alive, all opposition to the militarist regime in Japan had been crushed. There was not even the semblance of an underground opposition. The secret police had done its work effectively.

92. For the liberal movement the first month of occupation was mostly a matter of getting people together and becoming oriented to a new, unfamiliar situation. The Socialist Party, the first major political group to make its appearance, held its preliminary organizing conference on 22 September. Other political groups made their debut soon afterward.

93. At the present time there are more than 20 political and quasi-political groups crowding the political scene. The Greater Japan Political Association is now completely inactive although many of its members have reappeared with new party labels. The majority of the new political groups have yet to announce their platforms and since there has not been a free election for many years it is difficult to assess their following. Many of them will undoubtedly merge or disappear altogether as soon as the political situation begins to define itself.

A number of well-known wartime leaders have formed new groups. In view of the resentment against the militarist regime this may turn out to be more of a handicap than an asset. Party lines are blurred and it is difficult to make a sharp distinction between political parties at this time. It appears that the majority of the parties fall into four main groups.

Extreme Right Wing

94. The parties in this group are bound together by personalities as much as by political principles. Virtually all of them are led by men who were prominently identified with the militarist regime. None of them has formally announced a party program but it is apparent that they will seek to salvage as much as possible of the old regime. Judging by their published statements they will probably wage their campaigns chiefly around two issues: preservation of the present powers of the Emperor and opposition to "communism".

The main parties in this group are the Japan National Party, the Proletarian Party and one other party as yet unnamed which is being formed by former leaders of the GJPA. It is doubtful if much can be expected of these groups in the way of vigorous democratic reforms.

Conservatives

95. The Japan Liberal Party is the strongest of the conservative parties. It includes a number of prewar politicians as well as a number of men who were in the Diet during the war but claim that they were only "passive". Although the party has no known connection with the Mitsui-Mitsubishi group, it is generally regarded as the voice of the upper middle class.

Only a portion of the Party's program has been announced thus far. It calls for placing the supreme power in the hands of the Diet and "respect" for human rights. Japan's policy in China is criticized. The Party's stand on the Imperial Institution has not yet been announced. According to reliable sources party leaders favor reducing the prerogatives of the Emperor but would leave him with nominally absolute veto power.

Socialist Party

96. The Socialist Party will emerge as a formidable factor in the coming election if it can maintain unity. There are at least three different factions in the Party, all of them with widely divergent views. The minority left wing is close to the Communist in ideology but the right is extremely conservative and would hardly be regarded as "socialist" by United States standards. Although agreed on a common platform, the differences between them are still very real. Whether their unity can stand the test of a bitter election campaign remains to be seen.

The party program calls for extensive land reforms, development of cooperatives, enactment of wage and hour laws, official recognition of labor unions, establishment of health and unemployment insurance and other special legislation, separation of church and state, abolition of the peerage system and "democratization of Constitution according to the will of the people". Party leaders are believed to differ on the future status of the Emperor and the party has not yet announced its stand on the question.

Radical

97. The Communist Party has not yet formally reconstituted itself, although it has carried on a vigorous program of activity and its presence has been keenly felt on the political scene. Published statements by party leaders indicate that they will carry on a "Popular Front" program approaching that of the Socialist Party in many respects. They have stated that the Japanese people are not ready for socialism.

The main objective of the Party will be to break the hold of the "financial oligarchy". They seek to establish a "democratic Japan" in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration. They have announced that they would leave medium and small industries in the hands of the capitalists.

The Communists have been the only group to call for the total abolition of the Imperial Institution, but there are some indications that this stand may be modified with the arrival of the Japanese Communist group at present staying at the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party in Yenan. This group, according to newspaper reports, does not regard the Emperor question as a burning issue and is willing to compromise on the point to provide a basis for unity with other factions.

Labor and Farm Organizations

98. The labor and farm organizations have been assisted in securing adequate representation in the various information media, particularly on the radio. Farm and labor leaders have been given the opportunity to go on the air. Portions of the national convention of the Farmers Union were broadcast. There has been no complaint from farm or labor leaders that the news of farm and labor organizations has been distorted or reported untruthfully.

Youth

99. There was no vestige of an independent youth movement when the Occupation Forces entered the country. The liberal student movement of the early 1930's had been completely crushed. Its leaders were either in jail or had matured and lost interest in the movement. The youth of the country were organized in a National Youth Corps, a strongly nationalistic group which was entrenched in all the schools and was used chiefly to mobilize the youth for war. This Youth Corps has been disbanded and no independent youth movement of a forceful nature has yet arisen.

Women

100. From time immemorial the great mass of Japanese women has been restricted both by custom and legislation from any form of activity which would make them appear as equal of men. Bound to the home, their sole role has been to serve as housekeeper and mother in the family. Only a few women, through contact with western culture, became vitally concerned with lifting women from their

feudal status but they made little progress except among the intellectuals.

101. Beginning with the conflict in Manchuria, the government began to show active interest in women's organizations and after a number of reorganizations two nationwide groups were established. They were the Aikoku Fujinkai, comprising the upper and upper middle classes, with a membership of about 1,000,000 and the Kokugo Fujinkai, with members from the lower and lower middle classes, totaling 1,000,000. As the war progressed, these two organizations were merged into the Dai Nippon Fujinkai.

102. Officers of this organization were "elected" in name only. Generally they were government appointed. Funds were secured through donations. The Empress contributed a gift of 1,000,000 yen. The program was largely concerned with home aspects of the war effort such as welfare for the soldiers, aid to their families and promotion of scrap and bond drives. Women at rallies were expected to do what they were told. There was no freedom of discussion and no chance to decide on their own program of activities. Attendance was compulsory.

Despite the dictatorial character of the Dai Nippon Fujinkai it had one value. For the first time in their lives, women throughout Japan had an excuse to leave their homes and become a part of an organized group.

103. With the announcement that they now had the right to vote, the prewar liberal women were encouraged to use their new rights. The following steps have been taken: (1) a list of laws restricting the rights of women has been compiled; (2) nationally known women leaders have been given the opportunity to appear on the radio; (3) a "Woman's Hour" has been established; (4) officers of women's organizations have been advised on methods of organization; (5) a library of information on women's organizations in other countries is being brought from the United States and (6) a number of films on the subject of women's place in life are in production.

104. The films in process of production extol the life of famous Japanese liberal women who before the war were heroines to many Japanese women. They emphasize self-reliance, the new place of Japanese women in life and equality between men and women. These include "The Life of Hidako Kagayama" which will be released in February, "Half Her Life" a film based on the need for emancipation of women and "Design for Marriage" a documentary film on voting which stresses self-reliance on the part of women.

105. The following groups now have a membership of less than 1,000 but their membership includes capable women who are planning nationwide branches. (1) Reactionary groups. One of these which is being observed by this Headquarters is headed by women active in prewar government sponsored groups. (2) A large number of small unorganized groups which have infinite possibilities despite lack of experienced leadership. These groups, which are in an amorphous state and are being given help as they are discovered, include, among others, women's press association and college alumnae groups. (3) Union groups such as the Nihon Joshi Zemmei, which includes in its program the organization of technical schools, education on women suffrage, the enactment of child labor laws and safety and sanitation laws for women.

106. While new developments in the status of Japanese women have not yet reached the masses, women leaders are in general intelligent and progressive. They are aware of the shortcomings of the movement and are undoubtedly capable of correcting them.

They are eager for help from such American organizations as the League of Women Voters and business and professional women's clubs.

ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH

107. Daily analysis of the Japanese press is made and trends noted. At first the press failed to report news fully and accurately even after this Headquarters removed government restrictions, but under constant advisory direction press coverage and treatment now show definite improvement. Public opinion polls are being planned and personnel secured to measure public reactions to the progress of occupation. A reference library of American materials will be set up in Tokyo to furnish the Japanese public, editors, educators and writers with facts about America, international affairs and the war.

108. The vernacular Japanese press is being scanned daily. It was discovered shortly after the beginning of occupation that the press was restricted from, or perhaps had no intention of, voluntarily explaining the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration or the aims, policies or directives of the Supreme Commander.

Following the issuance of the directive of 4 October 1945 which called for the immediate abrogation of all Japanese Government restrictions on information dissemination agencies, analysis showed that certain subjects continued to be systematically ignored by press and radio while other subjects were distorted or grossly underplayed.

109. Analysis to date shows that the press is responding slowly but surely. First noticeable reaction occurred in the handling of foreign items. More space was devoted to world news and there was more information per news item. The next improvement was noted in articles which encourage social thinking, the activities of political parties, strikes in protest of wrongs, government attention or inattention to social difficulties and a growing discussion of war crimes and criminals.

110. There remains much to be desired in an adequate and independent press explanation of the aims and activities of the Occupation Forces but here too improvement has been noted. Especially significant was the first open discussion of the future status of the Emperor in the Japanese press when "Asahi" featured a roundup of representative world opinion on the subject. Press discussions heretofore had been limited chiefly to delicately worded comments on the extent of the possible revision of the Emperor's powers without reference to the possibility of the total abolition of the Imperial Institution.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION
of
NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES
in
JAPAN and KOREA

Number 1.

September - October 1945

23

PART V
KOREA

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SECTION 1
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GENERAL

Occupation

1. The occupation of South Korea came so rapidly that preparations for civil affairs activities in the area were far from complete, both in terms of policy directives and personnel. The United States Forces suddenly found themselves charged with the occupation of an area of approximately 36,700 square miles populated by about 17 million people. They were to treat this area as a liberated country and to foster conditions which would bring about the establishment of a free and independent nation capable of taking its place as a responsible and peaceful member of the United Nations.

Japanese Influence

2. Since formal annexation of Korea to Japan in 1910, the Japanese have made every effort to deprive Korea of the ability to stand alone as an independent country. Korean industry has been controlled by the Japanese and the trade and commerce of the country have been made subservient to Japan.

3. The Japanese have exercised absolute and autocratic power with no pretense of self-government. All except subordinate government positions have been filled by Japanese. The police, both civil and military, have been thoroughly Japanese and efficiently utilized as an instrument of tyranny.

Complicating Factors

4. Conditions at the time of surrender were complicated by the presence of large numbers of Japanese soldiers and Korean collaborators, who are intensely hated by the Koreans; by the strong expectation of the Korean people of immediate independence and complete sweeping out of the Japanese and liquidation of their holdings; by the artificial division of Korea along the 38th parallel, which split the industrial north from the agricultural south and divided the country between occupying forces; and by the confused political situation involving dozens of parties with widely conflicting views and a broad split between radical and conservative elements.

Occupation Problems

5. Besides fulfilling the normal obligations of maintaining law and order and carrying out the immediate task of disarming and repatriating the Japanese, the United States Forces have set about their longer-term job of separating Korea from Japan and paving the way for independent Korean governmental, economic, and social institutions.

6. The lack of qualified Korean administrators untainted by Japanese collaboration and the absence of any political party truly representative of the people made necessary either the continuance of the Japanese administration or the establishment of some measure of direct Military Government. The latter alternative has been followed.

7. A proclamation of General MacArthur of 7 September 1945 announced the establishment of control and the assumption of all governmental authority in South Korea; a United States Military Governor has been appointed; a Military Government has been organized to parallel the Government General at Seoul. Military Government teams are operating in the three principal cities occupied by United States Forces (Seoul, Fusan and Jinsen) and are being deployed to other provincial and local centers as they arrive in Korea.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Military Government Organization

8. Military Government at the top level (Government General) is organized to correspond to the existing central government organization in Korea. The United States Military Governor is acting Governor General of the Korean Government General and also commands all Military Government personnel not attached to tactical units.

The Military Governor is assisted by a Civil Administrator who coordinates the activities of the Secretariat and the various Bureaus with the staff of the Military Governor. The Secretariat is composed of the following sections: General Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Information, Personnel (Korean Civil Service), Army Administration, Property Custodian, Planning and Accounts.

The nine bureaus are: Finance, Mining and Industry, Agriculture and Commerce, Public Safety, Public Health, Education, Justice, Communications, and Transportation. These bureaus (staffed with Military Government officers and Korean officials), are the operating agencies of the central government. The Directors of the Bureaus and the Civil Administrator constitute the Cabinet of the Governor General.

Policy questions must be submitted by the various bureaus to the appropriate section of the Secretariat for final study before being placed in the hands of the Civil Administrator.

Below the level of the central government, Military Government teams are attached to tactical units and are under the command of such units. Liaison between the Government General and the teams is maintained through the Secretariat. As the problems of the occupation become more complicated and more civilian in nature it is expected that the provincial and municipal teams will be removed from command of tactical units and placed directly under the Military Governor.

Military Government teams have been operating at Seoul, Jinsen and Fusan and will operate in other areas as they become available. It has been impossible to spread permanent occupation

forces over very large areas. Small detachments have been sent to important points throughout South Korea to carry the United States flag, to observe activities of the disarmed Japanese Forces and to report conditions to higher headquarters.

Establishment of Military Control

9. United States policy prohibits official recognition or utilization for political purposes of any so-called Korean provisional government or other political organization by the United States Forces and requires the prompt removal of Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans from civil administration. Because there were no authorities then available to administer the country, the establishment of full-scale, direct Military Government has been necessary.

The substitution of American Military Government for the Japanese Government has not met with complete approval and many Korean elements desire immediate and complete independence. They interpret the "in due course" language of the Cairo Declaration to mean "in a few days".

Removal of Japanese Officials

10. The Koreans have been insistent upon the removal of Japanese officials and any attempts to utilize their services by Military Government have been unfavorably received. The Koreans feel that they have been liberated and will not obey Japanese officials.

All important Japanese officials in the Government General at Seoul have been removed. In some cases Japanese officials, although relieved of authority, have been requisitioned to do essential work. These will be relieved as soon as substitutes are found.

11. The Koreans do not have qualified personnel except for the low-level positions and have very few skilled technicians for essential public utilities and services. Qualified Koreans who held responsible positions are generally thought to be collaborators. Removal and replacement of officials in provincial and local governments is undertaken as soon as it is possible to assign Military Government teams to the areas.

Korean Advisory Councils

12. In order to provide for a greater share in the government by Koreans, Military Government has made use of advisory councils of Koreans; the members have been appointed to represent various shades of political opinion, but with no commitment to the organizations to which they may belong.

An advisory council of 11 Koreans (educators, lawyers, business men, radical and conservative political leaders) was appointed to advise the Government General at Seoul on 5 October. The reception of the advisory councils has been somewhat lukewarm by those Koreans who want immediate independence.

Civil Service

13. The Military Government expects to make no basic change in the Civil Service System established by the Japanese except to eliminate regulations which discriminate on the basis of race, nationality or politics. An order was issued by the Military Governor on 5 October which provided that the temporary appointment of officials of the first (Shokunin) and second (Sonin) ranks will only be made by the Military Government.

The appointment and dismissal of the third (Hannin) rank officials will not require the approval of the Military Government.

14. Most of the records and pension funds of the Korean Civil Service are kept in Tokyo by the Japanese civil service administration. Arrangements are being made to transfer necessary records and funds to Korea. The Japanese Government has been prohibited from promoting or otherwise exercising direct control over civil servants in Korea.

Foreign Affairs

15. Russian consular officials are stationed in Seoul. A reciprocal privilege does not exist in the North.

16. All connections between the Japanese Government in Tokyo and the diplomatic and consular officials of the former Japanese created government in Peking and elsewhere in China have been severed. Such officials in China will henceforth receive any necessary orders from the American Military Government of Korea.

Repatriation

17. Korea cannot attain final stability until the Japanese Forces have been repatriated. This is being done rapidly and without unusual incident. As of 25 October a total of 110,000 Japanese soldiers and sailors had been returned to Japan. It is estimated that by 20 November all Japanese Army and Navy personnel will have been evacuated from Korea except for certain Army personnel retained at Fusan to aid in repatriation of Japanese civilians.

The number of civilian Japanese living in Korea was some 700,000; by 25 October 71,000 of these had been transferred to Japan and in return 160,000 Koreans in Japan had been brought back to Korea.

POLITICAL PARTIES

18. At a recent meeting of political leaders called by the Military Governor, 1200 Koreans appeared. As of 24 October, 54 parties were registered with Military Government Headquarters. Their principal officers have been catalogued and from most of them statements of platforms have been obtained. The aims of these parties are in many cases vague and obscure and some of them have only a few dozen followers.

Some of the ideas they have in common are: seizure of Japanese property, expulsion of Japanese persons from Korea and immediate independence and self-rule. The love of Koreans for political factions, the lengthy suppression of political activity by the Japanese and the difficulty of underground operations have combined to cause a wide split in political trends.

19. All political parties agree that unification of the various groups is a necessary preliminary to political maturity. The chief contenders in the struggle to control the unification movement are the Korean People's Republic (radical) and the Korean Democratic Party (conservative). Both sides claim Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee, in an attempt to capitalize on the popularity of these two leading figures.

20. The Korean People's Republic is the most active and articulate party. Its platform calls for changes in land ownership, a

more rapid curbing of Japanese and Pro-Japanese Koreans from high places, higher wages and stable prices. The conservative program is cautious and full of vague generalities.

21. On 10 October a preliminary meeting of representatives of 43 parties was held to discuss unification. An action committee, "Unification Committee for Political Party Activities" composed of a Communist, a Nationalist and a Radical, was appointed on 14 October to lay the groundwork for unification. This effort has met with little success as 33 of the member parties have left the organization. The Korean Democratic Party refused to attend any meetings, claiming the presence of the People's Republic of Korea made it impossible.

22. Military Government has thus far placed two requirements on the parties.

(1) That each form suitable committees for drafting a proposed framework of government which is consistent with the needs and traditions of Korea.

(2) That these committees submit this proposal together with a plan for substituting the proposed new government for Military Government in a way that will result in the minimum disruption of industry, commerce, law and order. (To date this assignment has been given only to two parties: The Korean Democratic Party and the Women's Nationalist Party.)

23. Numerous posters and pamphlets have appeared, most of which are distributed by the People's Republic of Korea. They claim that the party represents the people and should be recognized as the government, that Military Government is being advised by Japanese "traitors", that reports of Russian lawlessness in the North are false, that Russian policies of equal land distribution and abolition of land taxes should be adopted in the South, and that the People's Republic of Korea represents a unified government of all Korea, regardless of the dividing line.

The radical propaganda campaign singles out the Korean Democratic Party as a tool of the capitalists, landowners and collaborators. All problems are simplified by blaming the Military Government and its advisers, the members of the Korean Democratic Party.

On 13 October a pamphlet entitled "The Traitors and the Patriots" appeared. It was sponsored by the "Government of the People of Korea". It attacks the statement of the press (10 October) of the Military Governor that Military Government is the only government in South Korea and calls on the people to stop pronouncements of irresponsible political groups.

The pamphlet claims that the People's Republic of Korea is the legal government of Korea by virtue of an assembly which met in Seoul on 6 October before the arrival of the American Forces. This pamphlet denounces certain Korean advisers to Military Government and other Koreans appointed to leading positions in civilian administration.

A sampling of public opinion indicates that the radical propaganda has been partially successful. The handbills and pamphlets of the conservatives have been inept and offer no concrete program or specific action. Military Government recently prohibited the further publishing or distribution of posters and handbills.

24. The Korean Communist Party has shown little direct political activity aside from a handbill ("A Manifesto") found in Seoul on 20 October. This party has been publicized as a supporter of the

Korean "People's Republic". A meeting of communist sympathizers was held on 25 September to form a solid front.

25. The return of Dr. Syngman Rhee, long-time representative of the Korean Provisional Government in the United States, has been hailed by all factions and the press. At a welcoming held in Seoul on 18 October Dr. Rhee urged patience, cooperation with Military Government and personal self-sacrifice.

At an unscheduled liberation-day speech before 50,000 Koreans in Seoul on 20 October, Dr. Rhee stated Korea's opposition to the division along the 38th parallel. "We remained unconquered and undivided under Japanese oppression, and we shall fight to remain so at the cost of our very lives." He advised the people that the answer to the question of whether Korea was to remain divided would be easier if the Koreans cooperated and if they showed they were able to control their people, act together and work with the United States Government and Occupation Forces.

26. On 23 October, a meeting of 200 persons (representatives of all prominent parties) was held with Dr. Rhee. A central Committee for Korean Independence to unify all existing parties was proposed and will probably be organized shortly. The presence of Dr. Rhee and the desire of all parties for independence are strong influences towards the consolidation of political parties.

27. Kim Koo, President of the Korean "Provisional Government", has been invited to return to Korea from Chungking. It is expected that he will cooperate with Dr. Rhee in the move to consolidate Korean political parties. Officials of the Korean "Provisional Government" and Kim Kyusik (leader of the Revolutionary Party, the more radical group supporting the "Provisional Government" in China) are expected later.

28. All persons returning to Korea are informed that they return in the capacity of private citizens and that there is no implication that the United States will recognize them as constituting a provisional government or having powers over and above those exerted through personal leadership.

29. On 25 October the conservative Korean Democratic Party joined with the Korean Communist Party and the middle-of-the-road Nationalist Party in a resolution which gave support to the "Provisional Government" in Chungking and urged its immediate recall.

30. The newspaper Mai-Il Shin Bo on 28 October analyzed the central political problem as reconciliation of the supporters of the "Provisional Government" in Chungking with the People's Republic of Korea and its adherents. It hoped that Dr. Rhee might accomplish this objective.

31. The Korean People's Republic is going ahead with a program of self-expansion. On 29 October it announced elaborate plans for the second "conference representing all the people" to be held in Seoul on 1 March 1946.

Elections of representatives for this conference will be held -- one representative for each 30,000 inhabitants. Candidates may nominate themselves and campaign freely. Suffrage will be offered to every Korean above the age of 18, regardless of sex, occupation, wealth, religion, or social status. All Japanese, as well as Koreans who worked with the Japanese for anything more than a salary, are denied voting privileges.

32. "Trusteeship" has met with wide disapproval in Korea. The Communist Party, the Nationalist Party, the Korean People's Republic and the Korean Democratic Party unite in denouncing it. Even the latter party has called it "a great insult to Korea" and has announced that as a concrete demonstration against it everyone is willing to stop cooperating with the Military Government.

The press has carried out a loud and continuous clamor against trusteeship. Each issue of every paper contains adverse comments. The Koreans feel that they are capable of establishing an independent government immediately.

INTERZONE ACTIVITIES

33. The present division of Korea into Russian-controlled North and American-controlled South presents many problems of policy and operation. The Korean people are greatly concerned with the artificial division of their country.

34. South Korea is the hub of the communications system. It also has the principal cereal crops. On the other hand it is dependent on North Korea for coal and electric power. Coal which is not yet obtainable from North Korea must now be imported from Kyushu or shipped half way around the peninsula from a small coal port on the eastern shore south of 38 degrees. The amount and duration of electrical supply is controlled by North Korea without consultation with consumers south of the line. Neither section of the country is self-sufficient.

35. The following commodities reported to be available in the Russian zone are needed in the American zone: coal, soy beans, wheat, salt, steel pig iron, aluminum, ferro-molybdenum, ferro-tungsten, fertilizer, super phosphate, ammonium sulphate, calcium cyanide, apatite ore, pyrite ore, borax, copper sulphate, caustic soda, liquid chlorine, nitric acid, hydrochloric acid, ammonia, sulphuric acid, rails and coupling parts, coal tar and barley.

36. Commodities available in the American zone which may be surplus for exchange are: rice; and when production is resumed, molybdenum concentrates, graphite mineral, asbestos mineral, zinc metallic, lead metallic, copper metallic, fluorite mineral, manganese ore and mining machinery.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS

37. The judicial system of Korea has followed basically that of Japan. It was headed by a Bureau of Justice in the Government General which included under its jurisdiction one Supreme Court in Seoul, three Courts of Appeal (at Seoul and P'yongyang in the American zone and at Taegu in the Russian zone), and a number of district courts with branches and sub-branches.

Japanese occupied all important positions in the Bureau and the courts. In 1939 there were only eight Koreans among 120 procurators and only 46 among 235 judges. As in Japan the Bureau supervised penal institutions.

Bureau of Justice

38. When the Military Government entered Seoul on 8 September 1945 a preliminary investigation of the Bureau of Justice was begun. It revealed that high officials had illegally destroyed important official documents, including part of the fingerprint records and had embezzled government funds. The director was immediately put under arrest.

Conferences held with the officials of the National Bar Association resulted in recommendations for the temporary appointment of Koreans in the Bureau.

Further investigation was pursued and by 15 October 1945 approximately four million yen of embezzled funds had been recovered. Some of the destroyed records were restored from fractional documents available in other bureaus. The arrested director was formally removed from office and a Military Government officer was appointed to fill the vacancy.

Koreans were selected for all other important positions replacing the Japanese officials. Young Korean employees already holding minor positions in the Bureau were in general retained and some Japanese temporarily retained for essential work.

The Bureau was reorganized and now contains the following departments: General Affairs, Civil, Criminal, Penal, Bar Associations and Admissions. The office of the Supervisor of Provincial and City Administration of Justice is under these departments. In addition there are the following officers which report directly to the director: Director of Korean Code Drafting, Secretary of Special Criminal Investigation Committee, Secretary of Advisory Council on Administration of Justice and, by a pending order, Supervisor of Special Property Courts.

Courts

39. All Japanese judges and procurators have been removed from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals at Seoul, the Juvenile Court at Seoul and the district courts at Seoul and Fusan and have been replaced by Koreans. District court branches at Songdo and Chuun Chu were abolished and replaced by district courts with Korean judges.

The Japanese judges and procurators on Saishu-To (Qualpart Island) having fled their posts, a Korean judge and procurator were appointed and the court reopened. Replacement eventually extended to all district courts and courts of appeal in the American zone.

40. The former Japanese method of exercising summary police punishment without trial has been abolished and in all districts a procedure is being introduced requiring the police to report promptly all arrests to the district courts on a special delivery form to the procurator for the custody of arrested persons.

41. After 15 August 1945 when the Japanese officials learned of the acceptance of the surrender terms they embarked on a systematic and extensive looting of government funds. In order to provide prompt and adequate investigation and punishment of these criminal acts without putting an impossible burden on the existing court system, a new organization and procedure was developed.

42. On 11 October the Military Governor appointed a Special Criminal Investigation Committee consisting of nine judges, three each from the Supreme Court at Seoul and the District Court at Seoul. A Secretary and certain other officials were also named. This committee was directed to hold hearings on such matters as might be referred to it by the director of the Bureau of Justice.

43. To prevent clogging of the district courts with the many judicial problems arising from the blocking of transfers of Japanese and other enemy property, the investigation and settling of fraudulent transfers, the determination of real ownership of property, and similar questions, Special Property Courts are being established as

independent branches of the district courts. These will be under the control of a Supervisor of Special Property Courts in the Bureau of Justice.

Penal Institutions

44. In the reorganization of the Bureau of Justice the supervision of penal institutions was made a separate department instead of merely a subsection as formerly and all Japanese officials have been removed and replaced by Koreans.

45. Investigation revealed that all the Japanese officials of the prisons in Seoul, namely the old Seoul Prison and the modern Westgate Prison, were involved in illegally destroying prison records, distributing prison funds and selling prison goods and pocketing the proceeds. All were arrested and imprisoned promptly and replaced by Koreans. The two prisons were merged into one, Westgate Prison, to which all prisoners were transferred. The old Seoul Prison is now undergoing repair and rehabilitation.

Immediate investigation and reorganization of all other penal institutions in the American zone is planned.

Legal Division

46. The Legal Division is in the General Affairs Section of the Secretariat of the Government General and is under the supervision of the General Counsel. The Director of the Bureau of Justice serves concurrently as Secretary of the General Affairs Section and General Counsel.

The work of the General Counsel and Legal Division includes legal advice to the Military Government and its Bureaus and Sections, drafting Military Government orders issued by the Military Governor and by Bureaus and Sections in his name and approving all Military Government instruments as to form and legal effectiveness.

In the future the Legal Division will be required to draft or pass upon numerous corporate charters and other corporate and financial instruments, contracts, leases and licenses, and orders and technical instructions to accomplish reorganization of the industrial and commercial economy of Korea away from Japanese domination and towards private enterprise and free economy.

Legislation

47. Legislation now issued includes the following:

Proclamation by CINCAFPAC

- | | |
|--------------------------|----------|
| ✓ No. 1. General | 7 Sep 45 |
| ✓ 2. Crimes and offenses | 7 Sep 45 |
| ✓ 3. Currency | 7 Sep 45 |

General Orders by Commanding General including

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| ✓ No. 2. Officer Appointments in Military Government | 14 Sep 45 |
| ✓ 3. Removal of Certain Japanese Officials in Government General | 17 Sep 45 |

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Ordinances by Military Governor

No. 1. Establishment of Bureau of Public Health	24 Sep 45
2. Concerning Property Transfers	25 Sep 45
3. Collection of Arms from Civilians (Swords and Knives)	26 Sep 45
4. Concerning Japanese Military and Naval Property	28 Sep 45
5. Disarming Civilians (Firearms)	29 Sep 45
6. Reopening and Operation of Schools	29 Sep 45
7. Abolishing Local Affairs Section in Secretariat and Transferring Functions to Planning Section	1 Oct 45
8. Establishing Foreign Affairs and Property Control Sections in Secretariat	1 Oct 45
9. Maximum Tenant Farmer's Rents	5 Oct 45
10. Registration of Japanese Nationals	8 Oct 45
11. Repeal of Laws	9 Oct 45
12. Shifting of Certain Functions Between Bureaus	9 Oct 45
13. Free Postage to Armed Forces	10 Oct 45
14. Wages for Civilian Labor, other than Civil Service, and for Civil and Military Governments	10 Oct 45
15. Change of Names of Certain Institutions	16 Oct 45

General Orders by Military Governor including

No. 8. Prohibition of Business Dealings by Military Government Personnel in Korea	6 Oct 45
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Miscellaneous Forms

(1) General Licenses by Finance Bureau including:

No. 5. Property Transfers (Reference Ordinance No 2)	25 Sep 45
No. 7. Property Transfers (Reference Ordinance No 2)	25 Sep 45

(2) General Notices by Military Government including:

No. 1. Establishing Free Market in Rice	5 Oct 45
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(3) Removals issued by Military Governor removing individuals from positions in government. Publications numbered consecutively.

(4) Appointments issued by Military Governor appointing individuals to positions in government. Publications numbered consecutively.

(5) Bureau Discharges issued by respective Directors of Bureaus but published in a single series and numbered consecutively.

Military Occupation Courts

48. Pursuant to authorization from Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, the Commanding General XXIV Corps delegated authority to appoint provost courts to the Commanding Generals of the 6th, 7th, and 40th Divisions and ASCOM 24. The appointing authorities exercise review and all records are forwarded to the Judge Advocate XXIV Corps.

49. As of 25 October 1945 a total of 110 cases were disposed of in these courts, a large proportion of which were larceny cases. The Commanding General XXIV Corps has not delegated authority to convene Military Commissions, there having been no occasion for the exercise of such jurisdiction.

PUBLIC SAFETY

Replacement of Undesirable Personnel

50. In general Koreans have accepted liberation quietly and there were no large outbreaks of any kind. The major problem in the field of public safety was the purging of the police of Japanese and pro-Japanese Korean elements and their replacement with suitable personnel.

The civilian police system was utilized by the Japanese as the chief means of controlling Korea. Besides the usual police functions, the Korean police had jurisdiction over the fields of politics, economic activity, education, religion, morals, health, public welfare and fire control. At the time of occupation at least 70 percent of the personnel were Japanese.

The first step was the removal of Governor General Abe and the Police Commissioner and a sweeping personnel revision of the police in Keijo District which was completed by 13 September. Subsequently police forces in the principal cities (Seoul, Jinsen, Fusan) were purged. Reorganization of the police in provincial and local centers is a primary step undertaken when Military Government teams enter such areas.

The Korean police replacements are often untrained (some ex-military personnel are used) and are not fully respected by the people. Some law enforcement must be done by the Military Police, and the Korean police in certain localities are inclined to rely too much on United States authority. In Jinsen the civilian police work side by side with the Military Police but in Seoul and Fusan the Military Police for the most part work alone.

Military Government Police

51. On 17 September control of the Government General Police Bureau passed to the Military Government. The Military Governor has established a Bureau of Police as one of the functional Bureaus in his office to parallel the Korean Government General. The Chief of the Bureau of Police is also the Provost Marshal General. The Bureau of Police has the following sections: Police Affairs, Economic Police, Public Peace, Publications and Defense. The Public Health function has been transferred to a separate bureau.

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52. By 29 September the Military Government Police Section at Seoul had terminated all activities of "Peace Preservation" and had removed from office all personnel performing these activities. An investigation and report was made of the fire-defense services of the capital which were in bad condition. A total of 1,556 Korean police recruits were released to the Keiki Military Government Provincial Team.

53. A Police Academy class for the training of Korean recruits opened on 15 October and 17 Koreans were tentatively appointed on the training school staff. Some 450 students were recruited from Seoul and 50 from Fusan. In order to stimulate the esprit de corps of the police it is proposed to add insignia of rank to their uniforms. At the present time they wear the same uniform as that worn under Japanese control.

54. At Fusan 800 Koreans were needed to bring the police force up to strength. Beginning 8 October arrangements were made to train 125 men a week.

55. At Jinsen the former Korean police chief took over the department on 2 October. The following day 87 Japanese police were dismissed. As early as 10 October the authorized police strength in Jinsen was 204.

Law Enforcement

56. On 8 October Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Korea, promulgated Ordinance No. 10 which restricted travel of persons of Japanese nationality and required registration with their local block associations. This security measure is enforced by the civilian police.

57. A number of riots and disturbances were caused by irresponsible Korean elements and it was generally found that the civilian police are not fully capable of dealing with them. Examples are:

(1) On 3 October Korean laborers returning from Japan rioted in the Sung district because of the suspension of payment to them from the 5 million yen fund set aside by the Japanese for this purpose, pending investigation of the legality of the fund. The Provost Marshal was requested to post Military Police at eight district offices in the area.

(2) On 18 October it was reported that an organization called the "Independent Party" ordered the mayor of Changnyong to dismiss the police force on or before 16 October by which time the party would take over the city government. The police thereupon quit and refused to obey a United States order to return to duty.

(3) On 20 October 15 young Koreans (Members of the Korean Preparatory Army in training 10 miles east of Seoul) who had attempted to murder a Military Government interpreter were interrogated.

(4) On 25 October it was reported that a political party known as the "People's Republic of Korea" had taken over the town government of Hadong (70 miles west of Fusan) and refused to recognize the Military Government. Party officials stated that it would require force to remove them. United States troops were sent to arrest the officials and replace them with approved personnel.

58. It is necessary to control the private armies which have sprung up in Korea by diverting their energies to useful channels and by strengthening the police. The United States Army authorities in Korea are considering the establishment of a national constabulary to maintain order and to provide a nucleus from which a Korean military force can be developed.

SECTION 2
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN KOREA

C O N T E N T S

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AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

1. The Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce of the Government General as of 17 October 1945 included 19 U.S. Army officers aided by 76 Koreans. In addition there were in the Bureau those Koreans who formerly worked under Japanese controlled regime in the Bureau. Of 198 Japanese formerly employed, 176 have been discharged and Koreans supplied by trusted agencies are being hired as replacements.

Food and Grain

2. A rice shortage in October as well as immediate absence of food at distribution points in large cities was solved by an immediate seizing of all warehouses, by quick inventories, by arranging for U. S. trucks and repaired Japanese trucks to furnish necessary transportation, by forbidding food exports from any ports, and finally by taking over complete control of the Chosen Food Company, which was renamed the Korean Commodity Company and staffed by U. S. Army officers.

Inventories were made of other foods and a balanced ration based on the reduced amount of rice available was distributed. Shipment of grain and other foods between provinces was ordered to equalize available supplies and agents were deputized to travel in the province to stimulate the movement of vegetables into market and to make purchases for authorized agencies.

A bumper rice crop is indicated for 1946. About 400,000 tons of fertilizer are required annually. It can be produced in the northern (Russian) area, but unless pending negotiations between the two governments produce a satisfactory solution, the fertilizer shortage will be acute.

Available fertilizer is being distributed to retailers through the Chosen Farmers' Association. The present grain ration is 2 go, 5 shaku, (approximately 12½ ounces) with double this amount for laborers. Rationing appears to be proceeding on an orderly basis.

Price Control and Open Market

3. The former controlled economy required immediate adjustments of pegged prices which were so low that the black market was not only inevitable but necessary. A Price and Wage Board was formed to consolidate information and decide matters involving prices and wages.

A free market in rice was established and the quasi-governmental Korean Commodity Company, capable of handling nearly half the total crop, was allowed to remain active in the competitive field to insure reasonable prices and distribution. A similar solution is being formulated for nearly all other commodities except scarce government-controlled items such as sugar, salt, ginseng and possibly drugs.

Fisheries

4. The fishing industry practically collapsed during the war, especially after 15 August 1945. In the province of Kyongsang Namdo, 860 tons of fish were produced in July 1945 as against 8,510 tons in July 1944. No fish are being canned at present due to insufficient supply. Plants and equipment are reported to be in good condition. Oil is scarce and the present supply of nets and rope will be exhausted by 1 March 1946.

The fishing industry has revived in the Jinsen area largely because of the aggressive action taken by the United States Forces. Investigation is being made of the Korean Fisheries Exploitation Company, the Chosen Fisheries Corporation, and their subsidiaries, all Japanese owned and controlled. These will be taken over and operated by Military Government.

Reorganization of key associations is in progress and opening of coastal waters, accompanied by publicity, was initiated. Fishing cooperative members agreed to resume fishing at once.

Domestic Commerce

5. Trade is almost at a standstill but is expected to revive as soon as raw materials are available and general conditions improve. Advertising and publicity have produced a large number of small entrepreneurs who indicate a desire to enter the market. The Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce is encouraging the handicraft industry by making available raw materials and emphasizing Korean art.

Sericulture

6. Korean counsellors have strongly advised that the silk-worm industry be promoted to the extent of establishing a separate department of sericulture in the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce. With the decline of the Japanese silk industry, the Koreans believe that this industry can become very important to their country.

Korea is 90 percent dependent on Japanese silkworm producers, and information that Japanese mulberry areas will be plowed for food crops led to a request for import of 150,000 sheets of eggs from Japan.

INDUSTRY, LABOR AND FUEL

7. The Bureau of Mining and Industry in the Government General supervises this field. By 20 October the Bureau had compiled lists of the most important factories with data as to ownership, employees and raw materials.

8. New factories to provide such items as boilers, grinding wheels, precision instruments, machinery, farm tools, chemicals, silk, clothing, shoes and paper are being opened. The public has been notified by broadcast that plants could be opened under Korean owners without waiting for transfer of title from former Japanese owners.

Labor

9. The Labor Section within the Bureau of Mining and Industry supervises labor relations. It will undertake arbitration in case of labor disputes and has submitted plans for labor legislation to a group of prominent Koreans.

10. The chief labor problem has been to persuade the Koreans to return to work. Liberation for many of them meant a prolonged holiday. The work-stoppage was aggravated by closing down of war plants and uncertainties as to ownership and control in Japanese industries.

Many workers objected to working for Japanese-owned industries. Returned Korean "slave laborers" from Japan have added to unrest and increased unemployment. A further factor in the prevailing unwillingness to work is easy money.

Just before surrender the Japanese in Korea are reported to have distributed large sums as bonuses to Koreans in their employ apparently with the dual motive of creating a belated good will for themselves and embarrassing the Americans by stimulating inflation. The Military Government is making efforts to re-engage Koreans in the work of rebuilding their country. This task is being stressed at every opportunity - in speeches by the Military Governor, in press releases, in radio broadcasts and in the distribution of leaflets.

Fuel

11. The fuel problem in Korea is a matter of shortage of coal which limits transportation and industrial production. The most recent reports indicate that South Korea faces a shortage of 150,000 tons of bituminous and 167,500 tons of anthracite coal a month.

By 31 December, local production of anthracite will not exceed 62,500 tons a month, compared with an estimated requirement of 230,000 tons a month. The coal problem is particularly irritating because the Russian zone normally provides for the whole country, but the lack of proper liaison with the Russians has meant that South Korea must look elsewhere for its coal.

Some coal has been shipped from Kyushu and arrangements are being made to ship anthracite from an 800,000 ton stock-pile at Sanchok (a small port on the East Coast just below 38°) to Fusan. If Manchurian soft coal can be made available, South Korea can provide railroad gondolas to move 90,000 tons a month and locomotives to handle it south of 38°. The delivery of coal from the Russian zone was put high on the list of subjects demanding urgent negotiation.

TRANSPORTATION

12. The Bureau of Transportation has under its jurisdiction railroads, navigation and shipping, civilian air lines and air fields, and the regulation and control of a group of truck units. It is also responsible for establishing rates, navigational aids, and the administration and repair of harbors and docks. A portion of the customs service is under the Bureau of Transportation and is operated in close coordination with the police.

The Bureau has started civilian air training schools for Koreans.

On 16 August there were 79,000 employees with the Bureau of Transportation of whom approximately 23,000 were Japanese.

Relatively few replacements in responsible positions were made with Koreans except in the main railway repair shops which are now staffed and operated by Koreans.

Railroads

13. Korea's railroads were built for strategic purposes rather than to meet the commercial needs of the peninsula. The railway system of South Korea has thus been able to meet the demands of troops, civilians and evacuees in this transition period. For about six weeks after the cessation of hostilities, no maintenance of any kind was undertaken on the railroads.

It is estimated that the equipment amounts to 472 locomotive, 3,600 box cars, 3,600 gondola cars, 250 flat cars and 12 tank cars, of which approximately 50 percent are serviceable. About an equal amount of rolling stock is in North Korea, except tank and refrigerator cars which are practically all in North Korea.

The gauge of the rails is 4 feet, 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches (the same as American Standard gauge) and there are about 2,400 kilometers of line. Most of the rails are 75-pound, with a few in the 110-pound class. The ballast is river-run rock. The rails and equipment are good, but the maintenance is poor, as the mechanical equipment is mostly Japanese and none has been shipped since 1941. Machine tools are in excellent condition.

Locomotives can be constructed in Korea but air brakes and locomotive tires must be imported. Most of the coal for locomotives came from Southern Manchuria. It is estimated that there is now on hand about 15 days' supply. Schools are now being started for training of Koreans as railway men.

Resumption of railroad traffic between the American zone and the Russian zone and an agreement providing for the pooling or interchange of rolling stock and its maintenance and repair is essential, as the best equipment, gondolas, refrigerator cars and locomotives are overtaxed. Points for crew and engine-changing and checking stations for inspection need to be agreed upon with the Russians. Resumption of commerce is dependent upon efficient rail transportation as other transportation facilities are totally inadequate.

Shipping

14. Under the control of the Bureau of Transportation there are some 140 ships averaging about 20 tons each, all in the sailing or semi-diesel class. There are 10 to 15 ships between 100 and 1,000 tons and one ship of the 1,500 ton class needing repair.

There are some ships of Korean registry now thought to be in Japanese waters which are to be returned to Korea. These ships are particularly needed to relieve the coal scarcity in the southern provinces and to move coal from Sanchok (on the East Coast, south of 38° parallel) to Fusan. The normal shipping of freight between the northern and southern half of Korea was stopped by the Russians after the occupation.

COMMUNICATIONS

15. The Bureau of Communications is an integral part of the Government General of Korea. It administers the government-owned telephone, telegraph, radio and postal services (the latter services include postal savings). South of the 38th parallel the Bureau operated 42 first class post offices and 565 extraordinary post offices, each of which served as a telephone and telegraph center for its area.

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16. The personnel of the Bureau numbered 20,000 employees. Of this total number the Japanese staff was 4,000. The Japanese group occupied 84 percent of the officer positions.

The Director has concluded that the Bureau can be operated by three-fourths of the pre-war personnel or 15,000 employees. By 20 October a reorganization was completed which reduced the subsections of the Bureau from 37 to 19.

In line with established policy of removing Japanese personnel from office, changes within this Bureau took place and included not only the Director, Ito, but also all section heads. Two section heads, Yoshida and Suzuki, were at once placed in jail on charges of misappropriation of funds in the amount of 7,500,000 yen which they forwarded to Japan. By 20 October, 1,237 Japanese were released from the Bureau. Classes of Korean replacements were started at the Technical Training School.

Telephone

17. The telephone system of Korea suffered no destruction of any kind as a direct result of war. The outside equipment of the plants was found to be generally in good condition, although the inside equipment shows shortage of cords, jacks, automatic switches and similar technical items.

The efficiency of the system after careful analysis is estimated to approximate 40 percent of that of the United States. This is due to the shortage of thoroughly trained personnel and the lack of equipment. Steps were taken to remedy the situation rapidly.

In one month's time the efficiency has been increased to better than the pre-war level. This has been accomplished not only by reducing the delay of long-distance telephoning from a four-to-seven hour period to three-to-four hour period, but also by the readjustment of the carrier bays so that Army traffic is handled expeditiously along with normal commercial volume. Monitoring is centralized at Seoul for all calls going to North Korea.

The rates and cost of services are at present the same as those existing before the war - fifty sen for local calls and eighteen to twenty yen maximum for any station within American jurisdiction. Because of probable rises in prices and wage scales the existing rates will doubtless increase.

The radio telephone circuit was opened between Seoul and Tokyo on 16 August 1945 and has handled a large volume of daily traffic. Other traffic is routed over the 11 cable lines (each of which is in excellent condition) running to Shimonoseki.

Postal Functions

18. The postal functions of the Bureau include mail dispatch, savings deposits, and insurance policies. With the exception of Army mail and Russian diplomatic mail, all mail to North Korea is censored at Seoul and that for South Korea at Fusan. Postal Savings deposits and postal insurance policies have played an important part in the life of the average Korean.

At present the deposits total ¥1,000,000,000, mostly lodged in Japan. The present face value of the insurance policies is 2,400,000,000 yen (300,000,000 yen are in Japan); the policies are held by 11,000,000 policy holders.

FINANCE

19. In finance the problem is to establish a sound, independent economy in place of a managed economy devoted to the support of Japan. Among the difficulties are 35 years of Japanese occupation; a ruggedly individualistic people demanding complete freedom from all foreign controls; the division of the country into two independent zones of occupation; and the usual incidents of military occupation such as a trend toward inflation, scarcity of consumer goods and food, some disorder and dislocation.

Currency

20. Bank of Chosen notes and type "A" supplemental Allied Military Yen are established as the only authorized legal tender. Only a limited amount of the supplemental yen was issued for circulation and this was subsequently withdrawn. Yen notes of the Bank of Taiwan and of the Bank of Japan are banned. Japanese state notes (50 sen) and Japanese 5 and 10 sen notes are permitted to be used because of the shortage of notes and coins of small denominations.

The rate of conversion for military purposes is 15 yen to one dollar.

Foreign Exchange

21. All dealings in foreign exchange are strictly controlled. All such dealings with Japan are prohibited. It is an established policy that foreign trade consistent with the best interest of Korean economy be continued in order to obtain industrial products from outside sources.

Where materials necessary for the carrying on of authorized Korean industrial activities are readily obtainable only in Japan, but the transaction cannot be completed because of the prohibition on foreign exchange transactions between Japan and Korea, it is necessary for the occupation authorities to grant special authorization and make proper arrangements for disposition of the proceeds of the transaction.

Public Finance

22. All public funds have been frozen. Taxes are not being collected. There are cases where Korean public officials and employees have not been paid. The entire tax system is being studied and a new and simplified system at variance with that of the Japanese is being devised. The present situation is confused both by the method by which taxes were paid, and the diversion and misappropriation that have taken place.

Property

23. There has been great public clamor to dispose of Japanese ownership of properties in Korea. Many Koreans are anxious to buy such properties. Property transfers between Japan and Korea involving the sale of Japanese-owned property in Korea are complicated and slowed up by provisions of Military Government requiring prior approval of the transaction and subsequent deposit of the purchase price in a designated bank to await possible payments.

Insurance

24. Japanese insurance companies have written over 1,100,000 life and war damage policies in Korea, aggregating over ¥ 2,750,000,000. The legal reserve on these contracts, which is the property of the insured, is held in Japan and at present no method is available either for the payment of premiums or the settlement of claims.

SECTION 3
SOCIAL ACTIVITIES IN KOREA

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EDUCATION

1. Education in Korea has been highly centralized and controlled in administration, teacher selections and training, and in textbooks. The system including both public and private schools is composed of a university, normal schools, technical, commercial, and primary schools.

Bureau of Education

2. The Bureau of Education of the Government-General exercises administration and supervision of the system through seven departments: "Schools", dealing with elementary and high schools, teacher's training, medical vocation, medical colleges; physical education, special training for adults, music, and science; "Standards", dealing with inspection and certification; "Business Management", dealing with budget and supplies; "Culture", dealing with religion, monuments, and arts; "Textbooks", dealing with subject matter materials; "Welfare", dealing with relief and social conditions for education; and "Meteorology", operating the observatories.

In all personnel matters the Bureau operated under Japanese civil service regulations. Among the three important civil service ranks (Chokumin, Sonin, and Hannin) the Bureau makes recommendations to the Military Governor for appointments in the first two classes and makes direct appointments in the third.

The Bureau has specific powers to open new public primary schools and all new schools, public or private, above the secondary level; to appoint principals and teachers of primary schools of Sonin rank upon recommendation of provincial educational offices; to appoint the superior inspectors in the provincial education office, and to appoint the head of the city education office if the rank is higher than Hannin.

3. Each province has an educational office which exercises authority to open new private schools at the primary level; to reopen all previously existing schools at the secondary level; to appoint teachers in the secondary schools except for Sonin rank upon recommendation of the principals; to appoint principals and teachers of primary schools of Hannin rank; to appoint inspectors in the provincial educational office (except superior grades); to appoint provincial resident inspectors in the city or county educational office if the rank is Hannin.

Education Ordinance of Military Government

4. As of 29 September 1945 the Military Governor of Korea issued instructions on education in Ordinance No.6. These provided

for the opening of private schools on proper application, freedom from racial or religious discrimination, the use of the Korean language in instruction, and abolishment of subject matter or practice inimical to Korean interests.

The secondary schools (middle schools) were opened on 1 October.

Replacement of Japanese Personnel

5. Since the arrival of XXIV Corps in Korea, eliminations of Japanese personnel have been accomplished whenever possible. Of the 56 Japanese formerly employed in the Bureau of Education, six remain. The main problem has been to secure Koreans for the duties of principals and teachers.

In order to prevent selection of pro-Japanese or otherwise unqualified Koreans, all appointments are first cleared through Army Intelligence. The problem of replacements has been given to the Korean Committee of Education. At present Mr. Kim Sung Soo by unanimous choice acts as advisor to the Director of Education without salary.

Textbooks and Curriculum

6. Japanese textbooks will be replaced by others which have been rewritten for teaching the Korean language in all elementary schools and high schools. Study and plans were made for a proper curriculum in all schools under the new conditions. Due attention is being given the problem of teacher shortages occasioned by the prevailing low salaries and the high cost of living.

Private Schools

7. Private schools which have been under the same centralized control as the public schools will be subject to adequate supervision.

Korean Advisory Council

8. A long-range program was undertaken by the Korean Advisory Council on Education which at present assists also in matters relating to personnel, financing and endowments.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

Press

9. Considerable efforts have been exerted to inform the people of Korea of the purposes and activities of the Military Government and of the responsibilities of Koreans. This was done by means of press, pamphlets and radio. In the country areas dissemination of information is difficult because many of the people cannot read and few of them have radios.

10. Daily distribution of mimeographed news releases in Korean and Japanese to the local press and radio stations began at Seoul on 24 September. Radio station JOEK disseminates news and directives of Military Government. A radio program entitled "Your Military Government Hour" was started on 6 October. A weekly news digest, containing all important proclamations and announcements to the people of Korea, was also inaugurated on 6 October to take the place of numerous separate pamphlets. It is intended to publish 50,000 copies weekly.

11. Arrangements have been made to circulate 400,000 copies of the "Chukan Digest", a weekly paper with news items, editorials, a war-background column, and a narrative cartoon strip. During the week ending 20 October, 340,000 leaflets were distributed by plane drop.

12. At Jinsen a newspaper, "Popular Civilian Daily News", was sponsored by Military Government, the first edition appearing on 6 October. The newspaper has a circulation of 15,000, is published daily and is used to disseminate official notices.

Motion Pictures

13. Arrangements have been made to procure United States-made orientation films for release in Korea.

Censorship

14. Press and radio censorship in Korea is exercised on a voluntary basis in accordance with the policy of making Korea a free and independent nation. No serious violation of the voluntary code has been reported.

Public Opinion Surveys

15. The Intelligence and Information Section conducts public opinion surveys and maintains a research office to operate five mobile teams. These visit localities throughout the American zone to determine public opinion. In addition public opinion is sampled by the Office of Civilian Contact, Seoul, receiving about 300 people a day (provincial offices will be established as necessary); by review of Korean newspapers and magazines; and by review of questions submitted by the civilian population.

The public opinion surveys have revealed public concern over the following matters:

- (1) Retention of Japanese officials as advisers to Military Government.
- (2) Return of the Provisional Government in Chungking.
- (3) Establishment and enforcement of price control.
- (4) Absence of Military Government personnel in outlying areas.
- (5) Conditions in North Korea.
- (6) Distrust of interpreters working for Military Governments.
- (7) Distribution of Farm lands.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

16. The Public Health Section of the Bureau of Police had charge of public health administration before the occupation but other bureaus in the Government General controlled various activities that were really public health matters. The Bureau of Education was responsible for welfare functions.

The Bureau of Public Health was established by Ordinance No. 1 issued by the Military Governor on 24 September 1945. All

duties, functions, funds, records and property of the Public Health Section of the Police Bureau were transferred to it and that Section was abolished. Public health activities of other bureaus have been taken over by the new Bureau, and welfare functions have been transferred to it from the Bureau of Education.

A reorganization of the new Bureau is proceeding. Agencies from the Bureau of Education, Mining and Industry and Police are being integrated into the Welfare Branch of Public Health Bureau. Koreans are being appointed to important positions in the Bureau. Ten Korean doctors were selected by the Bureau and have left for a year's study in medical schools in the United States so that they may be instructed in the latest developments in medicine and surgery.

Health Conditions

17. Medical facilities in general have been inadequate. Among the common diseases are dysentery, typhoid, paratyphoid, enteritis, common diarrhea, diphtheria, cerebrospinal meningitis, malaria, scarlet fever and smallpox. Venereal disease has been widespread. Hospitals have been maintained under provincial, municipal, missionary and private agencies but have not been adequate. In Seoul there were reported to be 10 hospitals with a total capacity of 1,620 beds.

18. Nursing conditions in Korea were found to be inferior to those in Japan. There are only 181 hospitals, 3,381 physicians, 573 dentists, 1,163 graduate nurses, 943 midwives, 42 tuberculosis sanatoria (with 1,238 patients) and three leprosaria with 8,000 patients.

Training of nurses, prefectural examination systems and nurses associations were under the guidance of the Japanese authorities, and were similar to those described in the report on Japanese nursing. A report on one hospital (Severance Union Hospital, Seoul) indicates that training had continued during the war under direction of Korean personnel.

The buildings are inadequate and teaching material, books and clothing for nurses are lacking. The bed capacity is 200, and there are 120 patients. Personnel includes 13 graduates and 79 student nurses. The Japanese language had been made compulsory but is no longer required.

19. No abnormal occurrences of serious communicable diseases have been reported to Military Government but reports so far have been meager and are considered highly inaccurate since the reporting system has broken down in recent years. A more efficient system of reporting is planned and will be put in operation shortly.

Epidemic louse-borne typhus is expected to be the greatest health hazard to the civilian population in the coming winter. Since 1942 this disease has been on the increase. A survey of the problem is in process by the United States Army Typhus Commission and plans are being formulated to combat the disease.

20. Civilian water supplies are generally untreated due to the absence of the needed chemicals. Chlorine has been requisitioned for this purpose. Waterworks in Fusan are inadequate to care for the population increased by refugees and repatriates who are continually passing through. Construction of new headworks was started prior to the occupation, but is held up for lack of materials. The Seoul water system is badly in need of repair and use of water is being restricted in both Seoul and Fusan.

21. Sanitary facilities have been entirely inadequate. Toilets in schools in Fusan were found to be in deplorable condition; this is

being remedied. Public latrines have been constructed at railroad stations in Fusan and Seoul to care for refugees passing through.

Two thousand lepers have been reported in the province of Kyong-sang Nando, including five hundred in its principal city, Fusan. Investigation is being made of the possible use of an island for a leper colony.

Medical Supplies

22. Supplies seized from Japanese troops have been made available through Military Government to hospitals and other civilian use. Additional drugs are needed. Twenty basic medical units have been requisitioned by the Bureau of Public Health for delivery every ten days, and if delivery is obtained within a reasonable time no critical shortage should develop.

23. Large amounts of vaccines are required for the extensive immunization program. Steps are being taken to inoculate Japanese repatriates at Fusan and Seoul for typhoid and smallpox. An immunization capacity of 10,000 per day at the two locations is planned for the present, but it is expected to reach 30,000 per day later. Inoculations for these and other diseases will be arranged as necessary for residents of Korea.

24. Laboratories at Fusan and Taegu are capable of producing 1,000,000 doses a year of typhoid or smallpox vaccine. The Public Health Bureau is testing the quality of these vaccines and introducing modern methods of vaccine production to improve the quality and increase the production.

25. Narcotics are found to have been poorly controlled and supervised in the past. The situation is being investigated.


Welfare

26. Welfare operating activities have been concerned mainly with the care of Koreans arriving from Japan and of Japanese departing from Korea at Fusan and Seoul. The "United Refugee Relief Service" was established at Fusan to coordinate the activities of participating agencies.

Military Government operating teams have assisted local authorities in obtaining needed clothing and other supplies for distribution. A critical shortage of winter clothing exists.

日本朝鮮占領報

SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS



SUMMATION

of

Non-Military Activities

in

JAPAN and KOREA

No 2 November 1945

G189

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION No 2

Non-Military Activities
IN
JAPAN AND KOREA

FOR THE MONTH OF
NOVEMBER 1945

0190

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
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SUMMATION NO. 2

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Change "Average Monthly Coal Production" for 1942
from 5,500,000 to 4,500,000.

CHART NO. 18 - "Bank of Japan - Selected Balance Sheet Items"
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In the Legend: Change "Government Bonds and Debentures" to "Private Loans".

Change "Private Loans" to "Government Bonds and Debentures".

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