

disclosed America's ultimate goal in the Japanese Occupation and its administrative policy. We cannot help being deeply impressed by it. The goal of the Occupation is 'a complete reformation of the Japanese people' and 'a reformation from blind fatalism of war to the considered realism of peace.' It is not only a reformation of the nation's structure; it is the complete reformation of our national spirit which is necessary in order to eliminate war in the future. It has now become clear that the policy for the realization of this ideal can well be called the occupational policy of justice. To clarify this objective, the statement stressed the mission of the Occupation to supply food to the Japanese people, who are now placed under an extended and strengthened blockade and require more financial appropriations for this purpose. The statement has become all the more admirable, since it pointed out that the American people cannot justify the punitive action of trying and executing guilty Japanese as a consequence of ill-treatment, including starvation of Allied prisoners at Bataan, if they should fail to provide the food necessary to sustain life among the Japanese people, who are now completely reduced to starvation. As we march toward the revival of a peace-loving and democratic country, through renunciation of war and the rights of belligerents, we are now pursuing the ideal, in common with that of the American occupation. The realization of this goal will prove most advantageous for Japan. As for the true democratization of this nation, both Japan and the United States have common interest. Japan must realize this objective, not only as its obligation for having accepted the Potsdam Declaration, but also for its own benefit in the future. The greatest obstacle to true democratization is starvation, which will render the people 'easy prey to any ideology, however evil,' as General MacArthur truly pointed out. We should keep in mind that General MacArthur requested the supply of food to Japan not so much to prevent starvation among the Japanese people but to establish a true democracy without falling prey to any evil ideology. At the same time, General MacArthur emphasized that the material rehabilitation of Japan is by no means charity, and that it is to be paid by the Japanese people in the future. We should reflect on this point.

"The occupation policy of America, as well as its administrative policy, is advantageous to the American people, as the statement frankly revealed. Therefore, we must not act obsequiously. Fortunately, the goal and policy of the United States now parallel the interests of Japan. The United States defined the realization of the goal of occupation as 'the final stage of the war.' The best way for us to pass this stage, as quickly as possible so as to establish true peace, is to realize this common objective with sincerity and earnestness. Only in this way can we finally make up for our crime in waging the Pacific War."

5. The text of the editorial in Asahi follows:

"General MacArthur, in a statement addressed to the War Department, disclosed the fundamental goal of the Japanese occupation. He explained in detail the policies for achieving this purpose and the bright prospects at present and in the future. This statement, which revealed positive policies based on a world-wide outlook from a certain historical viewpoint and a philosophy based on the principles of tolerance, justice and humanity, made a deep impression upon the Japanese people. It should certainly make them feel their own strength. He discussed the failure of victorious leaders in the past to 'content themselves with inflicting defeat upon the enemy power,' and he found it necessary to carry out a 'reformation from the blind fatalism of war to considered realism,' namely, a complete spiritual reformation of the Japanese people. At the same time, he defined the present Occupation as the final

phase for realizing this ultimate and grand objective.

"Even though the democratization of Japan is now being carried out as an Allied policy, in accordance with the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, still we are firmly convinced that there is, at the same time, a feeling of eagerness among the Japanese people, who have now learned from experience what war means. It is only through the manifestation of such a hope that we have made up our minds to renounce war in the new Constitution. In order to live in the future, there is no other way for us except to realize democracy and pacifism, both of which have now been firmly proclaimed in the new Constitution. We must often be reminded that this goal cannot be realized without a spiritual reformation and a renovation of the national structure.

"Regarding the supply of food and other commodities, General MacArthur emphasized that 'the relief is not charity'; we should carefully consider this meaning. We should interpret the relief as one of the policies for re-creating Japan as a democratic and peace-loving nation. A literal expression of thanks by us will not be true gratitude. Our gratitude can be fully accepted only when we take some positive steps towards industrial rehabilitation and food collection.

"We should do our utmost to re-establish 'the control of Japan by the Japanese Government' as quickly as possible, fully relying on the fact that General MacArthur has always paid thoughtful consideration to carrying out the occupational policies, so as to do his best to realize the objectives revealed in the Potsdam Declaration. In this respect, we should be convinced that it will take a long time to accomplish this task. No matter how long it may take, we can be sure that our efforts will be rewarded with success, unless we lose confidence in our people."

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM

6. In conformity with the new Constitution in which local autonomy is guaranteed, new laws are being introduced to free local government from domination by the national bureaucracy. The following changes are planned:

- (1) A prefectural governor will be responsible to the people who elect him to office rather than to the central government at Tokyo. He will no longer be an official of the central government nor a member of the civil service. Only in exceptional cases will he be responsible to the Home Ministry.
- (2) Within the pattern of democratic government local communities will select the form of government which they desire. Provisions for this choice will be made by law.
- (3) The democratically elected local assemblies will have increased authority over the budget.
- (4) Local assemblies will have the right to approve or reject the appointment of new officials of local governments.
- (5) Assemblies will choose their own officials. Except in extraordinary cases sessions will be open to the general public.
- (6) Initiative, referendum and recall will be instituted.

These devices will make possible new elections to replace undesirable local officials and guarantee citizens the right to take action in local affairs.

- (7) All local government officials will be salaried.
- (8) Local officials will no longer be dismissed by order of the central government nor will local assemblies be so dissolved.
- (9) Local courts, rather than governmental ministries, will make judicial decisions affecting local governmental matters.
- (10) Nonpartisan committees will administer fair and impartial elections.
- (11) The entire personnel problem will be studied and necessary revisions in the civil service recommended.
- (12) The present supervisory and disciplinary powers of the Home Ministry will be completely revised to assure more freedom for prefectures, cities, towns and villages.
- (13) All existing laws, Imperial Ordinances and other instructions affecting local government will be thoroughly examined and, when necessary, revised in order to ensure the effectiveness of the reforms.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Coalition Moves

7. The revised Yoshida Cabinet, which became known through the newspapers on 1 February, received a cool reception from the press and general public. This lack of enthusiasm had been anticipated and was discounted to some extent since Japanese political history shows that peacetime Cabinet changes have always been criticized for failure to meet the true needs of the moment.

8. Antagonism was also aroused within the ranks of the Government Parties. Liberal leaders, dissatisfied with Prime Minister Yoshida's failure to consult them on patronage matters and party policy, protested at his inclusion of such nonpartisans as Minister of Education Takahashi and Minister of Transportation Masuda. Charges were freely voiced that Yoshida was setting up a private bureaucracy. Liberals declared that when Yoshida was named Party president he had agreed to consult with Liberal leaders, and complained that he has since grown independent and "arrogant."

9. Progressive leaders were even more indignant since all the new posts had gone either to Liberals or to nonpartisans. Progressives objected particularly to Yoshida's concurrent assumption of the Agriculture portfolio as well as the premiership and to Tanzan Ishibashi's being simultaneously Minister of Finance and President of the Economic Stabilization Board. These posts, they felt, should have been given to Progressives.

10. In these circumstances the idea of a coalition Cabinet, already twice discussed and twice rejected during January, was again revived because such a Cabinet would associate the opposition with government policies and nullify any possible campaign arguments based upon the inability of the Administration to control inflation or prevent labor unrest.

11. The left-wing Social Democrats contended that if they were allotted only the economic portfolios their Party, though unable to test its socialistic philosophy, would be forced to share responsibility for failure to restore prosperity. As in January they voted to reject any plan which did not offer the prime ministership to Tetsu Katayama, Social Democratic Party president, and which did not give all important economic posts to Social Democrats. They particularly objected to the retention of Ishibashi as Minister of Finance.

12. Conservative Social Democrats were less wary of the offer. Secretary General Suyehiro Nishio again urged acceptance of a coalition move that would give the party four or five key portfolios, especially when Yoshida agreed to allow the Social Democrats to designate the men whom they desired. In this stand, Nishio appeared to represent majority sentiment within the Social Democratic Central Executive Committee, even though the Party as a whole agreed that Ishibashi should be dropped.

13. Announcement on 6 February that the Supreme Commander considered a new Diet election desirable put a temporary stop to negotiations, but within a few days new coalition proposals were put forward for the fourth time.

14. These were an outgrowth of a movement, originally sponsored by young Progressives, looking to an alliance with similar Liberal elements. This movement was later captured by more experienced Progressive Party politicians. At a joint meeting of Liberal and Progressive Party leaders, Vice Speaker Koraemon Kimura proposed a National Salvation Conservative Cabinet in which both Parties would share equally. Welfare Minister Kawai and Finance Minister Ishibashi, the latter a Liberal, conferring unofficially with Nishio and Chuzaburo Mizutani, Social Democrats, agreed upon the formation of a Cabinet in which Social Democrats, Co-operative Democrats and one member of the People's Party would be included. On these terms the Government Parties formally proposed coalition to the Social Democrats, retaining Ishibashi but promising to modify his policies along Socialist lines.

15. After considerable discussion the Social Democrats' Central Executive Committee unanimously refused the offer on 14 February. It was then announced that no further negotiations would be considered prior to the general Diet election.

Merger Movements

16. When efforts to relieve political tension by forming a coalition Cabinet including the Social Democratic Party failed to produce effective results, political attention turned toward the possibility of solidifying the Administration's control by combining the two Government Parties.

Day-to-day accounts of party maneuverings alternately affirmed and denied the imminence of mergers of the Liberals and Progressives.

17. On 19 February President Kijuro Shidehara of the Progressive Party formally proposed to Prime Minister Yoshida, President of the Liberal Party, that the two Parties formally merge their membership on any reasonable terms which the Liberals might propose. Despite this offer uncertainty continued. Much of the confusion stemmed from the fact that at least six separate merger movements were proceeding concurrently, with some individuals participating in two or more of the negotiations. These efforts were conducted by six separate factions within the Liberal Party

and by four Progressive Party groups in the interests of eight different leaders.

Virtually everyone in both the Liberal and Progressive Parties desired some form of merger. Despite innumerable protestations of high principles no question of political philosophy was involved. All participants were conservative. The only important factors were the timing of the merger, the distribution of spoils and considerations of individual prestige. None seriously opposed Yoshida as Prime Minister, nor did the merger move imply a Cabinet change.

18. If, for example, the elections were to be conducted under the existing 1945 Election Law, with large electoral districts and restricted plural voting, a merger was not likely prior to the first session of the new Diet. Politicians knew they could elect more Diet members by running supposedly competing candidates. Two parties would add to the Liberal-Progressive total.

On the other hand, if a revised single member district system were to be adopted, immediate merger was made almost inevitable.

19. Plans for democratizing party machinery, for the participation of voters in the nomination processes, for the financing of political parties and for the solution of the problem of whether Diet officials, Cabinet officers and bureaucrats should remain within party ranks or should constitute a special class beyond the reach of party control also complicated the progress of the merger movements.

20. Implicit in the merger movement was a quiet but determined contest over the future leadership of whatever combined Liberal-Progressive Party may emerge. Ex-Prime Minister Shidehara, Prime Minister Yoshida, Hitoshi Ashida, Takao Saito, Ken Inukai, House Speaker Yamazaki, Agriculture Minister Kimura, Welfare Minister Kawai and others, all of whom were reportedly ambitious for the new party presidency and for the post of prime minister, which was supposed to be at stake, were alike unwilling to yield advantage to any rival.

Merger Background

21. The action was typical of the course of Japanese party politics. Because Japanese voters invariably follow leaders rather than philosophies or labels the history of Japanese politics has always been a confusing array of secessions, amalgamations and realignments. Invariably party platforms, ever since the middle Meiji years, have been vague, insincere and free of controversial matter.

In some respects the party leader has merely replaced the old clan chief as the object of loyalty. Followers have assumed obligations to him rather than to the factions to which they presumably belonged. Defection from the party, therefore, and deviation from party platforms have never been regarded as serious offenses.

22. Plans for a united conservative party to be called the Democratic Party (Minshuto) were pushed, almost a year ago, immediately following the general elections of 10 April 1946. At that time the ostensible moving spirits were former Cabinet Secretary Wataru Narahashi, who was generally known to represent Baron Shidehara, former Speaker Toshio Shimada, former chief secretary of the Seiyukai and an original founder of the Progressive Party and former Transportation Minister Takeo Tanaka. Supporters of former Communications

Minister Chuzo Mitsuchi operated behind the scenes in these maneuvers.

Narahashi and his chief lieutenant, former Minister of State Takeshige Ishiguro, appealed first to the younger Progressive leaders who followed Ken Inukai, a protege of Shidehara. At the same time another independent, Isaji Tanaka, sought support from right-wing Social Democrats and from the Co-operative Party. Tanaka also made efforts to line up the small party representatives and the independents but neither he nor his associate Takeo Miki, then an independent but now a Co-operative Democrat, made headway.

Owing to the difficulties of forming a coalition government the plans collapsed. Ishiguro entered the Progressive Party where his abilities won him appointment first as chairman of the Political Affairs Investigation Committee and later as secretary-general, while Miki became an influential figure in the Co-operative Democratic Party.

23. The new merger movement was an extension of the old Narahashi-Ishiguro-Tanaka-Miki schemes.

Various Merger Plans

24. The chief merger plans were as follows:

- (1) Bureaucratic Plan. This was supported by the so-called "Official Groups" within each party. Headed by Yoshida and Shidehara respectively the Liberal and Progressive Party officers sought to form new alignments relatively free from interference by either the voters or by rank-and-file Party members.
- (2) Super-Party Plan. This also was nonpolitical but differed from the "Bureaucratic Plan" in that it opposed both Shidehara and Yoshida, favoring either Speaker Yamazaki or Agriculture Minister Kimura, with Welfare Minister Kawai as dark horse.
- (3) Political Coalition Plan. This group was frankly politically minded and was composed of practical nonbureaucratic politicians. Favoring Takao Saito as party president it envisaged union of the entire Liberal Party with all, or with at least the Minseito section of the Progressive Party.
- (4) Reform Plan. Anti-political-boss members of the Liberal Party, led by Hitoshi Ashida, preferred a new party to be composed of democratic elements of the Liberal and Progressive Parties with some assistance from conservative Social Democratic groups and from certain independents, Co-operative Democrats and People's Party members. A complicating factor was Ashida's simultaneous dickering with Saito's Minseito followers.
- (5) Inukai Plan. This scheme was drawn up by Ken Inukai, ostensibly to promote Shidehara's interests but actually to further his own ambitions. It sought originally to capitalize on young Diet members' dissatisfaction with their subordination to veteran political manipulators. It also flirted with the Ashida reform group, the right-wing Social Democrats and the Co-operatives, as well as with the People's Party and with independents.

- (6) Pseudo-Reform Plan. Taking advantage of the political unrest created by the Ashida and Inukai maneuverings professional politicians, especially Naranashi, Ishiguro and Miki, sought to take over the Inukai Plan. Since Naranashi and Ishiguro favored Shidehara as party president, as did Inukai himself (as an interim appointment pending his own elevation from the chief-secretaryship), Inukai worked with them. When, however, a Progressive Party council formally accented this theory of a merger, Saito and not Shidehara unexpectedly won endorsement as the chief of the projected party. Accordingly, Shidehara immediately withdrew his sponsorship.

The aftermath yielded unexpected assistance for the democratic theory of party control. Saito condemned Shidehara for implying that a party president had the right to veto the action of a party council, an attack which supplied support for those who favored liberalization of party rules.

Liberal Groups

25. The Liberal Party was divided into at least six factions, each distinct in itself but overlapping others.

Four of these groups favored some form of amalgamation with elements of the Progressive or Social Democratic Parties and approved, to varying degrees, the creation of coalition Cabinets with one or more of the opposition parties. One group definitely opposed mergers and the sixth was neutral.

- (1) Authentic Group. This combination of former bureaucrats and practical politicians, largely composed of former Hatoyama associates, controlled party machinery. Anxious to continue that control it was the only major group opposing coalitions and mergers. It did not oppose Yoshida as Prime Minister. Principal members of the group are Banboku Ono, Chief Secretary; Tomejiro Okubo, General Affairs Committee; Tamaichiro Fukatsu, General Affairs Committee; Naomichi Inada, General Affairs Committee; and Joji Hayashi, Chief Cabinet Secretary.
- (2) Official Group. This group, which was in almost full control, centered about the Prime Minister. It preferred a return to former methods of Japanese administration and its Cabinet appointments were often directed toward that end. With much experience in bureaucratic methods it tended to draw away from the rank and file and to assume a detached attitude toward Party affairs. To this end it was ready to form a close alliance with Shidehara's "Official Group." Professional politicians would be eliminated from leadership. Either Yoshida or Shidehara would be president. Members of the group are Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi, Commerce and Industry Minister Mitsujiro Ishii, Home Minister Etsujiro Uyebara, Education Minister Seiichiro Takahashi, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Shuji Masutani, and Parliamentary Vice Minister of Agriculture Yoshie Oishi. This group sought advice not only from the so-called "Professors' Group" of Tatsuo Morito, Hyoe Ouchi, Ichiro Nakayama, Seiichi Tonata and Shigeru Arisawa, whose advice conflicted with the Ishibashi finance plan, but also from such old-line leaders as

Count Shinken Makino, Yoshida's father-in-law, and Seihin Ikeda, former managing director of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha. Within this group Uyehara represented the link to the "Authentic Group" of practical politicians and Ishii, an executive of the newspaper Asahi and, prior to 1922, a Formosan Government official, the link with the friends of Hatoyama and with the "Super-Party Group." The socialist links, through Takahashi, a close friend of Tetsu Katayama, and Morita, member of the Social Democratic Party Central Executive Committee, were significant.

- (3) Reform Group. This group, headed by former Welfare Minister Hitoshi Ashida, a founder of the Liberal Party and present head of the Political Affairs Investigation Committee, asked liberalization of the Party's management. It favored either a general election whereby the people could once more pass upon the desirability of having certain Liberal Party Diet members represent their interests, or a merger with reform elements of the Progressive or other parties. At one time it was reported that Ashida favored secession from the Liberal Party to join the young Progressives, and he has been quoted as supporting and as denying this move. The "Reform Group" opposed both Yoshida and Shidehara as party leaders but worked with Takao Saito of the political-minded Minseito Progressives. The strength of this group is not accurately known. Ashida polled 60 votes when he became Political Affairs chairman, but his group was not believed to number more than 20 members. The group holds two seats on the 15-member General Affairs Committee. Its chief leaders are Shotaro Yano, ex-parliamentary councillor of Finance and Welfare and former police chief, General Affairs Committee; Moritoshi Nakajima, president of the Diet Members' council; Hiroshi Hatsukado, Isamu Murakami, General Affairs Committee; Mutsunosuke Kato, General Affairs Committee; Hajime Ito, Tetsuzo Kojima and Yano Kojima. Tetsuzo Kojima, Yano Kojima and Hatsukado were enthusiastic supporters of a new party movement; Nakajima and Ito were less convinced that a new party was necessary but felt that a coalition agreement could be reached with the Progressives.
- (4) Youth Group. This group, largely composed of Diet "freshmen," asked wider representation of new members in Party councils. Claiming 75 members it probably fell far short of that number, but it was strong enough in the Party convention to elect two members of the General Affairs Committee. The Youth Group did not stress amalgamation but opposed boss rule. It was led by Chujiro Kuriyama, former Mainichi correspondent in New York. Other members were Koji Tonoda; Takayoshi Aoki; Natsuo Eto, who has connections with Ashida; Hidetoshi Tombechi, brother of Yoshizo, of the Minseito Progressives; Toemon Hara, General Affairs Committee, a former independent; Manabu Shiotsuke; and Mikio Mizuta, General Affairs Committee.
- (5) Super-Party Group. Like the "Official Group" these men also distrusted professional politicians and preferred management that was not dependent exclusively

upon either electors or Diet members. The group differed from the "Official Group" in that it dis-trusted Prime Minister Yoshida even though it worked with him. Its members included Takeshi Yamazaki, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Giichi Takeda, who tied with Ashida for the chairmanship of the Political Affairs Investigation Committee, but who lost in the draw for breaking the tie; Furu-nosuke Kuhara, former president of the Seiyukai; and Mitsujiro Ishii, now of the "Official Group," who was a member of the "Super-Party Group" prior to his acceptance of the Commerce portfolio. This group had close associations with Minister of Agri-culture Kozaemon Kimura and with Minister of Welfare Yoshinari Kawai, both Progressive Party leaders.

- (6) Coalition Group. This group, centering about former Commerce Minister Jiro Hoshijima and former Trans- portation Minister Tsunejiro Hiratsuka, favored an immediate merger with the Progressive Party. Unlike the "Reform Group" which accepted only the more ad- vanced members of the Progressive Party, this group called for the immediate amalgamation of all Liberals and Progressives. It differed from the "Official Group" in that it would place the merger under control of politicians. Other leaders of this group include Kotaro Bando, former Seiyukai leader, General Affairs Committee; and Reikichi Kita, conservative writer and politician, General Affairs Committee.

Progressive Factions

26. The Progressive Party was split into four groups, each willing to merge with all or a part of the Liberal Party but differ- ing on the terms of union to be accepted.

- (1) Official Group. Largely composed of party members who have held or are holding office in the Yoshida or Shidehara Cabinets it desired a union controlled by conservative forces with Shidehara or Yoshida as head. Its leaders were former Prime Minister Kujiro Shidehara, Party president; Communications Minister Sadakichi Hitotsumatsu, party adviser; former Chief Cabinet Secretary Wataru Narahashi, ostensibly an independent; and former State Minister Takeshige Ishiguro, chairman of the party's Political Affairs Committee. Agriculture Minister Kimura was not a member of this coterie, serving instead as the liaison agent for the "Super-Party Group."
- (2) Minseitō Group. This was a conservative group of former Minseitō politicians, who preferred conserva- tive leadership but who did not approve of the Narahashi-Ishiguro influence. Not all of them were satisfied with Shidehara as Party head. This group was a survival of the old Chuji Machida clique which was influential at the time the Party was founded. It favored as president State Minister Takao Saito, party adviser and one of the Party's organizers. Members of the group were Chief Secretary Manitsu Tanaka, subsequently one of the "Official Group"; former Judge Fujiro Hara, Ren Hayashi, chairman of the Diet members; Yoshizo Tomabechi, General Affairs Committee, brother of Hidetoshi Tomabechi of the Liberal "Youth Group"; Isamu Narushima, Gen Nagai and Shigeru Nakagawa.

- (3) Reform Group (Shin Shin Kai, New Progress Society). Beginning as a youth movement led by Usuke Tsurumi this group developed into a personal coterie headed by Ken Inukai who sought to build up a Diet organization based on cultivation of first-term members. Later it professed itself a reformist body anxious to improve the character and principles of the Progressive Party.

Shin Shin Kai's main hope was to form a new group composed of its own 25 younger members, the independents and the Ashida wing of the Liberal Party. Ashida was originally invited to join the Progressive Party but preferred to remain inside the Liberal ranks.

Inukai's close friendship with Shidehara lends added importance to the Shin Shin Kai's activities. Important also is the Shin Shin Kai's statement that it is supported by Takao Saito, particularly in view of the fact that Saito won his Party's endorsement at the 10 February meeting. Prominent members of the group included Hideji (Shuji) Kawasaki, one of the party's founders and an old-time Minseito politician; Usaburo Chiizaki, General Affairs Committee; Shigeru Yasutashi, General Affairs Committee; Koichiro Yamaguchi, Shigeru Nori, Saburo Shiikuma, Shinzo Tsubokawa, elected as an independent; Tokuzo Okabe, Takeyuki Araki, Kentaro Kosaka, elected as an independent; Iwao Yamazaki, Yasuhashi Hosokawa and Takazo Kato. This group, through Inukai, was closely allied with the Official Group, under Shidehara, Ishiguro and Narahashi, and with certain elements of the Co-operative Democrats, especially Noburo Ishihara and Kunio Uda.

- (4) Super-Party Group. A small but powerful faction headed by Agriculture Minister Kozaemon Kimura and Welfare Minister Yoshinari Kawai was allied to the similarly named Liberal Party section under Yamazaki, Takeda and Kuhara. It intended to put forward Kimura as the candidate for president of a merged Liberal-Progressive Party, with either Kuhara or Yamazaki as Prime Minister to succeed Yoshida. The suggested name for the proposed new group was the National Salvation Conservative Party.

Minor Party Merger Plans

27. While Liberals and Progressives were discussing merger plans, similar consolidations were under consideration by minor parties. The 44 Co-operative Democrats were sure that they would be able to effect amalgamation with the newly formed People's Party which has 32 Diet seats. They hoped also for accessions from the 21 independents.

This movement, which had been rumored for many months, was revived 10 February when Takeo Miki, a former independent turned Co-operative Democrat, discussed merger problems with Seichi Okada of the People's Party. Previous negotiations had broken up because of the difficulty of choosing a suitable name. This difficulty was later said to be settled by tentative agreement on the name "People's Co-operative Party."

Other disagreements centered about the appointment of a party president.

The projected merger was hastened when the Co-operative Democratic Party lost its president, Sanehiko Yamamoto, through application of the purge, and its secretary-general, Tadao Wikawa, through death.

New Party

28. Founders of the Co-operative Democratic Party charged that the Party was abandoning its agrarian principles and becoming merely an opportunistic office-seeking clique.

In protest against this development two of the founders, Katsutarō Kita and his brother Masakiyo Kita, both Diet members from Hokkaido, and Saneō Ito withdrew last summer from party membership. On 21 February these three joined with Shiro Nakano, an independent, and Toahio Sakai, another Co-operative Democrat, to create a new five-member party, the Japan Farmers' Party.

The new party pledged itself to safeguard the imperial line, to reject dictatorship from either the Left or the Right, and to establish agrarian popular democracy. Its keynote was declared to be "co-operativism based upon toil, independence and mutual love."

INFLATION AND POLITICS

29. Japanese political leaders displayed apprehension over the sharp rise in open-market prices during the month and gave evidence that inflation and its control had become a major political issue.

30. On 5 February the left-wing Social Democrats, led by Mosaburo Suzuki, announced an economic program designed to combat inflation and help reconstruct the nation's economy. This program, drafted after consultation with the "Professors' Group" of academic economists, included the following points:

- (1) Rejection of so-called "Ishibashi inflation."
- (2) Suspension of interest payments on government bonds.
- (3) Currency stabilization.
- (4) Speedy and more drastic property assessments rather than imposition of income taxes upon wage earners.
- (5) Nationalization of the Bank of Japan and state management of other financial institutions.
- (6) A 50-percent rise in production, to be based upon an estimated annual coal production of 30,000,000 metric tons.
- (7) Abolition or sharp reduction of the government subsidy system.
- (8) Control of the black market.

Since these proposals did not differ greatly from the platform provisions previously published by the Social Democratic Party the right wing of the Party, which holds a 15 to 5 majority in the Central Executive Committee, found no difficulty in endorsing the left-wing program and adopted it as a Party statement.

31. Announcement of the program pointed up Social Democratic opposition to the retention of Ishibashi as Finance Minister. The drafting of the paper by the supposedly recalcitrant Left Wing of the Party, with subsequent approval by the conservative group, served moreover to minimize to the public the much-talked-of split between the Right and Left.

LABOR AND POLITICS

Prewar Political Activity

32. Japan's labor movement has never been politically united. At the time of the attack upon Manchuria in 1931 at least three labor groups existed, each suspicious of the other two. These were the Communist Party, National Farmer-Labor Mass Party and Social Democratic Party. The first was an underground organization, the other two legal parties operating under close police supervision.

The Farmer-Labor Mass Party was created in July 1931, two months prior to the Manchuria incident, as a merger of Professor Ikuo Oyama's Farmer-Labor Party with the less-well-known National Mass party under Hisashi Aso. After Rikizo Hirano and others left the movement to help form a State Socialist Party, the Farmer-Labor Mass Party and the Social Democrats merged in July 1932 into the Social Mass Party. Until 1936 this remained the only legal proletarian party in Japan. Among the leaders in the movement were Professor Isao Abe, Mitsu Kono, Hyo Hara, Yoshio Matsunaga, and Tetsu Katayama, all of whom are or have been active in the present Social Democratic Party. Because they opposed Communism as well as capitalism they were accused by radicals of being "Social Fascists."

In the elections of February 1936 the Social Mass Party won 18 seats, a number that increased to 37 in the April 1946 general election.

33. Militaristic pressure weakened both Communists and Social Mass members. Hirano and others of the Farmers' Union set up a special organization, the Imperial Way Association, to propagandize their activities.

34. Meanwhile certain proletarian leaders, notably Kanju Kato and Mosaburo Suzuki, now left-wing Social Democrats, sought to expand trade unionism by legal methods. Working through the Tokyo Transport Workers' Union and the Farmers' Union, they set up a Council of Farmer-Labor Proletarian Organizations.

Originally nonpolitical, the Council of Farmer-Labor Proletarian Organizations entered politics after merger proposals made by Hisao Kuroda of the Farmers' Union and Jiichiro Matsumoto, spokesman for the depressed Suiheisha class, had failed to win over the Social Mass Party. In February 1937 the Council organized the Proletarian Party.

35. As a result of Japan's growing nationalistic movement, 400 Leftists, including leaders of the Proletarian Party, Socialists and Communists, were arrested in November 1937. Many of the Leftists who escaped arrest entered wholeheartedly into the nationalist movement.

Among those who thus yielded to the militarists was Hisashi Aso, who desired to merge the Social Mass Party with an ultranationalistic movement led by Seigo Nakano, now classed as a war criminal. Most of the Social Mass Party members not only

favored this suggestion but also supported the motion to oust Takao Saito from Parliament after he had proposed making peace with China.

36. Nine Social Mass members, however, refused to obey militarist commands. Those were Tetsu Katayama, Suyehiro Nishio, Chozaburo Mizutani, Manryo Yonekubo, Yoshio Matsunaga, Eiji Tomiyoshi, Ken Okazaki, Bunji Suzuki and Isao Abe, all of whom defended Saito. They were thereupon expelled from the Social Mass Party. All but the last three are now Social Democratic Diet members and Dr. Abe is one of the Party's senior advisers.

37. Other members of the Social Mass Party then joined the Imperial Rule Assistance Association movement and Japanese labor ceased political activities.

Postwar Policies

38. Following the war most of the men formerly active in labor politics joined either the Social Democratic or the Communist Party. The former, led by antiwar Social Mass, Proletarian and Labor Party men, reflects today the prewar labor divisions.

(1) Kanju Kato, Kanson Arahata and Masaburo Suzuki of the Proletarians form the Left Wing.

(2) Tetsu Katayama, Suyehiro Nishio, Rikizo Hirano, Komakichi Matsuoka, Hyo Hara and Manryo Yonekubo of the Social Masses lead the Right Wing.

39. Organized labor has generally followed the Social Democratic rather than the Communist program. Matsuoka's General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions is thoroughly committed to the Social Democratic cause, while the National Congress of Industrial Unions, although denying Communist affiliations, reflects leftist interests.

Except for the Social Democrats and the Communists no major political groups have made serious efforts to mix in union politics. Some Co-operative Democrats and Liberals are said to have contemplated organizing special associations, ostensibly presenting nonpartisan programs, to gain unified acceptance of political ideas, but these have been either social or cultural and not labor bodies.

General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions

40. The General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions is a rebirth of the old craft-organized Nippon Rodo Sodomei. It is headed by Komakichi Matsuoka, an influential Social Democratic Central Executive committeeman of the conservative faction. It was formed on 17 January 1946 for the dual purpose of rejecting extreme leftist leadership and of rallying democratic labor forces around the Social Democratic Party.

41. While a frankly political purpose was reasserted at the August 1946 convention and again in February 1947 when the Federation confirmed its policy "of concentrating democratic influences around the Social Democratic Party," another plank in the August 1946 platform pledged the Federation to a separation of the labor movement "from ideological and political coloration."

By a vote of 594 to 127, Matsuoka was re-elected president over Kanson Arahata, the leftist candidate, while Toraichi Hara, sponsored by Matsuoka, became secretary-general by an even greater margin, 642 to 93, over a Left-winger. Three vice-presidents,

selected by Matsuoka, were also elected; all are conservative Social Democrats.

National Congress of Industrial Unions

42. The National Congress of Industrial Unions, a loose federation, was projected in February 1946 and played an active role in the movement for the creation of a Democratic Front in the 1946 May Day labor demonstrations. It also took a leading role in October 1946 and January 1947 labor difficulties.

43. Its president is Katsumi Kikunami, executive chairman of the Japan Newspaper and Radio Workers' Union, who has been an editorial writer for Tokyo Asahi and who, as a foreign correspondent, covered London news and the Italian-Ethiopian War for that paper.

Vice presidents are Kazuyoshi Tsuchihashi, sometimes called Kazuyoshi Dobashi, chairman of the National Union of Communications Workers, and Yasuo Sekiguchi, secretary-general of the Tokyo District Council of the Union of Government Railway Workers.

44. Active with Kikunami in the preparatory organization meetings of the NCIU were Kenichi Ito and Shoichi Kasuga, each an active Communist.

For this reason and because of the occasional parallel between the announced purposes of the NCIU and of the Communist Party the organization has been frequently regarded as Communist-affiliated. Satomi Hakamada, a Communist labor leader, boasted in March 1946 that "a handful of Communist members hold the actual leadership," but Kikunami insists that the NCIU is not actually affiliated with any party.

45. The NCIU directed an extensive "October Offensive" in which various unions threatened or actually inaugurated "general strikes" for the triple purpose of (1) gaining increased wages and better working conditions, (2) demonstrating the power of organized labor and (3) "overthrowing the reactionary Yoshida Government." The third aim, acknowledged by Kikunami and by vote of the Central Executive Committee, as well as by individual leaders of the railway, newspaper-radio, electrical industry and other strike movements, clarified the NCIU's interest in political affairs.

Kikunami added, however, that any claim that "the October Offensive was motivated by political purposes is a slander."

46. An official statement of the General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions declared that the NCIU was trying "to seize political power by overthrowing the present Government through a series of political strikes" which were "tactics of a revolution by violence."

47. Protests against the aggressive policies of the "Youth Action Corps," supposedly agents of radical labor organizations, were voiced by Shakai Shimbun, an organ of the Social Democratic Party. These men, according to the Party newspaper, are carrying the wartime Special Attack Corps spirit into the realm of political action on labor affairs:

"Their manners little differ from those of common street ruffians, indicating a deplorable deterioration of Japan's youth attributable to years of military education of which the ideal was the Kamikaze spirit."

The newspaper added, "Carrying red flags and shouting

the Communist International, those young men from labor organizations call at the headquarters to ask for the Party's support for their causes in labor disputes. Some come to advise the Party to desist from participation in a coalition Cabinet. The Social Democratic headquarters receives three such visits on the average, and more than 10 on days when mass demonstrations are held.

"With few exceptions, the unwelcome visitors storm the headquarters with a typical kamikaze spirit. With field-service cap at a rakish angle, coat unbuttoned, cigarette behind the ear, they shout invectives and accusations against the Social Democrats' supposed lack of zeal to support their organizations."

Shakai Shimbun closed its account with the mild suggestion that the Action Corps devote the hours thus wasted in storming political party headquarters to making real contributions to public welfare.

Social Democratic Party

48. In the belief that "political action is the most certain means of labor progress," and that a successful Japanese labor movement depended upon political solidarity, 120 labor unionists of varying ability agreed on 10 October 1945 to form a single federation which should support a labor party.

Among the influential leaders of this movement were Komakichi Matsuoka, head of the conservative Trade Union Congress, and Kanju Kato, leftist leader of the National Council of Japanese Labor Unions. Among the unions participating were the Seamen's Union, Tokyo Transport Workers, Tokyo Communications Workers, and Tokyo Gas Works Union.

The result of this agreement was the formation on 2 November 1945 of the Social Democratic Party.

49. From its inauguration the Social Democratic Party, created by men of divergent political and economic beliefs, has suffered from ideological differences. Internal disputes, while magnified in the popular press, have sometimes threatened Party stability. Prewar labor union memberships, revived within the Social Democratic ranks, have often resulted in setting up discordant factions within the Party.

Nevertheless the Social Democrats have presented the most effective example of alliance between labor unions and political leadership. The Party strength, supposedly largely concentrated in the industrial areas, is believed to rest upon its union affiliations.

50. Efforts currently in progress to widen the Party membership include winning support among farmers and intellectuals.

51. The chief union leaders currently aligned within the Social Democratic Party are:

Tetsu Katayama, Party chairman, head of the General Federation of Farmers' Unions 1926-1940.

Rikizo Hirano, executive committeeman, a former official of the Farmers' Union.

Suyehiro Nishio, Party secretary-general, head of the Osaka branch of the General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions, president of the Kansai Labor League and vice-president of the Tokyo Steel Workers' Federation.

Haruji Tahara, executive committeeman, chief of the Fishermen's Union.

Katsuzo (Kanson) Arahata, executive committeeman, who was an organizer for the General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions and for the Kanto Metal Workers' Union.

Komakichi Matsuoka, executive committeeman, president of the General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions.

Kanju Kato, executive committeeman, official of the Tokyo Transport Workers and of the Japan Council of Trade Unions.

Mosaburo Suzuki, executive committeeman, official of the Tokyo Transport Workers.

Zengoro Shimagami, former executive committeeman, an organizer for the Tokyo Transport Workers.

Hitoshi Imamura, conservative Social Democratic Diet member from Nagasaki, chairman of the independent Japan Mine Workers' Union.

52. The actual labor following of some of these leaders is not great, while several important unions have scant representation in the Party in spite of the fact that their members were active in forming it. No important leaders of the Seamen's Union, Communications Workers or Gas Works Union are included. Insofar as some of these unions are politically active they work through the supposedly nonpartisan National Congress of Industrial Unions.

Social Democratic Policies

53. In seeking a solution to labor problems the Social Democrats favor evolutionary development rather than direct economic pressure, and action through labor unions rather than through political means.

54. In the Diet, Social Democrats unsuccessfully fought the Liberal-Progressive Labor Relations Adjustment Bill on the ground that it restricted the right to strike and made labor a commodity. They introduced a bill to organize a Fishermen's Co-operative Union which would supplant all existing fishery organizations and control all fishing rights. This bill, sponsored by Tahara, did not come to a vote. The Party's other activities were largely in the form of opposition to the measures proposed and supported by the Government coalition.

55. The Social Democrats disappointed some of their supporters by failing to state their objectives clearly. Expected by some radicals, including certain members of their own Left Wing, to support a Democratic Front against capitalism and reaction, the Party agreed only to form a Democratic League for National Salvation on condition that it exclude Communists from membership.

56. When the Party's support was sought for certain general strikes, notably in the railway, publishing and electrical industries, the Central Executive Committee withheld consent on the ground that these movements had "political rather than economic" objectives. Nishio referred to the proposed general railroad strike as "a murderous weapon." The Party did, however, volunteer to act as an intermediary in this strike but its offer was rejected.

This opposition to the general strikes was partly due to the Social Democratic preference for political evolution rather than economic revolution, but it also stemmed from the Party's opposition to the theories and practices of the Congress of Industrial Unions. Nonnosuke Watanabe, deputy secretary-general, declared that the latter body was "anarcho-syndicalist" and that it was dominated by Communists.

The Central Executive Committee called the NCIU's "October Offensive" a system "endangering the very foundation of Japan's post-war industrial reconstruction and injurious to the cause of Socialism." The Party also condemned proposals for a general strike to begin on 1 February.

Communist Party

57. The full strength of Communist influence within the labor movement is difficult to determine, since Party strategy leads Communists consistently and purposely to exaggerate their strength.

The fact that many Communist-influenced organizations are also members of the NCIU and that the NCIU has in general paralleled the Communist Party line is taken by many Japanese as an indication that the Communists control that organization, which has two Communist officers, Kenichi Ito and Shoichi Kasuga of the Central Executive Committee.

Much the same relationship exists in the organization and control of farmers' unions, particularly in Hokkaido and Kyushu.

58. The Communists declared their "wholehearted support" of the general strike of seamen and of the press-radio workers, as well as of the proposed railway strike.

In common with the Social Democratic Party, Communists also opposed the Labor Relations Adjustment Bill. They invariably attacked all measures proposed by the Liberal-Progressive government bloc.

59. Much of the Communist strategy consisted of striving to split the Social Democratic Party by encouraging a radical left-wing group in opposition to the more conservative controlling faction. When this failed to achieve results the Communists attacked certain Social Democrats, among them Kanson Arahata and Kanju Kato, who had previously been considered fellow-travelers.

60. Communist policy in Hokkaido received a serious setback when Takashi Mizutani of the Central Executive Committee, a leading coal-mine union executive, quit the Communist Party in protest at its dictatorial labor union methods.

Moves Toward Harmony

61. Thoughtful Japanese deplored what seemed to them a tendency to resort to direct action in the solution of political and labor difficulties. They linked a murderous attack by irresponsible conservative youths upon Katsumi Kikunami, head of the Congress of Industrial Unions, with the unofficial policing of a labor mass-meeting by leftist Special Action Corps as indications that old methods of terrorism had not been entirely eradicated from Japanese political and economic life.

62. Movements toward political and industrial peace were, on the other hand, conspicuous features during February. A well-organized and thoroughly nonpartisan effort to reach agreement between labor and capital, the Economic Rehabilitation Conference,

gave promise of helping to quiet unrest.

Farmers' Union Politics

63. Growing political consciousness has also been apparent in certain phases of political movements among farmers. A Farmers' Union, said at the time of its foundation in February 1946 to include 20,000 members, expanded into an organization officially claiming 1,200,000 supporters. Of the original 20,000 members only about 1,000 were said to be Communists but because of close discipline and centralized direction they exercised an influence far greater than their numerical strength warranted.

64. Originally the Executive Committee of this organization, headed by the late Ko Sunaga and influenced by Rikizo Hirano, both important Social Democratic Party members, favored conservative measures. It supported the Government's land reform policy and the scheme of compulsory rice deliveries at official ceiling prices. It also urged Social Democratic participation in a coalition Cabinet with the Liberal-Progressive bloc. During the Sunaga regime the Farmers' Union attacked Communists for causing dissension by using libelous and untrue accusations.

65. Upon Sunaga's death in August 1946, at a time when black-market prices were soaring and when many farmers desired to withhold their compulsory rice quotas, Hirano proved unable to control the Party. Although Tottori, Gumma, Niigata, Kagawa and Chiba Prefectures upheld his leadership, other prefectures, notably Yamagata, Saitama, Kyoto, Aichi and Hyogo, moved steadily toward the Left. Yamanashi Prefecture is divided: some favor Hirano, others voted some months ago to expel him from the Union. Osaka and Ishikawa Prefectures also split, with two groups claiming to be authentic.

66. When on 12 February 1,354 delegates from 39 prefectures, together with 94 central committeemen, opened a three-day conference in Tokyo, it was apparent that the Hirano followers were a minority. Mainichi Shimbun estimated that 55 percent of the membership was leftist and 25 percent "neutral," with only 20 percent favoring continued Hirano control. Contests over rival delegations from Yamanashi, Osaka and Ishikawa were settled in favor of the anti-Hirano forces.

Although at the convention a resolution was passed calling for the overthrow of the Yoshida Cabinet and for the establishment of a "democratic government" centering about the Social Democratic Party, the leftist delegates controlled convention activities. Voting down a conservative suggestion to choose a new president (Hirano suggested either Michio Hosono or the treasurer, Yoshio Matsunaga, both Social Democratic members of the Diet), the convention decided to set up a Central Committee composed of one representative for each 1,000 members. This body, numbering 1,200 committeemen, would according to the conservatives be dominated by the radicals within the Party. From this a central executive committee was to be elected.

When the leftist elements again voted down the Hirano proposals, Hirano and some 250 conservative delegates bolted the convention. The remainder of the delegates then proceeded to elect Kiso Kuroda, radical candidate and old-time farm union leader, as chairman of the Central Executive Committee, with former secretary Masaru Nomizo as vice-chairman and Toshio Oishi, hitherto a section chief, as secretary-general. All are left-wing Diet members of the Social Democratic Party who favor a united front with the Communists.

As a final action the convention voted to expel Hirano from membership on charges that he was "a disturber of the peace." Hirano retorted by branding the convention "a tool of the Communists."

THE DIET

Diet Reconvened

67. After a recess dating from 23 December the Diet reassembled on 14 February. It had been scheduled to reopen 21 January but the recess was prolonged because of uncertainties concerning Cabinet personnel, questions arising from the possibility of creating a new major political party and failure of the Cabinet to complete a budget or to finish drafting necessary bills for submission to the lawmakers.

68. The Diet is obliged by law to adjourn on 27 March. Although the session may be extended by imperial ordinance no extension is contemplated in view of the scheduled April elections.

69. Since the 90th Diet session had taken final action on only 97 bills during a session of 113 days the Cabinet revised its schedule and cut the number of bills scheduled for submission during the 92nd Diet session to 100 bills and then to approximately 50.

The more important bills to be considered concerned the budget, labor standards, the Civil Code, Criminal Code and procedure, the Judicial Code, the Diet election, political parties, educational standards, local self-government, Government offices and officials, and antitrust control.

Party Membership

70. At the opening of the session the party line-ups had further consolidated. The strength of the parties as compared with other periods of the present Diet's lifetime were:

PARTY STRENGTH IN DIET

	10 Apr 46 (Election)	23 May 46 (90th Session)	26 Nov 46 (91st Session)	14 Feb 47 (92nd Session)
Liberals	140	143	148	148
Progressives	95	97	110	111
Social Democrats	92	95	97	99
Co-operative Democrats	17	33	45	42
People's Party	0	0	32	32
Independent Club	0	33	22	18
Communist	5	5	6	6
Farmers' Party	0	0	0	5
Independent	78	2	5	4
Shinko Club	0	29	0	0
Democratic Preparatory	0	27	0	0
25 minor parties	37	0	0	0
Vacancies	2	2	1	1
Total	466	466	466	466

The shifts in party strength indicate the extent to which Diet members changed allegiance during the period of the Diet's existence. The independents for the most part affiliated with the

People's Party, the Co-operative Democrats or the Independent Club. Minor party members were absorbed by the Progressives, Liberals and Social Democrats.

Government Policies

71. Prime Minister Yoshida's speech at the opening of the Diet session outlined the policies of the Liberal-Progressive coalition. He advocated:

- (1) Use of available materials to increase production of basic commodities.
- (2) Limiting economic controls to a minimum and establishing a "new organ for adjustment of the present control system."
- (3) Basic plans to improve labor efficiency, to revise the taxation system, to check black-market dealings and to establish a "national wage system."
- (4) Consideration of organized labor's suggestions for industrial reconstruction.
- (5) Democratization of labor unions to afford freedom of expression for each individual member and to prevent establishment of minority dictatorships.

Text of Prime Minister's Speech

72. The text of the Prime Minister's speech follows:

"More than one year has elapsed since the termination of the war, and during this period efforts have been made in all branches of the national system for the construction of a democratic and peaceful nation. However, in the matter of economy, which is the foundation of national recovery, we have not as yet been able to achieve security in the people's way of living. Chief among the emergency measures to be taken to cope with this situation are the rehabilitation of industry, the labor problem, the inflation, and the stabilization of the livelihood of the people.

Efforts Must Be Concentrated upon Coal Production "The keynote for industrial rehabilitation lies in centralization of scarce materials for the production of basic materials. An increase in coal production is of foremost importance. Since last November coal production has exceeded a monthly output of 2,000,000 tons. The Government formulated a plan to increase coal production to an annual output of 30,000,000 tons for the fiscal year 1947, with a view to placing our national economy on the basis of an expanding production. This plan is expected to produce the desired results comparatively early, and after April of this year the production of basic materials, led by iron, steel, and fertilizer, is expected to show increases. However, on account of this concentration policy, other industries, as well as the people, will be called upon to bear some sacrifices, but the Government hopes that the people will co-operate. Parallel with an increase in coal production, suitable measures will be taken in the fields of communications and transportation.

Controls Will Be Effected According to Necessity "The essential aim of the economy is to promote the prosperity of the entire society by recognizing the independence and autonomy of industry and by invoking its creative spirit. The aim of government lies in bringing about such economic conditions as speedily

as possible. However, in a country like ours, which has fallen into extreme poverty, it is necessary to adopt some appropriate and powerful control system on basic production materials and on essential daily necessities, by maintaining both social and economic peace and order, if a speedy recovery of economy and the security of the minimum standard of the people's living are desired. Therefore, the Government will see to it that the control system will not be applied where it is not considered necessary. It will also try to revise and even abolish such controls that have outlived their usefulness. To achieve this end speedily, the Government is planning to create a new organ within the Cabinet to readjust the economic control system. At the same time it will be necessary to stamp out the black market in key materials in order to halt the inflation. The Government now contemplates taking drastic measures for this purpose.

Anti-inflation Policy "The money-saving campaign, which has been launched by the Government as a link in the chain of the anti-inflation policy, has produced considerable results, and the drive will be continued in the future. However, the basic policy must be to obtain a sound and healthy growth of financial conditions, increases in production, and satisfactory circulation of both money and goods. The Government therefore seeks to maintain a good balance between state revenues and expenditures and to rationalize bank loans, in conjunction with the measures to control production and money circulation. By these means the Government intends to halt currency inflation and to stabilize prices.

Livelihood of Workers "Needless to say, it is impossible to overcome the present economic crisis and to lay the foundation for industrial recovery without the co-operation of the entire people, especially without the active support of the working class. Accordingly, the Government is greatly concerned with the betterment of the position of workers and the stabilization of their livelihood. Therefore, in order to decide upon a minimum standard of working conditions, including wages, working hours, and rest hours and to enhance the position of workers and their working efficiency, the Government has decided to present the Labor Standards Bill to the present session of the Diet. The Government is also considering measures to protect and rehabilitate workers. To attain this end we propose to promote public welfare enterprises and to consolidate measures for stabilizing the living conditions of workers. This is to be done with the funds accruing when the unequal distribution of wealth is leveled through revisions of the taxation system. Concerning the wage problem, the Wage Investigation Commission is examining the national economic power of our country from an overall viewpoint. Its purpose is to work out the basic pay on the basis of the standards of living permitted to our people at present. From this basic pay the Government will work out appropriate wages for different branches of industry, so as to establish a rational wage level which is consonant with the actual conditions existing in our country.

"The fact that our labor movement has actively developed since the end of the war, as a result of the organization of trade unions, is greatly conducive to our industrial recovery and the democratic reconstruction of the country. From the depths of our hearts we sincerely hope that this active labor movement will be used to work out concrete measures for the economic reconstruction of our country, with industrial peace as the goal. Since last fall, active movements have been started in all quarters for formulating definite measures for our industrial recovery. The Government takes this occasion to state that it will give credit to the results of these efforts, and if there is anything in them that the Government sees fit to adopt, it will willingly adopt such measures. At the same time, the Government sincerely hopes that the reconstruction

of our industry will be accomplished through the incentive to labor, which is developing among the workers.

"Concerning the recent labor dispute of the All-Government and Public Office employees, the Government recognized that their demands were the result of difficult living conditions. Accordingly, in order to stave off the disastrous effects of the general strike, the Government decided, as an emergency measure, to meet their demands as far as the state finances permitted. It is a matter of great regret that the Government's plan was not accepted by the union, which led to the release of SCAP's statement. However, it is a matter for congratulation that, on this account, the general strike was averted at the last minute, and that the danger of rendering futile all the efforts expended for the reconstruction of the country was also averted. It is necessary for us, however, to exercise deep self-reflection in this regard.

Democratization of Trade Unions "The Government ardently hopes that the internal conditions of trade unions will be thoroughly democratized and that trade unions will make a normal and healthy growth, so that they will not be isolated from the will of the majority of unionists because of the dictatorship of a minority. More precisely, the Government sincerely hopes that the internal conditions of trade unions will be thoroughly democratized in such a manner that the personality of each individual unionist will be thoroughly respected, and that the expressed will of the unionists will be echoed by trade unions. In order to realize this, it is necessary that capital, labor and the public become democratic, invested with moral courage, and able to express their will and views freely, at the dictate of their conscience and with full understanding of the true spirit of democracy. We are convinced that this is the foundation on which democracy stands; this is the keynote of national education. On the basis of the aforementioned principle, the Government contemplates a reform in education and development of activities for enlightenment.

Delivery of Staple Foods "Taking advantage of the favorable food situation brought about by the bumper crop, the Government increased staple food rations, but throughout the current year will have to import a large quantity of food. For this reason, we have to continue controls on staple food. The delivery of staple foods according to schedule is very important for economic recovery. Therefore we sincerely hope that there will be no cause for regret in this respect, with the co-operation and understanding of farmers. The Government will make further efforts to supply fertilizers and other farm necessities and to effect the delivery of staple food.

"The government employees are public servants, and their actions will have an immediate and far-reaching effect upon national interests. It is for this reason that the necessity for enforcement of official discipline is particularly emphasized. Those who are in the teaching profession are especially requested to be careful about their conduct, for they produce a far-reaching effect upon the younger generation, which is the cornerstone of the reconstruction of our country. It is a matter for great regret that lately there is a tendency to misunderstand the true spirit of democracy and to disregard discipline. Accordingly, parallel with the improvement in the wage level, the Government contemplates effecting reforms in official discipline, so that government employees will fully realize that they are public servants.

Speedy Return to International Society "The international situation is gradually recovering normalcy. In our relations with other countries we believe the time will come when the conclusion of a peace treaty will be considered. We ardently hope that that

time will come soon, so that we may be able to return to international society. However, in order to arrive at this stage, the sincerity of our people in co-operating for the reconstruction of the country must be made known to the world. It is a matter for great regret that, since the termination of the war, there have been signs that the enthusiasm of the people for reconstructing our nation has declined somewhat. The morale of the people, who once had been respected by other nations as a most patriotic people, has gone down. The people have been demoralized, and there are signs of increasing irritability and friction among them. This certainly is a most regrettable state of affairs. The living standard of our people has, so far, been maintained by reserve stocks and by imports from Allied Powers, but with the exhaustion of these stocks it has now become necessary for us to be solely dependent on imports. The Government, therefore, ardently hopes that you will extend your close co-operation for surmounting the present crisis and for reconstructing our country, by looking at these realities fearlessly."

Press Comment

73. Tokyo newspapers described the speech as "abstract." Yomiuri, Mainichi, Jiji Shimpō, Nihon Keizai and Asahi all agreed that while the Prime Minister's basic principles were "policies to which not a single exception could be taken," no positive and active measures were suggested to the nation.

74. Yomiuri welcomed the Prime Minister's statements that he would further economic control, enforce "official discipline" and urge co-operation of labor toward industrial rehabilitation, but observed that Yoshida "never has deigned to see the representatives of the workers."

75. Mainichi questioned Yoshida's announced desire to reform the taxation system, since, it said, he has shown no desire to change what was described as his "unfair policy." The Prime Minister's references to anti-inflation measures were dismissed by Mainichi as "bad even for an essay."

76. Asahi wondered why Yoshida failed to mention the need for "stabilizing the people's diet," while Nihon Keizai declared that in spite of all Yoshida's promises for the future "he has not lived up to the hopes of the people."

GENERAL ELECTIONS

New Elections Recommended

77. On 6 February the Supreme Commander sent Prime Minister Yoshida a letter suggesting that the time had come for another general election.

The text of the Supreme Commander's letter follows:

"I believe the time has come for a general election. Momentous changes in internal structure, in economic outlook, and in the whole fabric and pattern of Japanese life have occurred since the last general election nearly a year ago.

"It is necessary, in the near future, to obtain another democratic expression of the people's will on the fundamental issues with which Japanese society is now confronted. In this way we will once more advance in the process of democracy which now governs this state.

"The exact time and details are matters which I leave to the discretion of the Japanese Government, but the election should

take place as soon as practicable after the close of the present session of the Diet so that a new legislative body may initiate and synchronize with the introduction and effectuation of the new Constitution.

"The past year has been one of accomplishment. I look with equal confidence to the future."

Response to the Supreme Commander's Letter

78. The publication of the Supreme Commander's letter calling for a general election received a hearty welcome. Japanese editors recognized in the call for new elections a valuable contribution toward the popularization of the election process. Various political and labor bodies expressed their views and clarified their positions. The official reactions of the various parties follow:

Liberal Party "We heartily welcome General MacArthur's letter as it is only natural for the Diet to be dissolved when the new Constitution is enacted in order to ascertain anew the nation's will. We are sure that the Social Democratic Party is satisfied, too, as it has now obtained something definite to its recent demand for dissolution. The coalition problem has been automatically done away with by this incident."

Progressive Party "Regarding MacArthur's letter to the Premier, as far as our Party is concerned we have been expecting the dissolution of the Diet as a matter of course, after the enforcement of the new Constitution. Consequently we do not need to think out new measures because of this."

Social Democratic Party "We wholeheartedly support the General's message. Our Party will face the general election as one solid unit. As the current public opinion indicates, we shall undoubtedly emerge as the first party with a considerable majority. Then we shall do our utmost to stabilize the political situation."

Co-operative Democratic Party "General MacArthur's advice is gratifying. Our belief is that co-operation is the only means by which we can reconstruct our country under the present unsettled situation. Fortunately, large numbers of new supporters are appearing in both urban and agrarian districts, convincing us of success in the forthcoming election. We intend to overcome the current difficulty in co-operation with the parties on our sides."

Communist Party "Along with helping to develop mass struggles, our Party is going to participate in the election with the people, striving for the establishment of a democratic people's government and doing our best to sweep away the ruinous forces. We would like to take measures to overwhelm the conservative parties with a democratic front, joining hands with labor, farmers and other mass organizations and also with the Social Democratic Party."

General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions "We have already published a statement asking for the resignation of the Yoshida Cabinet and for a general election during the electric workers' dispute at the end of last year, because the present Cabinet clearly exposed its impotency with its economic and labor policies. Never has there been a government so far from the people's wishes as this one. We think the Government should resign immediately and ask for the people's confidence."

National Congress of Industrial Unions "The Yoshida Cabinet, which is based on the Liberal and the Progressive Parties, is absolutely hopeless. These two Parties are not what they were

at the time of the last election. At that time there were no such men as Yoshida and Shidehara in the Parties. In our opinion the Yoshida Cabinet should retire as soon as possible to ask for the people's confidence. In the coming general election, in co-operation with all the democratic bodies, we shall support democratic candidates chosen by the masses, so that the Diet may represent the interests of the working people. In that sense we attach much importance to the election campaign."

Japan Farmers' Union "The delivery of rice is a major question in the agrarian villages, but it has developed to a stage where the present Government cannot handle it. Some rich farmers are taking advantage of this inflation and fattening their pockets, thanks to the Yoshida Cabinet, but the majority of the farmers are rapidly becoming antigovernmental. In the election of the farmland committees, our Union's principle was not to vote for nonunion members. In the coming election we will exert our efforts to eliminate local bosses, co-operating with the Social Democratic and the Communist Parties."

Election Campaigns

79. Existing Japanese law forbids holding all elections at one time. Executives and legislators, for instance, must be elected on separate dates. In order to complete the governmental structure by 3 May, at least four elections must be held. On 17 February the Government announced the following election schedule:

- 5 April Elections for all executives, governors, mayors and headmen.
- 15 April Run-off elections in the event that no candidate receives the 3/8 vote required for election, or in the event of a tie.
- 20 April Elections for the House of Councillors, both those chosen from the prefectures and those elected at large.
- 25 April Elections for the House of Representatives.
- 30 April Elections for assemblymen of prefectures, cities, towns and villages.

Press Comment

80. The grave importance of the coming general elections in democratizing Japan was discussed by both Asahi and Yomiuri.

81. Asahi urged the people again to read the Potsdam Declaration prior to elections, "for it is necessary to establish a democratic Cabinet which will have its base in the people. Only thus may a new order of peace and justice be born."

Such a Cabinet is also necessary, the journal continued, "to carry out the responsibility of meeting reparations and reconstructing Japan."

Asahi further pointed out that the people should not forget the importance of local elections, "since local self-autonomy is the basis of democratic administration."

Warning against "vague and abstract campaign promises" by the various political parties and candidates, the newspaper said the people "should make its political judgment by seeking

concrete policies and not be misled by rhetoric and pretty adjectives."

82. Yomiuri also pointed out that the coming elections "are steps towards carrying out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration."

Emphasizing the importance of the elections to the people the journal declared, "Voters should not forget that those who corrupt the elections are also corrupting the motherland."

The significance of the elections, Yomiuri said, is as follows:

- (1) To show to the world the progress of democracy.
- (2) To set up a stable administration which will ably cope with the internal crisis.
- (3) To establish true democracy through local self-autonomy.

PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES

Cabinet Changes

83. Important changes in the Government during the month included the naming of Kozaemon Kimura, formerly Vice Speaker of the House of Representatives, as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Tomohara Inouye, Diet member from Kagoshima, as Vice Speaker; Hiroo Wada, former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, as director-general of the Economic Stabilization Board, a post carrying rank as minister without portfolio; and Manitsu Tanaka, secretary of the Progressive Party, as Minister Without Portfolio. Both Kimura and Inouye are members of the Progressive Party. Their appointment was a move to strengthen the Liberal-Progressive coalition.

Appointment of Parliamentary Vice Ministers

84. As a further consolidation of the alliance the Government appointed a number of Liberals and Progressives as Parliamentary Vice-Ministers.

The new vice-ministers, with their political affiliations, are: Home Office, Ren Hayashi, Progressive; Finance, Tokutaro Kitamura, Progressive; Justice, Kaitaro Kitaura, Liberal; Education, Takayoshi Aoki, Liberal; Agriculture and Forestry, Kotaro Mori, Liberal; Commerce and Industry, Shigeru Mori, Progressive; Transportation, Hiroshi Aizawa, Progressive; Communication, Shingoro Hanashi, Liberal; Welfare, Yasomi Ogasawara, Liberal; and Foreign, Ichiro Honda, Liberal.

SECTION 2
PUBLIC SAFETY

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Law and Order.	1
Public Casualties.	9
Police	11
Prisons.	16
Fire	21

LAW AND ORDER

Demonstrations

1. Labor continued to express its dissatisfaction with government policies at meetings, demonstrations and rallies throughout Japan during February. Little disorder or violence occurred except at the second nationwide mass meeting of the Japan Farmers' Union at Waseda University in Tokyo on 12 February, which was temporarily adjourned after a dispute as to the manner of electing a chairman ended in a fist fight.

Law and Order

2. A survey of robbery and burglary cases in Tokyo made public by the Crime Prevention Section of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board shows a decrease from 75 cases in December to 43 cases in January. The preponderance of offenses committed out of doors as against indoors was attributed to the high percentage of amateur robbers operating in the capital. Articles of clothing constituted the largest single item of theft.

Criminal Abuse of Office

3. The Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice examined the conduct of government and public workers in investigations carried out in February. Screening of 11,669 alleged offenses involving criminal abuse of office covering the period from September 1945 through December 1946 resulted in 4,500 indictments for such acts as theft, petty larceny and bribery.

Black-market Activities

4. During the month police continued active measures to suppress black-marketing with raids throughout Japan that led to numerous arrests and recovered quantities of consumer goods that had been diverted from regular channels.

In one such anti-black-market campaign, 5,215 persons were arrested in Osaka in the first 20 days of the month and quantities of goods were seized. Commodities confiscated in the arrests, mostly rice, sweet potatoes, wheat, fish, sake, shoyu, sugar, charcoal and cigarettes, were distributed through regular channels.

5. In Chiba Prefecture the police brought black-market activities under control in some of the larger cities, notably Katsura and Tateyama. Discouraged by the low official prices enforced as a result of the cleanup, many storekeepers refused to offer goods for sale, producing a shortage of consumers' goods.

Smuggling

6. The Customs Division of the Ministry of Finance reported 127 cases of smuggling undeclared commodities into Japan from May 1946 to January 1947. Of the smuggled goods 80 percent was sugar, totaling 400 tons, and the remainder was staple foods.

Crime

7. The number of criminal offenses reported in December dropped to 135,909, continuing the downward trend during the last half of the year. In previous years crime incidence had been high in December, and the low 1946 incidence reflected success of the nationwide crime prevention program carried out in December. See charts on next two pages.

8. The number of persons arrested dropped slightly to 76,576 in December, of whom 72,839 were Japanese, 3,505 were Koreans, 139 Formosans, 38 Chinese and 55 of other nationalities.

PUBLIC CASUALTIES

Traffic Accidents

9. One hundred seventy-eight persons were killed and about 800 injured when a train bound for Hachioji near Tokyo jumped the track and overturned on 25 February. The high toll was due to the flimsy wooden construction of the four overturned cars and to overcrowding of the cars. Lack of air pressure on the brakes of one of the cars was given as the cause of the disaster.

10. Last year 687 persons were killed and 2,799 injured in 3,578 traffic accidents in the Tokyo metropolitan area, according to an official survey made by the Metropolitan Police Board on 4 February. The survey showed that 57 percent of the total accidents involved automobiles while virtually all the rest involved metropolitan railway lines.

POLICE

Radio Patrol Cars


11. Following successful experiments with radio-equipped police cars in Tokyo last month, the Ministry of Home Affairs has made plans for equipping the nation's police force with 134 radio cars with simultaneous reception and transmission on two wave lengths. As facilities increase, leading fire stations and police launches will also be equipped with two-way radios.

Juvenile Delinquency

12. The number of juvenile delinquents in institutions under the Ministry of Justice remained fairly steady during the last six months of 1946.

CRIMINAL OFFENSES

RATE / 100,000 POPULATION / ANNUM




* "ALL CRIMINAL OFFENSES" INCLUDE MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES NOT SEPARATELY SHOWN.
 NOTE: ON SEMI-LOGARITHMIC CHARTS EQUAL RISES OR FALLS INDICATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES.
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS.
 GHQ-SCAP

JAPAN - FEB 47



NUMBER 2

PREFECTURAL CRIME RATES

DECEMBER 1946 RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION PER ANNUM*



NOTE: THE DECEMBER NATIONAL CRIME RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION WAS 2,230.



* POPULATION ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL CENSUS OF 26 APRIL 1946.
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS.

GHQ:SCAP

JAPAN - FEB 47

NUMBER 3

JUVENILES IN INSTITUTIONS

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
<u>Under Ministry of Justice</u>						
Private reformatories	2,683	2,733	2,838	2,898	3,075	2,754
Government reformatories	782	984	1,020	1,066	1,013	936
Juvenile prisons	1,616	1,333	1,420	1,618	1,656	1,667
Prisons	<u>1,034</u>	<u>1,372</u>	<u>1,532</u>	<u>1,853</u>	<u>1,901</u>	<u>1,349</u>
Total	6,115	6,422	6,810	7,435	7,645	6,706
<u>Under Ministry of Welfare</u>						
Houses of juvenile correction	-	-	<u>3,526</u>	<u>3,547</u>	<u>3,614</u>	<u>3,600</u>
Grand total	6,115	6,422	10,336	10,982	11,259	10,306

13. During Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Week in February 564 juveniles were temporarily taken into custody by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board. Among them were 33 primary school boys, six primary school girls, 387 middle school boys, 17 middle school girls and 106 boys and 15 girls who did not attend school.

14. In a survey of 2,290 cases of juvenile delinquency by the Niigata prefectural police it was found that children begin stealing as young as eight years old. Other statistics as to crimes and age when first committed showed incendiarism, nine years; embezzlement, 11; assault and burglary, 12; indecency, swindling, gambling, 14; rape, 15; and murder, 18.

15. The Criminal Section of the Ibaraki prefectural police disclosed that 1,295 boys and girls were arrested in the prefecture in December and January. Larceny was the principal offense, most delinquents selling the stolen goods to get money to buy food.

PRISONS

16. Thirteen persons were executed for murder in Japan between 20 November 1945 and 9 December 1946. Eleven of the 13 murders were in connection with robberies or burglaries and two involved rape. The executed murderers ranged in age from 20 to 49 years, the average age being 27.

17. The Ministry of Justice opened a new training course in advanced penology on 20 February with 59 guards and officials from various prisons throughout Japan attending. In a two-month training course with 286 lesson-hours the 59 men will study fingerprinting, regulation of prison affairs, criminal policy, criminal law and prison hygiene.

18. A survey of public and private institutes for detention of juveniles showed that all are in need of medicines, soap, fuel, clothing and more educational and recreational facilities.

Prison Surveys

19. Prison conditions in southern Honshu and Kyushu were

inspected by SCAP officials and were found to be generally satisfactory. Six persons inspected compared favorably with those inspected in other parts of Japan. Improvement was noted in neatness, cleanliness, medical facilities, working conditions and in the caliber of prison officials.

Deficiencies yet to be overcome include shortages of space, medical supplies, soap, fuel and clothing.

Released-prisoner Aids

20. The All-Japan Federation for the Protection of Released Prisoners is an organization to aid and keep surveillance over released prisoners. The Minister of Justice is honorary chairman of the Board of Directors of which most positions are unpaid. The Federation is dependent for funds upon donations plus a small amount from the Ministry of Justice. Regional headquarters are frequently headed by the chief procurator of the District Court who has an unpaid Board of Directors to assist him.

The organization gives food, lodging and temporary assistance, usually in the form of railroad fare to the ex-prisoner's home. Reports are submitted on the ex-prisoner's behavior and welfare.

In Fukuoka Prefecture there were about 1,500 ex-prisoners under supervision of 780 supervisors during 1946.

FIRE

21. Fire losses continued high throughout Japan in February.

In Tokyo the Shinsei market in the Shimbashi district was swept by a fire which destroyed 10 buildings, causing damage estimated at ¥ 7,000,000, and the Third National Elementary School in Omori Ward was razed with a loss of ¥ 5,000,000.

More than 800 persons were made homeless and 20 persons were injured in a fire which destroyed 150 homes and 76 other buildings in Katamura-gun, Mie Prefecture. Damage was estimated at ¥ 10,000,000.

A hospital in Mombetsu-gun, Hokkaido, was damaged in a fire caused by negligence with a cigarette. No one was injured but damage was estimated at ¥ 4,000,000.


22. Heavy losses incurred each year by fires in Japan prompted the Fire Prevention Section of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, with co-operation of the Ministry of Education, to have instructions for methods of fire prevention incorporated in textbooks for primary, intermediate and higher schools. These books are to be used in the new school term beginning in April.

23. The usual increase in fires during winter months was reflected in December fire figures for Japan but the sharp increase in casualties and fire losses was due to the 21 December earthquake which in Wakayama Prefecture alone accounted for 52 deaths, 211 persons injured and damages amounting to more than ¥ 1,000,000,000.

There were 1,793 fires reported throughout Japan during December, causing damage amounting to ¥ 1,503,701,398. Casualties totaled 110 killed and 352 injured.

FIRES: NUMBER, CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE

SINCE MAY 1946



SECTION 3
LEGAL AND WAR CRIMES

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Legal Affairs.	1
Japanese Judicial Administration	2
Military Occupation Courts	6
Investigation of Suspected War Criminals	8
Apprehension of Suspected War Criminals.	10
Prosecution of War Criminals	16
International Prosecution of War Criminals	23

LEGAL AFFAIRS

Trials Involving Chinese Nationals

1. Chinese representatives have been appointed by the Chinese Mission to sit in provost-court trials of Chinese nationals at Yokohama, Osaka and Fukuoka. A member of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces may be designated to represent China at trials in Sendai.

JAPANESE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

2. Principal judicial personnel were shifted by Minister of Justice Iwata in a series of appointments on 7 February. Appointees included a new Vice-minister of Justice, a new Supreme Court President, a new Prosecutor-general and heads of inferior courts.

3. Tadaichiro Tanimura, president of the Tokyo Bar Association, was named Vice-minister of Justice succeeding Senri Sakano, who will become Chief Judge of the Tokyo Appellate Court.

4. Dr. Choryo Hosono, recently Chief Judge of the Hiroshima Appellate Court, was appointed President of the Supreme Court, succeeding Seiichi Shimoyama.

Dr. Hosono, 64, was graduated from Kyoto Imperial University in 1908. He served as judge of the Nagoya and Osaka local courts and later studied in Germany and Austria. He has been Chief Judge of the Hiroshima court since 1940.

5. Tokutero Kimura, managing director of the Imperial Bar Association and former Minister of Justice, succeeds Namisuke Nakano as Prosecutor-general.

MILITARY OCCUPATION COURTS

6. Theft of United States goods by Japanese and Koreans, mostly on a small scale, continued in February. Goods most frequently stolen were cigarettes, food, clothing, blankets, tires and gasoline. Other cases tried in military occupation courts included posing as Occupation Forces personnel and refusing

information to Occupation Forces officials.


Four Japanese will be tried before a provost court for allegedly forging credentials of Occupation Forces authorities and "confiscating" hidden war materials from Japanese.

Another person was sentenced by a provost court for posing as an investigation agent for the Occupation Forces and extorting money from Japanese.

Convicted of refusing information to a member of the Occupation Forces on a matter of official concern, a Japanese was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and fined ¥ 75,000.

Three women and two men, all from Kobe, were found guilty of assisting eight soldiers in deserting the U. S. Army by furnishing them with living quarters. Sentences ranged from two to five years at hard labor.

7. The number of cases handled in EIGHTH Army and British Commonwealth Occupation Forces courts decreased in December and January. There were 1,144 cases tried from 21 November to 20 December and 1,137 cases from 21 December to 20 January.



INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

8. Cases now on file are classified as follows:

ATROCITY INVESTIGATIONS
Japan

	Cases on Hand <u>25 Jan</u>	Cases Received <u>25 Jan-24 Feb</u>	Cases Completed <u>25 Jan-24 Feb</u>	Cases on Hand <u>24 Feb</u>
POW camp conditions	9	1	1	9
POW camp atrocities	110	12	2	120
B-29 flyers	394	208	24	578
POW ship	55	1	6	50
Kempei-tai (Military Police)	25	3	2	26
Miscellaneous	<u>611</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>660</u>
Total	1,204	318	79	1,443

The Philippines

9. From 21 January to 20 February several cases were re-opened for further investigation and 124 cases were forwarded to the Review Board with the recommendation that they be closed due to insufficient evidence or because perpetrators are dead or cannot be found.

APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

Japan

10. Eight memorandums were issued to the Japanese Government to apprehend and deliver six former generals, one former admiral, 77 other former officers, 46 former enlisted personnel and 45 civilians to Sugamo Prison for alleged war crimes activities.

11. The Japanese Government was notified of the deletion of five names which appeared on previous apprehension lists. Two were reported dead, two no longer were required for trial and one was identified to be the same as a previously listed suspect.

12. Three memorandums were issued notifying the Japanese Government of the release of three persons from suspicion of being war criminals and their return to their former status.

13. Seventy-six suspected war criminals were interned in Sugamo Prison during the period 25 January-24 February. At the present time 977 persons are interned in Sugamo Prison.

Philippines

14. During the month 79 prisoners of war were received from various camps throughout the Philippines and from Japan. Two escaped prisoners turned themselves over to the authorities.

15. On 20 February 571 Japanese prisoners of war were being detained in the Philippines. Four hundred forty-six were identified as war criminals, 103 were suspected war criminals and 22 were being held as witnesses.

PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

Japan

16. One hundred forty-eight defendants have been tried in the war crimes trials in Japan to date. Of these 144 were found guilty, 19 receiving the death sentence, and four were found not guilty.

17. Twelve trials were completed in Japan between 27 January and 21 February involving 32 defendants.

TRIAL OF WAR ATROCITY CASES
Japan

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
NAKAJIMA, Sukeo	Camp Commander	Capt	29 Nov 46- 21 Feb 47	Death by hanging
KAWATE, Harumi	Guard	Civ		Death by hanging
KIMURA, Tamotsu	Guard	Civ		Death by hanging
HIRAMATSU, Sadaharu	Guard	Civ		Death by hanging
YOSHIZAWA, Kinio	Inter- preter	Cpl		Death by hanging
KIRISHITA, Takeo	Guard	Civ		Life imprisonment
SHIOIRI, Rikio	Med Ord	Pvt		Life imprisonment

KATO, Masayoshi	Med Ord	Pvt	28 Jan 47- 5 Feb 47	25 years

FUKUAMI, Kazuo	Guard	Civ	11 Feb 47- 12 Feb 47	10 years

HASHIMOTO, Chogo	Guard	Civ	12 Feb 47- 17 Feb 47	15 years

TAKAHASHI, Takeo	Guard	L/Cpl	25 Sep 46- 11 Feb 47	15 years

SATO, Katsuyasu	Guard	Civ		40 years

MIZUKOSHI, Saburo	Camp CO	Capt	27 Jan 47- 3 Feb 47	30 years

SASAZAWA, Chuta	Camp CO	Capt		Death by hanging

KOBAYASHI, Sadaharu	Not given	Sgt		30 years

YUI, Kiyoshi	Guard	Civ		30 years

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
FUJITA, Shosaburo	Guard	Civ	27 Jan 47- 3 Feb 47	10 years
TAKAHASHI, Hasanori	Guard	Civ		5 years
SUZUKI, Hikari	Guard	Civ		30 years
NISHIKAWA, Yoshio	Guard	Civ		15 years
SHIBANO, Tadao	Senior NCO	S/Maj	20 Nov 46- 3 Feb 47	Death by hanging
AOKI, Yuzu	Med Sgt	Sgt		Death by hanging
KUIYAMA, Michio	Inter- preter	Pvt		Life imprisonment
OTA, Narumi	Camp CO	Lt		Life imprisonment
TAGUCHI, Yoshio	Med Ord	Pvt		Life imprisonment
KONO, Hiroaki	Inter- preter	Pfc		Life imprisonment
KATEYAMA, Kengo	Inter- preter	Cpl		20 years
HADA, Masato	Med Ord	Pvt	27 Jan 47	Life imprisonment
MIYATAKE, Kunio	Med Off	Lt	21 Jan 47- 31 Jan 47	20 years
KATSURA, Takeo	Guard	Pvt	12 Feb 47- 20 Feb 47	40 years
ADACHI, Fukusaburo	Guard	Civ	17 Feb 47- 21 Feb 47	20 years
NAKAJIMA, Hidemaro	Camp Adj	Lt	24 Dec 46- 27 Jan 47	2 years

18. Charges and specifications were of the same nature as those which marked previous trials, involving unlawful killings, mistreating prisoners of war, misappropriating Red Cross supplies, administering collective punishment for individual offenses, forcing sick prisoners to perform arduous manual labor and command responsibility for permitting persons to carry out atrocities under a specific command.

The Philippines

19. As of 20 February 175 persons had been tried for war crimes in the Philippines. Nine were acquitted, 82 received death sentences and 84 were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment.

20. Six trials involving 22 defendants were completed from 21 January to 20 February. Results of the trials follow:

TRIAL OF WAR ATROCITY CASES
The Philippines

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
TOYAMA, Minoru	CO Special Security Unit	Capt	17 Jan 47- 28 Jan 47	Life imprisonment
INAGAKI, Toyoaki	Member Special Security Unit	Lt		25 years
NAKAMURA Yoshiyuki	Member Special Security Unit	Lt		25 years
HAGINO, Shumpei	Not given	Lt	3 Feb 47- 11 Feb 47	Death by musketry
HOSAKA, Shinkichi	Not given	WO		20 years
KIMURA, Keiichi	Not given	M/Sgt		Not guilty
KATO, Sakakatsu	Not given	WO		Not guilty
KOBAYASHI, Ichiro	Not given	WO		Life imprisonment
MOMMA, Rikizo	Not given	WO		Not guilty
FUKUOKA, Chiyokichi	Not given	Lt		25 years
ITO, Tetsusaburo	Not given	WO		30 years
NOGANI, Zenichiro	Not given	M/Sgt		Life imprisonment
NAKAMURA, Michinori	Unit Commander Kempei-tai	Col	24 Jan 47- 13 Feb 47	Death by hanging
KAMISUKI, Kotaro	Unit Adj Kempei-tai	Lt		Life imprisonment
SASAKURA, Rinji	Member Kempei-tai	Sgt		Death by hanging
ICHIJO, Koshin	Member Kempei-tai	Sgt		Death by hanging
ICHIHASHI, Shigeo	Member Kempei-tai	Sgt/Maj		Life imprisonment
OKAZUKI, Kasuaki	Member Kempei-tai	Sgt		Life imprisonment

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
KAZATO, Fumiyuki	Member Kempei-tai	L/Pvt	24 Jan 47- 13 Feb 47	Death by musketry
KAOMATSU, Shoichi	Staff Officer	Col	13 Jan 47- 8 Feb 47	Death by hanging
NOGI, Naraji	Medical Officer	Capt	16 Jan 47- 24 Jan 47	25 years
YAMAGUCHI, Nasakazu	Unit CO	Col	31 Oct 46- 29 Jan 47	Death by hanging

21. Charges and specifications involved unlawful killings and torture and mistreatment of prisoners of war.

British War Crimes Trials

22. The Japanese Government was notified of the results of British war crimes trials in Labuan, Singapore, Kampar, Malacca, Hongkong, Bentong, Rabaul and Pahang. Thirty war criminals were sentenced to death, 37 were sentenced to prison terms ranging from one year to life imprisonment and 11 persons were acquitted.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

	Paragraph
Synopsis of Tribunal Proceedings	23
Opening Defense Phase	28

SYNOPSIS OF TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS

23. The President of the Tribunal on 3 February announced in open court that all motions of defendants to dismiss were denied for insufficient grounds.

24. The Court recessed on 3 February and reconvened on 24 February.

25. Opening statement by the defense was presented on 25 and 26 February. Five of the accused were opposed to this document while some of the other defendants disagreed to it in part.

26. Request of defense counsel on 25 February to read a statement questioning the Tribunal's jurisdiction to try the accused was denied.

27. The Tribunal on 27 February overruled the objections of British and Soviet prosecutors to admission of documentary evidence which reviewed Japan-U. S. S. R. relations.

OPENING DEFENSE PHASE

28. On 25 February the defense introduced its opening statement declaring that "the defense will disprove each and every charge of criminality lodged against the accused."

"As far as possible evidence in common will be given where the offenses charged are in common," the statement began.

"The proof to be presented in common has been divided into the following divisions, in which order the evidence will be produced:

- Division 1. General problems.
- Division 2. Matters concerning Manchuria and Manchukuo.
- Division 3. Matters concerning China.
- Division 4. Matters concerning the Soviet Union.
- Division 5. Matters concerning the Pacific War.

"After the presentation of evidence in the above divisions, each accused will from his own individual standpoint offer evidence concerning himself," the statement continued.

General Problems

29. Continuing the defense declared, "The prosecution assumes that all military precautions adopted by the Government of Japan during the years from 1928 to 1945, from the standpoint of international law, were criminal acts in themselves. It not only avers that the policies of Japan were criminal but it asserts that if a nation initiates a so-called 'war of aggression,' or a war in violation of certain treaties, etc., the individuals who happened to be in office at the time and participated in the decision to wage such a war are criminally responsible. In other words, the fundamental proposition advanced in this case is that Japan, including the accused, continuously committed alleged international crimes during the entire period of 17 years.

"All the accused deny these propositions with the utmost emphasis of which they are capable. . .

"There are three vital considerations which should be outlined in this opening statement in order properly to comprehend the exact nature of the internal and external policies of Japan during the period covered by the indictment. These are independence, abolition of racial discrimination and diplomacy. These are not merely the policies of any particular cabinets, of which there were many, nor are they principles of specific political parties. Rather they are national, long standing, and firm aspirations universally subscribed to and cherished by the entire Japanese nation since the opening of the country to foreign intercourse in 1853, and are as important to the Japanese as are free speech, free education and freedom of religion in America.

"The first of these national characteristics is the fervent desire of the Japanese people to preserve the nation as a perfect independent and sovereign state. The treaty of 'Ansei' between Commodore Perry and the Shogun not only impaired the sovereignty of the nation extraterritorially but infringed upon its customs autonomy and hence was most deeply regretted by all Japanese of that era. . .

"The second point is the demand for the abolition of racial discrimination. Since East Asia has its own culture it has been the desire of the Japanese people to preserve and purify it so that an equal position may be maintained with all races and peoples in every respect and thus contribute to the progress of mankind everywhere. The aspiration for racial equality cannot be realized simply by raising the position of the Japanese to the standard of Europeans and Americans. By its very nature the standard of all the peoples in East Asia should be raised in order to attain the complete abolition of discrimination. . .

"The third fact to be referred to is what has been termed 'the fundamental principles and doctrines of diplomacy' of Japan. Since the Meiji Period the prevailing ideal held by the Government and the people of Japan in respect to foreign relations was to maintain peace in East Asia and thereby contribute to the welfare of the whole world. This was called the 'cardinal principle of diplomacy' in official documents and imperial rescripts, that is to say, the fundamental ideal of Japan which guided its foreign policy. The war with China 1894 to 1895 and the war with Russia 1904 and 1905 were fought with that aim and consideration in view. That is explicitly written in the rescripts declaring these wars. In the actual conditions at that time, Japan was the only country in the Far East which had adopted a western civilization and had all the qualifications of a modern state. Although China was a vast country abundant in resources, she faced the danger of being partitioned by the Powers into spheres of influence. Most of the regions in the south had already come under the domination of several Occidental Powers. Under such circumstances the Japanese people sincerely felt that Japan had a special mission as a stabilizing power in the East. . .

"Prince Konoye in his declarations of 3 November and 22 December 1938 first used officially the words 'New Order in East Asia.' In November 1943 the essence of this concept of the New Order in Greater East Asia was defined by the Greater East Asia Conference assembled in Tokyo. This concept provided:

- "(1) The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual co-operation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.
- "(2) The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.
- "(3) The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.
- "(4) The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close co-operation upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.
- "(5) The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world and work for the abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.

"Japan being a country of small area and incapable of self-support because of meager natural resources, there is no way for Japan other than immigration, foreign trade and industrialization in order to feed her rapidly increasing surplus population and to maintain her economy. Since immigration was restricted by many of the Western Powers, Japan was forced to choose foreign trade and industrialization and she naturally adopted the appropriate method toward that direction, especially in East Asia, which because of propinquity and special interests it was natural for her to do. . ."

Manchuria

30. The opening statement posed the question "Why did Japan acquire special rights and interests in Manchuria?" and supplied the following explanation:

"In 1908 Japan's emigration to the United States was virtually stopped by the so-called 'Gentlemen's Agreement.' At that time Jutaro Komura, Foreign Minister, spoke at the Imperial Diet as follows: 'In order to prevent our people from scattering around remote foreign territories it has become necessary to concentrate them to this district (Manchuria) and administer them with their joint co-operation.'

"Japan had a legal right under treaties and agreements to maintain the Kwantung Army in Manchuria in order to protect her rights and interests in Kwantung Peninsula and Manchuria.

"The Kwantung Army was a small force of 10,400 encircled by more than 200,000 Chinese. Its duty was to protect the South Manchuria Railway, which extended 1,000 kilometers, and Japanese nationals numbering 1,200,000 scattered all over the vast expanse of Manchuria. . .

"The Manchurian incident was settled in May 1933. During 1935-1936 China was inclined to recognize the de facto status of Manchuria. Other countries began to recognize Manchukuo. Especially the Soviet Union, which now sends prosecutors to this Tribunal, agreed to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo in 1941."

China

31. With regard to the China war the statement said, "The responsibility for the Marco Polo Bridge Incident does not lie upon Japan. It will be noted that Japan along with the other Powers had a right to station some armed forces in North China and was allowed to hold field maneuvers under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and its appended notes. Moreover, in this area Japan had other important lawful interests and a considerable number of her nationals residing there. Had the Incident been settled locally, as was desired by Japan, the conflict would not have been aggravated to such a magnitude and there would not have arisen any question of 'aggressive war.' Therefore, we will also prove that China was responsible for the enlargement of the Incident and that Japan throughout the whole Incident adhered to the policy of nonaggravation and tried its best to settle the question locally."

In reference to the application of the Nine-Power Treaty to the "China Incident," the opening statement named five points which "indisputedly so altered the situations contemplated by the said treaty as to render its effective application nugatory." These five points were:

- "(1) The Republic of China made it a national policy to oppose Japan and insult her in every way possible; boycotted Japan's goods; disseminated anti-Japanese sentiments in school textbooks.
- "(2) Collusion of the Comintern and the Communist Party of China in new anti-Japanese strategy, and a concomitant acquiescence by Chiang Kai-shek.
- "(3) Chinese forces were not reduced but increased after the Washington Conference. Modern arms and equipment were imported.

- "(4) Tremendous expansion of U. S. S. R. national power made its pressure felt along entire Sino-Soviet boundaries extending not less than 3,000 miles.
- "(5) World economy veered from economic internationalism to national protectionism."

U. S. S. R.

32. The opening statement declared that, aside from the conspiracy counts in the indictment, the seven specific counts related to the Soviet Union are "beyond the pale of this Tribunal," and that especially the Changkufeng and the Nomonhan Incidents became closed issues by the conclusion of the treaty of neutrality between Japan and the U. S. S. R. in April 1941.

Assumption by the prosecution of an aggressive intention on the part of Japan as bespoken by the 1941 annual program of the General Staff was refuted in the statement by a declaration that the program was hypothetical. The formulation of such hypothetical programs is a common practice of all nations, the statement declared.

"We will prove that the U. S. S. R. had a plan of operation in 1936 by which simultaneous attacks upon Germany and Japan were contemplated. After 1939 when the Nomonhan Incident occurred, the Soviet armed forces operating east of Lake Baikal were to be doubled over those maintained by Japan in Manchuria and Korea." The prosecution also stressed the presence of Japanese reinforcements in Manchuria during 1941. "Japan kept some forces in Manchuria after 1941," the statement said. "That is quite true. However, these forces were meant solely for our defense."

Pacific War

33. "Coming now to the causes of the Pacific War itself," the defense continued, "we shall prove that it ensued because of the supreme necessity of Japan to invoke the right of self-defense."

The statement reminded the Tribunal that "since 1937 Japan was unwittingly involved in large-scale hostilities tantamount to war with China."

Great Britain did recognize the situation, the statement continued, but the United States abrogated its Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in July 1939.

"From that time on the United States brought to bear upon Japan every kind of pressure and intimidation. The first was economic pressure. The second was the help extended to the Chiang Kai-shek regime with which Japan was in a life-and-death struggle. The third was the progress of encirclement by the United States, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies; in concert with China a ring was thrown and tightened by them around Japan. These three steps after 1939 were adopted one by one, their intensity increasing in vigor as time went on. A typical example of economic pressure thus brought to bear upon us Japanese will be recited here. In December 1939 the moral embargo was extended in scope, and in addition, aircraft and its equipment and instruments and machinery for construction of aircraft and for refining gasoline were added to the prohibited list. During July 1940 the Washington Government put an embargo on scrap iron. Considering the system of iron production then prevailing in Japan, scrap iron was an item of crucial importance. A heavy blow was thus dealt to this key industry of Japan. In August of the same year, the United States further put restrictions on the export of gasoline for aviation purposes."

The defense cited other economic restrictions placed against Japan in the years immediately previous to the start of the Pacific War.

Moreover, "Japan was quite unable to keep its population alive by the products raised within the Empire alone," the counsel reminded the Tribunal. "Japan had to obtain necessary commodities by foreign trade. By the freezing of assets by the United States, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies, more than half of Japan's foreign trade disappeared and the toil of 80 years' standing was wiped out. These were the results of the foregoing steps legally or illegally taken by America, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The inalienable right to live was deprived from the Japanese people. Just about that time, America at last put an embargo upon oil by the executive order issued on 1 August making good the veiled notification given to Ambassador Nomura on 24 July. Japan's navy was thus to lose mobility after her oil in stock was exhausted; solution of the China Incident was made practically impossible; Japan's defense was emasculated. Hereupon the stark question of self-defense presented itself before the whole nation as a cold and hard fact. This demanded immediate solution.

"Japan's will to peace, Japan's sincere effort to attain peaceful settlement did not bear fruit. America's note on 26 November 1941 made it finally crystal clear that not one single factor contributing to a casus belli could be settled by pacific means.

"Thereupon the Japanese Government. . . was forced at last to resolve upon recourse to the right of self-defense."

The defense declared in the statement that the final note sent to the United States Government "was tantamount to severance of diplomatic relations and in the light of the tense situation then existing an unmistakable notification of Japan's intention of commencing war.

"The United States Departments of War and Navy were both in possession of intelligence suggesting that diplomatic rupture was at hand, and by conjecture that an imminent attack was to be anticipated. The Hawaiian Department was also in possession of an instruction that the policy to induce Japan to commit the first overt act should not be construed as restricting the Department to a course of action that might jeopardize its defense. Also it was directed to undertake reconnaissance prior to Japanese hostile action. No wonder that between 6:33 and 6:55 a.m. December 7 (Hawaiian time) the U. S. Navy shot and sank a Japanese midget submarine in the contiguous waters. We are adducing the above fact in order to show that the Pearl Harbor attack at 7:55 a.m. on December 7 (Hawaiian time) did not come as a surprise attack."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION
of
NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES
in
JAPAN

Number 17

February 1947

PART III

ECONOMIC

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SECTION 1
AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

C O N T E N T S

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1. Agricultural production in 1946, although favored by generally good weather and adequate labor, suffered from a serious shortage of fertilizer.
2. A reconnaissance soil survey of south-central Honshu was completed.
3. Prefectural land commissions were elected in February.
4. Fish landings declined from the December level while shipments of fish from Hokkaido to Honshu gained.
5. Fuel oil controls were instituted to insure greater shipments of fish to larger cities and inland prefectures.

AGRICULTURE

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CROP CONDITIONS IN 1946

Agricultural Aids

6. Demobilization, repatriation and sharply reduced industrial demands in 1946 created an adequate source of farm labor, while generally favorable weather conditions and improved methods of cultivation and harvesting brought gains in some crops over 1945.


7. The summer, generally warm, sunny and with sufficient rainfall, was beneficial to the rice and sweet potato crops.

Typhoons and heavy rains in the autumn of 1945 delayed rice harvests and delayed or prevented later plantings of wheat and barley, resulting in lower yields and acreages of these crops. Acreage and production of wheat and barley from 1941 to 1946 is shown at the top of next page.

8. Agricultural land reclaimed from September 1945 to November 1946 totaled about 405,255 acres, mostly forest land and of poor fertility.

Shortages

9. Throughout 1946 serious shortages of fertilizer and insecticide hampered production. Only 75,400 metric tons of the annual requirement of 380,000 tons of nitrate were available. The 5,200 metric tons of phosphoric acid consumed was only two percent



of the required 250,080 tons. Only a negligible amount of the required 100,000 metric tons of potash was available.

10. Insecticide and fungicide shortages were reflected in heavy losses on fruits and vegetables. Damage to rice by plant hoppers was minimized by applications of fuel oil and pyrethrum.

INSECTICIDE CONSUMPTION
(metric tons)

	<u>1936-41 Average</u>	<u>1946</u>
Calcium arsenate	983	1,595
Lead arsenate	1,633	463
Derris root	146	44
Nicotine sulfate	121	2.6

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Seed Production

11. Production of certified seed, intensified in 1946, totaled 374,000 metric tons, 133,000 higher than in 1945. Production of other seed declined to 110,000 metric tons, 92,000 below the previous year but 52,000 above 1944.

Shipments in 1946 of 128,000 metric tons of certified seed white potatoes from Hokkaido to other parts of Japan will contribute to a greatly improved crop, in size and quality, from 1946 plantings.

Thirty metric tons of squash seed and 590 kilograms of tomato seed were imported during June and July 1946. Five tons of squash seed were distributed, augmenting the late summer and fall food crops, and the remaining seed is available for 1947 planting.

RECONNAISSANCE SOIL SURVEY

12. A reconnaissance soil survey of eight prefectures in south-central Honshu, including Kyoto, Shiga, Nara, Wakayama, Osaka, Hyogo, Okayama and Tottori, showed that rice constituted 75 percent of the summer crop. Common upland crops are vegetables, potatoes, fruits, mulberry, tea and tobacco. The chief winter crops are barley, wheat, genge, rape, peas and broad beans.

Soils

13. The chief soil groups in the area are the alluvial (the most important agriculturally), Ando, brown forest, planosols, yellow and red podzolic and lithosols.

Alluvial soils, light and dark in color and of various textures, are used for irrigated rice in summer and wheat and barley in winter. Planosols, also used for rice, are less adaptable to small grains than the more permeable alluvial soils.

Ando soils, while high in organic matter and permeable subsoils, are frequently deficient in phosphates. When supplied with nitrogenous fertilizers, Ando soils are among the most productive soils of Japan.

Brown forest and yellow and red podzolic soils are suitable for common upland crops. Lithosols, which are derived from rock formations, are used chiefly for timber production.

PREFECTURAL LAND COMMISSIONS

Election

14. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry set 20 to 25 February as the election period for prefectural land commissions. Prefectural governors were requested to submit to the Ministry the names and biographies of candidates for neutral members of the prefectural land commissions. Such appointments will be made by the Ministry.

Publicity

15. A 15-minute radio address, "How the Meeting of the Land Commission Should Be Handled," was broadcast on 3 February by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Nine three-minute broadcasts on aspects of land reform were delivered during the month.


Agricultural Association

16. The Japanese Association for Agricultural Liaison was formed in February to promote and improve agricultural research. The 35 members, including representatives of five imperial universities and the imperial experimental stations, are now drafting a plan for organizational improvement of agricultural research groups.


FISHERIES

Production

17. January fish landings totaled 88,608 metric tons, excluding 5,681 tons of cuttlefish. The December catch was 96,468 tons and 22,746 tons of cuttlefish.



Sardines fell to 22,859 metric tons, 25,917 below December. Shipment of fish from Hokkaido to Honshu climbed from 3,930 metric tons in December to 4,886 in January.



Planned Production

18. Estimated fish production for 1947 is 4,000,000 metric

tons, 2,262,300 more than the 1946 catch. The estimated 1948 production is 4,500,000 tons. Projected increases hinge on anticipated gains in consumer goods for fishermen, an increase in fuel oil allocations and on conditions affecting sardine and herring runs.

Antarctic Whaling

19. Total whales captured from 1 to 28 February totaled 413, nine less than during a comparable period in January. Blue whales landed declined from 285 to 199 but fin whales increased from 136 to 214. No sei whales were landed. Blue whale units decreased 47 units in February to 306.

Of the total 1,064 whales so far landed, the Taiyo Gyo-
gyo K. K. fleet has accounted for 574, the Nippon Suisan K. K. for 490.

20. The Banshu Maru No. 32 docked in Tokyo Bay on 11 February with about 400 metric tons of frozen whale meat which was distributed under rationing and price controls. The Hashidate Maru and other ships of the Nippon Suisan fleet left the whaling grounds on 26 February with an estimated 14,000 metric tons of marine products.

Fuel Oil Controls

21. Fuel oil consumption by the fishing fleet was placed under control of the Bureau of Fisheries in February to facilitate fish shipments by water to relieve the strain on land transportation and to provide more fish for larger cities and inland prefectures.

Allotments are now based on how much oil is needed to meet prefectural fish requirements; the number of boats operating in the prefecture; what percentage of the prefectural catch is required by large cities and inland prefectures; and how much fuel oil will be needed for transportation to landing ports for reshipment inland.

Representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry will supervise distribution of fish catches and fuel and re-shipment from 54 landing ports.

Fisheries Research

22. The Fisheries Research Foundation was organized on 15 February. The Foundation's ¥ 4,000,000 capitalization will be subscribed equally by individuals and companies connected with the fishing industry and by the Government.

SECTION 2

FORESTRY AND MINING

C O N T E N T S


	Paragraph
Forestry.	5
Mining.	9

1. Production of logs gained in January, while stockpiles also rose. The number of sawmills in operation increased.
2. Coal output in January dropped but increased in the first 20 days of February over the comparable period in the preceding month. January stockpiles increased.
3. January oil production achieved a small increase over December.
4. The decreases in mineral commodities in December were attributed to seasonal declines in output and continued equipment shortages.

FORESTRY


Log and Lumber Production

5. January production of logs totaled 453,040,000 board feet, a gain of 21,240,000 over December. Stockpiles in January were 1,610,120,000 board feet compared with 1,390,200,000 in December.



Wood Harvest

6. Wood harvested in 1946 totaled 1,286,000,000 cubic feet, 14,000,000 more than in 1945. Although substantially lower than wartime highs the 1945 and 1946 totals do not include wood directed into illegal markets.




Sawmills



7. Operable sawmills in January totaled 19,339 with a capacity of 379,177 horsepower, an increase of 334 sawmills over the revised December total.

Firewood and Charcoal

8. Charcoal production in December was 146,393 metric tons of which 104,763 were distributed. Firewood totaled 3,335,745 soseki koku (one soseki koku equals 9.827 cubic feet, stacked volume) of which 1,442,723 were distributed. Production of gasomaki, small blocks of wood used as motor fuel, totaled 30,164 metric tons of which 17,276 were distributed.



0604



MINING

	Paragraph
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Petroleum	16
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COAL

Production

9. In the first 20 days of February 1,405,400 metric tons of coal were produced, 235,500 more than in the same period of January. January production was 2,009,400 tons, a decrease of 184,600 from the revised December total. Average daily production declined 4,300 tons from the revised December figure to 80,100 in January.

Consumption

10. January coal consumption decreased 175,000 tons under revised figures of the previous month to 1,928,000, or 278,000 under the January allocation. Coal consumption by industries is shown on charts, pages 82 and 83.

Stockpiles

11. Coal stockpiles, increasing 73,000 metric tons over the same period in the previous month, stood at 998,000 metric tons in the first 20 days of February. Stockpiles at the end of January were 993,000 tons, 21,000 more than on 31 December.

Production Goal

12. Planned coal production for the 1947-48 fiscal year was revised upward to 30,000,000 metric tons. This is 3,000,000 tons greater than the earlier goal and represents a compromise between the Government demand for 36,000,000 tons and mine owners' production estimates of 27,000,000.

PLANNED COAL PRODUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1947-48
(thousands of metric tons)




	<u>April-September 1947</u>	<u>October 1947-March 1948</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido	3,750	4,686	8,436
East Honshu	1,400	1,933	3,333
West Honshu	1,110	1,302	2,412
Kyushu	<u>7,000</u>	<u>8,819</u>	<u>15,819</u>
Total	13,260	16,740	30,000

SOURCE: Coal Board and Coal Association.

13. To reach the production goal the Government has a five-point plan of assistance calling for: (1) furnishing of urgently needed materials and equipment to large mechanized mines in Hokkaido; (2) special rice rations and more housing for miners; (3) better transportation for mining materials and coal; (4) loans to the mines totaling ¥ 3,500,000,000; and (5) assisting mine owners in procuring materials at a reasonable cost.


Lignite

14. January lignite production dropped to 190,625 metric tons,



COAL CONSUMPTION BY INDUSTRIES

1940-1947*



* FISCAL YEAR BEGINNING 1 APRIL.
 NOTE: JANUARY 1947 ESTIMATED.
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

GHO - SCAP


JAPAN - FEB 47

NUMBER 17A

0608

COAL CONSUMPTION BY INDUSTRIES

1940-1947*



* FISCAL YEAR BEGINNING 1 APRIL.
 NOTE: JANUARY 1947 ESTIMATED.
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

GHQ - SCAP

JAPAN - FEB 47

NUMBER 17B

25,746 under December. Consumption declined 20,612 tons from the previous month to 173,593, while lignite stockpiles increased 25,728 tons to 413,846. Note the facing chart.

15. The lignite production goal in the 1947-48 fiscal year is 5,000,000 metric tons but estimated production for the same period is only 3,000,000 tons. The Japan Lignite Mining Federation in setting the production quota assumes an improvement in allocations and delivery of mining materials and in transportation.

LIGNITE PRODUCTION GOAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1947-48
(thousands of metric tons)


	<u>April-September 1947</u>	<u>October 1947-March 1948</u>	<u>Total</u>
Hokkaido	120	160	280
Tohoku	920	1,230	2,150
Kanto	260	240	500
Tokai-Hokuriku	750	750	1,500
Kinki	125	155	280
Chugoku	75	85	160
Shikoku	20	30	50
Kyushu	30	50	80
Total	2,300	2,700	5,000

SOURCE: Japan Lignite Mining Federation.

PETROLEUM

Production

16. Rising 142 kiloliters over December, January oil production reached 17,100 kiloliters while average daily production increased from 547 kiloliters to 551. Production for the first 10 months of the fiscal year totaled 177,647 kiloliters with average daily production 580. Estimated production for the fiscal year is now 213,000 kiloliters.





Drilling Operations

17. The Imperial Oil Company completed drilling two oil

LIGNITE PRODUCTION, SALES AND STOCKPILES BY REGIONS



LIGNITE PRODUCTION JANUARY 1947

ALL JAPAN = 190,625



LIGNITE STOCKPILES JANUARY 1947

ALL JAPAN = 413,846



GHQ-SCAP

JAPAN - FEB 47

NUMBER 19

producers and one gas producer in December.

DRILLING OPERATIONS - DECEMBER

	Exploitation Wells	Feeling- out Wells	Exploitation Wells	Total
Completed as producers	1	1	0	2
Completed as gas producers	1	0	0	1
Abandoned	5	0	0	5
Commenced during month	1	1	2	4
Drilling suspended	5	1	4	10
Other wells drilling at end of month	20	5	15	40

SOURCE: Imperial Oil Company.

18. The Petroleum Exploration Advancement Committee recommended in December that oil-producing companies should stress exploration in currently producing areas with assistance of field parties from universities while the Imperial Geological Survey should undertake long-range projects outside present producing areas. The Committee agreed that ¥ 7,000,000 of the total ¥ 43,000,000 should be allocated to finance exploration field parties and the purchase of geophysical equipment.

MINING INDUSTRY

19. Antimony production, reaching 7,190 kilograms in December in a 3,150-kilogram gain over the previous month, achieved the only significant increase of production in six commodities. Slight quantitative increases were made in production of graphite, iron sand, manganese oxide, molybdenum and steatite, but downward trends continued in copper, lead, sulfur and iron ore.

MINERAL AND METAL MINE PRODUCTION AND STOCKS a/
December

	Form	Unit	Production	Stocks
Antimony	metal in concentrate	kg	7,190	134,497
Arsenic	metal in concentrate	MT	92.4	467.8
Asbestos	fiber	MT	186	710
Barite	concentrate	MT	14	2,868
Chromite				
High-grade	concentrate 47%	MT	127	6,440
Low-grade	concentrate 27%	MT	12	13,924
Cobalt	metal in concentrate	kg	120	8,037
Copper	metal in concentrate	MT	1,575.4	9,004
Fire clay		MT	1,219	32,624
Fluorite	concentrate	MT	15	317
Gold	metal in concentrate	gr	131,285	1,266,498
Graphite				
Crystalline	concentrate	MT	1	4
	crude ore	MT	110	1,916
Amorphous	crude ore	MT	573	3,016
Gypsum	concentrate	MT	3,247 <u>b/</u>	14,578 <u>c/</u>

	<u>Form</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Production</u>	<u>Stocks</u>
Iron ore	concentrate	MT	26,362	729,799
Iron sand	concentrate	MT	298	-
Lead	metal in concentrate	MT	403	18,619
Manganese				
Oxide	concentrate	MT	280	2,768
Carbonate	concentrate	MT	1,817	60,833
Mercury	metal in concentrate	kg	3,198	12,754
Molybdenum	concentrate	kg	4,807	55,375
Pyrite	concentrate	MT	55,869	163,603
Silver	metal in concentrate	kg	3,801.5	37,236
Steatite		MT	10,897	71,112
Sulfur	refined	MT	1,401	4,218
Tin	metal in concentrate	kg	7,749	4,936
Tungsten	concentrate	kg	2,152	67,078
Zinc	metal in concentrate	MT	2,170	6,465

a/ Includes stocks at mines, rail stations and mine docks.

b/ Includes 750 tons of more than 40 percent concentrate, 2,497 tons of less than 40 percent.

c/ Includes 1,992 tons of more than 40 percent concentrate, 12,586 tons of less than 40 percent concentrate.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Mining Bureau.

20. Increased coal allocations and deliveries should stimulate mining production but continuing shortages of steel rope, conveyor belts, petroleum products and high-flotation reagents are hampering activities.

SECTION 3
HEAVY INDUSTRIES

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Coke	1
Metal Industries	2
Rubber	11
Petroleum	12
Cement	13
Construction	14
Shipbuilding	16
Chemical Industries	17
Machinery	27


COKE

1. January coke production totaled 104,500 metric tons, 7,500 tons over estimated production but 3,500 tons less than December. Coal stocks increased to 37,500 tons and coke stockpiles were reduced to 31,500 tons. Lack of coal and the New Year holidays retarded production. Estimated coke production for February is 112,000 tons.

JANUARY COKE ALLOCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTION
(metric tons)

	<u>Allocation</u>	<u>Distribution</u>
Consumed by producers		
Metal industry	51,000	58,287
Shipbuilding	4,884	6,849
	850	1,563
Industrial machinery	3,750	9,978
Electrical machinery	1,500	1,362
Rolling stock manufacturing	3,510	4,055
Ceramics industry (including cement)	1,571	1,490
Chemical industry	44,557	23,676
Maintenance and repair of coal mines	600	345
Others	1,941	2,982
Reserve	<u>2,437</u>	<u>2,399</u>
Total	116,600	112,986


SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.



METAL INDUSTRIES

Iron and Steel

2. The increased supply of coal to the iron and steel industry during January resulted in increased production of pig iron and open-hearth steel ingot. The continued electric power shortage caused further decreases in the production of electric-furnace steel ingot, steel castings and forgings and rolled-steel products.




Light Metals

3. January aluminum production increased from 795 to 1,024 metric tons as reports were received from seven additional plants. Alumina production fell from 452 to 204 metric tons.

With an increased supply of coal alumina output for February is estimated at 430 metric tons.

4. Production figures for 63 light metal rolling plants are shown in the following chart.



Copper

5. Ten smelters produced 2,142 metric tons of blister copper compared with December production of 2,688 tons (revised). Refined copper production was 2,538 tons, as shown in chart, top of page 92.

6. Rolled copper and copper alloy production fell to 3,556 metric tons in January. Production figures from 173 rolling mills are shown in charts, pages 92 and 93.



Zinc and Lead




7. January distilled zinc production was 352 tons, electrolytic zinc 493 tons. Zinc plate output of 342 tons showed a 32-ton increase.

8. Lead smelting production was 584 metric tons and refined lead production 638 tons, a decrease of 112 and 18 tons respectively from December figures. See chart, bottom of page 93.

Other Nonferrous Metals

9. Production of nonferrous metals is shown on the following table with estimates of February output.





NONFERROUS METALS PRODUCTION
(metric tons)


	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>	<u>February a/</u>
Bismuth	1.5	1.2	1.5
Mercury	4.2 b/	3.0	5.0
Tin, refined	19.0 b/	20.0	0

a/ Estimated.
b/ Revised.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Ferroalloys

10. Based on incomplete reports ferroalloy production in January increased to 446 metric tons. Low demand and shortage of power continued to retard production.



RUBBER

11. Crude rubber stocks are being maintained by imports.

RUBBER INVENTORY
(metric tons)

	<u>Crude Rubber</u>	<u>Latex</u>	<u>Scrap</u>
Inventory 1 January	3,419	149	249
Collections in January	1,117 a/	0	322
Consumption in January	1,271	12	249
Inventory 1 February	3,265	137	322


a/ Imported.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Rubber Control Union.

The second shipment of 550 tons of rubber arrived in Yokohama from Singapore on 4 February. The total amount of rubber purchased to date includes 4,050 tons from Singapore and 1,000 tons from Batavia. One thousand six hundred fifty tons of the Singapore order has been delivered.

PETROLEUM

12. Total crude output to refineries amounted to 17,406 kiloliters in January.




The seven refineries in the indigenous area refined 12,871 kiloliters.

CEMENT

13. Twenty-eight operating plants produced 73,954 metric tons of cement and 72,955 tons of clinker during January. Estimated production for February is 85,000 metric tons of cement. The limiting factors in production were a shortage of bags and of 5,000-calorie or better-quality coal. On 1 February the following stocks were on hand in plants.

CEMENT STOCKS AND SUPPLIES
(metric tons)

Coal	27,851
Clinker	105,431
Cement	107,903
Bags (pieces)	1,135,537



CONSTRUCTION

Japanese Housing

14. According to preliminary reports construction was begun in January on 39,856 buildings. Of these 22,543 were dwelling houses, 4,465 combined dwellings and shops and 12,848 other buildings.

Special building permits were issued for 2,137 buildings over 30 square meters, 1,724 for residences and 413 for non-residential buildings.

Completed construction for all prefectures was 19,256 buildings. Of these 19,251 were wooden and five of steel frame construction.

Railways

15. The cost of railway construction in January is shown below.

ADDITIONS TO RAILWAY FACILITIES (yen)

	<u>Labor Cost</u>	<u>Materials Cost</u>	<u>Total</u>
Track construction	956,038.62	1,515,108.40	2,471,147.02
Buildings, platform extensions, revisions	630,198.57	1,383,183.45	2,013,382.02
Crossings (gates, signals)	401,708.14	160,277.39	561,985.53
Electrification	<u>185,680.84</u>	<u>657,570.84</u>	<u>843,251.68</u>
Total	2,173,626.17	3,716,140.08	5,889,766.25

SHIPBUILDING

16. Between 10 January and 10 February civilian shipyards

completed repairs on 312 merchant vessels totaling 814,652 gross tons. In the same period one steel cargo vessel of 180 gross tons was launched and three steel cargo vessels totaling 1,120 gross tons were completed. Also during this period 53 steel fishing boats totaling 5,942 gross tons were launched and 29 steel fishing boats totaling 3,321 gross tons were completed. In addition nine wooden vessels totaling 1,750 gross tons were completed.


CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

17. Chemical production in January, shown on charts on next two pages, continued to be drastically limited by the coal and electricity shortage. Basic chemical production was 30 percent of estimated minimum requirements of the economy compared with 33 percent in December.

Fertilizer

18. Production of ammonium sulfate increased slightly in January. Productive capacity continued to rise but only 73 percent was utilized due to lack of fuel and electricity.


In general plant expansions and conversions continued satisfactorily but serious bottlenecks have developed in some cases. Delivery of high-pressure vessels and pipe is behind schedule because of the shortage of high-grade coal necessary to produce these products.



In late January increased efforts were made to assure more efficient delivery of raw materials to ammonium sulfate plants.

PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CHEMICALS


SINCE FEBRUARY 1946



NOTE: ON SEMI-LOGARITHMIC CHARTS EQUAL RISES OR FALLS INDICATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES.
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CHEMICALS

SINCE FEBRUARY 1946



JANUARY PRODUCTION			
CHEMICAL	METRIC TONS	CHEMICAL	METRIC TONS
SHEET 1		SHEET 2	
SULFURIC ACID	93,897	AMMONIUM SULFATE	47,493
SALT	13,893	CALCIUM SUPERPHOSPHATE	40,213
CALCIUM CARBIDE	14,131	CALCIUM CYANAMIDE	15,403
AMMONIA	13,699	CAUSTIC SODA	2,042
SODA ASH	1,977	HYDROCHLORIC ACID	1,359
ETHYL ALCOHOL (KL)	1,594	NITRIC ACID	343
METHYL ALCOHOL	264	SODIUM BICARBONATE	181
BENZENE	449	DYESTUFFS	189

NOTE: ON SEMI-LOGARITHMIC CHARTS EQUAL RISES OR FALLS INDICATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES.
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

The results obtained will not be reflected in increased production until March.

19. The production of calcium cyanamide continued to decrease in January. Plants were unable to obtain enough electric power and high-grade coal and coke. For the same reasons a further decrease is expected for February. Many plants are using the slack period to make needed repairs which will permit maximum operation as soon as power and high-quality coal become available.

20. Calcium superphosphate production in January showed little change from December output. Because of transportation difficulties there are now 58,000 tons of finished fertilizer at the factories, an 18 percent increase in stockpiles over December.

In order to continue production of necessary medicines, matches and industrial chemicals, it is planned to divert 375 tons of imported phosphate rock from fertilizer production to the manufacture of phosphorous chemicals.

Sulfuric Acid

21. Pyrite shortages caused by transportation difficulties forced some sulfuric acid plants either to curtail or cease operations. Output of sulfuric acid dropped to 98,897 metric tons.

Sodium Products

22. Production of salt in January was 13,893 metric tons and imports were 41,725 tons. Output in February will not increase because of the continued power and fuel shortage. At present no coal is being allocated for salt production.

Large salt imports in February are expected to increase production in the entire soda industry.

23. The supply of liquid chlorine has increased considerably because of the emphasis placed on its production for water purification purposes.

Coal-tar Products

24. Output of coal-tar products continued at a low level. February production will not increase as the coal allotment to the industry remained unchanged from that of the previous month.

Alcohol

25. Alcohol production dropped sharply to 1,858 kiloliters. In general raw materials are being stockpiled pending availability of coal to process them.

Oil and Paint

26. Production of hardening oil increased slightly during January but is still considerably below minimum requirements. The present low production is a result of both oil shortages and lack of coal. Fatty acid production declined 29 percent. Output of paint and other protective coatings decreased 36 percent. This drop was expected for some time because of the depletion of drying-oil stocks. Stocks of soap are also decreasing seriously.

The critical situation in the paint and soap industries may be slightly relieved in the future. The International Emergency Food Council has allocated to Japan 23,000 tons of copra and tentatively allocated 93,000 tons of soybeans and 5,000 tons of whale oil. These amounts represent about 18 percent, in terms of oil, of the minimum 1947 import requirements.

MACHINERY

27. As a result of accumulated scarcities of raw materials and power shortages, machinery production for January decreased 25 percent from the preceding month.

Plants producing coal-mining equipment have received special material and financial priorities to enable them to operate near capacity.

Precision Tools

28. By the end of 1946, despite limited supplies of raw material and power, makers had practically succeeded in balancing demand and supply of precision tools.

PRECISION TOOL PRODUCTION

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Straight-shank dies	287,295	386,310
Taper-shank dies	28,035	20,740
Milling cutters	26,707	19,553
Reamers	22,301	18,162
Taps and dies	258,192	66,862


SOURCE: Japan Small Tool Association.

The industry operated in January at about 18 percent of capacity compared with 23 percent in December.

Machine Tools

29. The production of machine tools in January remained insignificant. The lack of coal and curtailed power supply resulted in the factories' power consumption falling to 4,136,000 kilowatt hours. Of this 663,000 kilowatt hours were used for the production of machine tools.

The first postwar gear grinder was built. Orders were placed for special boring machines for journal bearings and for completion of 12 heavy slotters which had been standing semi-finished since the war's end.



Industrial Machinery

30. The production and repair of all categories of heavy industrial equipment and machinery totaled 12,950 metric tons valued at ¥ 253,800,000. Of this total 72 percent was for new units, 22 percent for parts and accessories and six percent for repair work. New production in January decreased 28 percent by weight, grossing only 9,282 metric tons.

31. Total production decreased 22 percent by weight and 17.5 percent in value from December output. The sharp decline resulted from: (1) the loss in man-hours caused by the New Year holidays; (2) power shortages which closed plants in the Osaka and Nagoya areas three days per week; and (3) the difficulty of obtaining materials through normal distribution channels.

32. Raw materials and fuel consumed by the 1,046 reporting factories increased. These figures indicate quantities moved from storage and not the amounts used in January production.

RAW MATERIAL AND FUEL CONSUMPTION (metric tons)


	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Steel	8,950	9,679
Iron	8,677	8,472
Coal	5,463	5,887
Coke	5,634	5,885
Power ^{a/}	8,762,000	-

^{a/} Kilowatt hours.

SOURCE: Industrial Machinery Association.

INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY PRODUCTION

PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES · 1946-1947



SOURCE: INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY ASSOCIATION, WOODWORKING MACHINERY ASSOCIATION AND PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING ASSOCIATION.

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Textile Machinery

33. January production of new units in the textile machinery industry increased more than 100 percent in value over December. The value of machinery production by fiber group is shown below.

TEXTILE MACHINERY PRODUCTION a/
January
(thousands of yen)

	<u>New Units</u>	<u>Parts</u>	<u>Total</u>
Cotton	26,199	15,532	41,731
Silk	2,924	849	3,773
Woolen and worsted	4,384	865	5,249
Flax	307	370	677
Finishing	<u>1,075</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1,081</u>
Total	34,889	17,622	52,511

a/ Repair figures not available.


SOURCE: Japan Textile Machinery Association.

Production of new units by weight increased 72 percent.

TEXTILE MACHINERY PRODUCTION
(metric tons)

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Cotton	245.2	1,100.0
Silk	108.2	118.2
Woolen and worsted	166.6	182.8
Flax	4.9	25.4

SOURCE: Japan Textile Machinery Association.



34. Consumption of raw materials far exceeds deliveries and

at the present rate of production stockpiles will soon be exhausted. In the cotton machinery group little new complementary machinery was produced. Completed new units totaled 3,375 while repairs exceeded 9,900 sets. New production was centered on 30 ring spinning frames, 18 carding engines and 223 new looms. Parts production for cotton machinery included 28,776 spindles, 25,162 spinning rings and more than 1,500,000 bobbins.

The principal output in the woolen and worsted machinery group was the manufacture of 40 new looms. The major effort of finishing-machinery production was in the manufacture of drying and folding machines.

5

SECTION 4
MANUFACTURING

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Food Processing	1
Pulp and Paper.	4
Glass Industry.	5
Optical Instruments	6
Medical Supplies.	7
Refractory Industry	9
Abrasive Industry	11
Structural Clay Products.	12
Asbestos Cement Products.	13
Vitreous Enamelware	14
Pottery and Porcelain	15
Electrical Manufacturing.	16
Transportation Equipment.	17
Rubber Manufacturing.	21
Leather Manufacturing	22
Agricultural Equipment.	25
Handicrafts	26
Miscellaneous Manufacturing	31

FOOD PROCESSING


1. General production declines continued due to raw material shortages. The seasonal reduction in milk supply was responsible for the drop in condensed and powdered milk production.

Further decreases in soybean deliveries to bean paste and soy sauce processors increased the use of sweet potatoes as an adulterant. This increases the bulk of bean paste but is not satisfactory for soy sauce processing.

Vegetable fats and oils production decreased despite the indigenous supply of rape seed and rice bran which together comprised 91 percent of the available raw materials. January production of fats and oils was 36.5 percent of January 1946.

FOOD PROCESSING

PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS SINCE DECEMBER 1945



NOTE: ON SEMI-LOGARITHMIC CHARTS EQUAL RISES OR FALLS INDICATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES.
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY.


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NUMBER 56

Brewing and Distilling

2. The first sake of the 1946-47 season was bottled in January. With the sweet potato harvest completed the production of imitation sake decreased. The increase in shochu resulted from additional allocations of alcohol. Seasonal factors continued to restrict wine production.






Containers


3. Power restrictions reduced the operating time of container factories by 50 percent. See chart at top of next page.

PULP AND PAPER

4. Pulp and paper production in January declined. The coal shortage continues to be a limiting factor. The price situation is also important as mills refuse to increase tonnage until ceiling prices are raised.

Tentative standards were established for Japanese newsprint and sulfite printing papers. Since the Japanese industry lacks suitable equipment for evaluating quality steps are being taken to establish better testing facilities.





GLASS INDUSTRY

5. Sheet-glass production in January remained at approximately the December level. Production of polished plate glass decreased 35 percent as the coal shortage continued.

Fiber glass production decreased 59 percent during January and output of glass wool dropped 58 percent.

In January 500 kilograms of two types of optical glass were produced.

Production of all types of glassware totaled 2,687 metric tons for January, an increase of 2.5 percent over December. See charts, next page.

OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS

6. Production of cameras during January decreased 14 percent. Output of binoculars and opera glasses dropped 24 percent and production of scientific and engineering equipment was generally below that of the previous month.





INSTRUMENT PRODUCTION

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Cameras		
Projectors	1,473	1,269
Binoculars and opera glasses	325	264
Microscopes	2,100	1,602
	412	242
Transits		
Engineers' levels	191	101
Hand levels	277	145
Sextants	115	0
	87	50
Alidades		
Gas indicators	340	200
Toolmakers' microscopes	136	126
Interferometer gas indicators	2	1
	0	100

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

GLASS PRODUCTION

1935-1947



* ONE CASE EQUALS 100 SQ FT OF 2 MM GLASS.
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.
GHQ-SCAP

JAPAN-FEB 47

NUMBER 42

MEDICAL SUPPLIES

7. Total value of medical supply production for January was ¥ 4,451,854 compared with ¥ 5,570,181 for December. The January figure does not include the value of X-ray and ultrashort-wave therapeutic apparatus which was included in December's total.

MEDICAL SUPPLY PRODUCTION

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Ampoule cleaning apparatus	17	85
Basins, sterilizing	890	500
Basins, wash	80	163
Cotton wool carriers	19,017	3,920
Distilling apparatus	74	88
Dressing drums	810	1,005
Electric drying ovens	55	52
Electric incubators	95	72
Forceps	12,649	6,396
Gauze containers	530	14
Ice pillow buckles	0	15,500
Illuminating lamps	207	35
Needles, suture	36,000	10,000
Operating tables	107	59
Percussion hammers	700	200
Pneumothorax apparatus	100	100
Spatulas	200	210
Speculums	1,061	1,813
Sphygmomanometers	90	800
Steam inhalers	150	400
Sterilizers	696	1,161
Stethoscopes	1,240	1,300
Sun lamps	11	5
Surgical knives	1,216	3,263
Surgical needles	1,385,399	0
Surgical scissors	9,043	6,150
Tongue depressors	239	0
Ultrashort-wave therapeutic apparatus	24	166
Vaporizers	400	122
X-ray apparatus	96	126

SOURCE: Japan Medical Instrument Control Association.

Hypodermic Syringes

8. Output of hypodermic syringes in January decreased nine percent to 230,610.

REFRACTORY INDUSTRY

9. January production of fire-clay brick decreased 17 percent and output of silica brick dropped 35 percent from December levels.

REFRACTORY BRICK PRODUCTION
(metric tons)

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Fire clay	12,762	10,559
Silica	2,763	1,804
Chrome	299	445
Magnesia	57	62
Corhart	180	105
High alumina	<u>182</u>	<u>130</u>
Total	16,243	13,105

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

Graphite Crucible Production

10. Graphite crucible production dropped 14.5 percent to 779,745 ban (one ban equals capacity to melt one kilogram of metal).

ABRASIVE INDUSTRY

11. January production of grinding wheels with vitreous bond showed little change. Output of wheels with elastic bond dropped 43 percent from the already low level of December. Twenty-seven vitreous-bond plants and three elastic-bond plants were operating.

Production of ordinary abrasive paper decreased four percent during January. Output of waterproof cloth increased 48 percent, approaching the peak October level. Shortages of paper and animal glue are limiting production.

January production of abrasive grains of all types decreased 16 percent from December output. Shortages of raw materials and electric power are retarding production.

ABRASIVES PRODUCTION
(metric tons)


	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Grinding wheels and stones		
Vitreous bond	301	298
Elastic bond	7	4
Abrasive paper and cloth (ren) <u>a/</u>		
Waterproof cloth	2,259	3,335
Ordinary paper	4,812	4,596
Waterproof paper	330	393
Abrasive grain		
Aluminum oxide		
Regular	68	68
White	21	2
Silicon carbide		
Regular	8.8	12

a/ One ren equals 480 sheets or their equivalent.

SOURCE: Grinding Wheel Manufacturers' Association, Japanese Abrasive Cloth and Paper Association and the Abrasive Materials Industry Association.

STRUCTURAL CLAY PRODUCTS

12. Production of building brick in January decreased 33 percent. This is a seasonal decrease due mainly to cold weather. January output of roofing tile decreased 25 percent based on reports from 2,969 plants compared with the 3,750 plants reporting in December.



ASBESTOS CEMENT PRODUCTS

13. Output of high-pressure pipe in January increased seven percent over December while concrete pipe production dropped 32 percent. Corrugated sheets and slates showed moderate increases.

ASBESTOS CEMENT PRODUCTS
January

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Production</u>
Asbestos cement high-pressure pipe	metric ton	906
Concrete pipe	metric ton	6,365
Corrugated sheets	tsubo <u>a/</u>	55,548
Slates	tsubo	5,565
Wallboard	tsubo	37,400

a/ One tsubo equals 36 square feet.

SOURCE: Japan Asbestos Cement Products Association.

VITREOUS ENAMELWARE

14. January production of vitreous enamelware amounted to 70,494 pieces weighing 93 metric tons compared with 99,726 pieces weighing 143 tons produced in December. Fourteen plants were operating in January compared with 18 in December as shortages of sheet iron and coal cut production.

POTTERY AND PORCELAIN

15. January reports were received from 68 pottery and porcelain plants representing about 80 percent of production. Mosaic tile again accounted for the large number of items reported under industrial ware.

POTTERY AND PORCELAIN PRODUCTION
January

	<u>Pieces</u>	<u>Weight (kilograms)</u>
Electrical insulators	3,517,138	780,652
Industrial ware	27,593,344	5,700,018
Laboratory ware	220	384
Domestic potteries	3,746,136	2,157,423
Sanitary ware	6,923	112,441

SOURCE: Porcelain and Chinaware Control Association.

ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING

16. Repairs to plants and equipment have increased monthly bulb capacity to about 12,500,000 pieces. Production fell short of capacity as output of certain parts required in the final assembly of electric lamps did not keep pace. Lead-in wire and certain chemicals are in short supply.

With only 30 to 35 percent of required cotton insulating materials available the use of silk is enabling the industry to continue production of critical rotating equipment.

Lack of fuel continued to hamper production of silicon steel sheets.

ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION a/

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Motors (except railway)		
Fractional HP	3,439	3,422
Standard HP		
1-15 HP	6,391	8,393
16-100 HP	493	545
Over 100 HP	37	70
Portable tools	3,960	3,199
Other	2,141	1,837
Generators, converters and M-G sets, except turbogenerators and welders		
DC generators	246	372
AC generators	8	32
Other	1,331	1,443
Turbogenerators		
Steam turbines for power stations	72	-
Steam turbines for ships	4	-
Other steam turbines	92	-

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Transformers		
Distribution, 100 KVA and under	3,363	3,144
Power, over 100 KVA	303	94
Instrument	946	512
Other	126	107
Rectifiers		
Hot cathode	30	37
Steel tank	1	3
Mercury vapor	67	65
Selenium and other	939	499
Power condensers	308	983
Furnaces		
Arc	2	1
Low-frequency induction	0	2
High-frequency induction	0	5
Resistance	55	127
Welding apparatus		
DC arc	20	-
AC arc	66	115
Resistance	3	3
Control apparatus		
Hand control		
Starters	231	299
Controllers	207	276
Other	615	539
Remote control		
Contactors	116	678
Contactor panels	29	45
Resistors	431	335
Lifting devices	34	32
Other	950	1,744
Switchboard apparatus		
For standard motors	3,194	2,772
3,300 volts and under	2,160	1,982
Over 3,300 volts	478	788
Meters		
Watt-hour	15,927	25,374
Pyrometers	2,346	2,350
Other	23,030	32,427
Household appliances		
Flatirons	10,876	13,282
Toasters	117	569
Cooking ranges	803	811
Other cooking equipment	34,851	38,490
Heating devices	21,457	27,969
Fans	7,511	6,091
Refrigerators	100	150
Vacuum cleaners	2	191
Washing machines	35	119
Other	8,369	10,079
Fuses (kilograms)		
Wire	14,931	45,639
Tape	10,214	24,134

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
Fuses (kilograms) (continued)		
Link		
Hard	454,000	652,550
Enclosed	600,628	687,214
	16,670	18,917
Knife switches		
Cutouts	22,928	21,390
Receptacles	11,500	39,000
	66,422	69,840
Sockets		
Weatherproof		
Key		12,360
Keyless	167,509	281,720
		20,560
Plugs		
Cable hangers	161,626	304,120
	637,000	720,000
Railway equipment		
Main motors		
M-G sets	136	145
Blower motors	41	25
Locomotives	4	2
Railway		
Mining and industrial	3	4
Control apparatus	5	2
Battery locomotives	27	-
Battery-operated vehicles	8	8
	11	21
Railway signal equipment		
Signal mechanism	150	108
Electric levers	98	51
Switch machines	4	-
Electric locks	36	40
Circuit controllers	17	-
Line transformers	115	141
Signal transformers	624	609
Rectifiers	265	280
Approach indicators	100	110
Signal relays	879	431
Insulation materials		
Mica (kilograms)		
Moulding plate	5,868	4,767
Commutator segment	3,199	3,276
Heat-resisting plate	0	96
Flexible plate	1,181	704
Paper	7,193	5,534
Paper (rolls)	1,878	1,710
Varnished cloth (square meters)	94,540	121,560
Varnished tubes (meters)	764,438	244,470
Black tape (rolls)	116,000	223,122
Rubber tape (rolls)	5,000	17,852
Varnished tape (rolls)	17,447	4,070
Illuminating equipment		
Fixtures		
Light bulbs	356,010	289,974
General use b/		
Special c/	3,363,123	2,935,354
Flashlight d/	291,657	199,804
	312,567	567,109