

All of the people are proclaimed under the new Constitution to be equal under the law and are to be respected as individuals.

This emphasis upon individualism and equality must be understood in the light of Japan's ill-fated experience of the past. The individual "subject" in Japan was formerly not respected as a personality but only for his value to the community. This collective attitude expressed itself, to begin with, in complete subordination to the head of the house who ruled the private family. The state at the highest community level was regarded as the national family with divine Emperor as the head under whose authority every phase and activity of individual existence could be controlled. In addition, the class character of a society which had lost its feudal elements only legally seemed to perpetuate inequality. The Bill of Rights in the new Constitution definitely discards this ideology of the past in freeing the individual from domination by the family and from interfering paternalism of the State.

The largest group to benefit from the newly stipulated equality will be the women of Japan who long have lived in virtual bondage. The Constitution, with one stroke, abolishes all discrimination on account of sex. The political emancipation of the women is already accomplished. The Japanese people, in spontaneous response to this reform, have elected 39 female members to the Diet. To conform to the Constitution, social and economic equality of women must be established. This requires a far-reaching revision of laws, particularly of the Civil Code.

The old feudal family system also affects the lives of the men. It is not reconcilable with the new Bill of Rights, and the deliberations on the reform of civil law indicate that it is doomed to disappear. Love of family and respect of parents by children, characteristic features of Japanese attitude, will be preserved within the unit of the small family on the basis of blood relationship and marriage. The Constitution provides for the enactment of laws and, again, stresses individual dignity and the essential equality of sexes. Marriage shall be founded on the mutual consent of both sexes and shall be maintained by mutual co-operation. The requirement of mutual consent is directed against the practice whereby parents arrange marriages for their children on the basis of social or economic considerations.

Most of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution are those customarily listed in modern constitutions. However, the abolition of peers and peerage means an almost revolutionary step in a society hitherto dominated by an aristocracy of feudal origin. It is noteworthy that, while the draft submitted to the Diet provided that present peers should retain peerage during their lifetime, the House of Representatives abolished this reservation. In contrast to England, the Japanese Constitution bans any kind of aristocracy. Even awards of honor, decorations or any distinction shall not be accompanied by privileges, and such award shall be valid only for the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.

The freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and then to divest themselves of their nationality represents an innovation for Japan.

Important principles are established in the field of education. Academic freedom, which includes teaching as well as learning, is a guarantee unknown to most other constitutions. Furthermore, equal education corresponding to ability is demanded for all people. Minimum educational requirements are free and compulsory. Parents or guardians are obliged to afford children opportunity for such education.

Elaborate safeguards regarding the administration of justice are included. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed except according to procedure established by law. A similar principle is established in the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution. The right of the accused in criminal cases to a speedy trial by an impartial court, the right to examine witnesses and to have the assistance of competent counsel as well as the prohibition of cruel punishments are also features of the American Bill of Rights.

Specific protection of the individual against unwarranted arrests is particularly needed in a country like Japan, where the people up to the present time have been at the mercy of the police. Even persons suspected of only minor offenses were frequently long held in police custody without being tried. Confessions were often extorted by third-degree methods. The law, while forbidding such procedures, left loopholes for circumvention. Now the Constitution sets up the rule that no person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a judicial officer which specifies the offense with which he is charged. He shall not be detained without adequate cause, which upon demand must be shown in open court in his presence and in the presence of his counsel. Infliction of torture is absolutely forbidden, and restricting rules with regard to the use of confessions are provided analogous to the Anglo-Saxon law.

Liability of the State is established for any damage suffered by a person through an illegal act of a public official. The Constitution goes so far as to provide that even in case of acquittal a person who has been arrested or detained may sue the State for redress. Finally, exclusion of double jeopardy has been introduced and the principle announced that no person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed.

Most of these safeguards will require an implementing revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it will be the task of the Supreme Court to insure that this legislation conforms to the letter of the Constitution and is applied in accordance with its spirit.

In dealing with economic matters, the new Constitution could not escape the influence of ideas which have increasingly permeated industrialized countries in our machine age. In an interpellation on 27 August 1946, a member of the House of Peers pointed out that the Supreme Court of the United States is not necessarily the stout guardian of capitalism, for the judgments rendered by this tribunal take adequate account also of the demands and exigencies of socialism. Referring to the Japanese Constitution the interpellator remarked that it cannot certainly be characterized as a socialist instrument. He expressed the opinion that under this instrument capitalism and socialism will have equal opportunity. The issue of capitalism versus socialism is left undecided, and for this reason the new Constitution may be criticized from both sides as a "half-way house." The Peer asserted, however, that a Constitution of this character is best suited to the changing conditions of present-day Japan.

Provisions pertaining to the economic life of the nation have been restricted to a minimum, perhaps because of the reluctance of the framers to take an inflexible position with regard to the antagonism to which the member of the House of Peers refers. As a matter of fact, the Constitution does not anticipate socio-economic developments, but leaves them flexible for future evolution. Property rights are declared inviolable, but with the limitation that they shall be defined by law in conformity with the public welfare and that private property may be taken for public use upon the payment of just compensation therefor.

The right of labor to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed in the new Constitution, which also provides that all people shall have the right and the obligation to work, that standards for wages, hours, rest and other working conditions shall be fixed by law, and that children shall not be exploited. Such guarantees exist most analogously in the written Constitution of the U. S. S. R., while in most other countries they have been gradually won by the working classes without constitutional safeguards.

The Constitution proclaims the right of all people to maintain minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living. Such right can materialize only if the State maintains an adequate public health and welfare system, as well as minimum security standards. Therefore, the Constitution imposes on the State the obligation to afford such guarantee. If the program is not carried out, the government will be censured for failure to comply with constitutional requirements.

The "right to work" may be similarly interpreted. While this provision cannot be enforced by an unemployed individual, the Constitution calls upon the government to create social and economic conditions which make possible the employment of each person according to his abilities, on the basis of full equality.

Enforcement of the Constitution

20. The Constitution will come into force on 3 May 1947, six months after its promulgation. This arrangement allows time for the enactment of new laws and for the revision of existing laws to conform to the provisions of the new basic law. Indeed, serious legal complications would occur if the Constitution were to be made effective at once because the existing laws are to a large extent out of harmony with its principles.

In the expectation that the comprehensive work of preparing implementing legislation will be accomplished within six months, the Constitution, as supreme law of the nation, provides that no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, shall have legal force or validity. Finally, the Emperor as well as ministers of state, members of the Diet, judges and other public officials are solemnly reminded of their obligation to respect and uphold the Constitution. Such obligation is legally understood, but upon its loyal fulfillment depends the victory of democratic principles in Japan.

Conclusion

21. On the whole, the new Constitution is an impressive manifestation of democratic principles, but history teaches that the most perfect basic law does not become a way of life unless government conforms to the spirit of its terms and unless the people understand and put into practice its ideals. In the case of Japan, the cabinet, for example, will have to insist on its monopoly of executive functions. As the sole adviser of the Emperor, it must not allow irresponsible elements again to win influence over him. The Diet must free itself from tutelage and guidance by the executive. Unless the members of the Diet become genuine legislators, who originate, draft, and debate fully the bills to be enacted into law, and manifest the eagerness and ability to exercise the powers entrusted to them by the people, the statement of the Constitution that the Diet is the sole law-making organ of the State cannot become reality.

Finally, the Japanese people must assume responsibilities which the Constitution imposes on them, understanding the meaning of their sovereignty and conscious of the fact that government is not an end in itself, but their concern and the servant of their will.

GOVERNMENT POLICY

22. On 4 November, the day after promulgation of the Constitution, the Cabinet proclaimed six "fundamental policies" designed to effect the "realization of democracy," as follows:

"The new Constitution, which is the basic code for a re-constructed Japan, was promulgated on 3 November, to take effect as from May next year. It is a source of great inspiration for us, the Japanese people. During the past year our nation has been treading a thorny path, but forging ahead step by step toward the goal for building a democratic country. For our people, long fettered by the trammels of convention, trained and tamed under militaristic leadership, it is not an easy task to accomplish the construction of a really democratic, peaceful country and to reach the point where we can contribute to the progress of the world culturally and economically.

"The ideal pervading the new Constitution is the realization of democracy. For that purpose each and every one of our people must become capable of acting freely and with the sense of responsibility for the benefit of society and mankind, while perfecting his character and fully displaying his personality. And for the perfection of the character the establishment of the economic basis for the people's life is needed as well as the reform and reinforcement of the educational system. For these are indispensable to the construction of a peaceful country and the advancement of the people's culture. We must rise from the ruins of defeat and proceed straight ahead toward that lofty objective. All of the people, united to a man, must heighten the moral sense, speak out what should be said, give ear to what should be heard, promote mutual improvement and confidence, and help each other in a positive spirit, wherein lies the way to that objective.

"In pursuance of the above mentioned principle, the Government will listen to the public opinion, and exert itself to the utmost with the support of the people, either in enforcing the budget and laws approved by the Diet at its last session, or in formulating and carrying out various policies hereafter. With the promulgation of the new Constitution the Government will work for the popularization and a thorough elucidation of the spirit of the Constitution. At the same time, by clarifying the fundamental points of the immediate measures concerning education, culture, economy, etc., it requests the people's co-operation for their realization.

- "(1) Popularization of the new Constitution. The new Constitution clarifies the principles of political morality common to all mankind, and it belongs to the people themselves. Its spirit is not a thing to be handed out to the people by the Government. The people must learn for themselves and digest it by themselves. Accordingly, the Government while it will do fully its own part, expects that the Diet will become the center of activities for the popularization of the new Constitution. It is also the intention of the Government to complete speedily the institutions provided for under the Constitution. As for the various laws which are required in connection with its

enforcement, they will soon be enacted, since the deliberations upon them by the Special Legislative Enquiry Commission have already been completed.

- "(2) Reform of the Educational System. A democratic educational system rests upon the following fundamentals: first, it should aim at the perfection of character and the sound development of individuality, and the training of men and women capable of carrying out their responsibilities as members of a nation and society; second, at providing an equal educational opportunity to all people; third, at enabling educators to accomplish their high mission freely and on their own responsibility.

"The Government has continued to study the matter carefully by setting up the Educational Reformation Commission, whose views will be taken into consideration for effecting a fundamental reform of the educational system based upon the above mentioned fundamentals.

- "(3) Reform of the Administrative Structure and the System of Public Officials, and of the Operation Thereof. In order to ensure the satisfactory operation of the new Constitution, the administrative structure and the system of public officials now existing and their operation must be subjected to an overall reform for their thorough democratization.

"Accordingly, there has provisionally been instituted in the Cabinet the Administrative Investigation Commission to engage in scientific and careful investigation and planning by mustering talent from Government and private circles. The recommendations of the Commission will be speedily put into practice.

- "(4) Establishment of Local Self-government. Local self-government is the foundation for democratic government. In accordance with the initial revision of the system of local government which has recently been effected, the Government will put in practice, justly and properly, the public election of prefectural governors, mayors, and town and village headmen, and a system of the people's participation in local self-government. It also intends to effect a second revision of the local government system on the basis of the findings of the local Government Investigation Commission so as to establish local self-government firmly in line with the spirit of the new Constitution.

- "(5) Rehabilitation of Industry and Economy. For the promotion of industry and economy the liquidation of the fictitious capital, which has disproportionately expanded during the war, is a fundamental requisite. With that end in view the Government will cancel payment of the war indemnities, expedite necessary adjustment by properly enforcing various laws related to the cancellation, and lay a solid foundation for economic rehabilitation through reconstruction and reorganization of enterprises.

"However, commodities in stock, which have been a stop-gap source of supply, are about to be exhausted. On the other hand, there has not been a sufficient increase in production. Moreover, disputes between capital and labor threaten to undermine the foundations of economic rehabilitation. It would be no easy matter to rehabilitate industry and economy after cancellation of war indemnities.

"The Government expects that every one, clearly grasping the situation, will commit himself to endurance and construction for the accomplishment of that difficult task. The fundamental objectives of the Government in this connection are as follows:

- a. The basis for the operation of economy lies in the lively initiative and activities of private enterprises. However, state control is required in certain cases in order to tide over the immediate crisis. State control, or operation, may be resorted to even in the future if necessary for the public interest.
- b. In parallel with the promotion of science, domestic resources will first be exploited to the utmost. In this connection the Government intends to thoroughly carry out reforestation and river improvement, increase agricultural productivity, reconstruct and reinforce aquatic and livestock industries, and bend its efforts to the development and increased production of coal, hydroelectricity, mining and industrial resources.
- c. In order to ensure the standards of living as a peaceful, civilized nation to this country, possessing meagre natural resources and a vast population, plans will be laid for developing to a high degree peaceful manufacturing enterprises.

In this connection, measures such as the formulation of a rational land development plan, the furtherance and improvement of techniques, the rationalization of industry, etc., will be put into practice to establish superior industries which will be able to stand competition in the international market in future.

- d. Accumulation of capital is urgently needed for a speedy reconstruction of industrial facilities. The Government appeals to all the people to curtail consumption, lay up money, and live a life of frugality and construction. It will also take steps to see that profits from enterprises are so expanded as to further and strengthen productivity.
- e. An enterprise is a workshop where capital and labor are brought together as one body for production. Reconstruction of industrial economy depends upon co-operation between capital and labor. Workers and management should mutually respect each other's position and personality. While they may claim what is due to them they should honestly perform their obligations.

The Government will promote capital-labor co-operative organizations founded upon such principles.

- f. Since the stabilization of the value of currency is the fundamental condition of economic rehabilitation, the Government will exert its utmost, with unreserved support of the people, for the prevention and control of inflation.
- g. The dissolution of the Zaibatsu and the abolition of monopolies will be thoroughly carried out and the principle of increasing industrial efficiency through fair competition of enterprises will be fully respected.

"(6) The Solution of the Labor Problem and the Stabilization of People's Livelihood. Labor Measures. Efforts will be made for the stabilization of the workers' livelihood and the elevation of their position, the awakening of a sense of responsibility on the part of labor and capital for the reconstruction of industry, and the autonomous development of healthy labor movements by preventing deviation from the genuine union spirit under the despotic leadership of a few.

Unemployment Measures. Primary importance will be attached to the realization of maximum employment by developing industries as well as by preventing the employed from losing their jobs to the furthest possible extent. On the other hand, every effort will be rendered to secure the living of the unemployed by the inauguration of a vigorous public works program including the rehabilitation of war-devastated areas, in parallel with the effective operation of various social organs.

The Securing of National Life. Along the line stipulated by the new Constitution, the minimum standards of living will be secured by a thorough and simplified enforcement of livelihood protection measures, and, at the same time, efforts will be made for the completion of social welfare medical and public health facilities.

The Protection of Repatriates. In order to stabilize the life of the repatriated, emergency measures for the winter will be instituted concerning their commodities, housing, etc. They will be assisted to get settled, which is necessary to regular employment.

"The Government intends to prosecute one after another the various measures mentioned above and that, in every case, by a truly democratic means. It will always follow the supreme will of the people expressed through the Diet, mobilize through various commissions, etc., the total wisdom of the official and private circles, and endeavor to carry out these measures perfectly with the co-operation and support of the whole nation. Accordingly, any movement which is based on coercion and violence and aims solely at destruction or which is carried on under the dictatorial leadership of a small group will be sternly eliminated and special efforts will be made for the maintenance of public peace and order. The true happiness of the Japanese nation cannot be realized without the establishment of a genuine democracy. The Government is firmly convinced that a

healthy democracy as enunciated by the new Constitution is the only way to reconstruct Japan, to elevate national life, and ultimately to contribute to the welfare of mankind.

"In conformity with the basic principles of the various policies mentioned above, the following measures will immediately be enforced, or prepared to be enforced, for the reorganization of the educational system, the reconstruction of the industrial economy, the solution of the labor problem, and the stabilization of national livelihood:

"(1) Reorganization of the Compulsory Education System.

a. Completion of the Compulsory Education System.

1. Re-examination of the period of compulsory education.
2. A drastic simplification of written Japanese by eliminating difficult characters, and the promotion of educational efficiency.
3. The rehabilitation of war-damaged schools and securing of a supply of materials for educational use.
4. Improvement of the substance of education.

b. Establishment of Educational Autonomy.

1. Establishment of a system for the attainment of the aim of education in a family-like atmosphere of mutual affection and respect between the teacher and the taught.
2. Encouragement of private schools and respect for the autonomy of educational circles.
3. Reform of the local system of educational administration.
4. A fundamental improvement of the teachers' training system.
5. Respect for religious and ethical instructions.

c. Equal Opportunity for Higher Education.

1. Opening of the higher educational institutions to the public by attendance, correspondence, radio, films, etc.
2. Diffusion of the university extension courses system, utilizing night-time, holidays, etc.
3. Expansion of library and museum facilities, etc.

d. Promotion of Scientific Techniques and the Renovation of a Business Education.

1. Standardization and encouragement of experiment and research organs.
2. A more intimate co-operation between schools and factories.
3. Opening to public utilization the Government's organs of scientific and technical experiments and researches.

"(2) Reconstruction of Industrial Economy.

a. Completion of the Statistical System.

1. Enactment of basic regulations concerning statistics.
2. Reorganization and reinforcement of the official system concerning the planning and compilation of statistics.
3. Expansion of the systems of statistics and diffusion of their utilization.

b. Increasing the Supply of Foodstuffs to the People.

1. Encouragement of the aquatic products and livestock industries as the sources of proteins and fats.
2. Establishment of farmers' co-operatives.
3. Expansion of the agricultural production capacity by the electrification of rural communities, the mechanization of farm management, the employment of animal power, etc.
4. Opening up and utilizing high lands and cold regions through the cultivation of suitable crops and the development of suitable industries.
5. Increased production and equitable distribution of chemical fertilizers and of agricultural implements of superior quality.
6. Encouragement of the processing and storing of foodstuffs.

c. Development and Reinforcement of Basic Domestic Industries.

1. Increase of production and improvement of quality of coal.
2. Prospecting and exploitation of domestic mineral resources.
3. Promotion of plans for the exploitation of waterpower resources.

4. Completion of forest and river conservation works.
 5. Establishment of priority for key industries and export industries.
 6. Guidance and promotion of small and medium size enterprises and rural industries.
- d. Reinforcement of Communications and Transportation.
1. Restoration and expansion of communications facilities.
 2. Accelerating of repair work on railway rolling-stock and the electrification of railways.
 3. Road repairs and improvement, and the reinforcement of minor transport facilities.
 4. An adequate adjustment of sea and land transportation.
- e. Prevention of inflation.
1. Stabilization of currency and establishment of the credit system.
 2. Securing of the supply of the necessities of life and a thorough control of black-marketing.
 3. Adjustment of commodity price systems and the stabilization of commodity price levels.
 4. Encouragement of savings and enterprise investments.
 5. Establishment of a sound finance.

"(3) Solution of the Labor Problem and the Stabilization of the People's Livelihood.

- a. Establishment of Labor Measures.
1. Enactment of a labor law.
 2. Establishment of a rational wage system based on productive efficiency.
 3. Encouragement of rational systems of management participation and profit sharing.
 4. Enlightenment of capital and labor and the people in general concerning the labor problem.
 5. Completion of scientific investigations and researches concerning labor.

b. Solution of the Unemployment Problem.

1. Enforcement of productive public enterprises and securing of the fruits of such enterprises.
2. Reduction of working hours and the operation of a shift system on a rational basis.
3. Strengthening of the functions and system of labor exchanges and of their mobile operation, e. g. the procurement of temporary jobs, etc.
4. Effective operation of vocational guidance and other common facilities.

c. Establishment of Livelihood Guarantee System.

1. A thorough operation of the Livelihood Protection Law and the amplification of various social enterprises.
2. The extension of social insurance systems.
3. Reorganization and reinforcement of the orphans and widows protection system.
4. The diffusion of medical services and the completion of public health equipment.
5. Establishment of rational nutrition measures."

Reaction of Parties

23. Reactions to the Government's policy statement followed strict party lines. The Liberal and Progressive Parties staunchly supported the statement but the opposition parties were quick to express disapproval.

24. Social Democrats dismissed the statement with the assertion that it was merely a "political composition."

25. Co-operative Democrats complained that some of the principles were "contradictory," pointing out that the Government refused to recognize the workers' right to control production and simultaneously "preached" co-operation between management and labor. It was noted that despite Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi's frequent assertion that the "so-called inflation" is nothing to worry about the Government intends to do everything possible to "alleviate the current inflation."

26. The New People's Party declared that before announcing these policies the Government should have "deeply reflected" on their effects and that the Cabinet ought to have sufficient courage to democratize itself.

27. The Communists charged that the Government statement did not touch "on any issue for which the masses are anxiously demanding solution." It was discounted as "an empty Constitution festival

and an array of empty words." Overthrow of the Yoshida Cabinet, "a cabinet leading the Japanese race to ruin, is the struggle the Communist Party intends to make together with the masses."

Press Reaction

28. The press was generally critical. The following comments by three Tokyo newspapers were typical:

Nippon Keizai argued that effective implementation of the program depended on reform of the bureaucracy which prevents smooth functioning of national administration. Without this step enforcement of the new measures will do more harm than good. "It is evident," the journal added, "that bureaucracy runs counter to democracy, and unless bureaucracy is completely done away with, the establishment of democracy cannot be expected."

Tokyo Shinbun doubted the ability of the Government to carry out its program, noting that the authorities often achieve results "different from, and in some cases entirely opposed to, the upheld aims." Practical programs rather than high-sounding policies are required, the paper said, declaring that the people are sick of "compositions by bureaucrats."

Mainichi held that the proposed administrative policies are inadequate in the critical situation now confronting the nation. The "superficiality" of the Government's approach to the labor and unemployment problem was particularly criticized. While promising to "maintain peace and order" against destructive labor tactics, the Government has failed to take adequate measures to eliminate the causes of labor unrest, the paper said. The editorial called the Government's public works program unjustified in view of existing acute material shortages and "lopsided" manpower distribution. These weaknesses, Mainichi said, show an outmoded conservatism and indicate the Cabinet's inability to comprehend the basic economic realities of today.

THE PURGE

Purge Extended to Local Officials

29. On 8 November the Government announced the extension of the 4 January Purge Directive to include prefectural, city, town and village officials. This announcement was issued in an atmosphere of sharp political tension engendered by vigorous opposition to the six-point Government policy statement and by widespread controversy over the Government's rejection of a plan for settlement of the electrical workers' dispute.

Achievement of the objectives of the original Purge Directive necessitated application to all levels of government. Since the lower levels of government directly influence the thoughts and actions of the people, local politicians and wartime bureaucrats represented a major obstacle to the creation of a new, peaceful, democratic Japan.

30. Following is the text of the Government's 8 November announcement of the purge extension:

THE PLAN FOR APPLICATION OF THE PURGE MEMORANDUM TO LOCAL PUBLIC OFFICES

8 November 1946

1. Extent of Application of the Purge Memorandum.

- (1) All persons who fall under provisions of SCAP Memorandum of 4 January 1946 with a subject "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office" (called the Purge Memorandum hereafter) shall be removed and excluded from the following local public offices:

Members of prefectural (To, Do, Fu, Ken, the same hereinafter), city (Shi), ward (Ku), town (Machi or Cho), village (Mura or Son) assemblies.

Prefectural governors, mayors of cities, headmen of wards, towns and villages.

Deputy mayors of cities and deputy headmen of towns and villages.

Accountants of cities, towns and villages.

Inspection commissioners and counsellors.

Members of Electoral Administration Committee, presiding officers of elections, superintendents of the poll (including heads of polling stations), superintendents of the counting of the votes (including heads of ballot opening station).

Members of Land Committees of prefectures, cities, towns and villages.

Headmen of Chonaikai and Burakukai, and chief of the federation thereof.

Responsible members of the staff of prefectures, cities, wards, towns and villages (including chiefs of departments, bureaus, sections and units).

Other public office holders whose positions correspond to the above.

- (2) Persons who are removed from national public offices or excluded from national government services as falling under the Purge Memorandum shall naturally be barred from local public offices, while persons who will be removed or excluded from local public offices under this plan shall also be barred from national government services.

2. Criteria for Screening.

The criteria for screening shall in general be based upon those provisions now applied to national public offices, but in regard to local public offices they shall be extended and applied as follows:

- (1) Scope of persons who fall under the provisions of paragraph "C" of the Purge Memorandum shall be extended so as to cover not only the influential members of prefectural branches, but also those of local (Gun, Shi, Ku, Machi and Mura) branches of the organizations falling under paragraph "C".

Persons who fall under the above shall be removed from national as well as local public offices and excluded from national government services as well as from local public offices.

- (2) Scope of persons who fall under the provisions of paragraph "D" of the Purge Memorandum shall be extended so as to cover

those who have held influential positions of the local branches of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Political Association of Great Japan.

The influential positions mentioned above shall be designated as follows:

- (a) Six Principal Cities (Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama, Kobe and Nagoya).
 - Chief of IRAA
 - Secretary General of IRAA
 - Directors of Divisions of IRAA
 - Chairman of Co-operative Conference
 - Chief of Yokusan-Sonen-Dan
 - Deputy Chief of IRAA
 - Director General of IRAA
 - Directors of Divisions of Yokusan-Sonen-Dan
- (b) Gun, Cities and Wards.
 - Chief of IRAA
 - Chief Secretary of IRAA
 - Chairman of Co-operative Conference
 - Chief of Yokusan-Sonen-Dan
- (c) Towns and Villages.
 - Chief of IRAA
 - Chairman of Co-operative Conference
 - Chief of Yokusan-Sonen-Dan

The above persons who fall under the provisions of paragraph "D" of the Purge Memorandum shall be removed sixty days before the coming elections and excluded from national government services as well as local public offices, provided that such persons who are at present in the national public offices shall not be removed.

- (3) Persons who held the following positions between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 shall be treated as persons who fall under the provisions of paragraph "C" of the Purge Memorandum.

Chiefs of Gun, City and Ward federations of branches (Rengo Bunkai) and chiefs of town and village branches (Bunkai) of the Imperial Ex-Servicemen's Association (Teikoku Zaigo Gunjin Kai).

The above persons who fall under the provisions of paragraph "G" shall be removed from local public offices and excluded from national government services as well as local public offices, provided that such persons who are at present in the national public offices shall not be removed.

- (4) Mayors of cities and headmen of wards and deputy mayors whose incumbency antedate 2 September 1945 shall be barred from running for the forthcoming local elections of deputy mayors, while town and village headmen and their deputies whose incumbency antedate 2 September 1945 shall be barred from running for the forthcoming local election of headmen of towns and villages and be removed or excluded from the offices of deputy headmen.

However, the persons thus barred from the forthcoming local election or the local public offices may be appointed any other local and national government positions and also regain their eligibility after the maximum term

of local elective public offices beginning with the forthcoming election (that is four years). Deputy mayors of cities and deputy headmen of towns and villages may stay at their positions until after the forthcoming local election.

- (5) Headmen of Chonaikai and Burakukai shall be newly elected by universal adult suffrage of the inhabitants of the community involved.

For the election, however, present headmen of Chonaikai and Burakukai whose incumbency antedate 2 September 1945 shall be barred from running as candidate for one term.

Procedure of screening.

- (1) With a view to conducting screening concerning local public offices, there shall be established the Prefectural Public Offices, Qualifications Examination Committee (called the Prefectural Committee hereafter) in each prefecture and the Municipal Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee (called the Municipal Committee hereafter) in each city with a population exceeding 50,000 (these two committees called the Local Committees hereafter).
- (2) Members of the Local Committee shall be appointed, in case of prefecture, by the prefectural governor, and, in case of city, by the mayor. Members of the Local Committee shall be appointed from among persons who are not office-holders excepting judges of district or higher courts or professors and teachers of educational institutions.

Screening of public office qualification of members of the Committees shall be conducted by the Central Public Office Qualifications Examinations Committee (called the Central Committee hereafter).

- (3) The Municipal Committee shall conduct screening concerning municipal officials in each city with the exception of candidates for the mayor and city assembly members.

The Prefectural Committee shall conduct screening concerning public offices of local government organizations in each prefecture with the exception of candidates for the prefectural governor, prefectural assembly members, mayors and city assembly members of Kyoto, Osaka, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya cities (called the five principal cities hereafter) and public offices to be screened by the Municipal Committee.

The Central Committee shall conduct screening of candidates for prefectural governors, prefectural assembly members, mayors and city assembly members of the five principal cities.

- (4) The Local Committee has full autonomy in its conduct of screening. However, with a view to assuring uniformity in application and interpretation of the Purge Memorandum, the Municipal Committee may apply to the Prefectural Committee, and the Prefectural Committee to the Central Committee, for their opinions regarding doubtful cases.

The Local Committee shall report to the Central Committee (in case of the Municipal Committee through the Prefectural Committee) any case where a person is deemed to fall under the Purge Memorandum. The upper Committee, if it deems any decision of a lower Committee improper, may make recommendations to the latter. However, it cannot reverse the decision.

- (5) The form of questionnaire shall be the same as in the case of national public offices. However, questionnaires to be submitted originally to the Local Committee shall be filled only in the Japanese language, and English versions shall be attached only when they are specifically needed.

Any person who submits false or incomplete entries in the questionnaire shall be punished in accordance with the law and regulations.

- (6) A certificate of eligibility shall be issued, upon application, to any person who has been established by the Central or Local Committee not to fall under the Purge Memorandum.

A certificate which has been issued on the basis of false or incomplete entries in the questionnaire shall be invalid.

A person who obtains a valid certificate to be issued under this plan hereafter will not be required to subject to further examination as to his public office qualifications.

- (7) Candidates for elective positions shall be screened before the elections and the certificate of eligibility shall be required for filing their candidacy.

However, members of the Land Committees of cities, towns and villages as well as prefectures shall be screened after the election so far as the first election because of the shortage of time.

- (8) The Local Committee shall publish result of each screening immediately after its completion.
- (9) The Local Committee shall report, regularly every week and whenever necessary, the current status and progress of screening activities to the Central Committee (in case of the Municipal Committee, through the Prefectural Committee).

Press Reaction

31. The Japanese press reflected understanding and support of the Purge extension and speculated extensively concerning political consequences.

32. The newspaper Asahi hailed the measure as "worthy of the name bloodless revolution."

"The latest extension of the scope of purge based on the 4 January Directive is expected to uproot the nests of the militarists and nationalists and expel them from the coming elections of prefectural assemblies. The significance of the loss of the guiding group by conservative influences is considered great," Asahi commented.

"The blow to be suffered by the militarists and extreme nationalists by the latest purge measure is considered to be greater than the purge order effected on the national level. It is anticipated that these two purge measures will effect a purging which will mark a new era worthy of the name bloodless revolution.

"The coming local elections will be conducted on a cleaned field and the true will of the population will be reflected in the returns. . ."

33. Mainichi also expressed approval: "Democratization of personnel is an indispensable condition for rejuvenated Japan and for this it is not sufficient to purge the central state machinery of undemocratic elements. The responsibility of local leaders for driving the local masses into militarism is by no means slight. There is naturally a difference of degree in culpability between national and local leaders but national leadership could only permeate the local areas with the endeavors of local leaders.

"Consequently it was lopsided justice that the G clauses had not been applied to local personnel. Now that they have been blacklisted, it is necessary to take scrupulous care that the dislodging of mayors and headmen in such numbers will not impair administration or give rise to unseemly controversies over the question of successors. Not a few probably will be dissatisfied with ostracism. But there can be no mistake that it will be a forward step toward Japan's democratization to peel one or two skins off local administration. That the rural areas are extremely feudalistic and reactionary compared with the national level has been demonstrated in labor affairs and by elections. This is because the rural machinery has not yet been adequately transformed. Thus a major operation of the kind announced is absolutely necessary before a local election. No favorable results could have been expected without such a measure.

"In applying the G clause the Government has been extremely slow and tardy and there are still many quarters left that should be properly purged. The local purge, in fact, should have been undertaken much earlier, immediately after the national purge. If that had been done the situation in local areas would have been improved. Both the Government and people must be resolved and prepared to effect thorough democratization in the coming local elections."

Resignations

34. For two or three weeks before the formal announcement of the Purge extension and immediately thereafter thousands of potential purgees submitted their resignations. These resignations, in general, had little effect on the routine of municipal and prefectural administration, despite some press reports to the contrary.

Statement of Home Minister

35. The Minister of Home Affairs issued the following statement:

"On the 8th instant, the Cabinet announced the scope of the application of the Purge Directive in regard to local elective and appointive posts. This step must be considered an important one in view of the fact that local elective and appointive posts form the basis of the democratization of this country and in the firm establishment of democracy and the rehabilitation of a democratic Japan, this step is particularly significant. The step is the same as presented in the press release and the contents thereof are obviously clear.

"In order to disperse any misunderstanding, however, which seems likely, I wish to make the following points clear, so that every citizen as well as the competent local authorities may view the facts calmly without unnecessary alarm or disturbance through false rumors, and I sincerely hope that they will carry out their duties towards securing the democratization of local government.

"First, in regard to those mayors of cities or headmen of towns or villages, deputy mayors of cities or deputy headmen of towns or villages, as well as the heads of town or village associations (Chonai-kaicho or Buraku-kaicho) or Combined Association (Rengo-kaicho) who assumed their offices after 3 September 1945, so long as they do not fall under the disqualifying provision, such as the Local Branch Chief of the IRAA, there will be no alterations in their positions.

"Second, even if a mayor of city or a headman of town or village resigns, the deputy mayor or deputy headman may remain in office so long as he does not fall under the provisions of the Purge Directive, until the assumption of office of the mayor or headman by public election. Measures have been taken to ensure the operation of important city, town or village administration such as the supply of rice, etc. for the citizens of the country or of city, town or village. I ask of the deputy mayor or deputy headman to accomplish splendidly his responsibility as a public official and to hand over his office to his successor. Further, in regard to a city, town or village which lacks a deputy mayor or a deputy headman, I ask that appropriate steps be taken, such as to appoint a deputy or a temporary proxy for a mayor or a headman.

"Third, I ask such mayors of cities or headmen of towns or villages who fall under the provisions of the Purge Directive, irrespective of the payment of retiring allowances or the promulgation of the Imperial Ordinance, to hand over their business without delay and willingly to retire from their office for the cause of the democratization of local government and to take such steps as may be required for the realization of the forthcoming public elections of the mayors of cities and the headmen of towns or villages.

"Last, I ask you all as citizens of this country to comprehend the significance of this present step and to co-operate in the election of new public officers with purpose and ability and to strive for the renovation of local politics as well as the stabilization of local society and I sincerely hope that democracy will be firmly established without a moment's delay in the central as well as local sphere."

Estimated Number of Purgees

35. Japanese press sources estimated that approximately 1,000,000 persons would be "screened" under the newly expanded purge program, and that almost 170,000 persons would be removed or barred from public office, as follows:

"C" category of the Purge Directive (membership in certain nationalist organizations): 550.

"D" Category (persons associated with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association or its affiliates): 37,000.

"G" category (militarists and ultranationalists): 10,000.

Incumbent Chonai-kaicho or Buraku-kaicho (chiefs of block and neighborhood associations), office holders during the war, who were denied the right of election to succeed themselves: 120,000.

In addition, Japanese sources speculated upon the possibility that between 80 and 100 Diet members may lose their seats at the time of the next general election through application of provisions of the purge extension.

The informal press tabulations failed to take into account thousands of town and village headmen, city mayors and others directly affected by the new application.

Political Results

37. Announcement of the purge extension prompted the non-government parties, especially the Social Democratic Party, to renew their demands for resignation of the Cabinet and dissolution of the Diet. Socialists were eager to capitalize on a situation that would at least temporarily affect the strength and influence of the Liberal and Progressive Parties in local communities. Simultaneously the Government parties initiated attempts to win the support of candidates willing to co-operate with local party organizations but not subject to the Purge.

Postponement of Local Elections

38. The Government decision necessitated a two- or three-month postponement of prefectural elections, the first of which was scheduled to be held in December. This delay was occasioned by the necessity for screening all prospective candidates.

Purge of Business Leaders

39. As soon as shock of the initial purge expansion was absorbed the Government announced a second extension eliminating "undesirables" in private businesses and organizations. Newspapers, magazines, publishing companies, political parties, cultural and charitable organizations, professional associations, trade associations, financial institutions and big business were covered.

The decision to apply the Purge to those who had held positions of responsibility in commerce, industry and finance was an acknowledgement of the part they had played in forming the totalitarian state which prepared for and prosecuted the war. Elimination of these persons was undertaken to clear the way for leaders who will create an economy dedicated to preserving peace.

40. Following is the text of the Cabinet's announcement of the new purge plan:

"The Government some time ago announced a plan for the application of the so-called 'Purge Order' on provincial public offices and is currently making preparations for its execution. Now, together with this it has decided to apply the Purge Directive to economic and publishing circles as well as to other public organizations. The main points of the plan are:

- "(1) To define clearly the scope of public offices (positions which the purgees will be prohibited from assuming) in accordance with the appendixes (A and B) to the program and to examine the qualifications of those in these offices and those who will hereafter assume these offices.
- "(2) Influential wartime leaders of influential corporations and financial organs as listed in Appendix A will naturally be treated as persons falling under Clause G.

- "(3) Those who are in influential positions in influential corporations, financial organs and others as listed in Appendix B as well as those who will hereafter assume these positions will have their qualifications examined.

"By the latest measure, the Purge Directive will be sternly applied to the economic, publishing and other circles. Needless to say, those who have thus far occupied leading positions in the economic world will be purged in toto and the process of democratizing Japan will further be expedited."

41. The text of the plan announced by the Government follows:

THE PLAN FOR APPLICATION OF THE PURGE MEMORANDUM
TO INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION

1. Extent of Application of the Purge Memorandum.

- (1) All positions of principal officials of companies, banks or organizations which come under any one of the following headings shall be subject to the screening under the provisions of the SCAP Memorandum of 4 January 1946 on removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office (called the Memorandum hereafter).

- (a) Companies to be designated by the Prime Minister as those which have excessively concentrated economic power, including influential private companies of large economic scale and influential private financial institutions.
- (b) Organizations to be designated under the provisions of the Temporary Supply and Demand Adjustment Law.
- (c) Organizations established under special legislations, organizations subsidized by the Government or those corresponding to the above, which have the nature of serving for public benefit and command wide national influence.
- (d) Principal newspaper companies, publishing companies, news agencies, broadcasting corporations, motion picture companies, theater companies and other media of public information.
- (e) Political parties and their branches, a member or members of which hold a seat or seats in the Imperial Diet.
- (f) Organizations which are required to file their declaration under the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946.
- (g) Companies and organizations to be designated hereafter by the Prime Minister as corresponding to the headings above.

- (2) Principal officials provided in the foregoing subparagraph (1) shall mean and include those listed in the headings (a) and (b) below.

Persons who fall under the provisions of the Memorandum

shall be removed and excluded from positions listed in the heading (a), and also be excluded from positions listed in the heading (b). However, those who hold at present positions listed in the heading (b) shall not, even though they fall under the provisions of the Memorandum, be liable to be removed therefrom, so long as they stay at their present position.

(a) Principal officials.

Chairman, Vice-Chairman;
President, Vice-President;
Directors;
Editor-in-Chief, Managing Editor and News Editor
(applicable only to public information media);
Director of Compilation Bureau and Director of
Research Bureau (applicable only to public
information media and to cultural organizations);
Secretary-General, Senior Executive Member,
Executive Member and member of Permanent
Executive Committee (applicable only to
political parties);
Any other official, regardless of his title,
who in fact exercises authority or influence
or receives compensation commensurate with that
of any of the officials listed above.

(b) Other officials.

Secretary;
Treasurer;
Adviser and Councillor;
Auditor;
Any other official, regardless of his title,
who in fact exercises authority or influence
or receives compensation commensurate with
that of any officials listed above.

- (3) Positions of personnel other than listed in subparagraph (2), heading (a) and (b) above shall not be subject to the screening under the provisions of the Memorandum.

Incidentally, a modification will be made concerning organizations designated in Appendix II of the Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1946 so that only officials thereof corresponding to those listed in the subparagraph (2) above will be subject to the screening.

2. Criteria for Screening.

The criteria for screening shall in general be based upon those provisions now applied to national public offices and extended lately in connection with the local public offices. In addition to the above, however, persons who held controlling influence in influential companies which commanded excessive economic power during the war time shall be defined to fall under Paragraph "G" of the Memorandum in the line as follows:

- (1) Persons who held, between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945, controlling influence in any of the following companies shall be defined as persons who fall under the provisions of the Paragraph "G."
- (a) Conspicuously influential companies which have manufactured finished aircraft or arms, or munitions.
- (b) Conspicuously monopolistic companies which have engaged in production of basic productive

materials or business of communication or transportation.

- (c) Conspicuously monopolistic companies which have engaged in domestic or foreign trade.
- (d) Holding companies designated or to be designated hereafter by SCAP Memoranda and influential companies closely associated with the above.
- (e) Companies which have the authorized capitalization exceeding ¥ 100,000,000.
- (f) Any other companies or financial institutions which have commanded excessive economic power.

Companies falling under any one of the categories above shall be designated specifically by the Prime Minister.

- (2) Persons who held controlling influence in a company provided in the foregoing subparagraph shall mean and include the principal officials as follows:

Chairman, Vice-Chairman;
President, Vice-President;
Managing Director, Standing Director;
Standing Auditor;
Active Adviser of Councillor;
Principal stockholders who owned 10 percent or more of capital stocks or who exercised controlling influence directly or indirectly in the company;
Any other official, regardless of his title or position, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensurate with that of any of the officials listed above.

- (3) All persons who are decided to fall under the Paragraph "G" under the foregoing subparagraphs (1) and (2) above shall be barred from the national and local government service. However, those who hold at present national public offices for being which or for holding which they have been cleared under the screening criteria now in force as not falling under the provisions of the Memorandum shall not be liable, to be removed from position, provided that the administration of the plan is so timed that all such persons subject to removal therefrom are removed from their respective offices not later than 3 May 1947.

3. Screening Agency.

Screening of officials covered under the present plan of extension of application of the Memorandum shall be conducted by the Central Public Office Qualification Examination Committee, provided that, with reference to organizations falling under headings (b) and (c) of paragraph 1, subparagraph (1) above, officials of those of the prefectural or local level shall be screened by the Prefectural or Municipal Public Office Qualifications Examination Committees which are to be established shortly in connection with the extension of application of the Memorandum to the local offices.

4. Appendix.

Companies, banks or organizations which fall under paragraph 1, subparagraph (1) above are listed in Appendix attached hereto

and those which fall under paragraph 2, subparagraph (1) are listed in Paragraph A thereof.

Appendix

Paragraph A.

a. In Japan.

- (1) Amagasaki Seitetsu K. K. (Amagasaki Iron Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (2) Asahi Denka Kogyo K. K. (Asahi Electrification Industrial Co. Ltd.)
- (3) Asano Bussan K. K. (Asano Trading Co. Ltd.)
- (4) Asano Cement K. K. (Asano Cement Co. Ltd.)
- (5) Asano Honsha (Asano Central Co.)
- (6) Chiyoda Seimei Hoken Sogo K. (Chiyoda Mutual Life Insurance Co.)
- (7) Chugoku Haiden K. K. (Chugoku District Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.)
- (8) Daido Seiko K. K. (Daido Steel Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (9) Dai Ichi Seimei Hoken Sogo K. (The First Mutual Life Insurance Co.)
- (10) Daiken Sangyo K. K. (Daiken Industry Co. Ltd.)
- (11) Dai Nippon Boseki K. K. (Great Japan Spinning Co. Ltd.)
- (12) Fuji Sangyo K. K. (Fuji Industrial Co. Ltd.)
- (13) Furukawa Denki Kogyo K. K. (Furukawa Electric Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (14) Furukawa Kogyo K. K. (Furukawa Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (15) Fuso Kinzoku K. K. (Fuso Metal Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (16) Godo Shusei K. K. (United Alcohol Co. Ltd.)
- (17) Hitachi Kokuki K. K. (Hitachi Aeroplane Co. Ltd.)
- (18) Hitachi Seiki K. K. (Hitachi Machinery Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (19) Hitachi Seisakusho (Hitachi Engineering Works Ltd.)
- (20) Hitachi Zohsei K. K. (Hitachi Arms Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (21) Hitachi Zosenso (Hitachi Shipbuilding Yard Co. Ltd.)
- (22) Hokkaido Tanko Kisen K. K. (Hokkaido Mining and Steamship Co. Ltd.)
- (23) Hokuriku Haiden K. K. (Hokuriku District Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.)
- (24) Ishikawajima Jyukogyo K. K. (Ishikawajima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.)
- (25) Kabushiki Kaisha Nissan (Nissan Co. Ltd.)
- (26) Kanegafuchi Kogyo K. K. (Kanegafuchi Industries Co. Ltd.)
- (27) Kansai Haiden K. K. (Kansai District Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.)
- (28) Kanto Haiden K. K. (Kanto District Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.)
- (29) Kawanami Kogyo K. K. (Kawanami Industries Co. Ltd.)
- (30) Kawasaki Jyukogyo K. K. (Kawasaki Heavy Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (31) Kawasaki Kisen K. K. (Kawasaki Steamship Co. Ltd.)
- (32) Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo K. K. (Kawasaki Aeroplane Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (33) Kawasaki Sharyo K. K. (Kawasaki Rolling Stock Co. Ltd.)
- (34) Keihanshin Kyuko Dentetsu K. K. (Keihanshin Express Tramway Co. Ltd.)
- (35) Kinki Nippon Tetsudo K. K. (Kinki Japan Railway Co. Ltd.)
- (36) Kobe Ginko (Kobe Bank)
- (37) Kobe Seikosho (Kobe Steel Mfg. Works Ltd.)
- (38) Kubota Seikosho (Kubota Steel Mfg. Works Ltd.)
- (39) Kyushu Haiden K. K. (Kyushu District Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.)
- (40) Matsushita Denki Sangyo K. K. (Matsushita Electrical Instruments Ind. Co.)

- (41) Matsushita Kokuki K. K. (Matsushita Aeroplane Co. Ltd.)
- (42) Meiji Seimei Hoken K. K. (Meiji Life Insurance Co. Ltd.)
- (43) Minsei Sangyo K. K. (Minsei Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (44) Mitsubishi Denki Kogyo K. K. (Mitsubishi Electrical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (45) Mitsubishi Ginko (Mitsubishi Bank)
- (46) Mitsubishi Honsha (Mitsubishi Central Co.)
- (47) Mitsubishi Jyukogyo K. K. (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.)
- (48) Mitsubishi Kasei Kogyo K. K. (Mitsubishi Chemical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (49) Mitsubishi Kisen K. K. (Mitsubishi Steamship Co. Ltd.)
- (50) Mitsubishi Kogyo K. K. (Mitsubishi Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (51) Mitsubishi Sekiyu K. K. (Mitsubishi Oil Co. Ltd.)
- (52) Mitsubishi Seiko K. K. (Mitsubishi Steel Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (53) Mitsubishi Shintaku K. K. (Mitsubishi Trust Co. Ltd.)
- (54) Mitsubishi Shoji K. K. (Mitsubishi Trading Co. Ltd.)
- (55) Mitsubishi Soko K. K. (Mitsubishi Warehouse Co. Ltd.)
- (56) Mitsui Bussan K. K. (Mitsui Trading Co. Ltd.)
- (57) Mitsui Ginko (Mitsui Bank)
- (58) Mitsui Honsha (Mitsui Central Co.)
- (59) Mitsui Kagaku Kogyo K. K. (Mitsui Chemical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (60) Mitsui Kozan K. K. (Mitsui Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (61) Mitsui Mokuzai K. K. (Mitsui Lumber Co. Ltd.)
- (62) Mitsui Seiki K. K. (Mitsui Precise Instruments Co. Ltd.)
- (63) Mitsui Sennaku K. K. (Mitsui Shipping Co. Ltd.)
- (64) Mitsui Shintaku K. K. (Mitsui Trust Co. Ltd.)
- (65) Mitsui Soko K. K. (Mitsui Warehouse Co. Ltd.)
- (66) Mitsui Yushi K. K. (Mitsui Grease and Fat Co. Ltd.)
- (67) Mitsui Zosen K. K. (Mitsui Shipbuilding Co. Ltd.)
- (68) Mizuho Sangyo K. K. (Mizuho Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (69) Nakajima Hikoki K. K. (Nakajima Aeroplane Co. Ltd.)
- (70) Nanyo Kaiun K. K. (South Sea Navigation Co. Ltd.)
- (71) Nichiden Kogyo K. K. (Nichiden Ind. Development Co. Ltd.)
- (72) Nikkoku Kogyo K. K. (Nikkoku Industries Co. Ltd.)
- (73) Nippon Alumi K. K. (Nippon Aluminum Co. Ltd.)
- (74) Nippon Chisso Hiryo K. K. (Japan Nitrate Fertilizer Co. Ltd.)
- (75) Nippon Chochiku Ginko (Japan Savings Bank)
- (76) Nippon Denki K. K. (Japan Electricity Co. Ltd.)
- (77) Nippon Denko K. K. (Japan Electrical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (78) Nippon Keikinzoku K. K. (Japan Light Metal Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (79) Nippon Kensetsu Sangyo K. K. (Japan Construction Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (80) Nippon Kentetsu Kogyo K. K. (Japan Kentetsu Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (81) Nippon Kogyo K. K. (Japan Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (82) Nippon Kokan K. K. (Japan Steel Pipe Co. Ltd.)
- (83) Nippon Musen K. K. (Japan Wireless Co. Ltd.)
- (84) Nippon Seikosho (Japan Steel Mfg. Works Ltd.)
- (85) Nippon Seimei Hoken K. K. (Japan Life Insurance Co. Ltd.)
- (86) Nippon Seitetsu K. K. (Japan Iron Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (87) Nippon Sekiyu K. K. (Japan Petroleum Co. Ltd.)
- (88) Nippon Soda K. K. (Japan Soda Co. Ltd.)
- (89) Nippon Suisan K. K. (Japan Marine Products Co. Ltd.)
- (90) Nippon Yusen K. K. (N. Y. K.)
- (91) Nipponkai Kisen K. K. (Nipponkai Steamship Co. Ltd.)
- (92) Nissan Kagaku Kogyo K. K. (Nissan Chemical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (93) Nissan Jyukogyo K. K. (Nissan Heavy Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (94) Nisshin Kagaku Kogyo K. K. (Nisshin Chemical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (95) Nitchitsu Kagaku Kogyo K. K. (Nitchitsu Chemical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (96) Nitchitsu Kogyo Kaihatsu K. K. (Nitchitsu Mining Development Co. Ltd.)

- (97) Nitchitsu Kainan Kogyo K. K. (Nitchitsu Kainan Dev. Co. Ltd.)
- (98) Nitchitsu Nenryo Kogyo K. K. (Nitchitsu Fuel Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (99) Nitchitsu Shoken K. K. (Nitchitsu Securities Co. Ltd.)
- (100) Nittetsu Kogyo K. K. (Nittetsu Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (101) Nomura Ginko (Nomura Bank)
- (102) Nomura Gomei Kaisha (Nomura Partnership)
- (103) Nomura Higashi Indo Shokusan K. K. (Nomura East India Colonization Co. Ltd.)
- (104) Oji Seishi K. K. (Oji Paper Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (105) Oki Denki K. K. (Oki Electricity Co. Ltd.)
- (106) Okura Doboku K. K. (Okura Engineering Co. Ltd.)
- (107) Okura Jigyo K. K. (Okura Enterprise Co. Ltd.)
- (108) Okura Kogyo K. K. (Okura Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (109) Onoda Cement K. K. (Onoda Cement Co. Ltd.)
- (110) Osaka Shosen K. K. (O. S. K.)
- (111) Otani Jyukogyo K. K. (Otani Heavy Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (112) Riken Kogyo K. K. (Riken Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (113) Sanki Kogyo K. K. (Sanki Engineering Co. Ltd.)
- (114) Sanwa Ginko (Sanwa Bank)
- (115) Seika Kogyo K. K. (Seika Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (116) Shikoku Kikai Kogyo K. K. (Shikoku Machine Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (117) Shoun Kosakusho (Shoun Engineering Works Ltd.)
- (118) Showa Denko K. K. (Showa Electrical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (119) Showa Hikoki K. K. (Showa Aeroplane Co. Ltd.)
- (120) Showa Hosan K. K. (Showa Agricultural Products Co. Ltd.)
- (121) Sumitomo Alumi Seiren K. K. (Sumitomo Aluminum Refinery Ltd.)
- (122) Sumitomo Denki Kogyo K. K. (Sumitomo Electrical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (123) Sumitomo Ginko (Sumitomo Bank)
- (124) Sumitomo Honsha (Sumitomo Central Co.)
- (125) Sumitomo Shintaku K. K. (Sumitomo Trust Co. Ltd.)
- (126) Sumitomo Soko K. K. (Sumitomo Warehouse Co. Ltd.)
- (127) Sumitomo Tsushin Kogyo K. K. (Sumitomo Communication Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (128) Teikoku Ginko (Teikoku Bank)
- (129) Teikoku Seimei Hoken K. K. (Teikoku Life Insurance Co. Ltd.)
- (130) Teikoku Seni K. K. (Teikoku Fiber Co. Ltd.)
- (131) Toa Kaiun K. K. (Toa Navigation Co. Ltd.)
- (132) Tohoku Haiden K. K. (Tohoku District Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.)
- (133) Tohoku Shinko Alumi K. K. (Tohoku Development Aluminum Co. Ltd.)
- (134) Tohoku Shinko Pulp K. K. (Tohoku Development Pulp Co. Ltd.)
- (135) Tokai Ginko (Tokai Bank)
- (136) Tokyo Gas K. K. (Tokyo Gas Co. Ltd.)
- (137) Tokyo Kaijo Hoken K. K. (Tokyo Maritime Insurance Co. Ltd.)
- (138) Tokyo Kyuko Dentetsu K. K. (Tokyo Express Tramway Co. Ltd.)
- (139) Tokyo Shibaura Denki K. K. (Tokyo Shibaura Electricity Co. Ltd.)
- (140) Tokyo Shibaura Koki K. K. (Tokyo Shibaura Mfg. Instruments Co. Ltd.)
- (141) Tokyo Shibaura Kyodo Kogyo K. K. (Tokyo Shibaura Joint Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (142) Tokyo Shibaura Seisakusho (Tokyo Shibaura Mfg. Works Ltd.)
- (143) Tokyo Shibaura Sharyo K. K. (Tokyo Shibaura Rolling Stock Co. Ltd.)

- (144) Toyo Boseki K. K. (Toyo Spinning Co. Ltd.)
- (145) Toyo Keiki Denki K. K. (Toyo Gauge and Electricity Co. Ltd.)
- (146) Toyo Koatsu Kogyo K. K. (Toyo High Pressure Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (147) Toyo Menka K. K. (Toyo Cotton Co. Ltd.)
- (148) Toyo Rayon K. K. (Toyo Rayon Co. Ltd.)
- (149) Yamashita Kisen K. K. (Yamashita Steamship Co. Ltd.)
- (150) Yasuda Ginko (Yasuda Bank)
- (151) Yasuda Hozonsha (Yasuda Central Co.)
- (152) Yasuda Shintaku K. K. (Yasuda Trust Co. Ltd.)

b. Outside Japan.

- (1) Anto Keikinzoku K. K. (Anto Light Metal Co. Ltd.)
- (2) Asahi Keikinzoku K. K. (Asahi Light Metal Co. Ltd.)
- (3) Banwa (Banwa Trading Co.)
- (4) Chintao Seitetsu K. K. (Chintao Steel Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (5) Chosen Chiaso Kayaku K. K. (Chosen Nitrate Powder Co. Ltd.)
- (6) Chosen Dengyo K. K. (Chosen Electrical Enterprise Co. Ltd.)
- (7) Chosen Denko K. K. (Chosen Electric and Engineering Co. Ltd.)
- (8) Chosen Jinzo Sekiyu K. K. (Chosen Synthetic Oil Co. Ltd.)
- (9) Chosen Kogyo Shinko K. K. (Chosen Mining Development Co. Ltd.)
- (10) Chosen Oryokuko Suiden K. K. (Chosen Oryokuko Hydroelectric Co. Ltd.)
- (11) Chosen Sekiyu K. K. (Chosen Oil Co. Ltd.)
- (12) Chosen Shinko Kinzoku K. K. (Chosen Shinko Metal Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (13) Chosen Sumitomo Keikinzoku K. K. (Chosen Sumitomo Light Metal Co. Ltd.)
- (14) Chuka Koku K. K. (Central China Aviation Co. Ltd.)
- (15) Chuka Rinsen K. K. (Chinese Ship Co. Ltd.)
- (16) Chuka Seitetsu K. K. (Central China Iron Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (17) Chuka Tabako K. K. (Central China Tobacco Co. Ltd.)
- (18) Daido Tanko K. K. (Daido Coal Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (19) Fushin Tanko K. K. (Fushin Coal Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (20) Hokuhyo Tanko K. K. (Hokuhyo Coal Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (21) Honkeiko Baitetsu K. K. (Honkeiko Coal and Iron Co. Ltd.)
- (22) Ishihara Sangyo K. K. (Ishihara Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (23) Kachu Denki Tsushin K. K. (Central China Telegram Co. Ltd.)
- (24) Kachu Suiden K. K. (Central China Water Works and Electricity Co. Ltd.)
- (25) Kachu Tetsudo K. K. (Central China Railways Co. Ltd.)
- (26) Kahoku Chiaso Kiryo K. K. (North China Nitrate Fertilizer Co. Ltd.)
- (27) Kahoku Dengyo K. K. (North China Electricity Co. Ltd.)
- (28) Kahoku Denshin Denwa K. K. (North China Telegraph and Telephone Co. Ltd.)
- (29) Kahoku Hatabako K. K. (North China Tobacco Leaf Co. Ltd.)
- (30) Kahoku Jidosha K. K. (North China Automobiles Co. Ltd.)
- (31) Kahoku Keikinzoku K. K. (North China Light Metal Co. Ltd.)
- (32) Kahoku Kotsu K. K. (North China Railways Co. Ltd.)
- (33) Kahoku Seni K. K. (North China Fiber Co. Ltd.)
- (34) Kahoku Toa Tabako K. K. (North China East Asia Tobacco Co. Ltd.)
- (35) Kako Shogyo Ginko (Kako Commercial Bank)
- (36) Kakuko Tanko (Kakuko Coal Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (37) Kanegafuchi Kodai Jitsugyo K. K. (Kanegafuchi Kodai Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (38) Karafuto Kogyo K. K. (Karafuto Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (39) Kinshu Pulp K. K. (Kinshu Pulp Co. Ltd.)

- (40) Kitashina Seitetsu K. K. (North China Iron Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (41) Kitsurin Jinzo Sekiyu K. K. (Kitsurin Synthetic Oil Co. Ltd.)
- (42) Kobayashi Kogyo K. K. (Kobayashi Mining Co. Ltd.)
- (43) Kokusai Unyu K. K. (International Transportation Co. Ltd.)
- (44) Kono Ginko (Agriculture Development Bank)
- (45) Manshu Dengyo K. K. (Manchurian Electrical Works Co. Ltd.)
- (46) Manshu Denki Kagaku Kogyo K. K. (Manchurian Electric Chemical Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (47) Manshu Denshin Denwa K. K. (Manchurian Telephone and Telegram Co. Ltd.)
- (48) Manshu Eiga Kyokai (Manchurian Cinema Association)
- (49) Manshu Enko K. K. (Manchurian Lead Mine Co. Ltd.)
- (50) Manshu Gosei Nenryo K. K. (Manchurian Synthetic Fuel Co. Ltd.)
- (51) Manshu Hikoki Seizo K. K. (Manchurian Aeroplane Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (52) Manshu Hitachi Seisakusho (Manchurian Hitachi Mfg. Works Ltd.)
- (53) Manshu Jidosha Seizo K. K. (Manchurian Automobile Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (54) Manshu Jinzo Sekiyu K. K. (Manchurian Synthetic Oil Co. Ltd.)
- (55) Manshu Keikinzoku K. K. (Manchurian Light Metals Co. Ltd.)
- (56) Manshu Kogyo Kaihatsu K. K. (Manchurian Mining Development Co. Ltd.)
- (57) Manshu Koku K. K. (Manchurian Aviation Co. Ltd.)
- (58) Manshu Kosho K. K. (Manchurian Arsenal Ltd.)
- (59) Manshu Kozan K. K. (Manchurian Mines Co. Ltd.)
- (60) Manshu Magnesium K. K. (Manchurian Magnesium Co. Ltd.)
- (61) Manshu Nochi Kaihatsu Kosha (Manchurian Agricultural Land Development Co.)
- (62) Manshu Oryokuko Suiryoku Hatsuden K. K. (Manchurian Oryokuko Hydroelectric Co. Ltd.)
- (63) Manshu Seitetsu K. K. (Manchurian Iron Mfg. Co. Ltd.)
- (64) Manshu Sekitan Ekika Kenkyusho (Manchurian Coal Liquefaction Research Institute)
- (65) Manshu Sekiyu K. K. (Manchurian Oil Co. Ltd.)
- (66) Manshu Sumitomo Kinzoku K. K. (Manchurian Sumitomo Metals Co. Ltd.)
- (67) Manshu Tanko K. K. (Manchurian Coal Mine Co. Ltd.)
- (68) Manshu Tokushu Tekko K. K. (Manchurian Special Iron-Ore Co. Ltd.)
- (69) Manshu Toshi Shoken K. K. (Manchurian Investment and Securities Co. Ltd.)
- (70) Manshu Toyo Boseki K. K. (Manchurian Toyo Spinning Co. Ltd.)
- (71) Mitsuzan Tanko K. K. (Mitsuzan Coal Mine Co. Ltd.)
- (72) Mogyo Dengyo K. K. (Mongolian Electricity Co. Ltd.)
- (73) Mogyo Denki Tsushin Setsubi K. K. (Mongolian Electric Communication Equipment Co. Ltd.)
- (74) Mozan Takko Kaihatsu K. K. (Mozan Iron Mine Development Co. Ltd.)
- (75) Naka Shina Gunpyo Kokanyo Busshi Haikyū Kumiai (Central China Distributing Association of Materials for Exchange with Military Notes)
- (76) Nichinan Shoji K. K. (Japan Manchurian Trading Co. Ltd.)
- (77) Nippon Koshuha Jyukogyo K. K. (Japan High Frequency Heavy Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (78) Okura Sangyo K. K. (Okura Industrial Co. Ltd.)
- (79) Ryuen Tekko K. K. (Ryuen Iron Mine Co. Ltd.)
- (80) Sansei Sangyo K. K. (Sansei Ind. Co. Ltd.)
- (81) Seian Tanko K. K. (Seian Coal Mine Co. Ltd.)
- (82) Showa Seikosho (Showa Steel Mfg. Works, Ltd.)

- (83) Showa Tsusho (Showa Trading Ltd.)
- (84) Taiwan Denryoku K. K. (Taiwan Electric Power Co. Ltd.)
- (85) Tohendo Kaihatsu K. K. (Tohendo Development Co. Ltd.)
- (86) Toyo Kaikinzoku K. K. (Toyo Light Metal Co. Ltd.)

Paragraph B.

1. National policy companies, Corporation (Eidan) Special Banks, etc.

- (1) Chuo Shokuryo Eidan (Central Food Corporation)
- (2) Hokkaido Takushoku Ginko (Hokkaido Colonial Bank)
- (3) Jyutaku Eidan (Housing Corporation)
- (4) Koeki Eidan (Trading Corporation)
- (5) Kokumin Kosei Kinko (National Rehabilitation Bank)
- (6) Kokusai Denki Tsushin K. K. (International Electric Communications Co. Ltd.)
- (7) Nippon Ginko (Bank of Japan)
- (8) Nippon Haasoden K. K. (Japan Electric Supply Co., Ltd.)
- (9) Nippon Hiryo K. K. (Japan Fertilizer Co. Ltd.)
- (10) Nippon Kangyo Ginko (Hypothec Bank of Japan)
- (11) Nippon Kogyo Ginko (Industrial Bank of Japan)
- (12) Nippon Sanshi Tosei K. K. (Japan Silk Control Co., Ltd.)
- (13) Nippon Sekitan K. K. (Japan Coal Co. Ltd.)
- (14) Nippon Shoken Torihikisho (Japan Securities Exchange)
- (15) Nippon Tsuun K. K. (Japan Transportation Co. Ltd.)
- (16) Nippon Yushutsu Nozanbutsu K. K. (Japan Export Agricultural Products Co. Ltd.)
- (17) Noshi Kaihatsu Eidan (Agricultural Land Development Corporation)
- (18) Norin Chuo Kinko (Central Bank for Agriculture and Forestry)
- (19) Onkyu Kinko (Pension Bank)
- (20) Sangyo Setsubi Eidan (Industrial Equipment Corporation)
- (21) Seimei Hoken Chuokai (Central Life Insurance Association)
- (22) Senpaku Unei Kai (Shippon Management Association)
- (23) Shoko Kumiai Chuo Kinko (Central Bank for Commercial and Industrial Association)
- (24) Shomin Kinko (People's Bank)
- (25) Songai Hoken Chuo Kai (Central Damage Insurance Association)
- (26) Teikoku Kogyo Kaihatsu K. K. (Imperial Mining Development Co. Ltd.)
- (27) Teikoku Nenryo Kogyo K. K. (Imperial Fuel Co. Ltd.)
- (28) Teikoku Sekiyu K. K. (Imperial Oil Co. Ltd.)
- (29) Teito Kosokudo Kotsu Eidan (Metropolis High Speed Transportation Corporation)
- (30) Tohoku Kogyo K. K. (Tohoku Development Co. Ltd.)
- (31) Any companies in which any of the following are the largest stockholders:
 - a. The Government, its subdivisions, agencies or branches
 - b. National policy companies or corporations (Eidan)
 - c. Special banks.

2. Organizations to be designated by the Temporary Demand and Supply Adjustment Law.

- (1) Aen Tetsuban Kyogikai (Galvanized Iron Plate Council)
- (2) Den Sen Kyogikai (Electric Wire Council)
- (3) Gomu Tosei Kumiai (Rubber Control Union)
- (4) Gyomo Menshi K. K. (Fishing Net Twine Co. Ltd.)
- (5) Jidosha Seizo Kogyo Kumiai (Automobile Manufacturing Industry Union)
- (6) Jitensha Seizo Kumiai (Bicycle Manufacturing Union)
- (7) Karbaido Seisan Kyogikai (Carbide Production Council)
- (8) Kami Oyobi Pulp Kogyo Bengokai (Paper and Pulp Industry Federation)

- (9) Keikinzoku Ju-kyu Chosei Kumiai (Light Metals Supply and Demand Adjustment Union)
- (10) Keikinzoku Kyogikai (Light Metals Council)
- (11) Kinu Jinken Orimonosho Kyokai (Silk and Staple Fibre Fabric Traders Council)
- (12) Menshi Sufuito Haikyu Tosei Kumiai (Cotton and Staple Fibre Yarn Distribution Control Union)
- (13) Nippon Aminosan K. K. (Japan Amino-Acid Co.)
- (14) Nippon Asaito Haikyu Tosei Kumiai (Japan Hemp Thread Distribution Control Union)
- (15) Nippon Asaorimono Haikyu Tosei Kumiai (Japan Linen and Hemp Cloth Distribution Control Union)
- (16) Nippon Bearing Kyokai (Japan Bearing Association)
- (17) Nippon Denki Kikai Seizo Kai (Japan Electrical Machinery Manufacturing Association)
- (18) Nippon Dankyu Kogyo Tosei Kumiai (Japan Electric Bulb Industry Control Union)
- (19) Nippon Garabo Tosei Kumiai (Japan Sundry Spun Thread Control Union)
- (20) Nippon Genpi Jyuzai K. K. (Japan Raw Hides Co. Ltd.)
- (21) Nippon Genyu Yuso K. K. (Japan Crude Oil Transportation Co. Ltd.)
- (22) Nippon Jinkenshi Tosei Kumiai (Japan Rayon Yarn Control Union)
- (23) Nippon Kanzume K. K. (Japan Canned Goods Co. Ltd.)
- (24) Nippon Kaya Tosei Kumiai (Japan Mosquito Net Control Union)
- (25) Nippon Keito Motouri Tosei Kumiai (Japan Woolen and Worsted Yarn Wholesale Control Union)
- (26) Nippon Kinuboshi Tosei Kumiai (Japan Spun Silk Yarn Control Union)
- (27) Nippon Kugi Harigane Kyogikai (Japan Nail and Wire Council)
- (28) Nippon Noki Gomu Haikyu Kaisha (Japan Agricultural Machinery Rubber Distribution Co.)
- (29) Nippon Nokigu Kogyo Tosei Kumiai (Japan Agricultural Implements Industry Control Union)
- (30) Nippon Sato K. K. (Japan Sugar Co. Ltd.)
- (31) Nippon Sekitan Kogyo Kai (Japan Coal-Mining Association)
- (32) Nippon Seniki Kogyo Rengokai (Japan Textile Machinery Industry Federation)
- (33) Nippon Shingu Seizo Tosei Kumiai (Japan Bedding Manufacturing Control Union)
- (34) Nippon Shubyo Haikyu Kumiai (Japan Seeds and Seeding Distribution Union)
- (35) Nippon Tekko Kyogikai (Japan Iron and Steel Council)
- (36) Nippon Taushin Kikai Kogyo Kai (Japan Communication Machinery Industry Association)
- (37) Noyaku K. K. (Farm Chemicals Co. Ltd.)
- (38) Ryu-sho San Seisan Kyogikai (Sulphuric and Nitric Acid Production Council)
- (39) Sangyo Kikai Kogyokai (Industrial Machinery Industry Association)
- (40) Sekiyu Seiseigyō Rengokai (Oil Refinery Federation)
- (41) Sekken Kogyo Tosei Kumiai (Soaps Industry Control Union)
- (42) Semento Kogyo Kai (Cement Industry Association)
- (43) Seni Kyokai (Textile Association)
- (44) Shindo Hin Kogyokai (Copper Plate Products Manufacturing Association)
- (45) Soda Kogyo Kai (Soda Industry Association)
- (46) Suisan Hikakugyo K. K. (Aquatic Hides Business Co. Ltd.)
- (47) Tar Seihin Kogyo Kai (Tar Products Industry Association)
- (48) Teikoku Mohi K. K. (Imperial Fur Co. Ltd.)
- (49) Teikoku Shintan K. K. (Imperial Fire Woods and Wood-Charcoal Co. Ltd.)
- (50) Teikoku Yuryo K. K. (Imperial Oil and Fat Co. Ltd.)
- (51) Toryo Hanbai K. K. (Paints Sale Co. Ltd.)

- (52) Zenkoku Itagarasu Haikyu K. K. (National Plate Glass Distribution Co. Ltd.)
- (53) Zenkoku Jidosha Bubunhin Kogyo Kumiai (National Automobiles Accessories Industry Union)
- (54) Zenkoku Kamisehin Seizo Tosei Kumiai (National Paper Products Manufacturing Control Union)
- (55) Zenkoku Kozan Kai (National Mining Association)
- (56) Zenkoku Miso K. K. (National "Miso" Co. Ltd.)
- (57) Zenkoku Seimen Tosei Kumiai (National Cotton Manufacturing Industry Control Union)
- (58) Zenkoku Seni Zappin Tosei Kumiai (National Sundry Fabric Manufacturing Control Union)
- (59) Zen Nippon Saisei Gomu Zairyo Tosei Kumiai (National Recovered Rubber Materials Control Union)
- (60) Zenkoku Shoyu K. K. (National Soy Co. Ltd.)
- (61) Any other organizations of the national level to be designated hereafter under the provisions of the Temporary Demand and Supply Adjustment Law.

3. Organizations established under special legislations, government-subsidized organizations, etc.

- (1) Bengoshi Kai (Lawyers' Society, including those of national and prefectural level, the term "prefecture" including here and hereafter To, Do, Fu and Ken.)
- (2) Chuo Baji Kai (Central Horse Affairs Society)
- (3) Chuo Shakai Jigyo Kai (Central Social Work Society)
- (4) Dai Nippon Ikuei Kai (Great Japan Education Association)
- (5) Dai Nippon Iryo Dan (Great Japan Medical Service)
- (6) Dai Nippon Keibo Kyokai (Great Japan Guarding Parties Association)
- (7) Dai Nippon Taiiku Kai (Great Japan Athletics Society)
- (8) Engyo Kumiai Chuo Kai (Central Association of Salt Industry Union)
- (9) Gyogyo Kai (Fishing Association, including all of local level, the term local including here and hereafter Shi, Machi and Mura)
- (10) Ido Eisha Renmei (Travelling Motion Pictures Projection League)
- (11) Ishi Kai (Doctor's Association, including those of national and prefectural level)
- (12) Jidosha Kaigisho (Automobiles Council)
- (13) Jiyu Shuppan Kyokai (Liberal Publisher's Association)
- (14) Karinsan Hiryo Seizo Kumiai (Super-phosphate Fertilizer Production Union)
- (15) Keimu Kyokai (Penitentiary Association)
- (16) Keizai Dantai Rengokai (Federation of Economic Organizations)
- (17) Nippon Denpun K. K. (Japan Starch Co. Ltd.)
- (18) Nippon Eiga Kyoiku Kyokai (Japan Motion Pictures Education Society)
- (19) Nippon Gakujiyutsu Shinko Kai (Japan Learning and Study Advancement Society)
- (20) Nippon Ido Engeki Renmei (Japan Travelling Drama Performance League)
- (21) Nippon Kaitaku Kyokai (Japan Colonization Association)
- (22) Nippon Kaiun Kyokai (Japan Navigation Association)
- (23) Nippon Kansho Bareisho K. K. (Japan Sweet Potatoes and Potatoes Co. Ltd.)
- (24) Nippon Koun Chuokai (Japan Central Harbour Transportation Society)
- (25) Nippon Seirakugyo Kumiai (Japan Dairy Union)
- (26) Nippon Seki Jyuji-sha (Japan Red Cross)
- (27) Nippon Shinbun Kyokai (Japan Newspapers Association)
- (28) Nippon Shinbun Renmei (Japan Newspapers Federation)
- (29) Nippon Shiryo K. K. (Japan Fodder Co. Ltd.)

- (30) Nippon Shuppan Kyokai (Japan Publishers' Association)
- (31) Nippon Sokogyo Chuokai (Japan Central Warehousing Society)
- (32) Nippon Tetsudo Kai (Japan Railways Society)
- (33) Nippon Zeimu Kyokai (Japan Taxation Affairs Association)
- (34) Nogiyokai (Agricultural Association, including those of national, prefectural and local level)
- (35) Ringyo Kai (Forestry Society, including those of national and prefectural level)
- (36) Ryuan Hiryo Seizogyo Kumiai (Sulfuric Ammonia Fertilizer Mfg. Industry Union)
- (37) Sanshigyokai (Sericultural Association, including those of national and prefectural level)
- (38) Seimei Hoken Kyokai (Life Insurance Association)
- (39) Sekkai Chiseo Hiryo Seizogyo Kumiai (Nitrate of Lime Fertilizer Mfg. Industry Union)
- (40) Shiho Hogo Kyokai (Ex-Offenders Protection Association)
- (41) Shakai Kyoiku Rengokai (Social Education Federation)
- (42) Shika Ishi Kai (Dentists Association, including those of national and prefectural level)
- (43) Shintaku Kyokai (Trust Companies Association)
- (44) Shoko Kaigisho (Chamber of Commerce and Industry including those of national, prefectural and local level)
- (45) Shoko Kumiai Chuokai (Central Association of Commerce and Industry Union)
- (46) Shokugyo Hodo Kyokai (Vacational Guidance Association)
- (47) Shuhan Kumiai Chuokai (Central Association of Liquor Sale Unions)
- (48) Shuzo Kumiai Chuokai (Central Association of 12 Brewers Union)
- (49) Songai Hoken Kyokai (Loss Insurance Association)
- (50) Suisan Gyo Kai (Aquatic Industry Association, including those of national and prefectural level)
- (51) Yakuzzaishi Kai (Pharmacists Association, including those of national and prefectural level)
- (52) Zenkoku Ginkogyo Kyokai Rengokai (National Federation of Banks Association)
- (53) Zen Nippon Homen Iin Renmei (All Japan District Committee League)
- (54) Zosen Rengokai (Shipbuilder's Federation)

4. Principal newspaper companies, publishing companies, etc.

- (1) Asahi Eiga-sha (Asahi Motion Picture Co.)
- (2) Asahi Shinbun-sha (Asahi Newspaper Co.)
- (3) Chubu Nippon Shinbun-sha (Central Japan Newspaper Co.)
- (4) Chuo Koron-sha (Central Critics Co.)
- (5) Dai Nippon Eiga K. K. (Great Japan Motion Picture Production Co. Ltd.)
- (6) Dai Nippon Yuben Kodan-sha (Great Japan Oration and Story Magazine Co.)
- (7) Fuzanbo (Fuzanbo Publishing Co. Ltd.)
- (8) Haku Bun Kan (Haku Bun Kan Co.)
- (9) Hokkaido Shinbun-sha (Hokkaido Newspaper Co.)
- (10) Iwanami Shoten (Iwanami Bookstore Co.)
- (11) Jiji Shinpo-sha (Jiji Daily News Co.)
- (12) Jiji Tsushin-sha (Jiji News Agency)
- (13) Jitsugyo No Nippon-sha (Business Japan Co.)
- (14) Kaizo-sha (Reform Co.)
- (15) Kenkyu-sha (Kenkyu Co.)
- (16) Kobundo (Kobundo Co.)
- (17) Kyodo Tsushin-sha (Kyodo News Agency)
- (18) Mainichi Shinbun-sha (Mainichi Newspaper Co.)
- (19) Maruzen Tosho K. K. (Maruzen Book Co. Ltd.)
- (21) Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
- (22) Nippon Hyoron-sha (Japan Commentary Co.)
- (23) Nippon Keizai Shinbun-sha (Japan Economic Newspaper Co.)

- (24) Nippon Times-sha (Japan Times Co.)
- (25) Nishi Nippon Shinbun-sha (Western Japan Newspaper Co.)
- (26) Obunsha (Western Literature Publishing Co.)
- (27) Osaka Shinbun-sha (Osaka Newspaper Co.)
- (28) Sanseido (Sanseido Co.)
- (29) Shincho-sha (Shincho Co.)
- (30) Shochiku K. K. (Shochiku Motion Picture Co.)
- (31) Shufu No Tomo-sha (House Wife's Companion Co.)
- (32) Toho K. K. (Toho Motion Picture Co.)
- (33) Tokyo Shinbun-sha (Tokyo Newspaper Co.)
- (34) Yomiuri Shinbun-sha (Yomiuri Newspaper Co.)

5. Political parties and their branches.

- (1) Gashi Boei Domei-Tokyo To (Starvation Defense Alliance-Tokyo)
- (2) Hokkaido Seiji Domei (Hokkaido Political Alliance)
- (3) Kyodo Minshu To (Co-operative Democrats Party)
- (4) Kyoiku Minshu To-Akita Ken (Educational Democrats Party-Akita Pref.)
- (5) Min Pon To-Osaka Shi (People Foundation Party-Osaka)
- (6) Miyagi Chiho To (Miyagi Local Party)
- (7) Nippon Jiyu To (Japan Liberals Party)
- (8) Nippon Kokumin To (Japan National Party)
- (9) Nippon Kyosan To (Japan Communists Party)
- (10) Nippon Minshu To-Ehime Ken (Japan Democrats Party-Ehime Pref.)
- (11) Nippon Seiron To-Tokyo To (Japan Righteous Argument Party-Tokyo)
- (12) Nippon Shakai To (Japan Socialists Party)
- (13) Nippon Shinpo To (Japan Progressives Party)
- (14) Nookhon To-Toyama Ken (Agricultural Foundation Party-Toyama Pref.)
- (15) Oita Ken Nookhon To-Oita Ken (Oita Prefecture Agricultural Foundation Party-Oita Pref.)
- (16) Saitama Kensei Shinko Kai-Saitama (Saitama Prefectural Administration Promotion Association)
- (17) Sanshu Nomin To-Aichi Ken (Sanshu Farmers Party-Aichi Pref.)
- (18) Seinen Minshu Shugi Domei-Yamaguchi Ken (Youth Democratic Alliance-Yamaguchi Pref.)
- (19) Shin Nihon Kensetsu Domei-Mie Ken (New Japan Construction Alliance-Mie Pref.)
- (20) Tohoku Nippon Kokumin To-Akita Ken (Northeastern Japanese Nationals Party-Akita Pref.)
- (21) Zennihon Shokuiki Doshi Kai-Osaka Shi (All Japan Business Fields' Comrades Association-Osaka)

Press Reaction

42. Press reaction again was favorable.

43. Mainichi declared that "until irresponsible militarism is eliminated in the world, a new order of peace, safety, and justice will not be realized. . . The power and influence of those who tricked the Japanese people into waging a war for the conquest of the world must be eradicated for all time to come.

"It is from our desire for the democratization and the peaceful reconstruction of Japan, more than from our feeling of being obligated faithfully to fulfill the Potsdam Declaration, that we hope for a speedy and fair application of the purge order.

"As a matter of fact, the Government has been as slow and negligent as usual in the execution of the Purge Directive since its issuance on 4 January. Needless to say, the goal for future Japan

is the construction of a cultural state, imbued with democracy and pacifism. To attain this objective, the replacement of the old systems by the new ones is being vigorously pushed in all fields of national activity. However, a mere renewal of systems does not assure a sudden change to democracy and pacifism. Of course, the renovation of structures and systems is important. But a change in the structure and system must be accompanied by a change in the personnel. Many of the leaders in the economic, financial and publishing circles have already retired voluntarily or involuntarily, but the clean-up of those circles has been incomplete. If the Government had acted more speedily, the democratization would have been far more advanced.

"It is a noteworthy feature of the new Purge that in most cases the final decision on removal will not be made until an individual examination of whether or not the person concerned was a militarist or an ultranationalist is conducted. When the qualification examination committees pass judgment on the eligibility of the listed organizations and companies, the examination committees are required to be as fair as possible in the individual examinations. The committees must be most cautious not to incur any criticism. If document examinations cannot clarify a matter, a statement of the person concerned must be taken so that the decision may be as fair as possible. Moreover, if a final decision is reached, the organization concerned must select a successor who is truly zealous for the reconstruction of a democratic Japan, since the successor must also pass a qualifications examination. This task is very important because the future of the economic, financial and publishing fields depends solely upon the quality of the new men. We hope that this Purge will become the occasion for a new start in the reconstruction of Japan."

44. Jiji Shimpō's approval was generally characteristic of press reaction:

"The sweeping purge of undesirable elements from economic circles, the press, and other public corporations has been announced by the Government. The present Purge, together with the previous one which was designed to screen political personnel, will change the picture in Japan completely. The present Purge is so sweeping that temporary confusion will occur due to the replacement of personnel. But it is anticipated that the Purge will rejuvenate Japanese society and will accelerate our national rehabilitation. We believe that the effects of the purge will be felt immediately."

LABOR AND POLITICS

Electrical Workers' Dispute

45. The electrical workers' dispute heightened the tension between labor and Government and between opposition political parties and the Government.

Although the Government itself had referred the dispute to the newly created Central Labor Relations Committee, on 6 November it announced its rejection of the Committee's compromise proposal. The Government's stand was explained by the Minister of Welfare who said the Committee had recommended a wage scale which would intensify inflation. He added that the rejection of the Committee's proposals should not be regarded as a repudiation of the Committee itself.

Reaction of Parties

46. The Government's decision immediately became a political issue. The Cabinet was at once bombarded with demands for Diet dissolution "to invite the verdict of public opinion."

47. The Social Democratic Party called upon the Cabinet to resign immediately, or dissolve the Diet "to make possible a fundamental solution of current labor trouble." The party statement declared that "the Government had no right to say that wage increases help to make inflation worse because it is the Government itself that is causing vicious inflation at the expense of the laboring class."

48. The Communist Party declared, "The Government is trying to maintain a low wage policy and a policy to protect the interests of capital. . . We demand the immediate resignation of the Yoshida Cabinet."

49. The Co-operative Democrats, although they disapproved of the wage increases recommended by the Central Labor Relations Committee, attacked the Government for its "lack of adequate policies."

50. Signs of strain between the Liberal Party and the Government were evident in a statement issued by a Liberal Party spokesman: "Our party does not support the statement of the Government in its entirety. . . We cannot judge this question lightly, and we prefer to decide our attitude after making careful studies."

51. Even one of the power company spokesmen joined in the general barrage of criticism with a statement expressing management's disapproval of the Government's action.

Press Reaction

52. Many newspapers thought the workers' demands were exorbitant and out of proportion to the general wage scale. Nippon Times commented on the political implications of the dispute as follows:

"So long as the Administration continues to adhere to the economic policies formulated by Finance Minister Tanzan Ishibashi and Economic Stabilization Administrator Keinosuke Zen, it will be imperative for it to carry out a drastic 'industrial rationalization'-- a program inevitably premised by mass unemployment. If, in the meantime, inflation aggravates, the masses will naturally give their support to labor's offensive. This attack will be sponsored by the Social Democrats and the Co-operative Democrats, and the Communists will have no reason to refuse to join in the move. Then, if the Japanese Federation of Labor joins hands with the NCIU together with other neutral labor unions, there will emerge a tremendous force-- virtually a popular front.

"Indications show that the peak of this movement will be reached around the year end, and this outcome will furnish a crisis for the Yoshida Government, or a golden opportunity to test its might.

"Cognizance of this situation has prompted the Administration to use every means to enlist the support of the Social Democrats. Recently, the Social Democratic Party demanded that the Diet be dissolved but it is doubtful whether it has full confidence in its power to assume the reins of government, for it has the big sore spot in its paucity of men capable enough to handle the delicate internal relations."

New Labor Moves

53. The National Congress of Industrial Unions and the National Federation of Labor strongly attacked the labor policy of the Government. The Federation demanded the Cabinet's resignation and dissolution of the Diet, charging that the Government lacked ability to cope with labor unrest and to speed up industrial reconstruction.

Government's Attitude

54. The Government's determination to resist this so-called offensive was disclosed by the Minister of Welfare at the prefectural governors' conference. He warned that the Government would deal resolutely with those who sponsor labor disputes in an effort to achieve political ends.

55. The Prime Minister, speaking at the same conference, lashed out bitterly against the coal miners' and electrical workers' unions, declaring that their strike maneuvers menaced not only Japan's reconstruction but the nation's existence. He declared that utilization of labor disputes to attain political objectives was contrary to the spirit of the union movement, and that labor leaders "should be aware of the natural limitations on the labor movement in the light of conditions facing the country today."

The Government's determination to adopt concrete measures to combat the labor "offensive" was further suggested by a press dispatch describing Government plans to introduce the Labor Dispute Restriction Bill during the extraordinary Diet session beginning on 25 November.

Communist Views

56. Communist party leader Sanzo Nosaka denied the Government charges concerning the political motivation of strikes, declaring that the allegations were a malicious invention of the Government. He pointed out that each dispute ended as soon as economic issues were settled. Subsequent press reports stated, however, that Communists were demanding that labor launch "general" strikes to overthrow the Yoshida Cabinet.

Social Democrats' Views

57. Tetsu Katayama, chairman of the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party, denounced "excessive militancy in the labor movement." Katayama asserted that the right to strike should be invoked only as a last resort.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Social Democrats' Attack on Cabinet

58. On 4 November the Social Democratic Party denounced the Government's six-point policy statement as a "political composition" and demanded the immediate dissolution of the Diet "in order to ask for the judgment of the people." The Party threatened to introduce a nonconfidence bill during the extraordinary Diet session.

49. This statement confirmed the Socialist Party's recently announced determination to become an all-out opposition party. Token opposition to the Government during the Ninetieth Diet session, which earned for it the designation "quasi-opposition party," was said by Party leaders to have been necessitated by the importance of nonpartisan deliberations on the Constitution and by the need for prompt action to cope with the food problem.

60. The first Social Democratic attack was followed by a denunciation of the Government's handling of the electrical dispute. Pointing to the "inconsistency" displayed by the Government in rejecting the award of its own arbitration body, the Party repeated its demand for the immediate resignation of the Cabinet "to make possible a fundamental solution of labor trouble."

Statement of Social Democratic Leader

61. Party policies were further clarified by Tetsu Katayama, chairman of the Social Democratic Party's executive committee, in an interview published by Yomiuri.

According to Katayama the Social Democrats will demand dissolution of the Diet to test the people's confidence in the Government, reject Government overtures to participate in a coalition Cabinet and discourage the development of labor disputes into political strife.

Katayama stressed the Party's conviction that Japan's present economic dilemma cannot be solved by the six-point administrative program of the Government. "It is high time," he said, "that we ask the people whether they prefer the old capitalistic policy of the Yoshida Cabinet or the socialistic policy of our Party."

To check inflation Katayama suggested the cancellation of a large share of government bonds now held by capitalists, whom he charged with aggravating inflation. In readjusting industry the interests of labor must be considered over those of capital and the participation of workers in industrial management increased, he said. Referring to the political aspects of recent strikes Katayama said, "We are not in favor of a political party directing labor disputes to satisfy its political ends."

Revival of Democratic League

62. Invitations were issued to a number of labor groups asking them to participate in conferences to revive the Democratic League for National Salvation. Despite strenuous protests from Social Democratic left-wingers no invitations were extended to unions believed to have Communist affiliations.

This proposed League had long been a subject of controversy in the Party. The left-wing faction wishes to make it a broad popular front movement in which all political groups participate, while the right wing vigorously insists on the exclusion of Communists and all extreme left-wingers. Victory of the right wing at the September party convention indicates that the League will probably be formed on the terms of the right wing. The goals which the latter propose for it are indicated by a statement of Tatsuo Morito, chairman of the League's preparatory committee:

"The aims of the League are the establishment of a socialistic regime and the rehabilitation of industry to solve the unemployment problem. Concrete programs of its activities are yet to be formulated but it can be said that the League will have to fight both the Government and the capitalists on the one hand and the pugnacious labor camp directed by the NCIU on the other hand."

Opposition of Other Parties

63. The Communists' attacks on the Cabinet were as vigorous as the Social Democrats', though less effective. Complete though unsolicited support was accorded all Social Democratic attacks upon the Yoshida regime. The Communists further advocated co-ordinated labor action and general strikes against the Yoshida Cabinet, which they characterized as "a warm nursery for fascists, reactionaries and monopolistic capitalists."

Industrial capitalists were invited to join the crusade with the assertion that the present Government injured all classes.

64. Communist strategy apparently will emphasize the labor and inflation problems, demanding nationalization of industry and "democratic" legislation for implementing the Constitution.

65. The New People's Party showed little activity. It was content to follow the lead of the Social Democrats. The Party's program calling for moral uplift and its politically inexperienced personnel drawn mostly from scholastic circles have so far had little effect on national politics.

66. Co-operative Democratic criticism of the Government was more restrained than that of the Social Democrats. The Party called for the formation of a national coalition Cabinet to tide over the economic crisis. Co-operative Democratic sources indicated their belief that some Government leaders had given this demand serious consideration. Prime Minister Yoshida was said to be noncommittal, but State Minister Kijuro Shidehara favored such a cabinet. The Social Democratic Party's price for co-operation in a national coalition government was said to be the assumption of all important economic posts in the Cabinet.

Government Parties

67. Liberals and Progressives resisted the pressure exerted by opposition parties and in general staunchly supported the Government in its refusal to dissolve the Diet.

The two parties were hard hit by the purge extensions. When top party leadership was affected by the original 4 January Directive Liberals and Progressives sought to bolster their strength by enlisting the support of government officials and political leaders in the prefectures, cities, towns and villages. A substantial proportion of these local bureaucrats and politicians were included within the terms of the expanded purge.

68. Political observers predicted that a shortage of candidates for local elections, occasioned by the purge extension, would stimulate Liberal-Progressive merger negotiations. Local chapters of the two parties were said to favor such a merger. National leaders, however, evinced a desire to "shop around." The Liberals were reported to have made overtures to the Social Democrats as well as the Co-operative Democrats.

69. In the Progressive Party such wayside negotiations have assumed some importance because there is a faction in the Party headed by Ken Inukai, chairman of the Party's Executive Committee, which has long advocated the infusion of young blood into the Party. This view was expressed by his comment on the purge extension: "This directive is a desirable step, because young members of local branches will have a golden opportunity to run in the coming elections in the place of the old members who have dominated local politics in the past."

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Conference of Prefectural Governors

70. On 30 October prefectural governors assembled in Tokyo for a two-day conference with representatives of the National Government. During the first day of the conference the governors participated in an informal conference with the Emperor. Local government administration and the requirements of economic rehabilitation were discussed.

The Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs urged the governors to adopt severe measures against participants who commit

illegal acts in labor disputes and public demonstrations. Prime Minister Yoshida, in an address to the conferees, emphasized the importance of the new Constitution and declared that impending reforms to effect regional administrative autonomy would establish the foundation for democratic government.

Decentralization

71. These reforms, which provide for the decentralization and democratization of local government, were explained by the Home Minister in the following statement:

"As to the state administration hereafter, the Government will perform its function such as drawing up of bills, etc., establishment of a nationwide standard, adjustment among all provincial organizations, and gathering and distributing information, and the rest will be, as far as possible, transferred to provincial autonomous bodies which directly reflect the will of local inhabitants. The revision of the provincial system is now in its first stage and its thoroughgoing reformation is left for the future.

"When the second revision of the regional system is accomplished, prefectural officials will become public officials (instead of representatives of the National Government). In order to achieve the democratization of provincial administration, reorganization of this bureaucratic system must be effected. These officials who are experienced and well-versed in provincial administration are requested to discharge their duties, heart and soul, believing that their positions will also be secured.

"As to the program for revision, the Provincial System Investigation Committee is now conducting an investigation. Following is the outline of the revision plan to which consideration must be given:

- "(1) Decentralization of authority shall be facilitated, and the state administration such as police, education, public health, finance, labor, etc., shall be transferred in so far as possible to provincial autonomous bodies.
- "(2) Democratization shall be further facilitated in the system and management of provincial autonomous agencies.
- "(3) A special system to suit the peculiarities of big cities shall be established.
- "(4) Cities, towns and villages shall be permitted independently to select their respective administrative systems.
- "(5) Strengthening of provincial assemblies, and enlargement of their authority as true self-determining organs of provincial inhabitants shall be sought.
- "(6) Provisions for the appointment and limitation of public officials shall be renewed and revised.
- "(7) Supervising powers of central offices shall be drastically revised.

"The draft revision of the police system shall be presented to the next ordinary session of the Diet along with the bill for revision of the provincial system.

"The application of the revised provincial system is based on the public election of heads and chiefs and the election of provincial assemblymen. As to control over elections by the police, constant attention shall be paid to control over movements before the fact. It is to be regretted that the evils of the so-called prefectural blocs seem to be spreading throughout the provincial administration at the present time when further decentralization of authority is sought. Those who are responsible for provincial administration are requested to pay special attention to this point."

Local Elections

72. Local elections were postponed until an estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 candidates could be screened under the terms of the expanded Purge and until all undesirable chief executives of municipalities and quasi-municipalities were removed from office.

Status of Large Cities

73. A plan outline prepared by the Local System Investigation Committee for granting "special city" status to Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama and Kobe was announced. The plan would remove these cities from prefectural jurisdiction, granting them local autonomy complete with police power. The wards of these cities, unlike those of Tokyo, would not be autonomous but would be preserved as administrative areas with their chiefs appointed by the mayor, subject to the approval of the city council.

THE DIET

Extraordinary Session

74. The Ninety-first Extraordinary Diet Session, organized on 25 November, was scheduled to last for 30 days.

75. Plans announced at the start of the session called for the introduction of five major and two minor bills. The major bills were:

- (1) Bill for the Election of Members of the House of Councillors, concerning the size of the House, the determination of electoral district, age requirements and election procedures.
- (2) Bill for the Diet Law, revising and liberalizing the old Diet Law and establishing the general principles governing the Diet. This bill is the only one of those scheduled for introduction which was drafted by a committee of the House of Representatives.
- (3) Bill for the Cabinet Law, relating to the composition and the function of the Cabinet and its agencies.
- (4) Bill for the Imperial House Law, revising the old Imperial House Law on succession to the Imperial Throne and on ascension, coronation, regency, and the Imperial Family.
- (5) Bill for the Imperial House Economy Law, providing for Diet approval of a budget to cover expenditures of the Imperial Court and of the Imperial Family.

The minor bills were:

- (1) Bill for Exceptions to the House Law, legalizing exceptions to Article 32 of the Diet Law, which provides that laws passed during one session must be promulgated before the opening of the next session. Since there will be a lapse of only one day between the present extraordinary session and the following regular session, it would be impossible for the Government to comply with this provision.
- (2) Bill for Exceptions to Article 12 of the Election Law of Members of the House of Representatives, correcting faults in the compilation of lists of voters for national elections.

Composition of Diet

76. On the opening day of the Diet session, party affiliations in the House of Representatives were as follows:

Liberals	148
Progressives	110
Social Democrats	97
Co-operative Democrats	45
New People's Party	32
Independents' Club	22
Communists	6
Independents	5
Vacancy	1

THE EMPEROR

Inspection Trip

77. On 17 and 18 November the Emperor toured Ibaraki Prefecture to inspect reconstruction work there.

Emperor's Popularity

78. Press reports published on 20 and 21 November claimed that the Emperor's popularity was greater than ever because he had helped to democratize the country. Cited as the greatest tribute was the ovation accorded him at the mass rally in the Imperial Palace grounds on Constitution Day. The reports also stated that the Emperor had won popularity because he had mingled freely with the people during recent prefectural visits.

STRUCTURAL AND PERSONNEL CHANGES

New Council

79. The Administrative Deliberation Council, an agency to plan and prepare for the improvement of administrative agencies of the Government, was established by Imperial Ordinance No. 490 on 28 November. The Council will function under the supervision of the Prime Minister.

SECTION 2

PUBLIC SAFETY AND INTELLIGENCE

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Law and Order	1
Public Casualties	11
Police	14
Prisons	18
Fire	24

LAW AND ORDER

1. Strikes and demonstrations by labor factions in late October and November remained generally orderly.

2. Ten persons were detained by the police during a Liberal Party convention at Kanazawa, Ishikawa Prefecture. Members of the National Congress of Industrial Unions, National Federation of Labor Unions and the Social Democratic Party attempted to interview Prime Minister Yoshida, who was attending the rally, to demand his resignation. When the interview was denied a disturbance followed resulting in the arrests.

3. At a mass rally of teachers and parents of pupils in Tokyo, a declaration was adopted wherein the teachers agreed to walk out simultaneously the moment a strike was ordered. This followed earlier demonstrations by teachers when six delegates were admitted to the Ministry of Education where they submitted a manifesto and resolution in the name of 400,000 teachers. Several other teachers' demonstrations were held, none of which were marked by disorder.

Black-market Activities

4. Black-market activities continued but black-market prices on foodstuffs and essential commodities in the Tokyo area declined as rationing of staple foods and other controlled goods became more certain and regular.

5. The police began a thorough inspection of incoming passengers at leading railway stations in an effort to halt the flow of goods illegally entering Tokyo. During the first two weeks of November more than 700 persons were arrested carrying unauthorized amounts of goods.

6. Occupation Forces agents arrested a Formosan who had offered an American officer a bribe of ¥ 2,000,000 to release from custody his brother, 25 tons of sugar and the vessel which had carried the sugar to Japan.

7. A black-market ring dealing in more than ¥ 3,000,000 worth of salt was broken in early November. Most of the operations, involving more than 300 persons, were carried out between March and August.

Delinquent Women

8. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Welfare

announced joint steps to be taken to implement more effectively the regulations enacted 21 January for the abolition of licensed prostitution.

Crime

9. The crime rate continued to increase with 173,776 offenses reported during September, a gain of 21,339 over August. See charts, pages 79 and 80.

10. The number of arrests has followed the trend of offenses reported. Arrests in September numbered 58,148, an increase of 1,771 over August.

PUBLIC CASUALTIES

Traffic Accidents

11. A daily average of seven persons were killed and 14 persons injured in rail traffic accidents during May through September. Two hundred sixty were killed and 703 injured by falling from trains and 43 were killed and 250 injured from striking objects while clinging to the sides of trains.

As a result of passenger congestion the number of persons who ride locomotives and couplings has increased. In an effort to reduce the resulting accident rate railway authorities decided on stringent restrictions on riding locomotives and couplings and any violations will be punished according to the Railway Business Law.

12. Eight persons were killed and 40 injured in a derailment accident near Shimomaki in Gumma Prefecture.

Crushed to Death in Crowd

13. Six worshippers were crushed to death and four injured in front of the Washi Shrine in Tokyo when a crowd of 300,000 pushed and jostled to participate in the Ninotori Fair of Yoshiwara.


POLICE

14. The Police System Investigation Commission, a National Government advisory body established to draft a reform plan to increase the efficiency of the nation's police affairs, proposed on 18 November that a Police Ministry be established. Under the plan, which is to be submitted to the next Diet session, the judicial and police administration would be unified, while direct police administration would be under the jurisdiction of the five largest cities and the respective prefectures.

15. A Juvenile Section was established in the Metropolitan Board on 20 November with a police superintendent as chief. Under him are two police inspectors, each heading a division. Other personnel include 11 assistant police inspectors, 23 police sergeants, 31 policemen and 14 policewomen.


16. Establishment of the Juvenile Section became necessary in view of the many cases of juvenile delinquency handled by the Metropolitan Police Board in recent months. See chart, page 81.

Reasons for the high juvenile delinquency rates are defective home education, low standard of school education, mistaken conception of the principles of freedom, the food and housing shortages, frequent visits to black markets, inadequate entertainment facilities, inflation, contact with confirmed delinquents and unwholesome motion pictures and magazines.





PREFECTURAL CRIME RATES


SEPTEMBER 1946 RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION PER ANNUM*



NOTE: THE SEPTEMBER NATIONAL CRIME RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION WAS 2852.



* POPULATION ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL CENSUS OF 26 APRIL 1946.
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS.
 NOVEMBER 1946 GHQ-SCAP NUMBER 3



17. In the 11 government reformatories now in operation, the number of regular juvenile inmates rose from 828 at the end of August to 857 at the end of September. The number of provisional inmates increased from 83 to 93 during the same period.

The term "provisional inmates" covers a variety of conditions under which certain persons are held in reformatories. It relates specifically to Article 73 of the Juvenile Act of the Criminal Code, which provides for the detention under supervision of certain offenders during the period of investigation prior to trial. Other special cases include "adults" just over the age limit of 18 years who still require the same treatment and attention given to "juveniles."

Inmates of these government reformatories are not to be confused with the inmates of juvenile prisons which house delinquents convicted of more serious offenses.

PRISONS

18. The Kanda Police Station completed in November marks another step in the overall program of improving conditions in Japan's outmoded jails and prisons. Cells are clean and airy in contrast with former dungeon-like cells.

19. Between 220 and 230 Koreans unsuccessfully attempted to escape from the Sakai branch of the Osaka detention house.

20. Eleven prison officials throughout Japan were honored for bravery in quelling mass rioting and preventing jail breaks. Three received the Medal of Merit, the highest award a prison warden can receive from the Ministry of Justice. The only other presentation of this award was in 1938.

21. On 30 September 29,021 persons were awaiting trial against 26,921 on 31 August.

PERSONS AWAITING TRIAL
30 September

	<u>In Prison</u>	<u>Free Un- der Bail</u>	<u>Free With- out Bail</u>	<u>Others a/</u>	<u>Total</u>
Courts of First Instance	14,513	2,297	495	7,971	25,276
Awaiting appeal hearings					
Courts of Appeal	100	186	10	3	299
District Courts	<u>748</u>	<u>2,194</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>460</u>	<u>3,446</u>
Total	848	2,380	54	463	3,745
Grand total	15,361	4,677	549	8,434	29,021

a/ Includes those ill in hospitals outside prisons, or individuals charged with an offense who have never been confined or detained during the case.

Imperial Rescript

22. The recent Imperial Amnesty Rescript granting amnesty to 331,400 persons in commemoration of the promulgation of the new Constitution included general pardons, special amnesty, commutation and rehabilitation.

General pardons were granted for the following crimes: lese-majeste, inciting rebellion, mutiny, malversation, insubordination, insult and crimes as prescribed in the Army and Navy Criminal Code; various political crimes concerning thought, speech and military crimes not provided for in the military codes; and economic crimes such as violations of the National Mobilization Law.

Special amnesty was of two kinds, suspending of sentences and nullifying verdicts. Special amnesty is applicable to convicts who are excluded from a general pardon or cannot be pardoned completely owing to other crimes.

23. The following number of persons were affected by the Imperial Rescript:

	<u>In Prison</u>	<u>Not in Prison</u>	<u>Total</u>
General pardon	500	93,400	93,900
Special amnesty suspending the carrying out of sentence	100	15,700	15,800
Commutation by virtue of Imperial Rescript	39,000	11,100	50,100
Special commutation	600	200	800
Restoration of Civil Rights (general)		117,000	117,000
Restoration of Civil Rights (individual cases)		<u>53,800</u>	<u>53,800</u>
Total	40,200	291,200	331,400


FIRE

24. Among the draft plans worked out by the Police System Investigation Commission at its first departmental meeting was one calling for the transfer of the fire-fighting administration from the Government to civilian organizations in provincial areas and for the separation of the fire-fighting administration from the

police system. This proposal is to be presented to the next session of the Diet.

25. Fire prevention training for the Tokyo Metropolitan Fire Brigade began on 20 November to last for one month under the guidance of the Metropolitan Police Board.

26. Eighteen persons were killed and 95 injured in 920 fires during September. Fire losses totalled ¥ 168,074,773, an increase of almost ¥ 60,000,000 over August losses. In Tokyo Prefecture losses jumped from ¥ 6,860,578 in August to ¥ 12,854,326 in September. Kanagawa Prefecture losses rose from ¥ 1,434,650 to ¥ 14,405,870 and Fukushima Prefecture suffered the heaviest losses of ¥ 19,311,404 in September against only ¥ 631,120 in August.



27. Almost 50 percent of the fires were caused by sparks, hot ashes, embers, overheating chimneys and similar causes, 14 percent from electrical causes, eight percent from careless smoking and the rest from other causes.

SECTION 3
LEGAL AND WAR CRIMES

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Legal Affairs.	1
Japanese Judicial Administration	6
Military Occupation Courts	9
Investigation of Suspected War Criminals	12
Apprehension of Suspected War Criminals.	20
Prosecution of War Criminals	25
International Prosecution of War Criminals	35

LEGAL AFFAIRS

Japanese Labor Law

1. On the problem of whether the Japanese law should contain explicit guidance as to what is a "strike" or whether the interpretation of the word "strike" should be left to the Japanese courts, SCAP advised that the interpretation of the word should be left to the Japanese courts since, under the new Constitution, the Japanese judiciary had assumed an independent role in the Japanese Government and consequently it would be in keeping with the provisions of the organic act.

Education

2. SCAP advised the Japanese Government that the United States' Fulbright Law, which provides for the international exchange of teachers and students, would not apply between the United States and Japan and that bringing American students and teachers to Japan would be a matter of decision for the Occupation authorities.

Bar Associations Convention

3. On 10 November the Federation of the Bar Associations of All Japan, Tokyo Bar Association and attorneys representing various bar associations throughout Japan held a special convention to enlighten all lawyers on the fundamental principles of liberty and democracy contained in the new Constitution.

Revision of Lawyers' Law

4. Officials of the Ministry of Justice decided to revise the lawyers' law. The revised law will aim at protection of human rights, maintenance of social justice and clarification of the mission of lawyers. At the same time it will require higher standards in qualifications for lawyers.

Local lawyers' associations will be left in their present condition except that the existence of three lawyers' associations in Tokyo will not be allowed as each local district is to have only one organization.

The creation of the Japan Lawyers' Association as the federation of local associations will be legally recognized and to it will be transferred the business of keeping the list of all lawyers.

Civil Claims Against United Nations' Nationals

5. Japanese courts were divested of all jurisdiction in civil claims against United Nations' nationals or organizations including corporations attached to or accompanying the Allied Armed Forces by a directive issued on 30 October.

Japanese courts will retain jurisdiction in civil cases affecting other United Nations' nationals, subject to review by SCAP.

JAPANESE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

6. On 3 November the Emperor issued an Imperial Rescript which provided for:

- (1) General amnesty with automatic nullification of verdicts.
- (2) Special amnesty on individual application nullifying verdicts.
- (3) General commutation of sentences.
- (4) Special commutation.
- (5) General rehabilitation.
- (6) Special rehabilitation.

7. One of the persons released by the amnesty was Matsutaro Matsushima, sentenced on 2 November to eight months at hard labor for having libelled the Emperor in the "Placard Incident" during the Food May Day celebration.

Matsushima had been charged with lese-majeste, which was disregarded, and was then tried for libel, of which he was found guilty.

Japanese Supreme Court

8. The newly added importance of the Supreme Court under Article 81 of the new Constitution which stipulates that "the Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act" lent special significance to a statement made on 12 November by Choryo Hosono, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in an effort to clarify the relationship of the Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice and to the Government.

Insisting that contrary to the wishes of the Ministry of Justice, personnel matters and the budget of the new Supreme Court must be the responsibility of the Chief Justice, he declared:

"The present courts in this country, established under the Meiji Constitution, have no independence. The Justice Minister, who is an administrative official, is empowered to direct and supervise the courts, procurators' offices and the Ministry of Justice.

"The Justice Minister has the right to appoint, dismiss

and transfer the judges. The courts have no authority over their own budgets.

"Under such circumstances, it is impossible to expect complete independence of the judicial power. Naturally, there has been some friction between the courts and the Ministry of Justice."


MILITARY OCCUPATION COURTS

9. Five Japanese were sentenced to hard labor on 13 November by a provost court in Sendai for stealing building materials valued at \$ 1,402 and for having illegal possession of four U. S. Army sweaters.

A similar case involving three Japanese and two Koreans was tried in Kyoto on 8 November. The Koreans were charged with obtaining goods and money while impersonating U. S. Army personnel and the Japanese were prosecuted for illegal possession of American goods.

10. Five Allied merchant seamen, three Americans, an Australian and a Canadian, were apprehended when they tried to sell a large amount of Occupation Forces property to Japanese at Enoshima. The three Americans were court-martialed on 16 November and the other two were turned over to British Commonwealth authorities.

11. From 21 September to 20 October there were 1,183 cases tried in British Commonwealth Occupation Forces and EIGHTH Army military occupation courts, a decrease of 412 cases from the preceding month.



INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

Japan

12. Numerous investigations were completed between 25 October and 24 November. Cases now in investigation files are classified as follows:

ATROCITY INVESTIGATIONS

	Cases on Hand <u>25 Oct</u>	Cases Received <u>25 Oct-24 Nov</u>	Cases Completed <u>25 Oct-24 Nov</u>	Cases on Hand <u>24 Nov</u>
POW camp conditions	7	4	-	11
POW camp atrocities	86	14	4	96
B-29 flyers	258	4	8	254
POW ship	50	4	2	52
Kempei-tai (Military Police)	21	1	-	22
Miscellaneous	<u>262</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>352</u>
Total	684	138	35	787

Australian Division

13. The Australian division interrogated 22 Japanese who had been called to Tokyo from various parts of Japan.

14. One investigation concerning the fate of two young Chinese children who disappeared in New Guinea in 1942 led to the revealing of a previously unsuspected atrocity.

It was discovered that the two children, together with 70 civilians, some of whom were missionaries, were brutally massacred in March 1943 on a Japanese destroyer. A platform was erected projecting beyond the deck of the ship and the civilians were forced to move singly or in pairs to the end of the platform where they were machine-gunned and their bodies permitted to fall into the sea. A sworn statement was obtained from a former naval lieutenant on the destroyer.

15. The investigation of the two Chinese children also disclosed the names of the perpetrators of the beheading of an Australian prisoner of war in New Guinea. The Japanese officer who ordered the execution and the digging of the grave made a sworn confession describing the details of the atrocity.

16. Another investigation exposed a false admission of guilt by a former Japanese lieutenant commander who, knowing that he would receive the death sentence for murder of an Australian civilian, sought to protect four other Japanese by taking responsibilities for the murder of four other Australians.

British Division

17. Thirty interrogations were conducted by the British division and 15 important statements were obtained.

Two new cases were uncovered, one concerning the execution of 22 prisoners of war at Singapore and the other a series of atrocities committed on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.

Chinese Division

18. Seven Chinese nationals who were formerly prisoners of war in Japan were interrogated.

The Philippines

19. From 21 October to 20 November several minor investigations were made in the Philippines on cases presently on trial and cases being prepared for trial. Three hundred fifty-eight cases have been investigated and forwarded to the prosecution division for preparation for trial.

APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

20. During the period 25 October-24 November nine memorandums were issued directing the Japanese Government to apprehend and deliver to Sugamo Prison 223 persons wanted for alleged war crimes activities.

21. Four memorandums were issued notifying the Japanese Government of the change in status of 33 persons whose names had appeared on previous orders for apprehension.

22. There are now 793 persons interned in Sugamo Prison.

23. The apprehension of the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army at New Guinea was requested by Australian authorities.

24. The British division requested the arrest of 41 suspected war criminals including a vice-admiral for the execution of 22 American and English airmen and two major generals for atrocities in the South East Asia command.

PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

Japan

25. One hundred five persons have been tried at the war crimes trials in Japan to date. Of these 101 were found guilty, 11 receiving the death sentence and 90 being sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment, and four were found not guilty.

26. Six trials were completed in Japan involving 13 defendants. Results of these trials follow:

TRIAL OF WAR ATROCITY CASES

Japan

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
KANEKO, Takio	Camp Commander	Capt	5 Sep- 14 Nov	28 years at hard labor
UCHIDA, Toshiharu	Senior NCO	Sgt		15 years at hard labor

KONDO, Kenichi	Medical Orderly	S/Pvt	1 Aug- 1 Nov	12 years at hard labor

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
NAKASAI, Matsujiro	Guard	Civ	1 Nov- 8 Nov	20 years at hard labor
GUNJI, Takenosuke	NCO	Sgt Maj	1 Nov- 4 Nov	3 years at hard labor
FUJII, Sannojo	Foreman	Civ	8 Nov- 13 Nov	5 years at hard labor
NICHIZAWA, Masao	Camp Commander	Lt	12 Aug- 1 Nov	Death by hanging
CHIZUWA, Takeichi	Camp Commander	Lt		Death by hanging
KAWAMURA, Hiroshi	Interpreter	Pfc		Death by hanging
KAMBE, Hatsuaki	Guard	Civ		Life imprisonment
SHISHIDO, Shonosuke	Guard	Civ		30 years at hard labor
IKEDA, Sukenobu	Employee	Civ		25 years at hard labor
YAMADA, Yoshitami	Camp Commander	Sgt		15 years at hard labor

27. Charges and specifications were of the same nature as those which marked previous trials, involving unlawful killings, mistreating prisoners of war, misappropriating Red Cross supplies, administering collective punishment for individual offenses, forcing sick prisoners to perform arduous manual labor and command responsibility for permitting persons to carry out atrocities under a specific command.

The Philippines

28. The following is a summary of the results of the war crimes trials in the Philippines from the first trial through 20 November.

Persons tried	150
Convicted	144
Death sentences	74

29. Four trials were completed in the Philippines during the month. Results of these trials follow:

TRIAL OF WAR ATROCITY CASES The Philippines

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
OHSUGI, Morikazu	Base Commander	Vice- Adm	1 Oct- 31 Oct	Life imprisonment

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trial</u>
NANJO, Masao	Member of Jap Gar	Lt	7 Oct- 14 Nov	Death by hanging

WATANABE, Tadashi	Company Commander	Lt	23 Oct- 26 Oct	15 years imprisonment

KAWAMORI, Shuji	Company Commander	Lt	4 Nov- 14 Nov	Life imprisonment

Trial of Ohsugi

30. Ohsugi, a former vice-admiral in command of the 23rd Special Naval Base in the Celebes, NEI, was charged with command responsibility for the willful and unlawful death of 13 unidentified American airmen.

Trial of Nanjo

31. Nanjo was alleged to have personal participation in the killing of 12 Filipino civilians and command responsibility for the death of another.

Trials of Watanabe and Kawamori

32. Lieutenants Watanabe and Kawamori were charged with command responsibility for permitting members of their commands to mistreat, abuse, torture and kill civilians in Negros Occidental Province.

Australian War Crimes Trials

33. The Japanese Government was notified of the results of war crimes trials as reported by Australian authorities at Rabaul. Sixty-eight persons were tried. Of these 33 were sentenced to death, 23 were sentenced to varying prison terms and 12 were acquitted.

Notification of Death

34. The Japanese Government was notified of the execution of 40 persons, 27 at Rabaul, eight at Singapore and Alor Star (Malaya), and five in Japan.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

	Paragraph
Synopsis of Tribunal Proceedings.	35
Tenth Phase of Prosecution.	37
Eleventh Phase of Prosecution	57

SYNOPSIS OF TRIEBUNAL PROCEEDINGS

35. The prosecution on 1 November completed the tenth phase of its case bearing on general preparations for war.

On 4 November the prosecution opened the eleventh phase

of its case, on relations between the United States and Great Britain and between these two countries and Japan, and closed it on 26 November.

Regular court sessions were conducted on 1, 4-8, 12-15, 18-22 and 25-29 November.

Prosecution Completes "Substance of Case"

36. The closing on 26 November of the eleventh phase of the prosecution's case, United States-British-Japanese relations, including the Pearl Harbor attack, completed the presentation of the substance of its case against the 27 major war criminals on trial, the Chief of Counsel announced.

Supplementary evidence to be presented pertains to the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies and war crimes and mistreatment of prisoners of war in other occupied areas.

TENTH PHASE OF PROSECUTION

37. The tenth phase of the prosecution's case, general preparations for war, was presented in four parts: industrial preparations, general military preparations, illegal fortifications of Japan's Mandated Islands and general naval preparations.

On 29 October testimony on industrial preparations was completed and evidence on general military preparations was introduced.

Documentary Evidence: Military Preparations

38. A series of laws and amendments was enacted from 1939 to 1941 in order to mobilize national resources of personnel and materials, extend conscription and protect military secrets.

Articles from the Japan Advertiser of 19 and 20 May 1938 explaining the National General Mobilization Law of Japan were presented to the Court on 29 October, excerpts from which follow:

"The Manchurian and China incidents have made great changes in the condition of national defense. The line of defense has been shifted several hundred miles from the national boundary and extended to Central China, a distance of more than 1,000 miles. It is extremely important to expand and strengthen all national power to hold this line of defense. . . to establish permanent peace in the Orient in co-operation with Manchukuo and China. Success or failure depends upon the determination of the Japanese and Japan must, for many years, make serious efforts to perfect and strengthen her national defense and the Mobilization Law is intended to do this. By national general mobilization Japan aims to control and operate all personnel and material resources to the fullest extent to be able to demonstrate national power most effectively.

"Training of young men as a labor potential for certain trades, . . . establishment of a wartime tax system and a policy of floating bonds to prevent inflation. . . and acquisition of vast quantities of necessary materials to supply the Army and Navy were named as elements of the mobilization program.

"All efforts must be made to mobilize educational institutions and propaganda organs to intensify the fighting spirit of the people to endure any amount of hardship and difficulty.

"Mobilization of the scientific elements of national

strength is another item in the scheme. The Government will arrange to enable scientists to raise their efficiency to the highest possible point. To facilitate this the Government will secretly collect all kinds of information at home and abroad as part of the mobilization of information, propaganda and guard service."

39. On 8 March 1939 Japan's military service law was amended, as shown by an excerpt from the Japan Year Book 1941-1942 submitted on 29 October, to provide conscription of ex-service men, postpone conscription for students, abrogate the short-term service system and recognize the privilege of postponement of conscription for Japanese students in Manchukuo Government schools.

40. A domestic population of 100,000,000 by 1960 was one of the objectives of a population policy agreed upon by the Cabinet on 22 January 1941, it is shown by an outline of the policy submitted on 29 October. This policy was established partially to implement the creation of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. A separate provision for overseas population was included in the initial outline.

"It is the aim," the outline stated, "to maintain a continual development of population to surpass other countries in respective power and quality; to ensure a supply of military and labor forces required for defense; and to effect a proper distribution (of population) to secure Japan's leadership."

41. On 1 April 1941 the military service law was further revised to merge first reserve army men and second reserve men into one reserve service. This revision also allowed young men to be enrolled in armies or garrisons stationed in regions other than Japan proper without regard to census registration.

Witness for the Tenth Phase

42. The witness presented by the prosecution in the tenth phase was:

Kazuo Horiba: A civilian employee of the Japanese Army assigned to the Total War Research Institute.

Testimony of Horiba

43. The Kampo (Official Gazette) for October 1940 contained the ordinance authorizing the organization of the Total War Research Institute.

The function of the Institute, as indicated by the testimony of the witness, was to bring together a group of selected students about 32 years old, both from Government and private business, to study total warfare.

Lectures supplemented by table-top maneuvers, critiques and discussions comprised the instruction. Lecturers were mainly professional men from the universities, the services, business and the Government.

Close liaison with the Cabinet's activities and overall planning by the Army and Navy was maintained.

Lieutenant General Iimura was director of the Institute from January to October 1941. Formerly Chief of Staff of the Kwangtung Army, he commanded the Fifth Army in Manchuria upon leaving the Institute.

Documentary Evidence Continued: Military Preparations

44. Record of the "First Table-top Maneuvers, August 1941," submitted on 30 October, pointed out that "according to the plan the object of the maneuver was to let the postgraduates practice different measures for total warfare and to make fundamental and thorough research on it as superior objectives. The principal items to be studied and practiced are national policy and the object which should be propagandized, strategies for total warfare to be adopted, points in drafting parts of the various plans necessary for executing scientific, economic and diplomatic warfare against a specific country, directing organs for total warfare in all phases and other matters necessary for executing total warfare by Japan."

45. Additional records of the maneuvers in August 1941, presented on 30 October, show that the following proposal on foreign policy was to be presented at the Cabinet meeting:

"Keeping its intention secret, Japan will carry out a surprise advance against Netherlands East Indies in the middle of October. . . Japan will try to keep her intention of opening war against the United States and Britain secret by means of a diplomatic policy and try to seize an advantageous situation at the outbreak."

46. "A military administration for occupied areas was to be temporarily set up," it was decided in the Liaison Conference of 20 November 1941, as reported in a document entitled "Details of the Execution of Administration in the Southern Occupied Areas," submitted on 30 October. This occupational force was to restore public peace and order, acquire vital resources, and maintain the self-sufficiency of operational forces.

"In the military administration, existing organs will be used as much as possible, and all social and racial customs will be respected. . . United States, British and Dutch nationals will be ordered to co-operate with Japan's military. . . The military administration will be gradually taken over by a new organization to be set up by the Government."

Documentary Evidence: Illegal Fortifications

47. On 17 December 1920 Japan was granted a mandate to administer the Mandated Islands, which numbered over 1,400 with an area of 2,149 square kilometers and included the Mariana, Marshall and Caroline groups. Provisions of the mandate, which are a part of the treaty of 11 February 1922 between the United States and Japan, stipulated that no military or naval bases or fortifications would be erected in this island-territory. This stipulation was disregarded by Japan, as is shown in the following depositions, presented on 31 October:

Elias Sablan, born on Saipan, declared that construction of Aslito Air Field began on Saipan in 1935. The Japanese brought in 10-inch guns in 1937 and started to set them up in 1939 and 1940.

Mariano Pengelinan, Saipan, worked under the Japanese as a labor foreman. He saw the beginning of construction of Aslito Air Field and observed the building of ammunition dumps, military barracks and other installations.

Vincente de Leon Guerrero, native of Saipan, in 1937 began work as a foreman over 30 natives in the building of the

underground tank at Tanapag Harbor. There were four big tanks and two small ones. Each big tank was approximately 1,800 feet round and 50 feet deep. The workmen were told that a war might occur in the near future and these installations must be completed before it was too late. The tanks, when completed, were to be filled with oil and gas for the ships that were to come from Japan. They were told to keep this secret under duress of punishment.

Alfred Milo, assistant chief of Moon Island, said that during 1938 the Japanese started building a lighthouse. When this was completed, the Japanese began to build caves, gun emplacements and a searchlight platform. Six gun emplacements were built for guns of 8- or 9-inch bore, all placed in the vicinity of the lighthouse. In November 1939 the Japanese installed radar in concrete emplacements and built emplacements for 5- or 6-inch guns, as well as for anti-aircraft guns. Two caves were dug in a mountain and ammunition stored there. In 1940 the area became a prohibited one. In 1939 a radio station was built on the eastern end, and in 1940 the Japanese began building an air strip on the northwest tip.

Documentary Evidence: Naval Preparations

48. Based on a national defense policy formed in 1923, Japan sought agreement of other major naval powers for a ratio of 70 percent in total tonnage, 70 percent in cruisers with eight-inch guns and present strength in submarines.

49. At the Washington Conference Japan failed to accomplish her demand of 70 percent in capital ships, receiving 60 percent; and at the Geneva Conference was given 60 percent in auxiliary ships. At the London Naval Treaty Conference of 1 October 1930 Japan succeeded in obtaining a ratio of 70 percent in total tonnage, according to the record of a Privy Council meeting for imperial ratification of the Treaty.

50. Ambassador Grew in a communication of 15 September 1933 to Secretary of State Hull reported the rising bitterness and contempt among Japanese naval leaders subsequent to the London Treaty:

"Two premiers were assassinated and other statesmen fear for their lives because of the bitter feeling. Three admirals have been retired because of their support of the Treaty and Admiral Taniguchi's retirement has put an end to the naval influence in favor of maintaining the present treaty. His retirement took place during the May 15 trials which have stirred up a great ardor against the treaty. The result has been the creation of a great antipathy against arms limitation and the demand. . . for revision of the present naval ratios.

"Vice Admiral Takahashi told the American Assistant Naval Attache that they were going to the conference in 1935 with a demand for parity and would return home if the demand was refused. His hope vanished as America began to build toward treaty limits and by 1936 they realize the situation will be like that of 1927."

51. On 19 December 1934 Grew sent a telegram to Hull stating that the Privy Council had unanimously approved the decision to abrogate the Washington Naval Treaty. . . . On 29 December 1934 Ambassador Saito notified Hull that if Japan abrogated the Washington Naval Armaments Agreement the same would cease to be enforced after 31 December 1936.

52. When Japan indicated that her navy would not adhere to the Naval Treaty signed on 25 March 1936 by the United States,

France and Britain, the United States Navy inquired through diplomatic channels whether Japan would limit her guns on capital ships to 14 inches. Japan's reply was that she would not accept the 14-inch gun limitation. An English editorial stated that the first step in the new naval race would be the adoption of the 16-inch gun.

53. A document entitled "Ships in the Japanese Navy, Battleships," shows that in February 1938, when the United States was trying to get Japan to confirm the report that she was not conforming to the Treaty of 1936, the battleship Yamato was being built, and the battleship Musashi was soon to be built. Each of the ships had a displacement of 65,000 tons and main batteries of nine 18-inch guns.

54. Presented on 1 November, a chart entitled "List of Total Increase in Imperial Japanese Navy Personnel from 31 December 1934 to 15 August 1945" shows that total navy personnel in 1934 was 95,009, 133,747 in 1937 and 311,359 in 1941

From a chart titled "Major Combat Vessels of Japan 1931-1945," presented on 1 November, it is shown that in 1931 the total Japanese war vessels under construction was 21, with a tonnage of 85,773 tons; in 1941 there were 53 being built totaling 234,592 tons.

55. The document "Japan's Decision to Fight," submitted on 1 November, showed that during August 1941 a large number of war games were held by the Japanese Navy. The final war game was held at the Naval War College in Tokyo, participated in by a large number of top ranking naval officers

There were two problems, an air strike at Pearl Harbor and the establishment of a schedule of operations for the occupation of Malaya, Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, the Solomons and the Central Pacific islands including Hawaii. By 1 November the final text of Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 had been agreed upon and printed. The order, with its annexes, detailed the plans and schedules for attacks upon Pearl Harbor and other British, United States and Dutch possessions.

56. To overthrow quickly the United States, British, and Dutch bases in the Far East, establish Japan's self-sufficiency, and at the same time hasten the surrender of China was the plan enunciated on 11 November 1941 by the Liaison Conference.

"To do this Japan will carry out a swift war, overthrowing the United States, British and Dutch bases in East Asia and in the Southwest Pacific, insuring for herself a strategically dominant position. She will acquire areas of vital natural resources and principal communications, thereby facilitating self-sufficiency for a long time. Every effort will be made to lure out the main naval force of the United States and destroy it."

ELEVENTH PHASE OF PROSECUTION

57. This phase of the prosecution's case, on relations between Great Britain and the United States and between the United States, Great Britain and Japan, was introduced on 4 November. The prosecution's opening statement enumerated and explained obligations of treaties to which the United States, Great Britain, and Japan were co-signatories.

58. The essential obligations of Japan and other contracting powers with respect to China were contained in the Nine Power Treaty of 6 February 1922.

The prosecution's opening statement pointed out that "the four cardinal points in Article I of the Nine Power Treaty were but declaratory of the foreign policy of the United States not only toward China but toward all nations. From the date of the Treaty, which is without time limitations, the other powers had a right to assume that these provisions constituted the foreign policy of Japan toward China and that Japan in simple terms was committed:

- "(1) To respect the sovereignty of China.
- "(2) To permit China to settle her internal problems without interference.
- "(3) To promote equality of commercial opportunity in China.
- "(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek special privileges.

"Until September 1931, Japanese pledges were reasonably observed," the statement comments. "After September 1931 pronouncement of Japanese foreign policy became more and more irrecconcilable with the commitments of the Nine Power Treaty."

Documentary Evidence

59. The deep concern of Secretary of State Stimson in the turn of affairs in Manchuria when the last remaining authority in the Government of China in South Manchuria as it existed prior to 18 April 1931 was destroyed is revealed in numerous telegrams to American diplomats in China and Japan.

Secretary Stimson supported the League of Nations in its efforts to persuade Japan to withdraw her troops into the railway zone but he also notified China and Japan on 7 January 1932 that the United States would not recognize any de facto situation in Manchuria which would impair treaty rights of the United States.

60. A telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State Hull 25 April 1934 stated that the Foreign Office statement by Eiji Amau which claimed special responsibilities for Japan in Asia has been given out without Foreign Minister Koki Hirota's knowledge or approval. Japan's policy, Hirota reaffirmed, was to completely observe and support the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty.

61. In a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on 19 May 1934, Hull remarked that he would be frank to say that there was a great deal of inquiry as to why Japan had set up a clause or formula about superior and special interests in East Asia and that many were wondering whether this formula had ulterior implications partaking of a nature of an overlordship of the Orient or the purpose of getting a preferential trade right in the Orient or Eastern Asia. The Ambassador stated that was not the meaning intended.

62. Ambassador Grew in an oral statement to Foreign Minister Hirota on 16 April 1935 protested that American oil interests are being deprived of their lawful business in Manchuria through the creation of a monopoly sanctioned by Japan.

63. A memorandum of Hull dated 12 June 1936 stated that "he had told Yoshida that he would speak frankly and say that the impression among many in the United States was that Japan sought absolute economic domination, first of East Asia and then of other places, which would mean in the end political and military domination. The result would be the exclusion of countries like the

United States from trading with all portions of China while under Japan's domination or control, which would be a serious question to first-class countries with commercial interests all over the world."

64. On 6 October 1937 the League of Nations adopted a report in which it stated "that it cannot be challenged that powerful Japanese armies invaded China and are in military control of large areas, and that Japan has taken naval measures to close the Chinese coast to Chinese shipping, and that Japanese aircraft is carrying out bombardment over wide regions of the country. . . The Committee must take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict."

65. On 21 October 1937 the Belgian Ambassador invited Japan as one of the signatory states of the Nine Power Treaty to participate in a conference at Brussels on 30 October to study amicable means of hastening the end of the conflict.

On 27 October 1937 Japan declined the invitation.

66. Ambassador Grew protested to Foreign Minister Hirota on 4 February 1938 that numerous complaints had been received by the United States of the utter disregard shown by Japanese armed forces in China for American property. Ambassador Grew cited numerous instances of burning, looting and breaking into property of American missions.

67. Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoye in a statement on 22 December 1938, presented to the Tribunal on 5 November, declared "Japan has resolved to carry out military operations with complete extermination of the Kuomintang Government and to proceed to establish a new order in East Asia with farsighted Chinese. A spirit of renaissance is sweeping over all parts of China and Japan desires to make public its basic policy for adjusting relations between Japan and China so that it may be thoroughly understood at home and abroad."

68. Ambassador Grew on 30 March 1939 emphatically protested the continued disregard by Japanese military forces of American lives and property in China. The Ambassador cited 28 attacks upon United States property which had been reported to Japan since the beginning of the year.

69. An increasing number of new economic measures and restrictions detrimental to American interests had been imposed during June and July by Japan's sponsored authorities in parts of China. There had been agitation against American interests and demonstrations by Japanese residents and the Japanese-controlled press. These developments raised questions as to the welfare and security of Americans residing there, it is stated in a communication from Undersecretary Welles to Ambassador Grew 9 August 1940.

70. War Minister Tojo, speaking before the Privy Council on 26 September 1940, stated that if worse comes to worst only a small part of Japan's military strength will be needed to carry out operations against the United States.

71. The prosecution presented a summary of 1941 conversations between the United States and Japan:

"The equilibrium in the Far East which had been established by the Washington Conference treaties had become seriously disturbed by the setting up by force in China, under Japanese control, of 'Manchukuo.' This control has been marked by a policy of

discrimination which has forced out American and other foreign interests.

"In the following years, Japan steadily went forward in her preparations for expansion by force. In December 1934 she gave notice of terminating the Naval Treaty of February 1922, and proceeded with an intensive construction of military and naval armaments and at the same time undertook limited actions directed toward extending her domination over China, regardless of the rights of third parties.

"In July 1937, Japan's armed forces embarked upon large-scale military operations against China. More than a million men occupied large areas on the seaboard and in the center. Puppet regimes were set up which started control and monopoly systems discriminatory in favor of Japan. . .

"It has been clear that Japan. . . has been moved from the start by broad and ambitious plans to establish herself in a dominant position in the western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and keep that position by force and make themselves masters of the area containing about one half of the population of the world, which would give them arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in the region.

"The proposed New Order means, politically, domination by one country; economically, employment of the resources of the area for the benefit of that country and the exclusion of the interests of others. Socially, it means the destruction of liberties and the reduction of the conquered to the role of inferiors. Such a program is of immense significance, importance, and concern to all nations.

"Notwithstanding Japan's aggressive course, the United States has made repeated efforts to persuade her that her best interests lie in developing friendly relations with the United States and others. At no time have there been any threats."

72. By 2 July 1941 Japan announced it was the decision of the Emperor that "she would not hesitate, if necessary to (go to) war with Britain and the United States in order to carry out her scheme against French Indo-China and Thailand."

Marquis Koichi Kido's diary reported on 16 July 1941 that Premier Konoye tendered his resignation.

73. Decision to attack Pearl Harbor was made on 3 November 1941. The date was set by the Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano.

74. On 11 November 1941 Japan's Liaison Conference alleged the following principal reasons for the commencement of hostilities against the United States and Britain:

"It is Japan's unshakable national policy to establish permanent peace by creating a new order in Greater East Asia. . . Japan has proposed to the United States a peaceful settlement and has negotiated for eight months. . . Japan cannot realize her policy and bring about stability if she accedes to the United States. This would mean that the China Affair meant nothing. Japan cannot tolerate this from the standpoint of existence and prestige. . . Greater East Asia is at a crisis and Japan's future is in jeopardy and she is compelled to take up arms to smash all obstacles."

The problem of how the final note was to be sent was a technical question to be handled by the Foreign Minister. The idea

that there was nothing in any treaty or in international law which would preclude an attack on the United States and Great Britain was the result of his own research.

75. Interrogation of Tojo dated 19 February 1946 shows that he was extremely anxious for the success of the surprise attack. While Tojo, in his capacity as War Minister, knew that four surprise attacks were to be executed at the same time against the possessions of the United States and Great Britain, the Cabinet did not know that the attacks were to be made without warning, and even Tojo thought that Ambassador Nomura would deliver the note at least 30 minutes before the attack.

Interrogation of Tojo dated 11 March 1946 stated that the note, according to instructions previously sent to Washington, was to be delivered to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m. 7 December, Washington time.

76. Foreign Minister Togo telegraphed Nomura on 2 December 1941 to burn all telegraph codes, including documents between the three departments and also the code books for Army and Navy.

77. Events occurred on 7 and 8 December (Tokyo time) in the following order:

7 December: 0940, American press told telegram on way to Emperor; 1000, Hull cabled Grew the cable was on way; 1100, Hull sent President's message to Emperor to Grew, cable marked "Triple Priority" and message sent in easily decipherable code; 1200, President's message received in Tokyo; 1500, United States radio announces message on way; 1800, this is the latest time in which the contents of President's message were known in Japanese Government offices; 2230, Grew received Hull's message.

8 December: 0015, Grew saw Togo, read message to him, and asked for appointment to deliver it to Emperor personally; 0045, the Shanghai Bund occupied; 0140, Kota Bharu shelled; 0200, Nomura asked to see Hull at 1300; 0205, Japanese landed at Kota Bharu; 0300, Nomura asked for postponement of meeting with Hull to 1345; 0305, Japanese landed at Singgora and Patani; 0320-25, attack on Pearl Harbor; 0405, Nomura arrived at Hull's office; 0420, Nomura handed Hull the document terminating negotiations; 0520, HMS Petrel sunk; 0610, air raid on Singapore; 0700, Tokyo radio gave first notice that hostilities had begun; 0730, Grew called on Togo, who handed him copy of document handed by Nomura to Hull, stating that it was the Emperor's answer to President's message; 0800, British Ambassador Sir Robert Leslie Craigie met with Togo and was handed a copy of the previous document; 0805, Guam attacked; 0900, Hongkong attacked; between 1140 and 1200, Imperial Rescript issued.

78. Togo instructed Nomura by telegram on 28 November 1941, presented to the Tribunal on 14 November, that he and Special Ambassador Kurusu should "refrain from giving the impression that the negotiation is broken off. They are to say that they are waiting instructions from home, and while not making clear the Government's intent, they are to explain that as a personal opinion Japan's claims have been just, and while Japan has made intolerable concessions and been conciliatory, the United States has not cooperated and has made the solution very difficult."

79. Nagano had approved the plan to attack Pearl Harbor, either at the end of October or the beginning of November, it is shown in his interrogation of 26 March 1946, submitted on 14 November. There had been considerable argument between the Fleets and

the Naval Operational Bureau. The Fleets were in favor of attacking, whereas the Naval Affairs Bureau considered it too much speculation and preferred the more conservative method of waiting for the American Fleet in the South Pacific.

Yamamoto was adamant in his belief in his plan to attack Pearl Harbor, and he threatened to resign with his staff if the plan were not carried out. Prior to that the Fleet had studied the plan very carefully. Nagano originally agreed with the Naval Operational Bureau, but as Yamamoto was so avid Nagano agreed to the plan. The Naval Affairs Bureau still wanted to use the plan it had had for many years of waiting in the Pacific Islands.

Nagano thought the Naval Affairs Bureau plan more logical, but rather than have the Commander of the Fleet resign, he thought it best to approve. This was the decisive factor in carrying through the attack on Pearl Harbor, and Nagano assumed responsibility.

80. The Emperor warned Tojo, and repeatedly asked, according to the interrogation of Tojo on 20 February 1946, that they make certain the note be delivered before the attack. This warning was given the first time just after the Imperial Conference of 1 or 2 December.

81. Tojo's interrogation of 19 February 1946 shows that the whole Cabinet attended the Imperial Conference on 1 or 2 December which made the decision for war. Japan felt that by her final note breaking off diplomatic relations she acquired freedom of action from international treaties and from the standpoint of international law. Prior to the attack the whole matter of treaty responsibility and international law had been considered by Tojo and his Cabinet. This matter was the grave responsibility of the Foreign Minister.

82. The affidavit of Joseph Clark Grew of 23 June 1946, submitted on 14 November 1946, stated in part:

That the President's message, stamped as having been received in Japan at 1200 on 7 December, was delivered to the Embassy at 2230.

At 0015 on 8 December he read the message to Togo and requested an audience with the Emperor to present the message personally to him. Togo said he would present the matter to the throne. Grew left at 0030.

At about 0700 Grew received a telephone call asking him to come and see the Foreign Minister at once. Togo said he had seen the Emperor and then handed Grew a copy of the memorandum which had been given to Secretary Hull three hours earlier by Ambassador Nomura.

Ambassador Grew reminded Togo he had asked for an audience with the Emperor and still wished to present the President's message personally. Togo said he had no desire to stand between the Throne and Grew. He then thanked Grew for co-operation during the conversation and saw him off. Togo said nothing about war having broken out anywhere, or about Pearl Harbor.

Shortly after returning to the Embassy, the Ambassador learned through a newspaper bulletin that Japan was at war with the United States and Great Britain.

83. The affidavit of British Ambassador Sir Robert L. Craigie, submitted on 18 November, states that Togo told him at 0800 on

8 December that Japan had decided to break negotiations with the United States and handed him a copy of the memorandum Nomura had given Hull at 2:20 p.m. 7 December Washington time. There was not a word in it about war. On his return to the Embassy Craigie learned for the first time, by radio announcement, that war had begun against Great Britain and the United States.

84. Tojo admitted, in his interrogation of 7 February 1946, that he was primarily responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor and United States and British possessions, while from the standpoint of assistance to the Throne the other Cabinet members were jointly responsible.

85. The imperial rescript of 8 December, submitted to the Tribunal on 18 November, stated that the Emperor declared war on the United States and British Empire, restated Japan's policies and objectives and declared Japan had no other recourse but to appeal to arms and crush every obstacle in its path. The rescript was signed by Tojo and his ministers.

Witnesses for Eleventh Phase

86. The prosecution presented the following witnesses for the eleventh phase of its case:

Joseph W. Ballantine: Member, United States Foreign Service, Far Eastern Affairs, from 1909 to 1945. At present, assistant to the Secretary of State.

Tateki Shirao: Secretary in the Ministry of Communications. In November 1941 he was in charge of Censorship Section, Ministry of Communications.

Morio Tateno: Announcer at Radio Tokyo in December 1941.

James O. Richardson: Admiral, United States Navy, retired. Designated by the Secretary of Navy to present official naval reports, records and documents before the Tribunal; Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor from April 1940 to 1 February 1941.

Testimony of Shirao

87. On 29 November 1941, when he was in charge of the Censorship Section of the Ministry of Communications, his friend, Lieutenant Colonel Tomura of the Communications Section of the Chief of Staff, telegraphed him to delay all foreign telegrams five hours for security reasons. No written confirmation of the telephone call from Colonel Tomura was received, the witness said.

On 6 December 1941 his orders were changed to delay the delivery by 5 and 10 hours on alternate days.

On 7 December, before 1800 hours and probably between 1600 and 1800 hours he knew of the contents of President Roosevelt's message to the Emperor. Tomura gave him this information in a telephone conversation in which he stated that all telegrams were to be delayed by 15 hours. These instructions were relayed to subordinates.

7 December was a day of great excitement and he could not say at what time the President's telegram was taken away.

Under cross-examination, Shirao was not sure whether Tomura or someone else had informed him concerning the arrival of President Roosevelt's message.

Testimony of Tateno

88. The witness reviewed radio logs on 8 December which scheduled the announcements concerning outbreak of hostilities.

Testimony of Ballantine

89. "From the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandizement except for a certain brief period when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy. However, the intervals between aggressive steps were periods of consolidation," the witness declared in beginning his testimony.

"In 1895 Japan annexed Formosa and tried to establish a foothold in Manchuria. In 1905 after the Russo-Japanese War she established herself in Manchuria by acquiring the Kwantung territory lease and ownership of the South Manchurian Railway as well as south Sakhalin. In 1928 she adopted a so-called positive policy toward China with a menacing disposition to intervene in Chinese internal affairs."

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and established Manchukuo. This flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty was Japan's break away from treaty obligations. United States opposition to this Manchurian move was shown in identical notes delivered to Japan and China in January 1932 in which the United States stated it would not recognize any de facto situation or any treaty which would impair the United States' treaty rights, including those relating to Chinese sovereignty and the open door policy.

In July 1937, when Koki Hirota was Foreign Minister, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between China and Japan to flagrantly invade China on a huge scale, pouring into China immense armies which spread fan-like over great areas, including industrial and key centers, raping, robbing, murdering and committing all kinds of lawless acts.

In November 1937 Japan declined to join with the United States and 18 other nations in a conference at Brussels to study peaceful means of hastening the Far Eastern conflict under the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. This refusal to participate effectively prevented efforts to end the conflict by mediation and conciliation and on 24 November the conference suspended.

On 12 December 1937 Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. Panay.

On 26 July 1939, the United States notified Japan of its intent to terminate the Commerce Treaty of 1911.

In August and September, 1940, with Vichy agreement, Japan moved troops into northern Indo-China.

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Germany.

After the autumn of 1940 it was clear that Japan's military leaders had embarked on a program to conquer the entire Far East and Western Pacific. This program was referred to in euphemistic slogans as the "New Order in Greater East Asia" and "the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." Japan went out with force and entered into collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, arrogating to herself a sphere embracing an area occupied by nearly half the population of the world.

During these years the United States tried to dissuade Japan from her courses by pointing out honorable alternatives which would have assured Japan national security and economic prosperity.

Before reviewing the conversations with the Japanese in 1941 the witness traced Japan's long record of duplicity in international dealings:

"In 1904 she guaranteed Korea independence and in 1910 annexed her. In 1908 she pledged with the United States to support Chinese independence and equal opportunity and in 1915 presented the '21 Demands.' In 1918 she entered into an arrangement whereby forces not exceeding 7,000 by any one power were to be sent to Siberia and the Japanese military, seeing in this an opportunity to annex eastern Siberia, sent more than 70,000 troops

"In 1922 in the Nine Power Treaty she agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence and integrity and to use her influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity. Her whole course in China since 1931 was in violation of these pledges. On 21 November 1932, Matsuoka said Japan wanted no more territory. By the end of that year she had occupied all of Manchuria and thereafter moved south and west occupying a vast area of China.

"On 27 July 1937 Konoys said that in sending troops to North China, Japan had only the purpose of preserving peace in East Asia. To do this, for four years Japanese forces had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.

"On 28 October 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office stated that Japan did not look upon the Chinese as an enemy. She showed this friendly feeling by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.

"On 15 April 1940 Mr. Arita, then Japanese Foreign Minister, said Japan was deeply concerned over any development that might affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. Following the occupation of Holland, Japan sent a commercial commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far-reaching that, if granted, the Indies would have been a Japanese colony.

"After the renewal of the undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders repeatedly gave assurances that United States' rights would be respected. . . and (they) were repeatedly violated. They stated that United States' lives and property in China would be respected, but there were steadily mounting cases of bombing of American property with loss of or danger to American lives. Repeatedly, Japan assured that United States' treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese-occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, etc. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities."

After large Japanese forces moved into south French Indo-China on 24 July 1941 the United States and others concerned were confronted with a problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. The United States had to make a definite move in self-defence.

Virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan occurred after the President froze Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States on 28 July 1941.

On 28 August 1941 Prince Konoye sent a message to the President urging a meeting of the heads of the two Governments to discuss all important problems covering the entire Pacific.

On 3 September the President replied, suggesting that there immediately take place in advance of the proposed meeting preliminary discussions on fundamental and essential questions.

On 6 September Ambassador Nomura presented a new draft of proposals ostensibly intended to furnish a basis for mutual agreement on fundamental policies on all questions interrelated to the United States and Japan. Another new draft of Japan's proposal was presented to Ambassador Grew on 25 September with a request for an early reply.

On 2 October Secretary Hull gave to Nomura a statement reviewing developments in the conversations and explained the points in Japan's proposal which were at variance with United States' principles.

After receiving the 2 October statement Japan renewed its efforts for haste in reaching an agreement. New formulas were offered the United States but they did not contain any commitment for a peaceful course nor contemplate retreat from declared objectives.

When the Tojo Cabinet came in on 17 October Japan became more insistent for a greater decision on her proposals.

90. Kurusu arrived in Washington on 15 November 1941 and on 20 November he and Nomura presented to Hull a proposal that:

- (1) Both Japan and the United States agree not to make any armed advances in Southeast Asia, except in French Indo-China where Japanese troops were stationed.
- (2) Japan would undertake to withdraw her troops in French Indo-China upon the restoration of peace with China or on establishing an equitable peace in the Pacific.
- (3) Japan would declare that she was prepared to remove her troops from south French Indo-China to the northern part on the conclusion of the proposed arrangement, which was to be embodied in the final agreement.
- (4) Both countries would co-operate to secure goods and commodities which they need in Netherlands East Indies.
- (5) Both would undertake to restore their commercial relations to the status prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets, and the United States would supply Japan a required quantity of oil.
- (6) The United States would undertake to refrain from any action prejudicial to the endeavors for restoring general peace between Japan and China.

Nomura and Kurusu intimated that this proposal was Japan's last word and if an agreement were not quickly concluded ensuing developments might be most unfortunate.

Acceptance of this proposal, the witness stated, would have bespoken by the United States:

- (1) Condonement of Japan's past aggression.
- (2) Betrayal of China.
- (3) Silent agreement to Japan's efforts to create a hegemony over the west Pacific and Eastern Asia.

Acceptance would have destroyed the United States' chances of asserting and maintaining her rights in the Pacific and would have been a most serious threat to United States national security. In this Japan clung to her advantageous position in French Indo-China which threatened the countries of the south and menaced vital trade routes.

Nomura and Kurusu kept up the appearance of negotiations until 7 December.

On 2 December the President had an inquiry made to ascertain the reasons for continued Japanese troop movements in French Indo-China. This drew a specious reply that reinforcements had been sent to French Indo-China as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops.

On 6 December the President telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor that the tragic possibilities in the situation be avoided. The President reviewed the situation in French Indo-China and stated that the withdrawal of Japanese troops would result in the assurance of peace throughout all of the South Pacific.

At his express direction the message was sent in the nonconfidential "grey" code, easy to decipher. To assure prompt decoding, a brief telegram was sent to Grew in advance to prepare for the message to the Emperor. The alerting message was sent on 6 December at 8 p.m. and the message to the Emperor at 9 p.m.

On 7 December at about 12 noon, Hull, in response to a request from Nomura, made an appointment to receive him and Kurusu at 1 p.m. Shortly after 1 p.m., Nomura and Kurusu requested by telephone that the meeting be postponed until 1:45. They arrived at 2:05 and were received by Hull at 2:20. Nomura said he had been instructed by Japan to deliver a paper at 1 p.m. but that difficulty in decoding it had delayed him, and he then handed to Hull a document.

On reading the telegram, Hull turned to Nomura and stated that in all of his conversations with Nomura he had never spoken one word of untruth, which is borne out absolutely by the record. In all of his 50 years of public service he had never seen a document that had more falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that he never imagined until today that any government was capable of uttering them. Nomura and Kurusu left without comment.

This interview, it later appeared, took place more than an hour after Japan had struck at Pearl Harbor and more than two hours after actual landing in Malaya, and four hours after Japan had crossed the boundary of the International Settlement at Shanghai. This was not mentioned by Nomura and Kurusu.

This message was not a declaration of war with reasons or an ultimatum. It was not even a declaration of intention to sever diplomatic relations. It contained allegations contrary to fact. From the beginning, Japan's efforts were directed toward

inducing the United States to surrender its basic policy while Japan maintained intact its policy of aggression and force. Japan's immutable policy was based upon establishing at the beginning a complete military and economic stranglehold over China, calling for Japanese control over strategic industries and facilities, which was referred to euphemistically as "economic co-operation with China." It had in mind the retention of large areas of China indefinitely, large Japanese garrisons to protect Japanese holdings, cloaked under the provision of "joint defense against Communism." These terms were embodied in the treaty of 1940 between Japan and Wang Ching-wei. Japan tried to obtain United States assent to the imposition of these terms on China. Japan at no time budged from these terms, and for Japan to speak of making the utmost concessions is a monstrous distortion of the facts.

Testimony of Richardson

91. Admiral Richardson presented his testimony by reading from a prepared statement composed from official naval records on Japanese Navy plans and preparations for the naval hostilities which began on 7 December 1941.

Admirals Yamamoto and Nagano as early as 1934 recognized the aircraft carrier as the best type of naval arm for expansion and aggression, it is shown in a record of conversations between United States and Japanese delegates to the Washington Naval Treaty conference in 1934.

Nagano at the London Naval Conference on 15 January 1936, before Japan withdrew from the Conference, declared that Japan advocated the abolition of the aircraft carrier and a drastic reduction in capital ships in order to establish a state of nonaggression and nonmenace.

The official naval leadership and personal co-operation of Nagano and Yamamoto are shown not only by their joint efforts in connection with the naval conference but later in 1936 and 1937 when they served together as Navy Minister and Vice-minister, and then again in 1941 to 1943, as Chief of the Naval General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

Nagano and Yamamoto and their associates adopted construction and use of aircraft carriers as a central principle of Japanese naval policy. This policy had three steps:

- (1) Abolition of existing treaty limitations on the construction of aircraft carriers, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the removal of barriers to secrecy in naval construction.
- (2) The construction of carriers and supporting units until Japan had carrier supremacy over the United States.
- (3) The use of aircraft task forces for making secret, sudden attacks to destroy, before war began, the men and ships of the United States Fleet while they were anchored at Pearl Harbor.

On 1 December 1936 Japan terminated the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 which had limited her Navy to a total carrier tonnage of 81,000 and began an aircraft carrier construction program. Between 1936 and 1941 the Japanese Navy's carrier tonnage increased from four carriers with a tonnage of 68,400 tons to 10 with a total of 178,070 tons.

No longer bound by the 1922 Treaty Japan rejected an American proposal for a reciprocal exchange of naval construction information among the United States, Britain and Japan.

While the carrier construction program went ahead in the home islands Japan now began to fortify and equip the Mandated Islands in direct violation of the Treaty of Versailles in 1920, the Mandate of the Islands to Japan and the Mandates Treaty between the United States and Japan.

The documents indicated that Japan's naval policy for the Mandated Islands was characterized by the same objectives as those with respect to the aircraft carriers, to develop and use them for naval expansion and aggression.

Capture of Japan's "Combined Fleet Top Secret Order Number One" from a cruiser sunk and then buoyed revealed considerable information about the use of the Mandated Islands. Among other things, the Order showed that the islands of Saipan, Kwajalein, Wotje, Jaluit, Taroa, Truk, Ponape, and Palau were among those allotted as naval bases.

The Commerce Destruction Unit was based on the Mandates to destroy sea traffic. Submarines en route from Japan to Pearl Harbor rendezvoused at Kwajalein.

Many other documents show that Japan erected fortifications in the Mandates, built radio transmitters, installed big storage tanks, built ammunition storage dumps, dug trenches, set up pillboxes, machinegun emplacements, wire entanglements, connecting road systems and many buildings.

Numerous documents show that Japan, particularly the Foreign Office, between 1931 and 1941 was engaged in the policy of surveillance, reconnaissance and espionage with respect to the United States Navy.

The United States Naval Court of Inquiry on Pearl Harbor found that Japan's espionage system used civilian, consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the world and enabled her to keep constantly informed of the United States naval building program and of the location and movement of United States vessels. An extensive continuous espionage was conducted under the Navy and Foreign Office at Honolulu through Consul General Kita and his 200 consular agents.

The first message from Toyoda on 24 September 1941 requested the Consul to report information on vessels in designated areas of Pearl Harbor waters, by types and classes of craft, and whether at anchor, tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks.

Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, according to his confession, "delivered to Kido at Honolulu on 2 December 1941 requested information and documents for which he was paid not less than \$ 10,000. The information included full details of United States ships, with berthing locations in the harbor."

On 6 December 1941 a message was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo giving the location of the ships in the harbor and stating that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the fleet air arm.

The plan of attack on Pearl Harbor, according to Nagano was conceived by Yamamoto early in January 1941 and was developed by operations officers beginning in September 1941.

The plan provided for organizing a select task force under Admiral Nagano of six aircraft carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 11 destroyers, three submarines and eight tankers. There were 360 attack planes, including 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal bombing planes, 40 torpedo planes and 81 strafing planes.

From a rendezvous point on the night of 6 and 7 December the task force made the run-in south at top speed. Early 7 December at a point 230 miles north of Oahu the carriers launched the planes in waves, the five bombers concluding the attack from 9:15 to 9:45 a.m. The task force withdrew at top speed to the northwest where the planes returned.

The attack killed 1,999 U. S. Navy men, including Rear Admiral Isaac Campbell Kidd, 109 Marines and 234 men of the Army. The United States lost 188 planes while Japan lost 29. The United States suffered severe damage to, or loss of, eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers and four miscellaneous vessels; Japan lost five midget submarines.

These losses reveal the extent to which Nagano and Yamamoto had succeeded in maintaining secrecy and in attaining surprises.

The witness was unable to find in any United States record any information regarding any Japanese document or communication by which Japan gave the United States warning of the imminent hostilities.

A notice from Japan's Foreign Office announcing a state of war had arisen was received in the office of Secretary of State Hull at 2:35 a.m. on 10 December 1941, 66 hours and 40 minutes after the attack.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION
of
NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES
in
JAPAN

Number 14

November 1946

PART III

ECONOMIC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Section 1. Agriculture and Fisheries	113
Section 2. Forestry and Mining	119
Section 3. Heavy Industries.	129
Section 4. Manufacturing	145
Section 5. Textile Industries.	165
Section 6. Transportation and Public Utilities	189
Section 7. Communications.	197
Section 8. Labor	209
Section 9. Imports and Exports	219
Section 10. Rationing and Price Control	229
Section 11. Finance	239
Section 12. Property Control and Reparations.	247

SECTION 1

AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Agriculture	4
Fisheries	13

1. The press, radio, posters and pamphlets were utilized in a nationwide program to acquaint farmers with the agrarian reform program.

2. November rice and sweet potato deliveries accelerated noticeably over October, but resentment continued toward the quota system. Greater agricultural research was planned.

3. October fish landings made substantial gains over September's catch. The antarctic whaling fleet departed on Japan's first expedition since the 1940-41 season.

AGRICULTURE

	Paragraph
Agrarian Reform	4
Crop Prospects.	7
Agricultural Research	10

AGRARIAN REFORM

Publicity Campaign

4. Following initiation on 22 November of the agrarian reform program the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry opened a campaign to familiarize farmers with provisions of the Agricultural Lands Adjustment Bill and procedures governing election of the agricultural land commissions.

5. Detailed articles appeared in the press, and Ministry representatives discussed the Bill in nine 15-minute radio talks. A film on agrarian reform was distributed throughout Japan.

6. A total of 630,000 posters, circulars and pamphlets were distributed, including:

- (1) Three hundred thousand posters explaining the importance and duties of the agricultural land commissions and procedure for electing the commissions.
- (2) Three hundred thousand circulars to acquaint farmers with the basic provisions of the agrarian reform legislation.
- (3) Thirty thousand pamphlets giving the text of agrarian reform legislation with explanatory notes for public officials responsible for administering the new laws.

CROP PROSPECTS

Rice Production

7. Rice collections up to 20 November totaled 1,002,000 metric tons, 689,000 tons more than the same period last year and indicating a crop of 9,000,000 tons. This harvest, virtually completed in November, would fall only 134,000 tons under the 1940-44 average yield.

Deliveries were faster than during October despite continued resentment toward the quota system. Under this system farmers must sell their rice to the Government at ¥ 550 per koku (one koku equals 5.11 bushels) whereas uncontrolled sales would net 10 times that amount.

Sweet Potatoes

8. The 1946 sweet potato crop is estimated at 6,000,000 metric tons, the largest ever produced and harvested in Japan. Harvesting was nearly completed in November. Deliveries exceeded quotas in some sections and reduced the prevailing market price below the Government price.

To minimize spoilage the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry instituted a program calling for rapid shipment, early utilization and industrial use of excess tonnage.

Seed Potato Shipments

9. By 7 November Hokkaido had shipped 44,456 metric tons of certified white seed potatoes to other parts of Japan, or nearly half the 97,500 metric tons scheduled for shipment before 10 December.

Although shortages of straw ropes and bags delayed earlier shipping initial shipments were only 12 percent behind schedule.

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH

Research Institute

10. Plans were made for an Agricultural Research Institute to study production costs, credit, farm management and crop insurance. The Institute will be part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and will be concerned eventually with agricultural planning.

Proper Storage

11. As part of its campaign to improve sweet potato seed stock, the Ministry forwarded to agricultural co-operatives pamphlets describing United States' seed curing, storage and handling procedures.

Plant Experiments

12. Recent Japanese experiments in the use of colchicine in doubling chromosomes in the offspring of crossed wild and cultivated tomatoes have produced a tomato of adequate size and superior vitamin content. Similar experiments are being made with Chinese cabbage, sunflower and buckwheat.

FISHERIES

Paragraph

Fisheries Production. 13


Antarctic Whaling. 21

Equipment and Supplies. 22

FISHERIES PRODUCTION


13. The fishing industry will produce an estimated 2,400,000 metric tons in 1946, 600,000 tons below the goal but 800,000 tons greater than last year's catch.

14. Fish landings in October were 113,196 metric tons, 27,121 tons over September. Of this sardines comprised 42,613 metric tons, 5,563 tons more than during the previous month.



Shipments and Storage

15. Shipments from Hokkaido of fresh, smoked, salted, frozen and other fish products from 29 September to 26 October totaled 3,828 metric tons. Cold storage holdings of salted, frozen and iced fish declined 2,658 metric tons to 86,389.



Composition of Fleet

16. A November census set the fishing fleet at 300,000 vessels, approximately 75 percent of which are of wood and less than five gross tons. Roughly 1,000,000 full-time and 500,000 part-time fishermen are engaged, with the former's monthly income averaging between ¥ 700 and ¥ 800.

Coastal Whaling

17. Whales captured and tonnage processed during the four-week period ending 16 November decreased sharply. Whales landed dropped from 212 to 112 while metric tons of oil produced declined from 103 to 70. Meat and blubber decreased slightly and other products dropped 69 tons.

COASTAL WHALING PRODUCTION (metric tons)

<u>Week Ending</u>	<u>Whales Captured</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>Meat, Blubber for Food</u>	<u>Other Products</u>
26 October	38	21	383	48
2 November	20	21	320	41
9 November	45	19	329	61
16 November	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>34</u>
Total	112	70	1,143	184

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

18. Production of fishing vessels and gear is increasing but shortages of equipment and black-market activities continue to hamper the fishing industry.

Processing Facilities

19. Processing facilities and better harbor conditions make Pacific coast fishing conditions superior to those of the Japan

Sea, where few natural harbors limit fishing to smaller vessels. The Pacific coast also has adequate refrigeration facilities, lacking on the Japan Sea coast.

20. Because of the shortage of tin plate for canning considerable quantities of fish are being salted and dried instead.

ANTARCTIC WHALING

21. The whaling fleet left Osaka, Nagasaki and Yokosuka during the last two weeks of November. Four allied observers are to assure compliance with terms of International Whaling Conventions and SCAP directives.

The fleet consists of two factory ships of 10,000 gross tons each, 12 whaler or "killer" boats of about 350 tons each and seven carrier boats of 1,000 to 10,000 gross tons each.

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Cotton Allocation

22. Ten thousand bales of cotton yarn (4,000,000 pounds) were allocated for October, November and December for the manufacture of fishing nets and twine.

Petroleum Products

23. There was an increase of 2,755 barrels in fuel oil allocations to the fisheries. Other allocations remained virtually unchanged.

NOVEMBER ALLOCATIONS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (barrels)

Fuel oil	109,635
Gasoline	566
Kerosene	2,642
Gas oil	17,612
Lubricating oil	8,183
Grease (pounds)	26,400

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
Bureau of Fisheries.

SECTION 2
FORESTRY AND MINING

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Forestry	5
Mining	8


1. October lumber production declined, and stockpiles of most forest products were reduced slightly from levels of the previous month.
2. September charcoal production topped average monthly output.
3. Coal output gained slightly and stockpiles decreased. Redistribution of coal and lignite controls was considered.
4. Crude oil production quotas were set for the remainder of the fiscal year.

FORESTRY

	Paragraph
Log and Lumber Production	5
Charcoal and Firewood	6


LOG AND LUMBER PRODUCTION

5. October production of logs was 448,088,000 board feet, 37,272,000 less than the six-month high reached in September; stockpiles dropped 87,152,000 board feet to 1,688,808,000. Production and stockpile decreases were evenly distributed through eight principal forest products.



TIMBER PRODUCTS

MONTHLY PRODUCTION SINCE APRIL 1945



NOTE - MARCH 1946 FIGURES MAY INCLUDE PRODUCTION WHICH OCCURRED EARLIER AND WAS NOT REPORTED UNTIL MARCH, THE LAST MONTH OF THE 1945-46 FISCAL YEAR. PILING DATA FOR FEB-JUL 46 ARE ESTIMATES.

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, BUREAU OF FORESTRY.


NOVEMBER 1946

GHQ-SCAP

NUMBER 10

PLYWOOD PRODUCTION

JAPAN-MONTHLY SINCE AUG 45




SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY.

NOVEMBER 1946

GHQ-SCAP

NUMBER 11



CHARCOAL AND FIREWOOD

6. September charcoal production totaled 113,346 metric tons, well over the monthly average of 85,590 tons but only 65 percent of planned production. Total charcoal produced since 1 April was 513,538 tons, only 56 percent of the planned production.

Firewood

7. Firewood produced in September totaled 2,315,640 koku (one koku equals 10 cubic feet), 46 percent of the planned production. Firewood production since 1 April totaled 15,450,494 koku, or 51 percent of the planned output.

MINING

	Paragraph
Coal	8
Petroleum.	18
Mining Industry.	22


COAL

Production

8. Preliminary figures on November coal production set output for the first 20 days at 1,248,700 metric tons, above averages of comparable periods.

This production increase resulted from extending working surfaces of coal, sufficient supply and efficient delivery of foodstuffs, an increase of 4,510 workers and more settled labor conditions.


9. Coal produced in October totaled 1,766,800 metric tons (preliminary figures), one percent over September. Of this Kyushu produced 972,100 metric tons, Hokkaido 419,400 and Honshu 375,300.



10. Production for the first seven months of the fiscal year was 11,900,000 metric tons, 150,000 less than planned production.


Consumption

11. Preliminary figures show coal consumed in October totaled 1,822,000 metric tons, five percent below the allocation and three percent less than September consumption. Coal consumption by industries is shown in charts, pages 124 and 125.



Stockpiles

12. Total coal stockpiles were reduced from 959,000 metric tons on 30 September, of which 17 percent was available, to 883,000 metric tons on 31 October, of which 11 percent was available.



Lignite

13. Preliminary lignite production figures show October output declined 36,536 metric tons to 195,219 metric tons. Consumption declined to 187,804 metric tons and stockpiles rose slightly to 381,775 tons. See the chart on page 126.

Coal Quota Increased

14. Plans for production of 12,895,000 metric tons of coal during the second half of the fiscal year were announced by the Coal Board and the Coal Association. The new total represents an increase of 95,000 metric tons over previous quotas.

PLANNED COAL PRODUCTION
October 1946 - March 1947
(thousands of metric tons)

October	1,873
November	2,025
December	2,193
January	2,177
February	2,139
March	2,467
Total	12,895

SOURCE: Coal Board and Coal Association.

15. The Government and the Coal Association announced a nine-point program of incentives and bonuses, financial and building assistance to help miners and operators reach the quota for the second half of the fiscal year. The program calls also for less coal consumption by mines and improvement in the quality of the coal.