

37. Three new radio programs were initiated by the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan and established programs continued their public service and popularity.

Motion Pictures, Theater and Music

38. A public health and safety code was drafted by the Japan Motion Picture Exhibitors' Association which plans to have it adopted throughout Japan.

39. Japanese companies produced 15 educational pictures and 18 film strips for release during October.

40. The Ministry of Education sponsored an Annual Arts Festival, extending from 4 October to 15 November, presenting drama, dancing and music.

41. The newly organized Kamakura Symphony Orchestra presented its first concert 5 October; other outstanding musical performances were concerts by the Tokyo Philharmonic Orchestra and the Toho Symphony Orchestra.

Library

42. October attendance at the SCAP Information Library for publications in English showed a large increase over figures for October 1946.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION  
of  
NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
in  
JAPAN

Number 25

October 1947

PART II

POLITICAL

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SECTION 1  
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Demobilization Bureaus

1. On 9 October the Supreme Commander directed the Japanese Government to transfer the First Demobilization Bureau, the former Ministry of War, to the Ministry of Welfare by 15 October and to abolish the Second Demobilization Bureau, the one-time Ministry of the Navy, by 1 January 1948.

Minesweeping and other operations were to be continued under the direct supervision of the Commander Naval Forces, Far East, until the January deadline. The Ministry of Welfare or other designated agency will assume necessary remaining functions at that time.

SCAP also directed the Japanese Government to "undertake a complete and comprehensive study and survey. . . of all boards, bureaus and agencies of the Japanese Government now engaged in or charged with responsibility for demobilization, repatriation, investigation, or research" connected with matters pertaining to the war or persons who served in or were connected with Japanese military organizations.

Civil-service Reform Enacted

2. The National Public Service Law, enacted by the Diet on 16 October, is designed to effect reorganization of Japan's bureaucracy.

The Law provides for a National Personnel Commission which will establish standards for all civil-service positions and will supervise and coordinate the work of personnel directors in the various ministries and agencies.

The Commission will include three members appointed by the Cabinet with the approval of the Diet, one of whom is designated by the Prime Minister to serve as chairman. The chairman will in turn appoint an executive director of the Commission. Initial terms will be for four years with reappointments limited to two years. Commissioners can be removed only under impeachment charges filed by the Prime Minister. Trial must be by the Supreme Court.

3. A National Personnel Council under the Executive Director of the Commission will include the personnel directors of the various ministries and other agencies and will be responsible for necessary liaison between the Commission and the operating agencies.

4. Appointment to the civil service must be made on the basis of competitive examinations or evaluations open to all persons with dismissals contingent upon competence and efficiency. Promotions will be based on merit and pay on degree of complexity of duties and responsibility rather than on seniority, the number of dependents or other factors as heretofore.

All employees are guaranteed the right to apply to the Commission for the adjudication of salaries, wages, working conditions, or to appeal any dismissal action. The right to a public hearing is also provided.

Personnel may not hold elective office or official positions in political organizations or profit-making enterprises and are prohibited from soliciting or receiving subscriptions for any political purpose.

Upon retirement, civil-service personnel will receive pension allowances.

#### Administrative Affairs Research Bureau

5. The Government on 27 September announced the appointment of six advisers to the Cabinet's Administrative Affairs Research Bureau. They are Toshio Irie, former chief of the Cabinet Board of Legislation; Tokujiro Kanamori, former State Minister without Portfolio; Aiichi Kamiyo, secretary general of the Federation of the Fiber Industry Labor Unions, General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions; Michiharu Tajima, president of Dai Nihon Ikueikai, an educational association; Nozomu Nakagawa, a former member of the Privy Council; and Kaneichi Moroi, a managing director of the Chichibu Cement Company.

The six were appointed to take the places of the nine Diet advisers to the Administrative Affairs Research Bureau who had resigned under provisions of the new Diet Law forbidding Diet members from serving in government advisory committees except by special Diet approval.

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

##### The ¥ 1,800 Wage Standard

6. The Government's determination to adhere to the ¥ 1,800 wage standard as an anti-inflation measure occasioned wide political controversies.

Hiroo Wada, director of the Economic Stabilization Board, urged the necessity for acceptance of this wage standard by the workers. Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama insisted on the fundamental soundness of the ¥ 1,800 wage standard despite mounting opposition. On 7 October he told the House of Representatives' Budget Committee that there would be no change in the wage scale.

Minister of Labor Mitsusuke Yonekubo, calling for support of a new labor program, emphasized the Government's determination to adhere to the wage policy.

Labor representatives insisted that retention of the ¥ 1,800 limitation would make the Government's plan unworkable because workers are unable to subsist under the ¥ 1,800 formula.

The National Congress of Industrial Unions expressed willingness to support the Government's program but only on condition that the Government raise the wage standard.

The General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions on 8 October adopted a resolution to cooperate more fully with the Katayama Cabinet. It also called for support of the new wage standard but qualified this by urging workers to cope with the differences between wages and prices by demanding "stop-gap allowances," pending attainment of economic stabilization. Prime Minister Katayama, addressing the convention, urged labor to put up patiently with austere living conditions for the sake of national rehabilitation.

#### Rice Price

7. The new price of rice, fixed at ¥ 1,700 per koku on 22 October, evoked considerable press and political comment.

Prime Minister Katayama publicly announced that on establishing the price full consideration had been given to its relationship to the general price structure. He admitted that the producer price was considerably lower than that demanded by the farmers, but he expressed hope that their dissatisfaction might be allayed by making available to them adequate supplies of the essential goods they require.

The Prime Minister further acknowledged that the new price would "add to the burden" imposed on the consumers' budget. He promised, however, that the Government would take steps to insure full delivery of rice quotas and to prevent delays or curtailment of staple-food rations. He urged the public to understand that the price was fair both to producers and consumers.

8. The Price Board explained that the new price of rice was fixed on the basis of a parity relationship between prices of rice and manufactured goods so as not to lower the living standard of workers paid in accordance with the official wage standard.

9. In commenting on the rice price the newspaper Tokyo Shimbun said: "Although the new price leaves much to be desired there can be no reason why it should not be considered satisfactory. However, the problem is a heavy responsibility for the Government. It is of primary importance to urge farmers to complete delivery of their rice quotas speedily under the new price. . .

"Without an early completion of rice deliveries in this time of world-wide food dearth, the lives of the people will be seriously affected, thereby destroying the present price structure and making it impossible for the Japanese economy to recover."

10. Representatives of the major political groups were varied in their reactions to the ¥ 1,700 rice price, offering such criticisms as neglect of farmers' cost of production, incompatibility with rising cost of living, tardiness of the measure, destruction of the price system and competition with black-market prices; but were generally agreed on the need for an implementation of full deliveries of rice quotas.

### Coal Control

11. The much-debated state coal control bill, introduced in the Diet late in September, continued to influence political affairs during the month.

The All-Japan Council of Coal Mine Workers' Unions issued a statement on 29 September declaring that it had withdrawn from the Coal Industry Reconstruction Council, a labor-management body, because mine operators were perverting it into an instrument of opposition to the coal control bill. The statement condemned the "high-handed" methods of the mine operators and pledged the Unions' continued efforts for increased production.

In a move to counter the arguments of the bill's opponents the Social Democratic Party launched a national campaign to win support for the measure. The Party's Special Committee for the Realization of Coal Mine State Control distributed handbills and posters and sponsored lectures, debates and mass rallies. Local chapters of the Party in cooperation with labor unions organized rallies in factories and shops to demand enactment of the control bill.

Utilizing their right to criticize the bill in the course of Diet deliberation, the Democratic Party Coal Policy Committee urged revision. Both opponents and supporters of the bill expressed their views during public hearings sponsored by Upper and Lower House committees.

At a liaison conference of the three Government parties on 13 October Social Democrats and People's Cooperatives charged that action on the bill was being delayed by the Democrats "dilatatory tactics." Secretary General Giichi Takeda of the Democratic Party pledged his efforts "to dispel misunderstanding."

At the end of the month the Diet committees had not yet reached final agreement on the coal control measure.

### Police Reform Bill

12. The Cabinet on 13 October approved the draft of a proposed Police Reform Bill in accordance with the principles outlined by the Supreme Commander in his letter of 9 September to the Prime Minister.

The draft bill gives a broad outline of the structure of a new police system stipulating a national police and local autonomous police forces, measures for handling emergency incidents and media for coordination between the national and local branches.

Secretary General Suehiro Nishio counseled public servants in their new responsibility and expressed confidence for the attainment of a fresh and firm system for the preservation of public peace.

The newspaper Jiji Shimpō expressed conviction that the draft bill ". . . will prove one of the most progressive and revolutionary reforms in a series of democratic renovations. . . and that it will more directly influence the livelihood of the people."

### Economic Decentralization Bill

13. The Economic Decentralization Bill was submitted to the House of Representatives on 9 October and to the House of Councilors on 10 October after long and intensive deliberation by the Cabinet.

The Bill is designed to effect the elimination of concentrated economic power as quickly as possible and to expedite the democratization of Japanese industry.

14. The main controversial points are: the fears of the industrialists and unions as to their respective safeguards; the difficulty of determining the enterprises which would be amenable to the law; and the close resemblance of the Bill to an antimonopoly law passed in March.

15. Those in opposition proposed revision of existing ordinances and laws since the measure implies overlapping with the antimonopoly law and functions of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission.

Director General Hiroo Wada of the Economic Stabilization Board promised that the Government would enforce the law, if enacted, with extreme caution, since the Bill would invest certain government agencies with extensive temporary authority.

### Katayama on Ideology

16. In a statement before the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee on 15 October Prime Minister Katayama stated the attitude of his party and the Cabinet concerning communism and measures to implement the Potsdam Declaration.

"The Social Democratic Party does not embrace communism," said Katayama. "It is democratic as well as socialistic and in this respect we wish to learn much from the British Labor Party. But we are being realistic about it and are enforcing policies that we think most suited to the existing social conditions. The Social Democratic Party, accordingly, is not a party compatible with communism."

He continued, "Japan wishes to make a positive contribution to world peace and to world civilization. We must really prove to the world our zeal for the construction of a peaceful and cultural nation. From such a point of view, utter disarmament need not be cause for any apprehension on our part. We must consolidate our own national structure and at the same time strive for world peace."

### Imperial Family Members Become Commoners

17. The new Imperial Household Council, at its first meeting on 13 October, approved the assumption of "commoner" status by 51 princes and princesses, leaving only the immediate members of the Emperor's family as Imperial Family members. The change was effective 14 October.

18. The Imperial Household Economic Conference, entrusted with the administration of financial affairs of the Imperial Household under the terms of the Imperial Household Economy Law, met on the same day under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Katayama. A plan was approved for the distribution of a total sum of ¥ 47,475,000 appropriated by the Diet for retirement allowances for the former Imperial Family members. Under the plan the 11



princes who were former career militarists were not granted allowances.

19. Several newspapers commented on the assumption of a "commoner" status by former Imperial Family members. A Nippon Times editorial said in part:

"The recent relinquishment of their titles by 51 Imperial princes and princesses and their descent to the status of commoners provide one more example of how sweeping and thorough a social revolution is taking place in Japan today.

"It may, of course, be argued that these changes are in outward form only and that the attitude of the Japanese people toward the social hierarchy remains unchanged. To a certain extent that contention may be true. But when a privileged class loses its official status and more importantly, loses its financial privileges so that it must compete on the level of the rest of the population to earn its own living, it is inevitable that any aura of tradition concerning its special character will speedily tend to disappear. This latest change is one whose significance should not be underestimated.

"But its real importance cannot be gauged except in connection with the change in other sectors of Japanese society. It is only one of the aspects of a social revolution which is transforming the whole character of the nation. With the liquidation of the Zaibatsu and the projected dispersion of the former concentrations of economic power, the economic basis of Japanese society is being markedly shifted. The land reform program, transferring the ownership of land from a relatively few to the mass of the cultivators, and perhaps even more important, the flow of income from the urban classes to the farmers, are causing still further shifts in the economic basis of Japanese society. All of these changes in the economic basis of Japanese society are bound to cause Japanese society and Japanese social attitudes to assume a profoundly different shape from the traditional one. . .

"Even though there may be reactionary elements who are acceding to the changes only reluctantly, and even if there are individuals who are trying to hold on to the substance of their former power behind the changes in form, they cannot hope to hold out very long in the face of the odds which are mounting against them. . .

"But the most important thing to notice is that, while the outward form of Japan's social structure is being changed by law, this is not all that is taking place. . .

"No changes so widespread as those now taking place in Japan can remain merely external. Even if they start as nothing more than external matters, they cannot be continued without soon inducing deeper results. The social revolution which is taking place in Japan today is thus apt to be indeed far more profound than is immediately apparent."

#### POLITICAL PARTIES

##### Social Democratic Party

20. The Social Democratic Party sponsored lectures and debates to acquaint the public with its principles and policies. Following are the chief points of emphasis:

- (1) Social Democrats are merely partners in the Cabinet and not its masters and are frequently obliged to compromise on certain phases of the Party's program. Workers were urged to bear this in mind when hearing charges of opportunism directed against the Party.
- (2) Despite impatience with the Cabinet for having failed to effect immediate solutions to Japan's difficulties, the people should understand that failure to support the present government would cause it to be replaced by a reactionary government with no interest in the people's welfare.
- (3) The ¥ 1,800 monthly wage level should be supported by the workers despite the hardships it is causing at present because it represents a vital element in the Government's program for coping with critical economic problems and for rehabilitating the nation's economy. Farmers must share responsibility for reconstruction by delivering rice quotas. If this is done the Government will be able to revive production, achieve full distribution of rations, smash the black market and set the nation on the road to recovery.

21. Suehiro Nishio, Chief Cabinet Secretary and Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party, announced on 6 October that he was ready to act as mediator between the Japan Farmers' Union and its rival, the National Farmers' Union, in order to solidify the Party preliminary to the approaching annual convention.

In reply the National Farmers' Union issued a statement attacking his proposal as an unwarranted intrusion into the Union's affairs and as an attempt to subordinate the Union's interests to those of the Social Democratic Party. Nishio's plan was also coldly received by the Japan Farmers' Union.

22. The Liberal Party of the Kinki (Kyoto) district held a rally on 21 October with Liberal President Shigeru Yoshida presiding. Resolutions were adopted calling for the following program:

- (1) Fundamental improvement of the delivery and ration system based on a composite policy providing for agricultural, marine and dairy foodstuffs.
- (2) Increased credit for small and medium enterprises.
- (3) Recognition of the independence of enterprises.
- (4) Establishment of a peacetime industrial system centered upon small and medium enterprises and rationalization of Government, public and private enterprises.
- (5) Introduction of foreign credit for industrial rehabilitation and food supplies.
- (6) Systematic planning of agricultural development to provide relief for the unemployed and repatriates.
- (7) Development of a peacetime agricultural organization based on cooperation of all farmers.

- (8) Determining which economic fields are to be free and which are to be controlled.
- (9) Strengthening of prefectural governments.
- (10) Reinforcement of land and marine transport and communications enterprises.
- (11) Introduction of "original" state planning.

23. Liberal Party maneuvers to form a new conservative party were sharply intensified.

The matter was taken up formally by the Liberal Party for the first time when Eisaku Honma, a Diet member, placed the matter on the agenda at a party caucus on 14 October. He demanded that there be no behind-the-scenes intrigue; that prior to the organization of a new party, Liberal Party leaders involved in the Seko case, as well as any other corrupt party "bosses," be expelled from the Liberal ranks; and that the new party's platform be clearly formulated and based upon "economy, culture, society and peaceful political life."

Replying to Honma's demands, Kozen Hirokawa, deputy secretary general of the Liberal Party, declared that organization of a new party had not yet reached a state warranting deliberation by the Party as a whole. He added that the Party's Political Affairs Research Committee was studying the problem of formulating a platform for the proposed new party.

24. Party President Shigeru Yoshida, in his interview with the Jishinkai, a group of new Liberal Party Diet members, expressed his disapproval of behind-the-scenes intrigue in forming a new party, rejected the strategy of seeking to persuade members of other parties to change their affiliations, and reiterated his thesis that the coming peace conference requires the formation of a powerful single-party Cabinet to replace the present coalition.

As a result of this interview the Jishinkai decided to support the party leadership in its new party campaign, issuing a statement on 16 October declaring that President Yoshida's new party policies were identical with their own and pledging their efforts "to become the nucleus" of the projected new party. On 18 October the Jishinkai announced its decision to initiate immediate action to form a new party.

25. On 21 October Liberal President Yoshida stated:

"The new party is planned on the principles of anticommunism and a free economy.

"As to the time of the expected political change, it is common sense to presume that agitation will start toward the end of November when the Political Parties Bill passes the Diet, and February to April will see the change. However, in view of the fact that the Social Democratic Party's domestic discord is growing sharp, it may even take place earlier."

The Liberal Party announced that it would disclose its new platform for a unified conservative party at its national convention, scheduled for early November. Party leaders declared that publication of the platform would have great political consequences.

#### The Democratic Party

26. The Democrats undertook little organized party activity during the month. Some members were involved in tentative negotiations to form a new conservative party with the Liberals, but no tangible results were announced.

The Party remained divided into two major factions, the majority group headed by President Hitoahi Ashida and the opposition led by Kijuro Shidehara.

#### People's Cooperative Party

27. Representatives of both the Democratic and Liberal Parties attempted to lure members away from the People's Cooperative Party. Rumors that a considerable portion of its membership would secede to join the Democratic Party grew so widespread that Communications Minister Takeo Niki, head of the People's Cooperative Party, on 21 October issued a statement denying the rumors and reaffirming the political faith of his Party.

#### The Communist Party

28. The Communist Party continued attacks on the Cabinet both within and without the Diet. Every important measure offered by the Government was seized upon by the Communists for further propaganda against the Cabinet and the Social Democrats.

The policy of the Communist Party with regard to economic decentralization was outlined in the Party's organ Akahata. The Communists stated their support in principle of a rational reorganization of the national economy in order to reconstruct Japan as a peaceful and democratic state. However, they insisted that this would have to be accomplished along Communist lines.

The position of the Communist Party with regard to the formation of the European Communist information organization was announced 7 October by Communist leader Sanzo Nosaka who declared that Japanese Communists "have nothing to do with it at present nor will they have anything to do with it in the future."

"Our party," Nosaka asserted, "is a party of the Japanese people. We are confident that we can deal with and settle the problems of Japan without any guidance or assistance from Communist parties in foreign countries."

#### Ryokufu-kai

29. Ryokufu-kai, the Green Breeze Society, largest faction in the House of Councillors, decided on 21 October to register as a political association and to set up a committee to study the question of reorganization as a regular political party.

Two factors tend to consolidate the group and to influence it towards transforming itself into a full-fledged political party. One is the growing experience in effective political action in the Diet by the group as a whole. The other is the proposed Political Parties Bill which would place difficulties in the way of informal political groups such as "bargaining bodies" of the Ryokufu-kai and minor parties.

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT

### Local Autonomy

30. The House of Councillors' Committee on Public Peace and the Prefectural System in response to demands from prefectural government authorities undertook the formulation of plans for the abolition of branch offices of Central Government bureaus which obstruct or usurp the authority of local government bureaus.

On 10 October the House of Representatives Public Peace and Local Government Committee appointed a subcommittee to work out plans for such dissolutions.

### Local Autonomy Law Revision Bill

31. A bill for revision of the Local Autonomy Law was introduced into the Diet on 14 October. The following amendments were proposed:

- (1) Requirement of Diet approval for the establishment of any branch office of "fixed staffs" of national ministries or agencies. Any such branches must be financed strictly by the ministry or agency concerned, although voluntary local grant aid may be received.
- (2) More precise definitions for voting requirements.
- (3) Establishment of a mandamus procedure compelling a governor or a mayor to perform his duties in executing national laws and Cabinet ordinances, thus eradicating the present dual function of administering national and prefectural laws by the prefectural executive.
- (4) Provision for temporary assumption of governor's duties by the concerned ministry in cases of necessity or emergency.
- (5) Steps for proceeding against a governor: the mandamus hearing; the contempt hearing; and the transfer of the case from the court to the Prime Minister for removal proceedings.

In each step the accused official is given written notice of the charges and after each hearing he may appeal to the court. The hearing on mandamus must be within 16 days from the time of filing the original petition and the court must give a decision within an additional 10 days.

If an accused is found guilty in the second hearing he may be removed from office, but only by the Prime Minister.

### By-elections

32. By-elections were held in various parts of Japan during the period from May to 8 October. Except for six seats for the House of Councillors, the by-elections were for local government posts.

Due to preoccupation with farming, the hot weather, and

various other reasons, the percentage of abstention was high. Except for Shiga Prefecture where the Prefectural Office sent out 12,500 posters bearing slogans and 210,000 copies of an official governmental bulletin containing the personal histories of the two candidates, the by-elections received relatively little publicity.

The by-elections were conducted in an orderly and dignified atmosphere with a negligible number of invalid votes cast and no complaints of election-law violations reported.

#### THE DIET

##### Extension of the Diet

33. The Diet voted on 18 October to extend the present session 40 days from 20 October to 30 November.

##### House of Councillors Recess

34. The House of Councillors recessed from 23 October to 30 October.

##### Legislation

35. The following bills were enacted by the Diet during the period 25 September-25 October:

Bill for Dissolution and Liquidation of the Japan Medical Treatment Corporation, Medical Association and Dental Association

Agricultural Seedling and Seed Bill

Bill Abolishing the Foreign Trade Association Law

Bill for Disposition of Vessels on the Coast of Japan

Bill Concerning Condition of Claims of the Deposit Bureau of the Finance Ministry

Disaster Relief Plan Bill

State Redress Bill

Bill Amending Law for the Reserve Fund of Courts

Judges and Other Court Officials Status Bill

Bill Concerning Appointment and Dismissal of Government Officials Pending Application of Provisions of the National Public Service Law

National Public Service Bill

Trade Fund Special Account Bill

Supplementary Budget No. 3 of the General Accounts for 1947-48

Criminal Code Bill

Road Traffic Control Bill

Bill for Temporary Allowances to Government Employees

Supplementary Budget No. 4 of the General Account for 1947-48

Supplementary Budget Special No. 1 of the General Account for 1947-48

Judges Impeachment Bill (House of Representatives Committee Bill)

Bill for Popular Review of Supreme Court Judges (House of Representatives Member Bill)

Bill Amending the Court Organization Law

The following bills were introduced into the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors:

Bill Amending the Solid Fuels Distribution Kodan Law (Mining and Industry Committee)

Bill for Deconcentration of Economic Power (Finance Committee)

Bill Establishing the Currency Issue Inquiry

Agricultural Loss Compensation Bill (Agriculture and Forestry Committee)

Temporary State Control of Coal Mining Bill (Mining and Industry Committee)

Bill Abolishing the Department Store Law (Commerce Committee)

Bill for Exemptions to Law No. 54 of 1947: Antitrust Law (Commerce Committee)

Bill Amending the Local Autonomy Law (Public Safety and Local Government Committee)

Bill Amending the Owner-Farmer Establishment and Special Measures Law (Agriculture and Forestry Ministry)

The following bill was withdrawn by the Diet at the request of the Cabinet:

Supplementary Budget No. 2 of the General Account for 1947-48

#### THE PURGE

##### Central and Local Government Screening

36. From 26 September to 25 October 18,515 persons were screened by the Central and Local Public Office Qualification Examination Committees. Of 7,207 screened by the Central Government Committee 315 were removed and 36 barred.

On the local government level of 11,245 screened, 430 were removed and 10 barred.

37. The cumulative totals of persons screened, removed and barred since 4 January by the Central and Local Government Committees are as follows:

SCREENING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

Screened by Central Government Committee	31,732
Removed	1,883
Barred	311
Screened by Local Government Committees	592,058
Removed	1,711
Barred	393

Information Media Companies

38. From 26 September to 25 October the Government screened 332 principal public officeholders in information media companies of whom 227 were passed and 63 barred.

39. Cumulative totals of persons screened as of 25 October are as follows:

SCREENING OF INFORMATION MEDIA COMPANIES

Screened	1,188
Passed	936
Barred	109
Pending final action	143

Other

40. Of 1,130 persons who were sent notices of "provisional designation" in the economic field, 980 were finally designated as being subject to the Purge since they had not submitted counter-evidence within the 30 days prescribed by law.

41. Of 403 persons screened under the Butoku-kai criteria 174 were previously designated by the Japanese Government as subject to other purge criteria, 110 were sent notices of "provisional designation," 24 were removed or barred from public office, 14 were reported dead and final action is pending in 81 cases.

42. Designation of 23 former suspected war criminals who had been released from internment became final during the month.





SECTION 2  
PUBLIC SAFETY

C O N T E N T S

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LAW AND ORDER

Black-market Activities

1. From 15 September to 25 October approximately ¥ 1,500,000 worth of hidden supplies formerly belonging to the Japanese Army were located in Tochigi Prefecture by investigators of the Home Ministry working in cooperation with the police. The goods, including clothing and blankets, had been illegally removed from the former Japanese Army air force barracks at Utsunomiya.

Crime

2. Criminal offenses reported and persons arrested in August totaled 185,229 and 97,378 respectively. Approximately 73 percent of the total offenses reported and 48 percent of the arrests were violations of the criminal code, of which larceny constituted 82 percent of the offenses and 53 percent of the arrests. See the chart on the next page.

Hokkaido reported 21,339 offenses, the highest of all the prefectures, while 16,463 were reported in Tokyo, 12,383 in Aichi Prefecture, 12,354 in Osaka, 9,456 in Fukuoka and 9,150 in Hyogo Prefecture. The total of these six prefectures constituted approximately 44 percent of the national figure.

3. Of the persons arrested in August 92,933 were Japanese, 4,370 Koreans, 22 Chinese, 43 Formosans and 10 of other nationalities.

POLICE

Police Reorganization Plan

4. To a letter enclosing the police reorganization plan as drawn up by a cabinet committee, the Prime Minister on 16 September received the following reply from the Supreme Commander:

"I have given careful consideration to your letter of September 3rd and to the plan for the reorganization of the police system submitted therewith. I fully understand your difficulty in reaching an acceptable compromise between the two divergent schools of thought of which you speak--a compromise which will prove adequately effective to meet the requisites for the preservation of law and order within Japan, and yet at the same time not impinge



upon the ideal of human liberty to which the people of Japan are now committed, nor upon that fundamental principle indispensable to a democratic society so aptly stated in the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan, 'Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people.'

"I am in full accord with the proposition that the realities of the situation require the maintenance of a national rural police unit to maintain law and order in the rural areas and available to the National Government to meet emergency conditions with which police forces available to the several local governments may be unable adequately to cope, and your suggested increase in the over-all authorized police strength to 125,000 men to provide for such a national rural police meets with my full approval. I am not in accord, however, with the idea of, nor the necessity for, delaying the decentralization of the police power now existing, as I feel that the preservation of that power in its present centralized form is wholly incompatible with the spirit and intent of the new Constitution and inimical to democratic growth.

"It has been a dominant characteristic of modern totalitarian dictatorships, as it was in Japan's feudalistic past, to establish and maintain a strongly centralized police bureaucracy headed by a chief executive officer beyond the reach of popular control. Indeed, the strongest weapon of the military clique in Japan in the decade prior to the war was the absolute authority exercised by the national government over the thought police and the *Kempai-tai*, extending down to prefectural levels of government. Through these media the military were enabled to spread a network of political espionage, suppress freedom of speech, of assembly, and even of thought, and by means of tyrannical oppression to degrade the dignity of the individual. Japan was thus in the fullest sense a police state.

"It is in recognition of this condition that the police system must be so reorganized as to provide what you so clearly describe in your letter as a 'fundamental remedy for the misuse of the police by the state power as in the past.' In the achievement of this objective the potentiality of a police state inherent in centralized control must scrupulously be avoided. It should never again be possible for antidemocratic elements, either of the extreme right or the extreme left, to enmesh the freedom of the people in a web of police terrorism.

"This basic objective can best be accomplished by the thorough decentralization of the police system in accordance with the principle of local autonomy embodied in the Constitution. Each city and town should be responsible for the preservation of law and order within its boundaries through its own local police system independent of the central government and headed by a police chief to be appointed and removable by a commission composed of three civilian members appointed by the mayor of the city or town with the consent of the local assembly and holding office for a fixed term of years. At the prefectural level there should also be a corresponding commission similarly appointed which will exercise operational control over the national rural police operating within the boundaries of that prefecture, reserving to the national government administrative authority over such national rural police wherever stationed.

"Such a reformation of the Japanese police system would be in consonance with the general pattern of the reorganization of the Japanese governmental structure, integrating police officials

and services as agencies of the people at the appropriate levels of government. Action toward such end should proceed immediately upon enactment of the appropriate statute.

"The national government should allocate the necessary funds until such time as local financing is possible. So long as it is necessary for the national government to make allocations of funds, the strength of the police in the various localities should remain fixed at the present number, but after provisions have been made for the localities to assume the financial burden, the responsibility for determining the necessary numbers within their respective borders should belong to the cities and towns, in accordance with local requirements.

"The necessary legislation should, of course, be enacted at the present session of the Diet. If vigorously prosecuted, I believe that completion of the plan may be accomplished within a period of ninety days thereafter.

"As to an appropriate organization on the national level, I believe that there should be created directly under the authority of the Cabinet a Public Safety Commission composed of five members who have not been career officials, either in the police or the civil service. Such commission should be appointed by the Prime Minister, with the consent of the Diet, and should hold office for a fixed term of years.

"To prevent the resurgence in disguised form of a centrally controlled national police network no channel of command should exist between the national rural police unit and the local police forces, but technical channels of communication should, of course, be permitted in the interest of over-all efficiency and to facilitate a relationship of mutual assistance, liaison and coordination. The intervention by the national government into control over prefectural or local police affairs should temporarily be provided for, however, in the event of a national emergency when, upon the recommendation of the National Public Safety Commission, the Prime Minister might assume operational control over prefectural units of the national rural police force, subject to ratification by the Diet within twenty days. In this way the authority of the prefectural governor may be protected against arbitrary police interference by the national government, at the same time affording adequate safeguard for the national interest.

"In the past, one of the ill-conceived aspects of the Japanese police system was the exercise by police officials of numerous administrative functions not related to the task of investigation and apprehension of criminals or the preservation of public order. All such functions should be exercised by non-police representatives of the particular ministry having responsibility for such matters, and wherever proper should be decentralized to local public entities in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution conferring upon such entities 'the right to manage their property, affairs and administration.'

"Closely related to the law enforcement process is, as you have specifically pointed out in your letter, the subject of reform in the judicial administrative system. Under the Constitution of Japan, the Supreme Court is now vested with the administration of judicial affairs and the rule-making power. With the establishment of an independent judiciary, the Ministry of Justice no longer is responsible for the determination of rules of procedure and of practice, the internal discipline of the courts, or other attributes of the judicial process. Moreover, with the diminution of

the role of the procurators in the administration of justice and their subordination to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, the basic attributes of the procuratorial system under the Ministry of Justice have been radically revised.

"On the other hand, to the Cabinet, as the executive branch of the government, is expressly delegated the responsibility for executing the provisions of the Constitution and of the laws enacted by the National Diet, as well as for determining questions of amnesty, commutation of punishment, and restoration of rights. To reflect adequately this constitutional separation of powers, it would seem desirable that the Ministry of Justice, within which authority over adjudicative functions has been traditionally intermingled with executive power, be replaced by an Attorney General, sitting in the Cabinet as a Minister of State and serving as the chief legal adviser to the executive branch of the government.

"To administer the laws effectively requires the closest coordination between police officials charged with the apprehension of offenders against the national laws, and public attorneys charged with the prosecution thereof. The establishment of an Attorney General's Office with the responsibility of conducting all litigation, criminal and civil, in which the government has a direct interest, and of furnishing all legal advice to the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in the discharge of their duties, would I believe provide a mechanism for such close coordination, facilitate the faithful execution of the laws, and support the independence of the judiciary as the bulwark of the liberties of the people. Consistent with this concept of an Attorney General, the present Legislative Bureau of the Cabinet can be dispensed with in the interest of government efficiency and economy.

"Within the framework of the plan outlined in your letter, modified in the manner I have indicated, I feel confident that a law enforcement system may be evolved in Japan which will satisfy all requirements of public safety, which will provide for the definitive separation of the administrative from the judicial process, and which at the same time will comply meticulously with the underlying principles of the Constitution. In this connection it should be borne in mind that, in the final analysis, police power in the preservation of law and order in a democratic society does not attain its maximum strength through oppressive controls imposed upon the people from above, but rather does it find infinitely greater strength in the relationship of a servant of, and answerable directly to, the people. Thereby, and thereby alone, may it encourage respect for the people's laws through confidence and paternalistic pride in the police as the law enforcement agency of the people themselves.

"I am hopeful that the legislation necessary to give effect to these programs in the reorganization of government can be completed in time for consideration at the current session of the National Diet. To such end do not hesitate to call upon this headquarters for any assistance which you believe would be helpful."

5. Following receipt of the letter the Government formulated a Police Reform Bill consisting of five chapters and 90 articles and providing for the decentralization of the police into local autonomous police departments in communities with a population greater than 5,000, the establishment of a national rural police of 30,000 men, an increase in the over-all authorized police strength to 125,000, measures for handling emergency incidents and coordination between the national police and the local autonomous police.

### Police Activities

6. A nationwide drive was initiated during October against illegal publications and against gangsters who utilize such publications as means of extortion, threat, blackmail and fraud.

7. The campaign against gangsters and organized crime resulted in the arrest of approximately 8,000 persons.

Ken Sekins, head of a gang claiming membership of 20,000 gamblers, thugs and construction workers, surrendered to the police on 30 September, ending a three-month search throughout 10 prefectures.

Police have arrested 539 coal mine racketeers since August. Forty percent of the total arrests were made in Fukuoka Prefecture and 20 percent were in Hokkaido while the rest were scattered throughout the nation.

8. October was designated "Vicious Crime Eradication Month," during which the nation's police force was mobilized in an effort to curtail serious crimes. Measures employed included special police patrols, checkups for illegal possession of weapons and renewed efforts to complete investigations of unsolved crimes.

### PRISONS

9. A nationwide Juridical Protection Week, sponsored by the Ministry of Justice, was held from 11 to 19 September. Lectures on democratic methods of juridical care of juvenile delinquents and public demonstrations were held in all prefectures by procurators and other governmental officials.

10. Twelve prison camps were established in Hokkaido to help absorb the transfer of prisoners from overcrowded prisons in Honshu. Approximately 1,300 prisoners have already been transferred.

11. The prison population totaled 82,789 in September, as shown in the chart at top of the facing page. Of those confined, 64,533 were sentenced, including 3,613 juveniles, and 18,256 were awaiting trial.

Prison deaths numbered 62 in September, a decrease from 73 of the previous month.



### ACCIDENTS

12. One hundred twenty-six persons were killed and 295 injured in rail mishaps in September, as shown on the second chart on facing page. Of the 344 killed or injured through personal carelessness 132 were struck by trains, 132 fell off trains, 49 jumped from trains and 31 were victims of other accidents.

### FIRES

13. Fires in August numbered 1,182 with losses of ¥ 534,100,617, an increase of 40 and 25.5 percent respectively over the July figures. Note the chart on page 38. Approximately 37 percent of the fires were caused by embers, 9 percent by careless smoking and 13 percent by electrical causes. The remainder resulted from miscellaneous causes.


Osaka, Iwate, Yamagata, Tokyo and Hiroshima Prefectures each reported fire damages exceeding ¥ 41,000,000; Osaka reported ¥ 85,007,302, the highest of all the prefectures.



Persons killed by fires in August numbered 40 while the injured totaled 119 as compared with 19 and 171 respectively in July.

14. A fire in Chofu, Tokyo Prefecture, on 17 October destroyed 700 houses and made homeless approximately 1,300 families.





15. The second National Fire-Prevention Week was observed during the week 5-12 October with widespread publicity given to fire fighting and fire prevention methods and activities.

16. The Tokyo Fire Department concluded a series of 17 six-day training classes which began in May. The 223 main fire stations and substations in Tokyo sent 310 sergeants to the classes. These sergeants will in turn instruct other personnel and direct training in the stations.

SECTION 3

LEGAL AFFAIRS AND WAR CRIMES

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LEGAL AFFAIRS

Japanese Judicial Administration

1. Five bills affecting the judiciary were enacted by the Diet in October:

- (1) The Law Amending the Law for the Reserve Fund of Courts complies with those provisions of the Court Organization Law and the Diet Law providing reserve funds in the budget appropriation for the courts. The fund will be under the administration of the President of the Supreme Court subject to approval of the Judicial Assembly of the Supreme Court and will be used for emergency expenditures.
- (2) The Law for the People's Examination of the Supreme Court Judges implements Article 79 of the Constitution which provides that the appointment of Supreme Court judges shall be reviewed by popular vote at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following such appointment and at 10-year intervals following the initial review. If the majority of the voters favors the dismissal of any judge, he must relinquish his office. The law provides for a simple type of printed ballot for contesting results of the review in the Tokyo High Court and for penal provisions in cases of fraud.
- (3) The Law Amending the Court Organization Law provides that some judicial research officials may be first-class officials and increases the number of first-class officials among judges and court officials.
- (4) The Law Concerning the Status of Judges and Other Court Officials implements the provisions of the Constitution and of the Court Organization Law which provide for the removal of judges in case of mental or physical incompetence. It provides for punishment other than removal and describes procedures to be followed in disciplining a judge guilty of neglect or degradation. It also concerns the dismissal or discipline of court officials other than judges.

- (5) The Judges' Impeachment Law, implementing Article 78 of the Constitution, provides that a judge may be removed for gravely violating or neglecting his official duties or for conduct incompatible with the dignity of his office. Petitions for impeachment may be filed by any person with an Impeachment Committee consisting of 20 members of the House of Representatives. This Committee will perform functions similar to those of a grand jury. Impeachment trials will be held before an impeachment court consisting of seven members of each House of the Diet. Provision is also made for renewal of trials at any time upon discovery of new evidence or upon other justification. Under certain conditions defined by the Law judicial qualifications may be recovered five years following the date of removal. Trials must be public.

2. The Supreme Court for the first time made use of its rule-making power under the new Constitution with regard to transfer of jokoku (appeals on questions of law) cases for the High Court.

It specified that a High Court as a court of jokoku instance must transfer cases to the Supreme Court if the opinion of a High Court on questions of interpretation of the Constitution or of any other laws or ordinances would be, if written as a decision, contrary to a former decision of the Supreme Court, in conflict with that of another High Court or with a judgment previously rendered by the former Supreme Court or any old Court of Appeals as the court of jokoku instance.

3. Ninety-four candidates were designated by the Supreme Court for appointment as presidents of the 49 District Courts and the list was submitted to the Cabinet for action.

4. The first hearing of cases by the Supreme Court was held on 1 October. Among its other activities the Court is investigating causes of prolonged detention of unconvicted persons and protracted trials. A special committee of five judges was created to formulate a plan to protect individual rights in this field. The action was necessary because the facilities of the courts are so limited they are unable to try cases as promptly as desirable. As a result jails are crowded and sentencing is delayed.

5. The revised Criminal Code was enacted into law on 26 October and will take effect on 15 November. One of the most important revisions is the abolition of lese-majesty provisions, which had afforded the Emperor and members of the Imperial Family special protection against violations of their lives or reputations. By this revision the Diet went on record as considering the lese-majesty provisions no longer reconcilable with the new constitutional position of the Emperor and with the principle of the equality of all citizens.

The penal provisions concerning treason in wartime were eliminated as a logical consequence of the renunciation of war proclaimed in the new Constitution.

Provisions pertaining to crimes against reputation or libel were revised to allow greater freedom of speech, especially if allegations were made in the public interest. Public interest is assumed if a public official is the object of the allegation. In such cases truth is admitted as a defense.

The adultery provisions of the former Criminal Code, which discriminated against married women, were abolished. An attempt in the House of Councillors to make adultery equally punishable for both sexes failed.

INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

6. Investigation of 26 atrocity cases involving B-29 flyers and 111 miscellaneous cases was completed during the October reporting period, reducing the backlog of total investigations on hand.

ATROCITY INVESTIGATIONS

	Cases on Hand <u>25 Sep</u>	Cases Received <u>25 Sep-24 Oct</u>	Cases Completed <u>25 Sep-24 Oct</u>	Cases on Hand <u>24 Oct</u>
POW camp conditions	11	0	4	7
POW camp atrocities	125	1	15	111
POW ship	31	0	3	28
B-29 flyers	491	10	26	475
Kempeitai (Military Police)	31	0	0	31
Miscellaneous	<u>951</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>846</u>
Total	1,640	17	159	1,498

APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

7. The Japanese Government was directed to apprehend and deliver to Sugamo Prison 31 persons wanted for alleged war crimes, of whom 13 were former Army officers, two former Navy officers, 12 former Army and Navy enlisted men and four civilians.

8. The Government was notified of the deletion of 25 names from previous apprehension orders and the clarification of status of 105 previously suspected war criminals. The Government was also notified of the temporary release of one suspected war criminal and the release of another to undergo psychiatric examination.

9. Ninety-two persons suspected of committing war crimes were interned in Sugamo Prison, bringing the total interned to 1,062.

PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

10. As of 24 October a revised total of 385 war crimes suspects had been tried of whom 368 were found guilty and 17 acquitted. Of the total guilty 33 were given death sentences; five death sentences have been executed and 28 are awaiting approval. The remaining 335 war criminals were sentenced to terms ranging from six months to life at hard labor.

11. From 25 September to 20 October 11 trials were completed involving 21 persons of whom 16 were civilians and five were former military personnel. One person was acquitted and 20 received prison sentences ranging from six months to 20 years.

TRIAL OF WAR ATROCITY CASES  
Japan

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
KARIYA Yoshiaki	Guard	Civ	18 Sep 47- 25 Sep 47	11 years
ASADA Shigetsuchi	Clerk	Civ	24 Sep 47- 29 Sep 47	3 years
NODA Ietoshi	Liaison Officer	Civ		3 years
FUJITA Mitsuyoshi	Timekeeper and Interpreter	Civ	26 Sep 47- 30 Sep 47	6 months
UEDA Fumio	Guard	Civ	26 Sep 47- 2 Oct 47	15 years
YAMAMOTO Hiroshi	Guard	Civ		15 years
FUJII Shoichi	Guard	Civ		15 years
DATE Tatsuami	Guard	Civ		10 years
MITSUHASHI Yoshio	Acting Camp Commander	Asst Police Inspector	22 Sep 47- 7 Oct 47	5 years
NAKAO Masatake	Camp Commander	Police Superin- tendent		Acquitted
NEMOTO Ko	Acting Camp Commander	Asst Police Inspector		5 years
UCHIDA Kanemasu	2nd in Command	Sgt Maj	5 Sep 47- 7 Oct 47	20 years
NODA Eiichi	Adminis- trative NCO	Sgt	19 Sep 47- 14 Oct 47	20 years
NAGAHARA Keiji	Camp Commander	Capt	30 Sep 47- 14 Oct 47	1 year

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
SAITO Terukichi	Guard	Civ	6 Oct 47- 14 Oct 47	10 years
SASAKI Shoichi	Guard	Civ		5 years
SUDA Kiyematsu	Guard	Civ		7 years
YUTANI Seiichi	Guard	Civ		10 years
-----				
ISHIMATSU Matasuke	Camp Commander	1st Lt	6 Oct 47- 15 Oct 47	12 years
YAMAJI Koseki	2nd in Command	Sgt Maj		15 years
-----				
HATA Tatsumi	Cook	Civ	8 Oct 47- 20 Oct 47	20 years
-----				

12. In addition to cases completed and eight cases in session 15 cases were referred to the Commanding General, EIGHTH Army, for reference to a Military Commission for trial. There were 138 perpetrators whose cases are in various stages of preparation at the end of the October reporting period.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

	Paragraph
Defense of Koki Hirota. . . . .	15
Defense of Seishiro Itagaki . . . . .	21
Defense of Okinori Kaya . . . . .	29
Defense of Koichi Kido. . . . .	34
Defense of Heitaro Kimura . . . . .	37

13. Regular court sessions were held on 1-3, 6-10, 13-17, 20-24 and 27-30 October.

Eleven of the 25 accused have completed presentation of their individual defenses.

14. The Tribunal ruled on 1 October that the whole of documents admitted by the court rather than merely the part of the document read into the court transcript would be weighed as evidence.

DEFENSE OF KOKI HIROTA

15. Hirota was a career diplomat in the Japanese Foreign Office, serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs from September 1933 to February 1937, as Prime Minister from March 1936 to February 1937

and as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Konoye Cabinet from June 1937 until he resigned in May 1938. His defense was heard 26 September-3 October.

Opening Statement for Hirota

16. The accused was described by the defense as "one of the most outstanding men ever produced by Japan, widely and favorably known throughout Japan and most of the nations of the world as a liberal and progressive man who constantly strove for peaceful relations between Japan and all other nations. He was known and deeply respected both as a diplomat and statesman because of his uniform advocacy of peace and conciliation among nations.

"No responsible official in the Foreign Office was ever so naive as to think Japan could ever successfully dominate the 400 millions of people in China. Japan did try to protect the lives of its nationals and their legitimate property rights in China. It had no other motive as far as the Foreign Office was concerned. The principles and policies which Mr. Hirota advocated with respect to the China Incident ultimately met opposition from the Army and this in turn caused him to resign as Foreign Minister in the first Konoye Cabinet in May 1938.

"His assertion in the Diet of 1935 that 'there will be no war while I remain in office' is illustrative of his determination as a diplomat and statesman."

Testimony of Kazuo Kuwashima

17. The witness joined the Japanese diplomatic service in 1908. From August 1933 until January 1937 he was director of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs and in 1939 and 1940 he served as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Netherlands and to Brazil.

"It was Hirota's firm resolution on becoming Foreign Minister to alleviate the oppressive tension between China and Japan," the witness declared.

Hirota carried out his resolution steadily but after the Manchurian Incident the Chinese avoided association with the Japanese. This worked as an important restraint on the activities of the Japanese Ambassador to China.

18. Under cross-examination the witness quoted a purported statement of Hirota that he was constantly trying to work out a smooth relationship between diplomacy and national defense, and that in consequence the war budget problem would become urgent. Hirota said he intended to clarify his position, standing between as a third party. They would expand their utmost by foreign policy; when this policy arrived at its limits they would leave the matter to the Army and Navy for disposal.

The witness was asked if this quoted statement did not represent Hirota's real opinion and intentions when he first took office as Foreign Minister in 1933. The witness replied he didn't know when and in what connection Hirota made such a statement, but did know that in September because of the critical stage of Sino-Japanese relations it was Hirota's intention to bring about closer relations with China and also third powers.

The witness said he had never heard of such a statement.

Kuwashima said he was convinced that Hirota never had any idea of securing Japan's expansion by negotiation even if he could, or of using threats and ultimatums by the Army to secure compliance with his negotiation demands. When the Army conducted negotiations directly with the Chinese there never was an instance when they consulted either with Hirota or the Foreign Office. Hirota never allowed the Army and Navy to enforce Foreign Office demands. Hirota's negotiations were all conducted through regular diplomatic channels.

It was suggested to the witness that Hirota and his government took action to strengthen Japan's grip on Manchukuo and made it impossible for any peaceful negotiations to succeed. The witness stated his view was completely different.

#### Documentary Evidence

19. A document, "Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," issued in 1937 by Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, paid tribute to the efforts of Hirota in concluding negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo by Russia.

"The sale of the railway," the document stated, "must be regarded as the solution of one of the most complicated Far Eastern problems, and at the same time as the greatest positive event in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations. . . Hirota, the Japanese Minister, who has taken active part in all stages of the negotiations, has rendered no small service."

#### Testimony of Kensuke Horinouchi

20. The witness was Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs in the Hirota Cabinet from 10 April 1936 until he was appointed Ambassador to the United States on 15 October 1938.

In cross-examination the witness was asked "if there was a Cabinet meeting on 24 December 1937, which decided the outline of measures for the China Incident." He replied he remembered "an outline was decided on at about that time."

The document from which the following excerpts are taken was identified by the witness as the outline of measures for the China Incident and "Decision of the Cabinet Council on 24 December 1937."

The document stated: "With the development of their military activities in China, the occupational area had become extensive and it was necessary to carry out its management. They should not necessarily expect a conclusion of the negotiations with Nanking, but in order to cope with the resistance they should take measures according to the following policy in North and Central China. The purport of this policy should be declared to the world at a suitable occasion.

"In North China they should aim at the establishment of an anticommunistic, pro-Japanese and Manchurian regime, and inseparable relations between Japan, China and Manchuria, economically. They should promote these objects and strengthen this regime, which should be supervised to become the leading power of a new China.

"Regarding supervision of the regime, this should be done according to a policy of noninterference in the particulars of the administration, but restricted to internal supervision by Japanese advisers. The areas to be included in the regime should depend on the development of military operations, but should mainly be Hopei,



Shantung, Shansi, and a part of Chahar provinces. The Chitung self-government should be dissolved and absorbed by the new regime; likewise, the self-government of Chanan and Chinpei. Close relations should be maintained with the self-government of Mongolia.

"The object of the economic development in North China should be to strengthen the relation of Japanese and Manchurian economy, and establish the foundation of co-prosperity among those two nations and China. They should develop every line of economy by combining Chinese capital with their capital and technique and thereby strive for peace and stabilization and contribute the development of production of necessary materials for national defense in Japan and Manchukuo.

"They should pay attention to the harmonization of international revenues and disbursements and the adjustment of supply and demand. They should do their best to put Chinese in the limelight so they would not get the impression that economic pressure was put upon them. They should emphasize proper management so as not to betray the expectation of the nation.

"A national policy company for the development and control of North China economy should be organized to realize the industrial mobilization of Japan. This company should be responsible for the development and management of important industries.

"As to managing the company they should be careful to exercise control according to circumstances and to comply with the industrial plans of both Japan and Manchuria. Except for major transportation, communication, electric power generating and transmission, mining and salt enterprises, other industries should not be put under special control except for special reasons.

"In the economic development of North China they should utilize Chinese capital and cooperate with Chinese enterprises. Cooperative investment of funds by third countries should be permitted, and their existing economic connection should be kept in trade relations between Japan, Manchukuo and North China, and suitable adjustment should be made with regard to trade between North China and any third country.

"The government on the spot should gradually establish necessary facilities in regard to agricultural improvement, etc. Existing enterprises in North China, in connection with major industries, should be disposed of or adjusted according to this policy. They should immediately operate enterprises able to start at once, on condition that disposal or adjustment would be made according to this principle.

"In expectation of the establishment of a new regime in Central China the Special City should be an open port, and foreign rights should be recognized. To establish Japan's economic development in Central China with Shanghai as a base the areas around the concession should be called the Special City and a national policy company should be established to maintain control of the various public utilities. The scale and order of the undertakings of this company should be determined separately. The capital of the company should be provided from funds on the spot, so far as allowable for that purpose.

"Capital for Japanese entrepreneurs in the Special City and concession and the acquirement of real estate in the concession by Japanese should be taken into consideration separately. Official

establishments in the Special City formerly owned by Chinese authorities should be taken over and utilized. Those required by the Special City authorities for administration should be used by them.

"The Special City should be utilized as the base for communications, transportation and airways between the Shanghai vicinity and Japan, North China and Manchuria. Suitable steamship companies should make use of Chiukiang and Chaoshang Chu piers. Facilities for communication rights in the future would be controlled."

#### DEFENSE OF SEISHIRO ITAGAKI

21. Itagaki rose rapidly in the Kwantung Army from colonel in 1929 to chief of staff in 1936-37. He was Minister of War under Konoye and Hiranuma from June 1938 to August 1939. At the end of the war he was commanding general of the 7th Area Army in Singapore. His defense was presented 6-10 October.

#### Opening Statement for Itagaki

22. The statement declared that Itagaki:

- (1) Did not consciously join or participate with anyone in any plan or preparation for any war of aggression, or in the execution thereof, or any war in violation of international law.
- (2) Had no culpable or wrongful part in any of the incidents mentioned in the indictment and in the evidence.
- (3) Had no culpable or wrongful part in the causing of war against the United States, the Philippines, Great Britain, the Netherlands or Thailand.
- (4) Neither caused, counseled, ordered, permitted, committed or condoned any mistreatment of any prisoners of war at any place, but on the contrary, at all times and places with which he had anything to do endeavored to see to it that such prisoners were well and fairly treated and, within the limits of supplies available, that they were well fed, housed and clothed.
- (5) Did not commit, or cause, advise, command or condone any violations of the laws of war.

"The Mukden Incident was not planned but was a chance occurrence which happened following a long series of violent acts committed by the Chinese troops," the statement vouched. "The Kwantung Army and Japanese nationals, being in a place where they had a right to be, in order to defend against the violent and murderous acts of the Chinese troops, took actions and measures solely for self-defense."

There was no plan to set up a military government of Manchuria and none was set up. There was no plan, so far as the Japanese were concerned, to have Manchuria secede from China and set up an independent state, and the movement which resulted in such secession and the establishment of Manchukuo originated with and was accomplished by Manchurians themselves, the statement declared.

Testimony of Shinhichiro Kokubu

23. The witness was a 5th Division staff officer on the China front under General Itagaki.

The 5th Division, commanded by Itagaki, was moving toward Paoting at the time of the Nanking capture and atrocities, the witness stated. Needless to say, the officers and men of the 5th Division had nothing to do with the Nanking affair.

Itagaki advocated and practiced enforcement of strict disciplinary measures among his officers, the witness testified. His policy was to punish severely, according to military law, any guilty man. He attached importance to the responsibility of commanding officers and reprimanded such officers when they neglected their duties in enforcing discipline.

Testimony of Inosuke Furuno

24. The witness was formerly president of the Domei News Agency.

In April 1938 Konoye asked the witness to visit Itagaki, whom he had known since World War I days, in Peking and ask his opinion about settling the China Incident and also what would be his intention if he were recommended to be Minister of War.

In reply to this question Itagaki said very earnestly that they must reach a peaceful conclusion, withdrawing the entire forces from China as soon as possible. He stated he was not qualified for the post of Minister of War as he was a junior in the Army, and since he had long served in the line of supreme command he was uninformed as to administrative matters.

25. When asked in cross-examination if Itagaki was successful, the witness knew that after Itagaki became Minister of War the war in China intensified and extended to Central and South China. Asked if he kept an interest in Itagaki's speeches and activities after he became Minister of War, the witness stated he did not give particular attention to Itagaki after he became Minister of War. He gave his attention to general conditions.

The witness was in Japan the last part of June 1938. Asked if he knew that Itagaki, in an interview with the Domei News Agency on 26 June 1938, stated that Japan should be prepared to fight for 10 more years and asked for popular support, the witness stated that he had no recollection of that, but it was possible Itagaki said it.

Testimony of Junjiro Ihara

26. When the witness arrived at his post as Chief of Staff of the Korean Army, 9 July 1942, it had been decided that 1,000 POWs should be kept in Korea. The POW camps were either newly built or reconstructed.

Itagaki, the Army commander, was concerned about English POWs who were to come to Korea in cold weather. Considering that also they must be weak and sick from their long voyage, he instructed his men about the preservation of POWs' health and asked them to be careful about the position of the camps and equipment.

27. Under cross-examination the witness identified a document submitted by the prosecution as a message from Itagaki to Tojo dated 23 March 1942, from which this excerpt was quoted: "The purpose of interning U. S. and British POWs in Korea was to make Koreans realize the true might of Japan and contribute to psychological propaganda for stamping out ideas of worship of Europe and America."

The witness also identified a telegram to the Minister of War from which was quoted:

"Since it would be effective in stamping out Korean admiration for Britain and the U. S. and as the Governor General and the Army were strongly desirous of it, the Chief of Staff wished one thousand British and one thousand U. S. POWs be interned in Korea." The Vice-minister of War was asked to give special consideration regarding this matter.

In a telegram replying, which showed on its face that it was approved by Tojo, who was concurrently Minister of War, Tokyo authorities agreed to send "about 1,000 white men" but suggested that the buildings of two theological schools in Seoul where the prisoners were to be confined were "too good."

#### Testimony of Itagaki

28. Cross-examination of the witness began on 7 October following the reading of his 44-page deposition.

The witness denied ever having talked with the former General Ryukichi Tanaka who had testified previously as a prosecution witness that in June 1931 Itagaki had told him Japan's only hope for settlement of Manchurian troubles was "to resort to force."

Itagaki also denied he had a conversation with Dr. Shumei Okawa, now in a hospital for the insane, in which he had expressed similar ideas.

The witness testified he had not seen Okawa for six years prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

In further cross-examination the witness was asked who sent Doihara to China in 1938. He answered that Prince Konoye had done so, and then added that Doihara, together with Vice-admiral Tsuda of the Navy, was appointed by the Government to assist Lieutenant General Banzai. Their objective was to get together the best men who were out of office and who had an earnest desire for peace and to create an atmosphere favorable to peace.

The witness stated that Kagesa, who went to China after Doihara returned, was to contact Wang Chao-ming (Wang Ching-wei) and bring him from Hanoi to Shanghai. Wang had escaped from China in order to begin a peace movement.

Continuing the cross-examination the witness was asked if he was severely reprimanded by the Emperor on the occasion of an audience in regard to the Cabinet decision on the Changkufeng Incident. The witness denied the prosecution's suggestion that he was reprimanded.

#### DEFENSE OF OKIHORI KAYA

29. Kaya was Minister of Finance under Konoye and Tojo. He was asked to resign his post as Minister of Finance in 1938 because his moderate policy was regarded with disfavor. He resigned as Minister of Finance a second time on 19 February 1944, this time at the request of Premier Tojo.

#### Opening Statement for Kaya

30. The opening statement said by way of preface that not only is there a paucity of evidence against the accused Kaya to sustain the charges of the prosecution under the indictment, except for the fact that he held conventional administrative offices in the Konoye and Tojo Cabinets, but that there was nothing in the record of the trial to sustain the charges against him.

31. Kaya was president of the North China Development Company from August 1938 to October 1941. This company was supervised by the China Affairs Board and the witness was not permitted to act on his own initiative.

Kaya had a strong desire to avoid war long before he became a member of Tojo's Cabinet. He had no connection with the Imperial Conferences of July and September 1941 nor did he know anything about these Conferences. In October 1941, when Tojo requested him to become Minister of Finance, he did so only after receiving the assurance from Tojo that the new Cabinet would endeavor to maintain peace and would adopt policies to that end.

After joining the Cabinet, Kaya worked toward the amicable settlement of the Japanese-American negotiations. He endeavored to prevent war even if the negotiations were not successful. However, the conditions at that time placed it beyond his power to prevent war. Dissatisfied as he was with the outcome, he did not resign from his post because he could not do so as a loyal citizen of the country. However, he assented to the decision for war because he clearly recognized that the war was inevitable.

The opening statement denied that he was a party to any plan to wage battles in breach of laws of land warfare, or that he gave silent approval to such acts.

Treatment of POWs was a matter outside his jurisdiction, the statement declared.

#### Testimony of Kaya

32. The witness testified that he had devoted his entire career as an official of the Ministry of Finance, with the exception of about two years as president of the North China Development Company.

"In the Finance Ministry, a great part of my time was spent in the study and evaluation of military budgets and other civil budgets, and during this period I constantly endeavored to slash military budgets and prevent them from increasing. The prevailing conditions at the time made this task extremely difficult, but I believe I succeeded in no small degree in suppressing the growth of military budgets.

"I attended the Geneva and London Naval Disarmament Conferences as a member of the Japanese delegations and exerted myself toward the successful culmination of the disarmament treaties.

"My efforts to suppress the military budgets and successfully conclude the disarmament conferences were due to the instruction of my superior officials and to my personal desire to maintain a healthy national finance and thus lessen the burdens of the people and a strong hope for the maintenance of peace.

". . .The demands for military budgets increased greatly after November 1932. I vehemently opposed the increased demands and fought to the best of my ability to keep them down.

"I opposed especially the dispatching of troops to Shanghai for I believed it would spread the Incident wider. I asked for reconsideration, but my request came to no avail, for the other Cabinet members thought the dispatching of troops was necessary in order to protect Japanese interest. However, on every occasion I tried my best to limit the budgets required for the dispatching of troops."

The witness denied that he knew anything about the five-year plan for steel and the Third Plan for North China which were adopted by the Government while he was Vice-minister of Finance, and likewise the Army Five-year Plan for Heavy Industries, allegedly adopted while he was Minister of Finance from June 1937 to May 1938. The Cabinet did not adopt any such plan, he declared.

Concerning the North China Development Company the witness testified that "all major acts of the Company, including the granting of approval to its affiliated companies, were made at the instruction and approval of the China Affairs Board. The Company was prohibited from taking any action on its own.

"The company's accounts were mostly in the red and subsidies from the Japanese Government were required to pay private stockholders dividends of not more than six percent per annum. Most of the affiliated companies were in the red or made very little profit. In the payment of dividends the Japanese stockholders were not given special favors.

"On the night of 17 October 1941, Tojo requested me over the telephone to join his Cabinet as Finance Minister. Before giving my reply, I requested an interview. To my query as to whether he (Tojo) was decided on waging war against the United States, he replied in the negative and stated he intended to continue with the Japanese-American negotiations and exert his efforts toward an amicable settlement.

"I was satisfied with the interview and felt that I should join the Cabinet and do what I could to help steer the State to a peaceful landing. So I consented.

"After joining the Cabinet, I did everything within my power to avoid war but there were two causes pointing toward a possible war: the first was the military pressure of the Allied Powers and the second was the economic pressure by these Powers."

At the liaison conference between the Supreme Command and the Cabinet on 1 November 1941, the Supreme Command insisted on an immediate war decision, asserting that "the defensive power of Japan in the western Pacific in comparison with that of the Allied Powers will day by day decline."

"I argued strongly against making an immediate decision," Kaya said. "But after thinking it over I came to the conclusion, regardless of whether the issue in question be good or bad, circumstance did not permit me to stop it. If I opposed it, there was

nothing I could do except to resign. I felt that if I resigned, the effect both at home and abroad would be unfavorable towards the settlement of the Japanese-American negotiations and thus aggravate the possibility of a war between the United States and Japan.

"My assent for war was inevitable. However, I firmly believed we were fighting a war in self-defense and for our very existence."

33. Under cross-examination Kaya was shown to have made numerous speeches throughout Japan relating to the war effort. From one of these speeches, given by Kaya when he was chairman of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Round-table Conference, the following is excerpted:

"It is hardly necessary to mention that the main aim of the Imperial Army's attack in the present China Incident lies in the destruction of the Chiang Kai-shek regime which is thoroughly ridden with anti-Japanese and pro-communistic policy--a regime which does not understand the position of the Chinese nation and its real mission in East Asia. However, within the last 10 days we have received joyful reports that Wuchang, Hankow and Canton have been occupied. That now the Chiang Kai-shek regime has suffered a most crippling blow militarily, financially and economically, and that it has fallen into a process of destruction is seen as a great advance toward achievement of the purpose of the holy war.

"I am continually lost in admiration of the valour of the Imperial Army and, at the same time, I also have the deepest gratitude for the loyalty and labors of our officers and soldiers. However, it is also hardly necessary to say that the aim of the present holy war consists not merely in the annihilation of the Chiang Kai-shek regime but also in the establishment of a new regime friendly to both Japan and Manchukuo in order that there may be hope of building a new revived China, and furthermore, it consists in the establishment of a basis of peace in the Orient through formulating a far-reaching plan between Japan, Manchukuo and China. Therefore, unless the construction of a new era is completed, it cannot be said that the mission of our troops in the holy war has been completed; also for the achievement of so-called victory, it cannot be said that the mission has been completed. As long as the completion of this stage is not in sight, I think that we cannot compensate the millions of souls who have sacrificed their precious lives in defense of their fatherland at war and have been enrolled among the gods in the Yasukuni shrine. In order really to establish a foundation for peace in the Orient, there must be perfected a really strong national union between Japan, Manchukuo and China, which is more than the single phrase 'friendly cooperation.'

"One may safely say that this is the dawn of a new East Asia and, moreover, that it is the foundation period of a new East Asia. To realize this ideal, namely, to be a real stabilizing force in East Asia we must contrive to establish and expand powerful armaments and commensurably strong economic power, since it is necessary to have powerful means in order to realize the ideal. The existence of strong economic power which unites financially all the various economic factors such as production, trade, traffic and communication forms the underlying foundation of powerful armaments. In the present Incident it has been keenly realized how greatly armaments, on the material side, depend for support on economic power, particularly in war times, although it is also true in normal times."

#### DEFENSE OF KOICHI KIDO

34. Kido served close to the Emperor as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. His grandfather, Marquis Takayoshi Kido, was one of the three founders of the government in the Meiji era. His father, Marquis Takamasa Kido, was Grand Chamberlain to Emperor Meiji's son, who became Emperor Taisho. Marquis Kido kept a diary from 1930 to 1945, setting down detailed entries about the succession of political events. His defense was heard 14-23 October.

#### Direct Testimony of Kido

35. "My assumption of the office of Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal coincided with the start of a series of incidents in the government of Japan which were marked by several assassinations as the military attempted coups d'etat," Kido testified.

"I did everything in my power to counteract the militarists' forcible machinations and divert them into proper channels within the pale of my official duty."

Both as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal the witness declared he was a court official having no power or responsibility for political or military affairs.

"On 10 September 1931 I agreed with other high-ranking officials that if the Chinese commenced trouble in China, Japan would have to defend herself since the position of the Japanese people in Manchuria was becoming dangerous.

"After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on 19 September 1931, the Army's attitude became so tough that even the problem of national reform began to be discussed.

"All my strenuous efforts to localize the Incident proved to be fruitless, however, and the Incident went on expanding. It would appear that the Cabinet's policy of localization and nonexpansion was virtually ignored. Hence the questions of cabinet reconstruction and formation of a national or coalition cabinet were raised. On 17 November 1931, Finance Minister Inoue stated that a coalition cabinet would not be strong enough to control the military, and if unchecked in its disregard of international relations, the country might be led to its own ruin.

"As Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal I had no connection whatsoever in the formulation or execution of any plans in support of the Manchurian Incident.

"I have never collaborated or conspired with anyone to bring about the Manchurian Incident or encourage its continuance.

"I have always opposed Fascism.

"I had absolutely nothing to do with the commencement of the China Incident which broke out while I was president of the Board of Peerage in the Imperial Household Department.

"I knew of no preparations for that Incident, did not participate in any preparations, did not know it was going to happen and did not conspire or plan with anyone to bring it about.

"Four months after the beginning of the Incident, I joined Konoye's Cabinet as Education Minister to assist him in terminating



the China Affair as soon as possible.

"As Education Minister I respected the request of educational leaders for self-autonomy and never interfered with their freedom of thought.

"Previous testimony that the school system was reorganized and more time was devoted to military training and teaching of military subjects. . .under my ministry is absolutely false.

"Concerning the Konoye statement of 16 January 1938 of not dealing with Chiang Kai-shek, I did sign it as one of the Cabinet. Since it was ascertained that Chiang Kai-shek had no bona fides in restoring peace with Japan, the Japanese Government thought it a short-cut for settlement of the China Affair to take constructive measures in China in conjunction with those Chinese who share Japan's ideals rather than to overrun the vast territory of China with armed forces. Later I realized the unwisdom of this policy and agreed that the policy should be changed.

"The first time I ever heard of the Nanking atrocities was after the end of the war.

"I had no part in the commencement of the Changkufeng Incident involving Russian border troops in 1938, which I contended should be settled through peaceful channels.

"I disapproved of forming the alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy. I feared it would lead to war between Japan and America.

"I never knew, until I saw Prince Konoye's memoirs, that the plan decided at the Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941 contemplated an advance to French Indo-China and was to be carried on even if it meant recourse to war against the U. S. A. and Britain.

"As recorded in the diary of 7 August 1941 I most sincerely and earnestly tried to show Prince Konoye the hopelessness of Japan's even considering going to war with America from the standpoint of oil alone. Our hopes lay in the southern regions but I had no thought of obtaining needed materials other than by peaceful means.

"I asked Prince Konoye if he could not abandon the draft agenda for the Imperial Conference of 6 September, consisting of the following three points, but failed:

- "(1) War preparations be made against America and Britain.
- "(2) In parallel, the negotiations with America be pushed very hard.
- "(3) In case no prospect of an amicable conclusion of the negotiations with America came in sight by the first 10 days of October, Japan to make up her mind to wage war with America and Britain.

"On 5 September 1941 when the Emperor asked Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama when the projected southern campaign would be terminated, he replied that he expected the campaign would be terminated in a short period of time, whereupon His Majesty reprimanded Marshal Sugiyama, reminding him that he said a similar thing at the outbreak of the China Affair, which was not yet settled.

"In the Imperial Conference of 6 September President of the Privy Council Hara, at my suggestion, asked if primary importance was attached to diplomatic negotiations. When the High Command did not reply, the Emperor 'took it to task.'

"The Emperor then ordered the High Command to extend a full measure of cooperation in the diplomatic negotiations, clearly manifesting Imperial wishes to avoid war by all means.

"On 11 September 1941 War Minister Tojo told me that the Army was making strenuous efforts to bring negotiations to conclusion but, he added, the Army was bound at the same time to make preparations for war.

"I approved Tojo to become Prime Minister after the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet in October 1941 on condition he would disregard the decision of the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941. I had only one motive in recommending Tojo, and that was to avert war with America.

"I was opposed to the Pacific war from the beginning to end. I never supported it in any positive way. I endeavored hard to seize every opportunity to avert it, as already mentioned. But alas! The American reply of 26 November made me helpless, depriving me of all possible means to save the situation at the eleventh hour. The subsequent events took their implacable course with the really regrettable result that the war dogs were unleashed. When hostilities opened I decided there was only one course for me. I would render my best services to the Emperor and work for peace. In taking a long-range view of Japan's future, I decided to try to save the country from impending misfortune by putting forth every ounce of energy to assist the Emperor, however difficult and trying the task might be. It is to be profoundly regretted that the developments of the war situation falsified all anticipations, indeed so much so that Japan had to surrender unconditionally. It is my sole consolation, however, that at the close of the war I was able to give full play to my bold activity under the august virtues of the Emperor, thereby succeeding in preventing the Japanese mainland from becoming a battleground and saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of people."

#### Cross-examination of Kido

36. The Chief of Counsel, questioning the witness concerning the powers of the Emperor, asked:

"Are you intending to say that if the Cabinet agreed upon war the Emperor of Japan would have no actual power to prevent it?"

The witness replied: "Yes, the Emperor had no power to prevent it."

Concerning the Emperor's Rescript he was asked, "Was it not intended to cause the people of Japan to believe that this was the real will of the Emperor himself and this was a war which he authorized and believed to be in the best interest of his people?"

Kido replied: "At that time the Government's explanation was that there was no alternative but for the nation to rise in arms for the defense and existence of the Empire, and, therefore, Japan was by such circumstances placed in a position where war was unavoidable. The Imperial Rescript was something that came together with, parallel with, the decision for war and was a natural act."

Asked whether he was in favor of the Pacific war, he answered: "No. Inasmuch as the decision had already been made by the Government, whatever may have been my personal views or opinions, I had no authority to oppose."

Concerning the Emperor's authority to select prime ministers, the former Lord Keeper said that the Emperor instructed him to consult the Senior Statesmen on the selection of a suitable person to occupy the post of prime minister and make recommendations.

#### DEFENSE OF HEITARO KIMURA

37. Kimura was chief of staff of the Kwantung Army from 22 October 1940 until 10 April 1941. He was Vice-minister of War in the Tojo Cabinet. His defense was presented 24-27 October.

#### Opening Statement for Kimura

38. The opening statement in defining the duties, powers and responsibilities of Vice-minister of War Kimura declared:

- (1) He did not formulate policies, nor advise in their formulation. He acted only under prescribed regulations and assisted the Minister of War on purely administrative matters.
- (2) Kimura concentrated his energy chiefly on ordnance administrative matters and at the same time endeavored to establish and maintain harmony in the Ministry.
- (3) Concerning the trial of the Doolittle flyers, Kimura was not responsible for any decision in connection with the matter.
- (4) The treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees in the Burma area was generally good during the time that General Kimura was in command of Japanese forces in Burma from August 1944 until the end of the war.
- (5) Important orders issued by the Minister of War were preceded by the words "as the Minister has decided so I sent this note by order."
- (6) Kimura as Vice-minister of War was an assistant to the Minister of War on military administrative affairs, but not concerning state affairs, the statement declared.

#### Testimony of Naoichi Kawahara

39. The witness, who was Adjutant General of the Ministry of War from August 1939 to February 1943, worked with Kimura under War Minister Tojo.

Vice-minister Kimura took charge of almost all of the routine and ceremonial affairs and miscellaneous business of the Minister, the witness testified.

Even after he became Premier and concurrently Minister of War, General Tojo managed all affairs of the Ministry of War for himself with strenuous efforts, so that the powers of vice-minister and the matters under his charge were the same as before and were not extended at all; nor was he ordered to act for the Minister.

Vice-minister Kimura never attended Liaison Conferences or Imperial Conferences.

Either by direct order of the Minister or in accordance with his confirmed intention, a policy or plan important to the Army was formed by the competent bureau and department, and was deliberated by departments and bureaus concerned and became a definite plan through the Minister's final decision.

The matters in the Ministry of War concerning the treatment of prisoners of war lay chiefly in the hands of the chief of the Prisoner of War Control Department, but other chiefs of bureaus disposed of POW matters which fell under their jurisdiction, holding themselves directly responsible to the Minister.

Testimony of Tadakatsu Tanaka

40. During the duration of Kimura's tenure as Vice-minister of War the witness was always with him and assisted him as secretary attached to the Vice-minister. The witness had previously served as staff officer of various army units.

Until his assumption of office of Vice-minister, Kimura was exclusively a genuine soldier chiefly engaged in artillery education, technical administration of arms and as army commander. He did his best in the field of ordnance administration with his profound knowledge and experience in this line.

During his tenure of office as Vice-minister, Kimura was not in a position to play his role positively on account of the surroundings at that time. Minister Tojo was well versed in military administration, especially proficient in business affairs, besides being a man of special industry. With "Command at the Head of the Column" and "Simplification and Dispatch of Business" as mottoes, he held power over principal bureau and department chiefs and ordered them direct, and conducted business positively and decisively. Most of these bureau and department chiefs were in their respective positions for a long time and they were all skilled men of ability; so they conducted business promptly and correctly, faithfully complying with the intention of the Minister. Under such circumstances, the actual state of affairs at that time was that Vice-minister Kimura naturally used his ability principally in the sphere of ordnance administration, in which he was well versed; and simultaneously endeavored to help the skilled and talented Minister as well as bureau and department chiefs to display their abilities to the fullest extent.

Since Minister Tojo was always extremely pressed with various miscellaneous business matters in addition to important state affairs, ceremonial matters of all kinds and other miscellaneous businesses were almost exclusively transacted by the Vice-minister so that the Minister might concentrate his energy chiefly on important matters.

The military police (Kempei-tai) were under direct control of the Minister of War.

Matters concerning employment of POWs on the Burma-Siam railway were outside Kimura's jurisdiction.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION  
of  
NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
in  
JAPAN

Number 25

October 1947

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ECONOMIC

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SECTION 1  
AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

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AGRARIAN REFORM

Land Sales

1. Land sales to tenant farmers in 24 prefectures under the agrarian reform program reached 69,568 cho (170,483 acres) on 30 September with a total of 312,280 tenant purchasers, a gain of 18,129 cho (44,427 acres) over revised totals on 31 August.

LAND SALES TO TENANT FARMERS a/  
(cho) b/

<u>Prefecture</u>	<u>September Sales</u>	<u>Sales Cumulative to 30 September</u>	<u>Purchasers (households)</u>
Aomori	2,954	4,888	13,165
Iwate	3,136	3,136	10,560
Miyagi	0	154	609
Akita	0	2,785	4,323
Yamagata	0	10,581	40,780
Gumma	76	76	462
Saitama	11	11	58
Chiba	0	15	82
Kanagawa	1	1	1
Toyama	0	6,761	30,438
Ishikawa	0	6,288	31,944
Fukui	2,732	2,732	16,053
Gifu	0	8,324	54,498
Shizuoka	1,874	1,874	1,303
Aichi	1,066	2,655	19,201
Mie	329	2,264	14,399
Shiga	0	1,672	11,040
Kyoto	720	720	4,761



<u>Prefecture</u>	<u>September Sales</u>	<u>Sales Cumulative to 30 September</u>	<u>Purchasers (households)</u>
Osaka	2,069	4,509	17,754
Nara	717	2,414	10,589
Wakayama	0	4,508	25,287
Shimane	2,187	2,534	1,568
Okayama	148	538	3,327
Kumamoto	109	128	68

a/ Preliminary.

b/ One cho equals 2.4506 acres.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Government Purchasing Program

2. Government land purchases of 348,730 cho (854,598 acres) on 2 October, the third purchase date, brought the total land purchased to 697,016 cho (1,708,107 acres). About 272,854 cho (668,656 acres) have also been turned over to the Government in lieu of tax payments, bringing the total land available for resale to 969,870 cho (2,376,763 acres).

GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS OF LAND FOR RESALE TO FARMERS a/  
(cho) b/

<u>Prefecture</u>	<u>Purchases</u>		<u>Taken in Lieu of Taxes</u>	<u>Total Acquired</u>
	<u>2 October</u>	<u>Total</u>		
Hokkaido	40,478	79,277	6,540	85,817
Aomori	9,523	18,341	6,599	24,940
Iwate	3,083	13,551	3,924	17,475
Miyagi	12,816	29,376	10,535	39,911
Akita	8,732	17,110	19,292	36,402
Yamagata	10,803	24,688	18,002	42,690
Fukushima	4,388	19,992	8,434	28,426
Ibaraki	11,000	31,114	21,652	52,766
Tochigi	15,074	19,502	8,011	27,513
Gunma	7,057	12,028	2,168	14,196
Saitama	25,324	32,961	4,074	37,035
Chiba	19,316	24,403	11,185	35,588
Tokyo	1,208	1,627	13,101	14,728
Kanagawa	5,270	6,696	2,437	9,133
Niigata	21,524	25,912	54,821	80,733
Toyama	5,710	13,079	4,239	17,318
Ishikawa	2,850	9,329	2,296	11,625
Fukui	3,011	9,291	291	9,582
Yamanashi	4,888	7,935	2,924	10,859
Nagano	11,196	21,417	4,285	25,702
Gifu	6,647	16,748	4,391	21,139
Shizuoka	5,734	14,060	5,139	19,199
Aichi	10,472	16,610	3,270	19,880
Mie	7,810	12,356	2,149	14,505
Shiga	5,132	7,950	637	8,587
Kyoto	6,133	8,698	450	9,148
Osaka	2,583	8,309	1,412	9,721
Hyogo	8,414	18,420	1,670	20,090
Nara	4,714	7,398	626	8,024
Wakayama	1,728	6,620	411	7,031

Prefecture	Purchases		Taken in Lieu of Taxes	Total Acquired
	2 October	Total		
Tottori	1,631	8,569	3,298	11,867
Shimane	4,720	10,406	7,255	17,661
Okayama	7,458	13,716	1,781	15,497
Hiroshima	5,826	11,951	1,616	13,567
Yamaguchi	1,543	7,011	1,004	8,015
Tokushima	3,600	6,414	1,804	8,218
Kagawa	5,150	8,887	5,197	14,084
Ehime	5,100	11,029	2,802	13,831
Kochi	2,592	6,152	1,142	7,294
Fukuoka	5,987	14,093	4,021	18,114
Saga	220	7,099	1,852	8,951
Nagasaki	3,722	7,829	1,927	9,756
Kumamoto	731	15,347	8,840	24,187
Oita	4,864	9,266	1,584	10,850
Miyazaki	8,485	13,909	3,102	17,011
Kagoshima	4,483	10,540	664	11,204

a/ Preliminary.

b/ One chc equals 2.4506 acres.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

#### Educational Program

3. More than 5,000,000 copies of a pamphlet on land reform were distributed to rural communities under the agrarian reform education program of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

#### LAND RECLAMATION

4. The Government reclaimed more than 6,000 hectares of land during August, bringing the total land-reclaimed since 15 August 1945 to 265,979 hectares.

#### LAND RECLAIMED August 1947 (hectares)

	<u>Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku</u>	<u>Hokkaido</u>	<u>Total</u>
Paddy land	251	-	251
Upland	<u>3,313</u>	<u>2,821</u>	<u>6,134</u>
Total	3,564	2,821	6,385

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

#### FLOOD DAMAGE

5. Summer typhoons accompanied by heavy rains damaged more than 50,000 hectares of cultivated land, over 38,000 irrigation facilities and approximately 7,176 kilometers of roads and canals serving farming areas in 43 of the 46 prefectures.

6. The September floods damaged approximately 29,675 hectares of farmlands to the extent of ¥ 1,152,874,171. Repair costs of roads, reservoirs, dams and canals serving farming areas rose to ¥ 3,224,773,722.

Greatest damage occurred in parts of northern Honshu and the mountains adjoining the Kanto plain. In Gumma Prefecture, where one entire village was devastated, the damage totaled ¥ 1,078,654,672 including ¥ 303,867,675 for 5,940 hectares of cultivated land and ¥ 774,786,997 for facilities serving farmlands. Losses in Iwate Prefecture totaled ¥ 608,430,078 including ¥ 175,342,264 for the repair of 4,480 hectares of cultivated land. Repair costs in Saitama Prefecture were set at ¥ 575,007,410 and Tochigi's amounted to ¥ 476,976,000.

7. Floods during June, July and August accounted for damages totaling ¥ 2,657,869,969 including ¥ 637,267,651 for 21,207 hectares of cropland.

FLOOD DAMAGES TO FARMING AREAS  
(June - September)

Prefecture	Cultivated Land		Irrigation Dams, Reservoirs, Canals, Farm Roads (yen)	Total (yen)
	(hectares)	(yen)		
Hokkaido	4,925	45,707,000	375,648,420	421,355,420
Aomori	1,359	44,275,800	144,505,500	188,781,300
Iwate	5,981	223,575,964	537,297,844	760,873,808
Miyagi	2,702	140,438,055	257,821,779	398,259,834
Akita	6,833	189,465,460	266,668,339	456,133,799
Yamagata	2,580	98,167,600	300,464,300	398,631,900
Niigata	1,560	29,037,735	141,761,755	170,799,490
Nagano	225	5,992,820	99,684,060	105,676,880
Fukushima	478	9,509,800	73,120,000	82,629,800
Ibaraki	4,489	122,154,140	253,832,359	375,986,499
Tochigi	714	79,632,000	397,344,000	476,976,000
Gumma	5,940	303,867,675	774,786,997	1,078,654,672
Saitama	3,350	181,518,110	393,489,300	575,007,410
Chiba	76	2,110,000	11,113,000	13,223,000
Tokyo	115	4,412,100	49,930,155	54,342,255
Kanagawa	100	3,789,500	28,889,390	32,678,890
Fukui	41	1,148,700	20,318,770	21,467,470
Yamanashi	766	25,132,677	78,189,363	103,322,040
Shizuoka	139	3,658,400	36,605,750	40,264,150
Aichi	685	9,007,100	68,249,300	77,256,300
Mie	574	8,391,760	34,755,960	43,147,720
Shiga	607	6,925,000	4,794,174	11,719,174
Shimane	31	1,944,290	6,470,390	8,414,680
Toyama	210	3,325,930	43,098,400	46,424,330
Ishikawa	432	11,765,630	35,110,800	46,876,430
Gifu	290	8,726,440	48,351,250	57,077,690
Kyoto	258	6,599,490	24,980,140	31,579,630
Hyogo	1,774	49,950,210	178,044,170	227,994,380
Wakayama	1,308	79,697,325	102,303,120	182,000,445
Okayama	109	2,183,600	36,438,400	38,622,000
Hiroshima	354	14,465,437	96,454,760	110,920,197
Yamaguchi	64	3,608,234	27,179,865	30,788,099
Tokushima	54	800,000	2,500,000	3,300,000
Kagawa	130	2,995,600	8,266,000	11,261,600
Ehime	188	6,434,230	9,724,190	16,158,420

Prefecture	Cultivated Land		Irrigation Dams, Reservoirs, Canals, Farm Roads (yen)	Total (yen)
	(hectares)	(yen)		
Kochi	313	20,097,975	41,127,920	61,225,895
Fukuoka	5	158,800	11,036,000	11,194,800
Saga	228	5,310,840	42,917,400	48,228,240
Nagasaki	40	413,000	15,718,500	16,131,500
Kumamoto	448	17,262,200	60,155,950	77,418,150
Oita	39	1,326,100	5,872,870	7,198,970
Miyazaki	188	8,000,000	42,600,000	50,600,000
Kagoshima	180	7,159,095	57,755,500	64,914,595

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Land Development Bureau.


#### CROP CONDITIONS

8. Mid-September floods caused heavy vegetable losses in the Kanto plain region supplying Tokyo markets.


9. Anticipated crops of rice and sweet potatoes were considerably reduced by the floods plus some drought and insect damage in limited areas of the Kinki, Chugoku and Kyushu regions during August and early September.

#### DAIRY PRODUCTS AND LIVESTOCK

10. July milk production of 15,469,000 liters was an increase of 2,096,000 over June and 477,000 under August production of 15,946,000, the peak output for the calendar year.



11. Livestock slaughtered in August totaled 27,972, an increase of 824 over July, as shown in the chart on the following page. The number of cattle slaughtered increased from 15,476 in July to 17,342, horses rose from 4,163 to 4,442, hogs declined from 6,359 to 5,283 and goats, sheep and calves fell from 1,150 to 905.



#### SEED CONTROL

12. The Agricultural Seeds and Seedlings Control Law promulgated by the Government on 2 October required that all seeds be accurately labeled as to quality (germination and adulteration), variety and freedom from disease. Similar standards are required for nursery trees, seedlings, transplants and bulbs.

#### FISHERIES

##### Fish Landings


13. September marine production totaled 113,280 metric tons, an increase of 1,488 over August. Increases in five of the 12 species reported in both months brought fish landings to 863 metric tons over August. The catch of sea animals, shellfish and seaweeds totaled 34,707 metric tons, 2,351 more than August.

##### Fishing Fleet


14. Steel and wooden fishing vessels over five gross tons totaled 15,247 in September with a combined tonnage of 375,518, an increase of 209 ships over August. Steel craft, primarily whalers and trawlers, totaled 138,379 tons. Wooden vessels were nearly double steel craft with 237,139 tons. See the graph on page 68.

# MARINE LANDINGS


MONTHLY SINCE MARCH 1946



## SEPTEMBER MARINE LANDINGS - BY REGIONS




## SEPTEMBER MARINE LANDINGS - BY SPECIES



NOTE: IT IS BELIEVED THAT A PORTION OF THE MARINE LANDINGS IS NOT REPORTED TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.  
 \* OTHER INCLUDES MISCELLANEOUS FISH, SMELL-FISH, CRUSTACEANS, CUTTLER-FISH AND OCTOPUS, SEA CUCUMBER, WHALES, AND SEAWEED

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, BUREAU OF FISHERIES.  
 GHQ-SCAP JAPAN - OCT 47

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#### EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

##### Cotton Allocations

15. Fisheries were allocated 1,995 metric tons of cotton for nets during the October-December quarter, an increase of 363 metric tons over the July-September allotment and 52 percent of the reported requirements.

##### Petroleum Allocations

16. Allocations of gas oil, kerosene and lubricating oil for the fishing industry declined in October. Other items remained unchanged from September.


#### ALLOCATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (barrels) a/

	September	October
Fuel oil	144,670	144,670
Gas oil	21,732	21,423
Kerosene	3,583	2,943
Gasoline	717	717
Lubricating oil	11,171	9,303
Grease (metric tons)	15	15

a/ One barrel equals 42 U. S. gallons.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

## DIESEL OIL ALLOTMENTS TO FISHING INDUSTRY



17. Authorized allotments of petroleum products for the antarctic whaling expedition included over 375,000 barrels of Navy diesel and special oils.

### PETROLEUM ALLOTMENTS FOR THE 1947-48 WHALING EXPEDITION (barrels) a/

Navy 7-0-2 diesel	100,369
Navy special oil	287,099
Kerosene	755
Gasoline	81,128
Lubricating oil	3,562
Grease (long tone)	5.9

a/ One barrel equals 42 U. S. gallons.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.






SECTION 2  
FORESTRY AND MINING

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Forestry . . . . .	1
Mining . . . . .	3

FORESTRY

1. September production of logs declined to 453,320,000 board feet, 13,432,000 board feet less than the August total, as shown in the graphs on the next page. Stockpiles declined to 1,903,728,000 board feet, 54,928,000 board feet under the previous month.






Inaccessible Timber

2. More than 6,300,000 acres of forests with over 10,500,000,000 cubic feet of timber are inaccessible for lack of roads, railroads or streams for the transportation of logs. Approximately 70 percent of this forest area, or 4,500,281 acres, is in Honshu near the major consuming centers, while 1,380,437 acres or about 22 percent are in Hokkaido. The remaining areas include 351,184 acres in Kyushu and 161,536 acres in Shikoku.

# LOG, LUMBER AND PLYWOOD PRODUCTION

1930-1947



\* FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING 1 APRIL.  
 \*\* ALL LOGS CUT IN THE WOODS FOR USES OTHER THAN FUEL. CONVERTED FROM KOKU BY RATIO OF 80 BOARD FEET PER KOKU.  
 \*\*\* CONVERTED FROM KOKU BY RATIO OF 120 BOARD FEET PER KOKU.  
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY.  
 GHO SCAP JAPAN: OCT 47

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The inaccessible areas contain over 17 percent of the country's total timber volume of 61,627,756,152 cubic feet and approximately 10 percent of the total forest region of 61,905,916 acres.

**INACCESSIBLE FOREST AREAS AND TIMBER VOLUME**

<u>Forests</u>	<u>Area (acres)</u>	<u>Volume (cubic feet)</u>
National	2,952,570	5,959,965,850
Private	1,941,935	2,412,991,195
Community and prefectural	1,313,224	1,764,017,225
Former Imperial	167,827	431,338,869
School	13,120	21,112,209
Shrine and temple	4,752	8,331,114
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,393,428</b>	<b>10,597,756,462</b>

MINING

	<u>Paragraph</u>
Coal . . . . .	3
Oil. . . . .	11
Mining Industry. . . . .	13

COAL

3. Coal production in the first 20 days of October was 1,484,700 metric tons, 1.7 percent or 24,600 tons less than the revised output 1-20 September.

4. Total September coal production increased to 2,292,300 metric tons, 188,300 more than revised August production and 99.4 percent of the 2,310,000-ton quota. Average production per working day in September rose to 87,800 tons from the revised 83,800 in August. Note the chart on the following page.

Deliveries

5. Coal deliveries in September were 2,137,000 metric tons, as shown on the charts on pages 75 through 77. Deliveries were 155,300 under the month's production, 7,000 below revised August deliveries and 195,000 metric tons under the allocation.


6. The revised total of coal deliveries during August was 2,144,000 metric tons, 40,000 less than July, 87,000 less than the allocation and 40,000 over final August production.

Stockpiles

7. Stockpiles of available coal reached 524,500 metric tons on 30 September, 80,700 more than August. The increase was mainly attributed to typhoon damage which prevented movement of coal from the mines. In addition, more than 13,000 metric tons of coal previously reported as inaccessible became available with progress in construction of loading facilities and a cableway at Hokkaido mines.

# COAL PRODUCTION, DELIVERIES AND STOCKPILES

1930-1947




\* 1930-1939 ARE CALENDAR YEARS; 1939-1947 ARE FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING ON 1 APRIL.  
 \*\* HONSHU DATA INCLUDE SMALL AMOUNT OF PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILES IN SHIKOKU.  
 NOTE: PRODUCTION AND DELIVERIES DATA FOR AUGUST 1947 REVISED, SEPTEMBER 1947 PRELIMINARY.  
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.  
 GHQ - SCAP JAPAN - OCT 47





# COAL DELIVERIES

BY PRINCIPAL USER CATEGORIES - 1930-1947



NUMBER 14C



**COAL STOCKPILES**  
August - September  
(metric tons)

<u>Available</u>	<u>31 August</u>	<u>30 September</u>
In transit	373,500	379,900
Available under present conditions	<u>70,300</u>	<u>144,600</u>
Total	443,800	524,500
 <u>Unavailable</u>		
Not available due to lack of shipping facilities <u>a/</u>	203,100	209,700
Coal of low calorific value due to prolonged exposure, contamination with surface soil or in inaccessible areas	<u>23,200</u>	<u>7,900</u>
Total	226,300	217,600

a/ Previously reported available though lack of shipping facilities prevented its utilization.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.

8. Additional stocks of substandard coal, with less than 3,000 calories, totaled 388,400 metric tons. Due to the critical shortage this is now being used after mixing with better coal.

Mine Employees

9. Coal mine employees receiving daily wages numbered 435,786 on 20 October, a gain of 6,167 over September.

The total of coal mine employees, including engineers and office workers paid on a monthly basis and not previously reported, was 479,364.

Lignite

10. September lignite production, charted opposite, was 243,821 metric tons, 32,575 over the revised August production.

OIL

11. Crude oil production in September was 16,817 kiloliters with a daily average production of 560 kiloliters, two less than in August. Production totaled 104,297 kiloliters for the first half of the fiscal year. Note chart, top of page 80.

Drilling Operations

12. The Imperial Oil Company brought in two new wells during September, a gas well in Niigata Prefecture with an initial daily production of 1,900 cubic meters and an oil well in Akita Prefecture producing an initial 15 kiloliters a day. Three exploration drilling wells were under production test in September and nine new locations for test wells were approved.

# LIGNITE

## PRODUCTION, SALES AND STOCKPILES

THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS






AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION 1930-1945\*: ACTUAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION SINCE JANUARY 1946

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS

### MONTHLY RATE OF PRODUCTION

1930-1947



REGION	STOCKPILES IN THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS																
	0	20	40	60	80	100	120	140	160	180	200	220	240	260	280	300	320
TOHOKU	[Stockpile bar for Tohoku]																
TOKAI	[Stockpile bar for Tokai]																
KANTO	[Stockpile bar for Kanto]																
KINKI	[Stockpile bar for Kinki]																
CHUGOKU	[Stockpile bar for Chugoku]																
HOKKAIDO	[Stockpile bar for Hokkaido]																
SHIKOKU	[Stockpile bar for Shikoku]																
KYUSHU	[Stockpile bar for Kyushu]																

**LEGEND**

[Hatched box] LIGNITE STOCKPILES ON 31 JULY 1946

[Solid box] LIGNITE STOCKPILES ON 31 JULY 1947

\* FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING 1 APRIL.  
 NOTE: PRODUCTION DATA FOR SEP 47 PRELIMINARY AND FOR AUG 47 REVISED. STOCKPILE AND SALES DATA FOR AUG AND SEP 47 NOT AVAILABLE. ALL DATA PRIOR TO AUG 47 INCLUDED HEREIN, WHICH REPRESENTED APPROXIMATELY 10 PERCENT OF PRODUCTION, SALES AND STOCKPILES.

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.  
 GHQ-SCAP


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# MINE PRODUCTION

SPECIFIED MINE PRODUCTS 1930-1947



MINE PRODUCT	UNIT	AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION					AUGUST 1947 PRODUCTION
		1930-1934	1935-1939	1940-1944	1945	1946	
ANTHRONY (CONTENT)	METRIC TONS	NA	14,452	18,183	35,500	4,417	2,523
ARSENIC (CONTENT)	"	199,142	319,335	217,220	NA	NA	115,000
BARITE CONCENTRATE	"	NA	647,083	1,174,150	628,333	48,417	111,000
CHROMITE CONCENTRATE	"	1,268,317	3,664,300	5,140,133	3,626,167	603,417	261,000
COAL	"	2,598,000,000	3,768,400,000	4,533,000,000	1,864,000,000	1,698,000,000	2,104,000,000
COBALT (CONTENT)	"	NA	10,285	32,583	359,083	NA	1,124
COPPER (CONTENT)	"	5,214,217	5,569,350	6,926,700	2,622,000	1,428,250	1,782,000
FLUORSPAR CONCENTRATE	"	0,000	33,867	503,400	287,250	21,500	0,000
GOLD (CONTENT)	"	1,095	1,893	1,314	0,064	0,097	0,198
GYPSUM CONCENTRATE	"	4,372,450	9,242,333	14,175,650	6,951,750	3,605,833	6,300,000
IRON CONCENTRATE	"	24,032,083	58,252,767	204,021,275	116,046,912	46,437,631	59,263,000
LEAD (CONTENT)	"	518,633	872,100	1,459,167	893,500	354,083	425,000
LIGNITE	"	10,000,000	11,200,000	124,600,000	137,000,000	196,000,000	211,246,000
LIMESTONE	"	562,433,233	895,396,087	1,039,548,908	363,465,667	376,450,385	529,880,000
MANGANESE CONCENTRATE	"	2,674,763	8,428,600	22,808,166	13,303,583	2,366,593	3,096,000
MERCURY (CONTENT)	"	0,417	1,795	15,397	7,550	4,083	3,361
MOLYBDENUM (CONTENT)	"	0,900	0,400	11,416	19,333	8,167	2,145
PETROLEUM (CRUDE)	KILOLITERS	21,841,800	30,714,600	23,913,400	19,947,000	17,997,000	17,426,000
PYRITE CONCENTRATE	METRIC TONS	65,699,00	150,435,650	146,463,594	33,664,832	39,572,746	73,347,000
SILVER (CONTENT)	"	15,12	28,208	28,471	1,466	2,770	5,500
SULFUR (REFINED)	"	7,791,404	17,124,883	13,088,249	3,160,667	1,782,417	3,628,000
TIN (CONTENT)	"	124,416	199,433	123,817	6,125	4,500	3,688
TUNGSTEN CONCENTRATE	"	3,918	18,283	60,050	28,333	4,917	0,980
ZINC (CONTENT)	"	1,651,117	3,165,700	5,570,866	2,796,000	1,757,750	2,421,000

MINE PRODUCT	PERCENTAGE INCREASE / DECREASE OF AUGUST 1947 OVER / UNDER AUGUST 1946 PRODUCTION									
	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90
ANTHRONY (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
ARSENIC (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
BARITE CONCENTRATE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
CHROMITE CONCENTRATE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
COAL	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
COBALT (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
COPPER (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
FLUORSPAR CONCENTRATE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
GOLD (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
GYPSUM CONCENTRATE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
IRON CONCENTRATE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
LEAD (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
LIGNITE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
LIMESTONE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
MANGANESE CONCENTRATE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
MERCURY (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
MOLYBDENUM (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
PETROLEUM (CRUDE)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
PYRITE CONCENTRATE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
SILVER (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
SULFUR (REFINED)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
TIN (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
TUNGSTEN CONCENTRATE	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									
ZINC (CONTENT)	[Bar chart showing percentage change]									

**LEGEND**  
 ■ PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF AUGUST 1947 OVER AUGUST 1946  
 □ PERCENTAGE DECREASE OF AUGUST 1947 UNDER AUGUST 1946

NA DATA NOT AVAILABLE.  
 NOTE: INDEX OF MINE PRODUCTION DATA FOR JULY 1947 REVISED.  
 SOURCES: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, LIMESTONE MINING ASSOCIATION.  
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
SECTION 3  
HEAVY INDUSTRIES

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Coke . . . . .	1
Metal Industries . . . . .	3
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Machinery. . . . .	33
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COKE

1. September coke production totaled 176,900 metric tons, 2,100 tons above August. Coke stockpiles at the end of September increased to 34,750 metric tons and coal stockpiles decreased to 69,500 tons.



2. During September coke was allocated and distributed to industries as follows:

SEPTEMBER COKE ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION  
(metric tons)


	<u>Allocation</u>	<u>Distribution</u>
Consumed by producers	67,110	62,503
Chemical industry (including fertilizer)	58,810	54,852
Industrial machinery	17,347	16,059
Metal industry	18,462	15,653
Rolling-stock manufacturing	8,028	7,556
Electrical machinery	4,376	4,082
Ceramics industry	2,896	2,785
Shipbuilding	2,600	2,462
Repair of coal mine machinery	800	632
Others	2,461	2,278
Reserves	<u>1,605</u>	<u>1,478</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>184,495</b>	<b>170,340</b>

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.

METAL INDUSTRIES

Iron and Steel

3. Preliminary reports of September production of 31,063 metric tons of pig iron and 89,781 tons of steel ingots reflected decreased output compared with a revised total of 33,999 metric tons of pig iron and 89,880 tons of steel ingots in August.



Open-hearth steel ingots increased in output from 47,605 metric tons (revised) in August to 50,044 tons in September, but electric furnace output decreased from a revised total of 42,275 metric tons in August to 39,737 tons in September.


Preliminary reports of steel castings and forgings in September totaled 6,742 and 3,171 metric tons respectively compared with revised August output of 5,826 and 3,066 tons.

4. Total output of rolled steel products decreased from a revised August total of 55,214 metric tons to 53,070 tons in September with the critical item of rails accounting for the major decrease.

#### Light Metals

5. Total aluminum output of six primary and 14 secondary plants in September totaled 1,103 metric tons, an increase of 342 tons above August.

6. Decreased supplies of fuel oil and scrap caused a 271-metric-ton drop in September output of aluminum and aluminum alloy sheet and rolled products.




#### Copper and Copper Alloys

7. Thirteen smelters and eight refineries produced 3,983 metric tons of blister copper in September compared with revised August output of 3,975 tons, while output of refined copper totaled 3,754 metric tons compared with revised August production of 3,654 tons.

8. Rolled copper sheet and products output in September remained at the August level with production of 914 metric tons. Output of brass sheet and products totaled 3,431 metric tons, 170 tons greater than August. Bronze production increased from 83 metric tons in August to 110 tons in September. Increased production was due largely to recent allocations of high-grade coal which made possible the smelting of stored copper ores.






**Zinc and Lead**

9. Electrolytic zinc production increased from 616 metric tons in August to 690 tons in September while distilled zinc output dropped to 496 metric tons compared with 531 tons in August.

10. A decline in output of zinc plate to 363 metric tons was registered in September, 114 tons less than August.




11. September output of crude lead and refined lead decreased 49 and 95 metric tons below August to 443 and 457 metric tons respectively.

Other Nonferrous Metals

12. Output of bismuth increased from 1.8 metric tons in August to 2.1 tons in September; production of mercury and crude tin declined to 4.4 and 16 metric tons respectively in September compared with 5 and 19 tons in August.

Ferroalloys

13. Ferroalloy production continued downward in September with output of 996 metric tons compared with 1,061 tons in August.



RUBBER

14. Crude rubber stocks decreased six percent during September.

RUBBER INVENTORY  
(metric tons)

	<u>Crude Rubber</u>	<u>Latex</u>	<u>Scrap a/</u>
Inventory 1 September	3,770	121	570
Receipts during month	1,329	85	514
Consumption during month	1,552	27	570
Inventory 1 October	3,547	179	514


a/ In hands of collection agencies only.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

PETROLEUM


15. Crude petroleum runs to stills in September totaled 22,557 kiloliters, an increase of 2,982 above the preceding month. Refined petroleum production in September totaled 13,229 kiloliters.

583 kiloliters greater than revised August output. Eight refineries in indigenous crude oil producing areas were in operation.



#### CEMENT

16. Thirty-three operating plants produced 104,644 metric tons of cement and 100,655 tons of clinker during September, decreases of 13 percent and 19 percent respectively below the previous month.



#### CONSTRUCTION

##### Coal-miners' Housing

17. Loans totaling ¥ 2,365,537,000 were made in September to mine operators for construction and repair of coal-miners' housing under the following program:

	<u>Units</u>
New construction	11,003
New dormitories	146
Repair and rehabilitation	13,355

Building Permits

18. Building permits issued in September for new construction totaled 38,461, a decrease of 146 below August; permits issued for repairs increased 2,464 units above August to 7,855.

Housing and Industrial Construction

19. New construction started in September totaled 43,062 units, an increase of 8,603 units above August.

New construction completed in September was 1,566 units greater than August, with rural building continuing to exceed building in urban areas.

NEW CONSTRUCTION STARTED  
September

	<u>Urban</u>		<u>Rural</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>
Dwellings	8,975	392,280	19,039	856,856	28,014	1,249,136
Combined dwellings and shops	4,110	199,715	1,872	104,447	5,982	304,162
Nonresidential buildings	<u>2,867</u>	<u>332,174</u>	<u>6,199</u>	<u>417,726</u>	<u>9,066</u>	<u>749,900</u>
Total	15,952	924,169	27,110	1,379,029	43,062	2,303,198

a/ Square meters.

SOURCE: Board of Reconstruction.

NEW CONSTRUCTION COMPLETED  
September

	<u>Urban</u>		<u>Rural</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>
Dwellings	6,593	271,343	11,647	503,973	18,240	775,316
Combined dwellings and shops	3,294	137,870	931	46,939	4,225	184,809
Nonresidential buildings	<u>2,309</u>	<u>261,491</u>	<u>4,025</u>	<u>222,044</u>	<u>6,334</u>	<u>483,535</u>
Total	12,196	670,704	16,603	772,956	28,799	1,443,660

a/ Square meters.

SOURCE: Board of Reconstruction.

SHIPBUILDING

20. Shipyards completed repairs on 528 vessels totaling 1,175,042 gross tons from 10 September to 10 October. From 20 September to 20 October five steel cargo vessels totaling 6,520 gross tons were launched and three steel cargo vessels totaling 1,120 gross tons were completed. During the same period 19 steel fishing vessels totaling 2,181 gross tons were launched and 17 steel fishing vessels totaling 2,174 gross tons were completed, while one wooden ship of 150 gross tons was launched and one wooden vessel of 150 gross tons was completed.


CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

21. Chemical production in September remained approximately at the August level with the production index of basic heavy chemicals at 42 percent of the requirements for a minimum balanced economy. Note charts on pages 92 and 93.

Fertilizers

22. Production of calcium superphosphate reached a postwar high of 71,667 metric tons in September, 15 percent above August production.


Production of ammonium sulfate in September totaled 55,594 metric tons compared with revised August output of 55,804 metric tons. Continued lack of electric power caused a loss in production of approximately 15,000 metric tons. Production represented 54 percent of available capacity compared with 60 percent the preceding month.



Calcium cyanamide output decreased from a revised August total of 21,724 metric tons (equivalent to 17,379 tons of 20-percent-nitrogen content) to 18,051 metric tons (equivalent to 14,441 tons of 20-percent-nitrogen content) in September due to lack of power in most plants. Production of insufficient carbide to meet requirements for the industry made it necessary to withdraw 2,000 metric tons from existing stocks.

Sulfuric Acid

23. Sulfuric acid production increased from a revised total of 127,998 metric tons in August to 137,340 tons in September.



Soda Industries

24. Decreased supplies of coal and salt caused a drop in output of caustic soda from the revised August total of 4,773 metric tons to 4,549 tons in September of which 862 metric tons were produced by the solvay process and 3,687 tons by electrolytic process. Output of soda ash was 3,576 metric tons, eight percent less than August. See first chart on page 94.

Salt

25. Domestic salt production increased from the revised August output of 17,611 metric tons to 18,932 tons in September. Imports totaled 64,500 metric tons in September, as shown in the second chart on page 94.


Coal-tar Products

26. Although output of crude benzene in September was 18 tons greater than August, pure benzene production decreased from a revised total of 384 metric tons in August to 377 tons in September as a smaller quantity of crudes was refined.

27. Coal-tar refining during September increased, resulting in higher output of pitch, creosol, naphthalene and creosote oil. Any increased quantity of pitch produced is readily used directly to increase production of briquettes or is made into pitch coke to be used in manufacture of electrodes.

# PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CHEMICALS


SINCE FEBRUARY 1946



REVISÉD  
NOTE: ON SEMILOGARITHMIC CHARTS EQUAL RISES OR FALLS INDICATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES.  
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.  
GHQ - SCAP JAPAN - OCT 47 NUMBER 28A

# PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CHEMICALS



SINCE FEBRUARY 1946



SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION!			
CHEMICAL	METRIC TONS	CHEMICAL	METRIC TONS
SHEET 1		SHEET 2	
SULFURIC ACID .....	137,340	AMMONIUM SULFATE .....	55,594
AMMONIA .....	16,117	CALCIUM SUPERPHOSPHATE .....	71,667
SALT .....	18,932	CALCIUM CYANAMIDE .....	16,051
CALCIUM CARBIDE .....	19,213	CAUSTIC SODA .....	4,549
SODA ASH .....	3,576	HYDROCHLORIC ACID .....	3,436
ETHYL ALCOHOL (OL) .....	1,375	DYESTUFFS .....	265
METHYL ALCOHOL .....	243	SODIUM BICARBONATE .....	474
BENZENE .....	733	NITRIC ACID .....	585

REVISÉ. SOURCE: SODIUM BICARBONATE PRODUCTION.  
 NOTE: ON SEMILOGARITHMIC CHARTS EQUAL RISES OR FALLS INDICATE EQUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES.  
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.  
 SHQ - SCAP





Oil and Paint

28. Paint production dropped from a revised total of 677 metric tons in August to 623 tons in September.

29. Glycerine output increased from 15 metric tons in August to 121 tons in September due to the refining of crude glycerine which had been collected from small stockpiles recently uncovered.

Dyes


30. Total production of dyes rose from a revised August output of 207 metric tons to 285 tons in September, the highest monthly output of the year. Almost all dyes registered a gain in output with sulfur, direct and vat colors showing the greatest increases.

Fermentation

31. Limited supplies of crude alcohol resulting from the seasonal shortage of sweet potatoes caused a decline in output of ethyl alcohol from 1,418 kiloliters in August to 1,375 in September.

Camphor

32. Crude camphor production in September rose 41 percent above August while refined camphor output dropped eight percent. Production of camphor oil increased 24 percent.




MACHINERY

33. There was little change in machinery unit production in September although value of production increased moderately. Acute shortages of raw materials, especially coal, continued to hamper the industry.

Machine Tools

34. Unit output of machine tools in September continued to decline, falling 79 units below the total for August.



#### Small Tools

35. General small tool and small precision tool production dropped slightly reflecting the decrease in steel consumption from 234 metric tons in August to 213 tons in September.

#### SMALL TOOLS PRODUCTION

	August	September
Straight-shank drills	735,863	486,376
Taper-shank drills	37,668	25,735
Taps and dies	157,787	208,422
Milling cutters	21,936	17,091

SOURCE: Japan Small Tool Association.

#### Precision Bearings

36. Ball and roller bearing production in September declined to 465,859 units from 521,341 for the preceding month.

#### Industrial Machinery


37. The value of production and repair of industrial machinery in September increased ¥ 42,388,000 over August's total although gross tonnage declined eight percent.

Large gains were shown in production of conveyors and equipment for iron and steel works in September.

Over-all production was proportioned 72 percent for new units, 25 percent for parts and three percent for repairs.

# INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY PRODUCTION

PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES SINCE JULY 1946



SOURCE: INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY ASSOCIATION, WOODWORKING MACHINERY ASSOCIATION AND PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING ASSOCIATION.  
GHQ-SCAP JAPAN - OCT 47 NUMBER 33

INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY PRODUCTION, PARTS AND REPAIRS  
(thousands of yen)

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>
Chemical	75,536	82,717
Pumps	51,128	53,928
Woodworking	50,405	48,724
Fans and blowers	37,461	42,284
Cranes and hoists	48,183	40,174
Prime movers	35,368	39,697
Mining	32,847	37,756
Metal forming	26,761	30,862
Conveyors	18,013	27,505
Iron and steel manufacturing	18,365	26,251
Printing and bookbinding	24,386	19,061
Power transmission	13,875	17,227
Crushers	18,501	15,761
Food products	14,278	12,586
Rubber	10,146	10,907
Foundry equipment	7,011	6,841
Pulp and paper	4,429	5,264
Miscellaneous	<u>17,108</u>	<u>28,645</u>
Total	503,801	546,190

SOURCE: Industrial Machinery Association, Printing and Bookbinding Association and Woodworking Machinery Association.

38. Raw materials, fuel and electric power used by the reporting factories are shown below.

RAW MATERIAL AND FUEL CONSUMPTION <sup>a/</sup>  
(metric tons)

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>
Steel	8,325	9,125
Iron	8,763	9,106
Coke	6,761	7,741
Coal	8,464	7,471
Power <sup>b/</sup>	10,887	10,756

<sup>a/</sup> Excluding bookbinding and printing machinery and woodworking machinery.

<sup>b/</sup> Thousands of kilowatt hours.

SOURCE: Industrial Machinery Association.


RAILWAY ROLLING STOCK

39. Production of new railway locomotives in September increased one over August. While steam locomotive output increased two above the previous month to 13, the output of electric locomotives dropped one from August's five. General and partial repairs increased 15 units to 489.

40. Passenger car output totaled 82 units in September, an increase of two over the preceding month, while freight car output decreased by two. General railway car repairs for September decreased by 99 units from August's 4,237 while partial repairs for September were 2,256 as against 2,281 for August.


# RAILWAY LOCOMOTIVE PRODUCTION AND REPAIR

1930-1947



# RAILWAY CAR PRODUCTION AND REPAIR

1930-1947





SECTION 4  
MANUFACTURING

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Food Processing. . . . .	1
Tobacco Products . . . . .	5
Pulp and Paper Products. . . . .	6
Glass and Ceramics . . . . .	8
Medical Equipment. . . . .	15
Electrical Manufacturing . . . . .	16
Transportation Equipment . . . . .	17
Rubber Manufacturing . . . . .	22
Leather. . . . .	23
Agricultural Equipment . . . . .	25
Handicrafts. . . . .	26
Miscellaneous Manufacturing. . . . .	30

FOOD PROCESSING

1. Imports of raw materials made possible increased processing of cereal grains in September. In the flour-milling industry, 40,611 metric tons were produced from indigenous wheat and 126,314 tons from imported wheat and corn. Indigenous materials were utilized for 59,845 tons of the total 97,042 tons produced in the rolling industry in September with barley comprising the bulk. Imported materials processed in the rolling mills totaled 11,808 metric tons of wheat, 23,956 tons of barley and 1,433 tons of milo. Lack of power prevented further production although sufficient raw material was on hand in the mills for 40 percent greater production.




2. Canned food production dropped sharply from 848 metric tons in August to 350 tons in September, reflecting the seasonal availability of raw materials. Bottled foods increased from 514 metric tons in August to 540 tons in September with seaweed accounting for 35 percent of the total pack. See the chart on the following page.

Brewing and Distilling


3. Production of sake decreased from 543 hectoliters in August to 424 in September. The sharp increase in liquor and wine output from 6,926 hectoliters in August to 24,678 in September was due almost entirely to increased production of fruit wine. Imitation sake and shochu increased from 15,048 hectoliters and 7,935 hectoliters respectively in August to 39,966 hectoliters and 16,608 in September due to blending operations. Note the graphs at top of page 103.



# FOOD PROCESSING



\* 1947-12-MONTHS' PERIOD ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 1947  
 P PRELIMINARY.  
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY.  
 GHQ-SCAP      JAPAN OCT 47      NUMBER 36




Containers

4. Consumption of tin plate for containers decreased from 504 metric tons in August to 341 tons in September.


TOBACCO PRODUCTS

5. There was a decrease in production of all types of tobacco products in September below August.



PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTS

6. Pulp production increased four percent in September over August with the major gains in unbleached sulfite and kraft which have been critically short.



7. Total output of paper in September remained at approximately the August level although paperboard and wrapping and bag paper registered increases. These are used by manufacturing and handicraft industries for raw material and packing purposes. See the chart at the top of opposite page.

GLASS AND CERAMICS

8. Window glass production in September decreased one percent below August. No polished plate glass was produced during September.

Fourteen metric tons of optical glass were melted in September for future optical glass production. No optical glass was produced for it takes two to three months for the melted glass to harden properly.

Fiber glass output in September totaled 15,496 kilograms, an 18-percent decrease below August.

Production of glassware in September was 7,112 metric tons, a four-percent increase above August. Note the second chart on the opposite page.