

officials who have received provisional notice. The Government is continuing its investigation into the records and publication of less known public information organizations on the black list.

The cumulative totals of persons screened since 4 January are as follows:

SCREENING OF INFORMATION MEDIA COMPANIES

Screened	1,434
Passed	1,258
Barred	162
Pending final action	4

53. Of the 16 organizations that were added to the information media black list on 25 November, six have submitted counter-evidence.

The Japanese Government is now reviewing prewar books of ultranationalistic nature and subjecting them to the provisions of the Memorandum.

Economic Phase of Purge

54. Under the economic phase of the purge program 517 persons were barred or removed from office by the Central Screening Committee while 1,187 economic resignees have been provisionally designated and 1,110 were finally designated as being subject to the Purge since they had not submitted counterevidence within the 30 days prescribed by law.

All auditors who held positions commensurate with that of standing auditor and all directors or branch managers who in reality exercised the power and authority of standing managing directors have been designated. This action brings 202 auditors, 61 directors and six branch managers under the provisions of the Memorandum.

Butoku-kai Criteria

55. Of 2,082 persons screened under the Butoku-kai criteria 1,053 were in public office at the time of screening. Of these 424 were removed or barred and 606 passed, while the statuses of 23 are pending further investigation. Of the 1,029 former Butoku-kai officials not in public office, 823 were provisionally designated, 88 were found to have been previously designated under other provisions of SCAPIN 550 and implementing ordinances, and 118 were deceased.

Other

56. During December the Central Screening Committee substantially completed provisional designation in most of the purge categories. Between 25 November and 13 December 81,588 persons were notified of their provisional designation, making a total of 89,442 persons so designated to date. This figure includes some 81,216 army and navy career officers and members of the gendarmerie, 3,264 officials of ultranationalistic and terroristic societies, 922 individuals who played a leading role in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and its affiliates and 3,100 persons falling under Category G which includes economic, public information media and Butoku-kai provisional designees.

During the same period prefectural screening committees provisionally designated 33,675 individuals who had headed local Imperial Rule Assistance organizations and affiliated groups, while 40,087 chiefs of local ex-servicemen's organizations were also provisionally designated.

57. On 10 December the Cabinet issued a statement announcing virtual completion of the purge which said:

"The screening relative to persons now in public service in the various fields may generally be said to have been almost terminated. Again, as final measures relative to the execution of the purge, the procedure of provisional designation against invisible purgees has been practiced since this summer. In this sphere too, with the exception of those parts relative to writers it has at this time approximately reached a concluding stage.

"With respect moreover to the scope and criteria of the purge, with the exception of a possible extension and consolidation relative to ultranationalistic and terroristic organizations, there will be no further expansion. Thus the public service purge, to all intents and purposes, may now be said to have been terminated."

SECTION 2
PUBLIC SAFETY

C O N T E N T S

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LAW AND ORDER

Black-market Activities

1. From 25 November to 10 December the Tokyo police discovered 463 illegal fuel and petroleum products transactions. Sixty-nine cases were turned over to the Tokyo District Court and the remainder are being investigated.

2. Tochigi Prefecture police apprehended 523 persons involved in black-market operations in tobacco and confiscated 156,000 packs of cigarettes and one and one-half tons of leaf tobacco from 1 to 15 December.

3. Hoarded and concealed goods uncovered in November by the Economic Police of the Home Ministry and the Economic Stabilization Board amounted to ¥ 14,391,476, of which ¥ 8,441,671 were foodstuffs, ¥ 1,880,090 were textiles, ¥ 846,519 were fuel and petroleum products and ¥ 3,223,196 were miscellaneous items.

Crime

4. Criminal offenses reported and persons arrested in October numbered 177,815 and 99,817, of which 53,175 and 54,636 respectively were violations of the criminal code. Larceny constituted 101,780 of the total offenses reported and 22,959 of the arrests. See the chart on the following page.

5. Hyogo Prefecture reported the highest criminal offense rate, 50.4 per 1,000 population per annum, while Osaka, Aichi and Tokyo each reported rates exceeding 44.


6. Of the 99,817 persons arrested 95,579 were Japanese, 4,172 Koreans, 37 Formosans, 22 Chinese and seven of other nationalities.

POLICE

7. The Ministry of Home Affairs was dissolved on 31 December by legislation enacted by the Diet on 8 December. All essential functions under its jurisdiction were either transferred to other governmental agencies or appropriate legislation was enacted to reorganize former agencies, as in the case of the national police which was decentralized by the new Police Law.

CRIMINAL OFFENSES

RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION PER ANNUM




OFFENSES AGAINST CRIMINAL CODE - OCTOBER 1947

OFFENSE	RATE / 1,000 POPULATION / ANNUM									
	0	2	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18
LARCENY										
FRAUD										
EMBEZZLEMENT										
STOLEN GOODS										
GAMBLING										
WOUNDING										
ROBBERY										
COUNTERFEITING										
MURDER										
RAPE										
ARSON										
OTHER										

RELATION OF PREFECTURAL RATES TO NATIONAL RATE DURING OCTOBER 1947

NOTE
NATIONAL CRIME RATE DURING OCTOBER 1947
WAS 26.64/1,000 POPULATION / ANNUM.



(White)	0.0 - 39.9
(Diagonal lines /)	40.0 - 79.9
(Diagonal lines \)	80.0 - 119.9
(Cross-hatch)	120.0 - 159.9
(Dense cross-hatch)	160.0 - 199.9
(Solid black)	200.0 AND OVER

NATIONAL RATE = 100%

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS.
HQ-SCAP

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NUMBER 2

The Police Law

8. Provisions of the Police Law, passed by the Diet on 8 December, define the police mission and limit it to those functions recognized throughout the world as properly belonging to a civil police force; hence the Sanitation Section, Fire Department, Census Bureau, Economic Controls Section and other nonpolice agencies were removed from the police system. Civil police functions will no longer include special guard activities at railway stations, banks and Occupation Forces billets and buildings. Responsibilities of the police are confined to prevention of crime, suppression of criminal activities, preservation of law and order, control of traffic and traffic safety and serving of warrants, subpoenas and other court instruments when directed by competent authority.

Operational control of the police is defined as the process of enforcing the law, including the directing of police forces in preservation of law and order, the planning and carrying out of law-enforcement procedures before and during situations prejudicial to law and order and the use of police power in areas of responsibility as provided by law. Administrative control of the police is the management of all police matters not included in operational control.

9. The Police Law establishes a National Public Safety Commission of five members directly under the Prime Minister.

The members of the National Public Safety Commission are appointed for five years by the Prime Minister with consent of both houses of the Diet, from among persons who have not been in the police service or career public service. Members may not be officers of a political party or political organization, and not more than two may belong to the same political party. The Prime Minister and Cabinet, with the approval of the Diet, may remove incompetent officials. The Commission controls the affairs of the National Rural Police, and the Imperial Guard and National Building Guard, whose members will not be police and will not be included in the 125,000-man limitation on size of police forces.

10. The National Rural Police will maintain the national police communications system and control the police education and training system, administratively controlling all National Rural Police echelons, supervising criminal identification and criminal statistical matters and operating criminological laboratories.

The Headquarters of the National Rural Police is to be established as the executive offices of the National Public Safety Commission and the National Rural Police. The Director General of the Headquarters, who is to be appointed by the National Public Safety Commission, is to control the affairs of the Headquarters.

The Law provides for six National Rural Police Regions throughout the country, each with a Police Regional Headquarters presided over by a director. The Law also provides for establishment under the Governor of Public Safety Commission of three civilian members in each of Japan's 46 prefectures to exercise operational control over the National Rural Police within the respective prefectures.

Each prefecture will have one National Rural Police Headquarters except Hokkaido, which may have as many as 14. The principal prefectural police officer will be the Chief of National Rural Police of that prefecture, appointed by and under administrative control of the National Rural Police Regional Director. National Rural Police stations, each with its own district and substations or police boxes, are to be established as deemed necessary.

11. The Police Law makes cities, towns and villages of 5,000 or more population responsible for maintenance of police and enforcement of law and order within their respective boundaries. A Public Safety Commission of three members is to be established in each such municipality, appointed by the mayor or headman with consent of the local governing body, to control the police of that entity. The fixed number of police is to be determined by the local entities according to local requirements, but within a fixed maximum based on population so that the total police of all the municipalities will not exceed 95,000.

12. Operational cooperation between the rural, city, town and village police forces is to be developed to secure effective nationwide police coverage. The National Rural Police may exercise authority within the jurisdiction of a local autonomous police force only at the specific request of the city, town or village Public Safety Commission.

13. The Police Law provides for a centralized system of criminal statistics and criminal identification in which all National Rural Police echelons and all autonomous police forces will participate.

14. The Prime Minister, upon recommendation of the National Public Safety Commission, is authorized by the Law to proclaim a state of national emergency in respect to the country as a whole or any part of it, setting forth the area, outlining the situation and setting the effective date of the proclamation. Following such proclamation he will temporarily assume complete operational and administrative control of all or any police forces in Japan, including all National Rural Police forces and all police forces of autonomous entities. The Prime Minister must rescind this proclamation when the emergency no longer exists, or when so ordered by the Diet.

15. Decentralization of police was initiated in Chiba, Hokkaido, Miyagi, Tokyo, Osaka, Hiroshima and Fukuoka Prefectures and by 27 December police in a total of 513 cities throughout Japan were decentralized.

16. A simplified, practical course on the principles and application of unarmed self-defense and arrest technique was established for the police. From 12 to 20 December 110 police instructors from all the prefectures assembled in Tokyo for orientation in the new course which requires 30 hours of instruction and will be part of the regular police training.



PRISONS

17. The prison population decreased from 83,875 in October to 82,785 in November. There were 67,714 persons sentenced, including 3,662 juveniles, and 15,071 awaiting trial. Persons awaiting execution numbered 29. See the chart at the top of next page.

18. Prison deaths in November numbered 63, a decrease from 67 during the previous month.

ACCIDENTS

19. Rail mishaps in November numbered 201 with 77 persons killed and 175 injured. Of the total killed or injured 34 persons fell and 23 jumped from trains, 90 were struck by trains, 101 were victims of train collisions and derailments and four were injured by other causes. See the second chart on next page.



FIRES


20. The National Fire Defense Law, enacted by the Diet on 9 December, was made necessary by that provision of the new Police Law which divorced fire-fighting functions from control of the police. The Law removes all municipal fire departments from control of the National Government and makes cities, towns and villages responsible

for providing adequate fire protection within their respective boundaries.

The Law provides for the establishment under the National Public Safety Commission of a National Fire Defense Board composed of a director and two other members appointed by the Commission and subject to its direction and supervision. The Board shall create a Fire Research Institute and an Administrative Bureau to take charge of city grading, technical research, preparation of codes, drills, techniques, publications, specifications and statistics; investigation of arson and negligence; establishment of a fire inspection service; and training of investigators and fire department instructors. Neither the Board nor the Institute will exercise administrative or operational control over the various municipal fire departments, but may at the request of the mayors, headmen or the fire chiefs of the municipalities advise and counsel them in matters pertaining to fire defense and assist them in the procurement of materials and equipment.

Fire defense of municipalities is to be controlled by their respective mayors or headmen in accordance with municipal by-laws.

21. Fires and fire losses increased from 868 and ¥ 368,495,531 in September to 1,051 and ¥ 597,903,211 in October respectively. Embers caused 355 fires with damages amounting to ¥ 115,604,235, electrical causes were responsible for 128 costing ¥ 98,318,065, careless smoking caused 77 fires with losses of ¥ 172,423,840, inflammable liquids caused 77 fires with damages of ¥ 35,501,427 and the remainder resulted from various other causes.



22. Yamaguchi Prefecture suffered the highest fire damage, ¥ 153,236,850, while Osaka, Tokyo, Fukushima and Hyogo Prefectures each reported losses exceeding ¥ 27,000,000.

23. Fire casualties in October numbered 104, of whom 20 were killed and 84 injured.

SECTION 3
LEGAL AFFAIRS AND WAR CRIMES

C O N T E N T S

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Apprehension of Suspected War Criminals	3
Prosecution of War Criminals.	5
International Prosecution of War Criminals.	9

LEGAL AFFAIRS

Japanese Judicial Administration

1. The Diet on 8 December passed the Law Establishing the Attorney General's Office. Promulgated on 17 December, this law will become effective 15 February.

The Law provides for the separation of the judiciary from the executive branch of the Government and establishes an Attorney General's Office within the Cabinet to become the supreme advisory body of the Government on legal questions, giving opinion or advice to the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the executive ministries.

The Attorney General's Office will administer matters concerning criminal investigation and prosecution, civil litigation and the public procurators' offices, formerly under the Ministry of Justice; draft and examine cabinet bills; undertake research and expression of legal opinions; and handle prison affairs and rehabilitation.

INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

2. Investigation of 20 atrocity cases involving B-29 flyers and 25 miscellaneous cases was completed during the December reporting period.

ATROCITY INVESTIGATIONS

	Cases On Hand <u>25 Nov</u>	Cases Received <u>25 Nov - 23 Dec</u>	Cases Completed <u>25 Nov - 23 Dec</u>	Cases On Hand <u>23 Dec</u>
POW camp conditions	6	0	2	4
POW camp atrocities	108	4	2	110
B-29 flyers	451	2	20	433
POW ship	26	0	0	26
Kempei-tai (Military Police)	31	0	1	30
Miscellaneous	<u>824</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>800</u>
Total	1,446	7	50	1,403

a/ The total number of cases shown above are those still under active investigation which may or may not result in trial of an undisclosed number of war criminals.

APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

3. The Japanese Government was directed to apprehend and deliver to Sugamo Prison 12 former Japanese Army officers, four former Navy officers and six civilians wanted for alleged war crimes.

4. The Government was notified of the deletion of five names from previous apprehension lists and the clarification of status of 55 previously suspected war criminals. The Government was also notified of one release from hospital arrest and the arrest of another suspect.

PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

5. As of 23 December 429 war crimes suspects had been tried of whom 410 were found guilty and 19 acquitted. Of the persons guilty 33 were sentenced to death and the remaining 377 were given terms at hard labor ranging from six months to life.

6. From 21 November to 20 December six trials were completed involving 32 war criminals of whom five were former Army officers, eight were former enlisted men and 19 civilians. Two persons were acquitted, one was given life imprisonment and the remainder received sentences at hard labor ranging from one year and six months to 30 years.

TRIAL OF WAR ATROCITY CASES

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
TSUNEYOSHI Yoshio	Camp Commander	Capt	10 Oct 47- 21 Nov 47	Life imprisonment

KIMURA Teutao	Overseer	Civ	20 Nov 47- 24 Nov 47	1 year 6 months

TANAKA Hiroshi	Camp Commander	1st Lt	2 Sep 47- 25 Nov 47	16 years
ASAKURA Tadao	Guard	Sup Pvt		Acquitted
HITOSUGI Yukio	Guard	Sgt		10 years
IEDA Nakazo	Guard	Sgt		4 years
KAMEDA Jirokichi	Guard	Civ		5 years
KAWAI Shoji	Guard	Civ		18 years
KAWAMURA Kaneki	Guard	Civ		18 years
KAWAMURA Tomihisa	Guard	M/Sgt		1 year
KOKUBO Nobuo	Guard	Civ		4 years

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
KONDO Kinpachi	Guard	Civ	2 Sep 47- 25 Nov 47	1 year
KAYEDA Minoru	Guard	Ldg Pvt		Acquitted
MIZUMO Tatsuo	Guard	Sgt		8 years
MURASE Akihisa	Guard	Civ		1 year
NAKAGAWA Tatsuo	Guard	Civ		6 years
SAKAI Hideo	Guard	Civ		4 years
SAWANO Yoshikazu	Guard	Civ		4 years
TANAKA Tokuichi	Guard	Civ		30 years
YADOIWA Isso	Guard	Civ		15 years
YAMAGISHI Masakazu	Guard	Civ		3 years
HARA Isamu	Guard	Civ		3 years
KATO Genzo	Guard	Civ		2 years
HAYASHI Masao	Guard	Sgt		1 year 6 months

OSAKO Ko	Camp Commander	1st Lt	26 Nov 47- 3 Dec 47	2 years
GOTO Hirozo	Guard	Civ		2 years 6 months
KODAMA Noboru	Guard	Civ		2 years 6 months
MURAKAMI Tetsuya	Guard	Sgt		1 year 6 months
NISHIMURA Bunki	Guard	Civ		2 years
OKAMOTO Motomu	Guard	Civ		2 years

TAKASAKI Iku	Camp Commander	Lt Col	10 Nov 47- 12 Dec 47	25 years

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
MOHI	Camp		28 Nov 47-	
Hisao	Commander	1st Lt	15 Dec 47	7 years

Former Army captain Yoshio Tsuneyoshi, commandant of the O'Donnell, Capas, Tarlac and Luzon prisoner-of-war camps in the Philippine Islands, was found guilty of contributing to the death of numerous American prisoners by failing to provide medical supplies and was also convicted of responsibility for the unlawful killing of 15 prisoners who were summarily executed without court martial.

Prisoner-of-war camp commanders Hiroshi Tanaka, Ko Osako, Iku Takasaki and Hisao Mori were found guilty of command responsibility for the beating and mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war while the civilian guards and six of the eight enlisted men were convicted of brutal mistreatment of prisoners.

7. On 20 December 10 trials were in progress. In addition to the cases completed and those in session, 15 cases were referred to the Commanding General, EIGHTH Army, for reference to a Military Commission for trial. Cases of 100 war crimes suspects were in various stages of preparation.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

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Defense of Hiroshi Oshima	9
Defense of Kenryo Sato.	11
Defense of Mamoru Shigemitsu.	16
Defense of Shigetaro Shimada.	21
Defense of Toshio Shiratori	26
Defense of Teiichi Suzuki	30
Defense of Shigenori Togo	33

8. Regular court sessions were held on 1-5, 8-12, 15-19, 22-24, 26 and 29-31 December. Sir William Flood Webb, president of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, resumed his seat on the Court on 15 December.

DEFENSE OF HIROSHI OSHIMA

9. The individual defense of Oshima, former Ambassador to Germany, began on 25 November and was completed on 3 December.

Oshima testified that in March 1941 he recognized the probability of German aggression against Russia. His conclusion was based on observation of a concentration of large bodies of German troops on the Russian border.

10. The accused was asked in cross-examination if he did not believe that the Japanese Government planned to use armed force in establishing the so-called New Order in East Asia under the Tripartite Pact. Oshima replied that he did not think so.

In reply to questions by the prosecution the witness said he did not recall having told Erdmansdorff on 18 October 1941 that in his opinion the Japanese Government in concluding the Tripartite Pact must have been certain that the Great East Asiatic Area could be achieved only by "advancing with the sword to the south." Oshima denied ever having had any official conversations with Erdmansdorff, then chief of the Japan Section in the German Foreign Office.

DEFENSE OF KENRYO SATO

11. Sato was chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, April 1942 to December 1944. His defense was presented on 3 December. Sato's defense counsel announced to the Tribunal:

"After careful study and deliberation, the undisputed revelation arising from the reading of the court record is that there is simply no evidence of any merit adduced against the Accused Sato to warrant an individual defense. Hence, the accused will not take the witness stand and only a few documents designed to clarify minor issues will be presented."

Testimony of Yoshie Seichi

12. Seichi was formerly in charge of the personnel affairs of General Staff officers. He appeared to identify his affidavit concerning Sato's appointment and answer cross-examination.

"All the Ministers of War, following the February 26 (1934) Incident," Seichi testified, "strictly maintained a policy of being very careful in appointments, lest cliques be formed in the Army. General Tojo, when he became War Minister, also followed this policy."

"In 1942, when director of the Military Affairs Bureau Akira Kato was transferred to another post, Mr. Sato was appointed as his successor. He was first selected by Lieutenant General Tomi-naga, then director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, and after the deliberation and the approval of the selection were given therefor by the three chiefs of the Army (namely, Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff and Inspector General of Military Training); he was appointed by the Minister."

"It was also a very natural and appropriate appointment. Mr. Sato was familiar with the business in the Bureau owing to his service in the Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, ever since just prior to the war. Furthermore, he was qualified to be a director of the War Ministry as he had already been promoted to the rank of major-general. For these reasons, he was considered to be a competent wartime director of the Military Affairs Bureau, capable of handling the complicated and busy tasks effectively."

Testimony of Yoshikiyo Ninomiya

13. Ninomiya, as chief of the Military Affairs Section, worked under the accused Sato, then major-general.

Ninomiya testified that matters relating to prisoners of war were handled by the Prisoners of War Information Bureau. Under cross-examination he denied having handled any POW matters while working under Sato.

Documentary Evidence

14. Keijiro Kuramoto, formerly major-general, testified by affidavit that Sato, then colonel, was presented the "Third Degree

of the Order of the Golden Kite" for his merit at the battle of Hanking, China, in his capacity of Vice-chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces.

15. Former General Akito Nakamura, commander of the Japanese Army in Siam, 1943-1945, declared by affidavit that Sato, as chief of the 37th Division of the Army in Siam, had no authority relative to the disposition or employment of POWs.

DEFENSE OF MAMORU SHIGEMITSU

16. Shigemitsu served as Foreign Minister under Tojo, 1943-1944, and as Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister for Greater East Asia under Koiso. His defense was heard on 3 and 4 December.

Affidavit of Kazuro Moriya

17. The witness served as first secretary of legation while Shigemitsu was first Consul General at Shanghai.

"At the time of the outbreak of the first Shanghai Incident in January 1932, when clashes between Japanese marines and Chinese soldiers occurred, Minister Shigemitsu expressed his firm determination to settle the situation by peaceful means," the witness declared in his affidavit.

"Even before formal conferences proposed by the League of Nations started, he had many informal conferences with Sir Miles Lampson, the British Minister, and Nelson Trusler Johnson, the American Minister. At his request they got in touch with the Commanding Chinese General at the height of the hostilities and a temporary truce was effected in order to allow Chinese noncombatants to evacuate Chapei, in which hostilities centered, thus saving the civilian population from the full effect of the fighting. During its course he persuaded the officers in command of the Japanese forces to limit the fighting to Shanghai and the adjacent area, and not to advance further into China. It was just at the time when the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities around Shanghai was almost concluded that Minister Shigemitsu had the misfortune to be wounded seriously by a bomb explosion. The bomb was thrown on 29 April during the celebration of the Emperor's birthday in New Park, Shanghai. I was on the spot with several of my Legation colleagues and transported the Minister to the hospital. In spite of his serious wounds, he could not forget the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities. He immediately dictated and ordered us to telegraph to Foreign Minister Yoshizawa that he would be unable to attend to his daily business for some time, but he strongly urged that the conclusion of the Agreement should not be hindered or delayed because of the bomb incident.

"I was present at the ceremonial signing of the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities in the British Consulate General on 5 May 1932. In the course of the ceremonies the Agreement was taken to the bedsides of Mr. Shigemitsu, General Ueda and the Chinese delegate, Mr. Quo Tai-chi, all of whom were in different hospitals, General Ueda having been injured by the same bomb as Mr. Shigemitsu and the Chinese delegate in an assault by students. Mr. Shigemitsu's leg was amputated an hour or so after he signed."

Affidavit of Baron Killearn (Sir Miles Lampson)

18. "In the spring of 1932 when fighting broke out in the suburbs of Shanghai between Japanese and Chinese forces, I, with other neutral colleagues, endeavored to put a stop to hostilities and to

prevent them from spreading and to this end arranged meetings attended by both Japanese and Chinese representatives. On the Japanese side Mr. Shigemitsu from the outset cooperated wholeheartedly and much of the credit for reaching an agreement was due to his persistent efforts and patient cooperation.

"When agreement had been reached he was unfortunately seriously wounded in a terrorist outrage. Despite the fact that he was in severe pain he refused to allow his injuries to hold up the signature of the agreement, which was accordingly taken to him in the hospital where he signed it."

Affidavit of Nelson Johnson

19. "From the time when hostilities between Japan and China broke out at Shanghai, China, in January 1932 to the signing of the truce that ended those hostilities on 5 May 1932, Mr. Shigemitsu devoted all his time and energy first to finding means of bringing his own countrymen and the Chinese to discussions aimed at ending the strife, and latterly with me, the British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson (now Lord Killlearn), M. Wilden, the French Minister, and Count Ciano, the Italian Minister, to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion with the truce agreement of May 5, 1932.

"That agreement had to be taken to the bedside of Mamoru Shigemitsu at a hospital, where he lay seriously wounded by an assassin's bomb, thrown onto the speakers' platform where he and other Japanese speakers were standing on April 29th. Throughout this difficult time Mr. Shigemitsu spared no effort to localize the incident, and contributed decisively to the creation of an atmosphere of friendliness, making possible a truce and the withdrawal of the considerable Japanese military forces landed around Shanghai."

Affidavit of Lord Sempill

20. Lord Sempill was formerly head of the British Aviation Mission to Japan.

"My long-term friendship with M. Mamoru Shigemitsu began in 1921 and was carried on spasmodically after my return to Great Britain towards the end of 1922 until he was appointed Ambassador to the Court of St. James's in 1938.

"His Excellency's appointment as Ambassador to Great Britain was very timely in view of the fact that Anglo-Japanese relations had declined steadily since I first made his acquaintance in Tokyo in 1921. The aggressive tactics of Germany were all too evident at that time, and caused him profound uneasiness, and I well remember him telling me a few months after his arrival in London that unless such tactics were checked in Europe he could see but one outcome-- world conflict. Within a year, war in Europe had broken out. His Excellency worked with redoubled energy to prevent his own prognostication becoming true, and lost no opportunity of initiating or joining in any discussion that might lead to some solution that would at least localize the conflict that then enveloped Europe.

"He invited me to come and see him at any time that one felt that he might be able to help in preventing the spread of hostilities over the world. When the Foreign Minister in Japan, M. Matsuoka, came to Europe in 1941, His Excellency frequently asked me how it might be possible for him to get by air to some neutral country to meet his Foreign Minister in order that he might advise him directly against closer cooperation with the Axis. He was in touch with Mr. Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, who had emphasized a number of points that he would like to have

put by His Excellency to his Foreign Minister. I remember meeting His Excellency at this time, and his telling me with obvious enthusiasm and elation that he had received most important and effective material from the Prime Minister for this purpose. At this time everything in Europe was disrupted by the war, and this meeting, so full of possibilities, could not take place."

DEFENSE OF SHIGETAO SHIMADA

21. Former Admiral Shimada served as Navy Minister under Premier Tojo. His defense was heard 4-9 December.

Testimony of Koshiro Oikawa

22. Oikawa preceded Shimada as Navy Minister.

"When the third Konoye Cabinet fell it became my duty to recommend a successor as Navy Minister in the new cabinet to be formed," Oikawa testified. "I decided not to succeed myself as Navy Minister before I even heard that Lieutenant General Tojo was to become the new premier. I simply thought it was time for a new man to take over since I had been a member of two different cabinets, each of which had resigned.

"Navy Ministers are appointed from the ranks of senior officers on the active list. I considered Shimada as my logical successor and the best choice of available candidates. My opinion was definitely formulated on the morning of October 17, 1941, and before I knew Tojo was to assume the premiership. Therefore, there is absolutely no truth to the allegation that Admiral Shimada was appointed because Tojo wanted him to be.

"I conveyed to him (Shimada) my desire that he accept my recommendation as next Navy Minister. He refused, at first, but later accepted, after stating to Tojo a prerequisite to his acceptance--that Japanese-United States negotiations be approached from a completely new state."

Testimony of Yorio Sawamoto

23. Sawamoto served as Vice-minister of the Navy under Navy Ministers Oikawa and Shimada.

"I personally know that on the morning of October 18th, after agreeing to accept the Navy Ministership, Admiral Shimada went to see the new premier, Lieutenant General Tojo. The purpose of his visit was to set forth a prerequisite for his entering the Cabinet, to which Tojo must agree. That condition was that diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States must be continued with the avowed purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the matters in dispute. Admiral Shimada told me and several others at the Navy Ministry that Tojo had completely agreed with him, and that they were going to adopt the policy of making utmost concessions to the United States in order to avert war. We were all highly pleased.

"The Navy Ministry never issued orders connected with operational movements of the Fleet. Such orders came from the Combined Fleet and the Chief of Naval General Staff, but even so I have never heard of any orders commanding the commission of atrocities or violating recognized rules of warfare. Several times before and during the war the Navy Ministry issued interpretations relative to rules of warfare. It is unthinkable, therefore, that this same Ministry would have issued orders commanding the commission of atrocities or violation of recognized rules of warfare."

Testimony of Sadatoshi Tomioka

24. Formerly a rear admiral, Tomioka took part in General Staff planning and liaison work in basic operations.

"Admiral Shimada," he testified, "had nothing whatsoever to do with the drafting of operational plans either for the Pearl Harbor attack or other naval operations. The function of the Navy Ministry was entirely separated from that of the Naval General Staff and of course did not possess the ability to interfere with such operational planning. To illustrate the point further, Admiral Shimada was not consulted on the operational movements of the Navy and in such naval engagements as the Battle of Midway he was not given notice of the plans until after they were drafted."

Testimony of Shimada

25. The witness, after tracing his navy career, repudiated the prosecution's contention that he had "joined the Tojo Cabinet because he was, and was known to be, an active supporter of the Tojo policy."

"In the first place I did not know Tojo, having met him only once and for a few moments in Shanghai in 1940. Again, it would have been impossible for the Premier, an army man, to even suggest a certain individual in the Navy for the post of Navy Minister, since it would have met with violent opposition, not only because it was a step contrary to custom and prejudicial to naval prestige invading the province of the Navy, but because of the natural rivalry and opposing viewpoints of the two branches of the armed service. Of course the fact of the matter is that I did not know what the Tojo policy was.

"Tojo emphatically agreed to my prerequisite in joining the Cabinet that it would be the policy of the Government to start from scratch in attempting to wholeheartedly and sincerely reach a diplomatic understanding to the end of preventing war in accordance with the Emperor's wish.

"Thus I did not have the impression that I was joining a war cabinet under which the nation would be plunged into the bitter and tragic struggle that followed."

Liaison conferences began on 23 October 1941. "In the period between these conferences and the Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941 I recall that all my thoughts were focused on the following two problems:

- "(1) How best to ease the most difficult conditions of withdrawal of troops from abroad and to reconcile this fact with the views of the Army Section of the Imperial General Headquarters.
- "(2) What were the greatest possible concessions that Japan could afford to make in its endeavor to reach an understanding with the United States? The greatest difficulty concerned the withdrawal of troops from China and French Indo-China.

"After studying these issues, the best solution appeared to be a compromise with the United States and Great Britain with each side giving ground. Consequently, I directed my efforts along this line of action in a sincere attempt to avoid the possible tragic effect of hostilities.

"There was a strong prevailing opinion that matters had developed so far as to make it physically impossible to withdraw all of our forces from China and that it would have been a psychological blow which would stun the Japanese people. It was argued that it would have amounted to a victory for China over Japan and would have raised the prestige and standing of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East, thereby relegating Japan to a position of being dependent upon these powers for its economic existence and position as a world power.

"On November 5, 1941, the Allies had effected an economic encirclement of Japan with a result more telling than we dared admit to the world. We viewed with alarm the increasing armaments of the United States and could not reason that such military steps were taken in contemplation of war with Germany alone. The American Pacific Fleet had long before moved from its West Coast base to Hawaii and there stood as a threat to Japan. The United States policy toward Japan had been strict and unsympathetic, revealing a determination to enforce their demands without compromise. The American military and economic aid to China had aroused the bitterest of feeling among the Japanese people. The Allied powers had carried on military conferences which were pointedly directed against Japan. It was a tight, tense and trapped feeling that Japan had at that time.

"Regarding the so-called Pearl Harbor Attack Plan, it was not until after my appointment to the post of Navy Minister that I first learned of the Pearl Harbor Attack Plan and of the practice and research that had gone on in the past.

"Ambassador Kurusu was dispatched to the United States to contribute to the immediate solution of difficulties. The negotiations had developed into a fight against the time element and a redoubling of our efforts to succeed in diplomacy before we were forced into hostilities. It was during this time that I began to fully appreciate the gravity of affairs. Each day I went to the Shrine to ask for divine guidance so I might serve the Emperor in bringing about his fervent desires for peace.

"Then the Hull note of 26 November came. There were no members of the Cabinet nor responsible officials of the General Staff who advocated acceptance of the note. It was regarded as an ultimatum threatening the existence of our country.

"As a patriotic Japanese loving my country I was confronted with the question of whether or not Japan could bow to the American demands and yet preserve its standing in the world. It would have been treasonable to have advocated a step contrary to the best interests of my country.

"Therefore I frankly state that it was this reply of the United States that caused me to overstep the boundary line of peace when the final decision was made at the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941."

DEFENSE OF TOSHIO SHIRATORI

26. Shiratori served as Ambassador to Italy in 1939, as adviser to the Foreign Office, 1940, and as Minister to Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland 1933-1936. His defense was heard 9-12 December.

Opening Statement

27. At the time of the Manchurian Incident Shiratori was a section chief of the Foreign Ministry, neither a statesman nor a politician but an official serving under the control and direction of the

Foreign Minister, the defense declared.

The anti-Comintern pact was negotiated in Japan while Shiratori was serving as Minister in Sweden.

Shiratori had nothing to do with the initiation, the talk and the negotiations for concluding a tripartite alliance until early 1939, and then only in a limited capacity, and also had nothing to do with Italy's acceptance to participate in the alliance. Moreover, practically the entire negotiations with Italy were made through Germany.

Concerning the prosecution's designation of Shiratori as a propagandist, the defense declared:

"He contributed articles and delivered lectures on his own volition and not upon instructions or directions of his government. He was not, properly speaking, a writer or lecturer, and a certain amount of popularity of his writings and lectures resulted from his outspokenness and indiscretion as a diplomat. His writings and lectures were always of a private nature and had only a limited influence. It will also be shown that the main purpose of Shiratori's delivering lectures after his return from Rome was to answer certain criticisms against his activities in Italy."

Testimony of Yoshie Saito

28. Saito stated that he and Shiratori served as co-advisers to the Foreign Office under Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka.

"The negotiation of the Tripartite Pact was conducted exclusively between Mr. Matsuoka and Messrs. Stahmer and Ott at Mr. Matsuoka's private residence. I acted as a sort of legal expert and advised Mr. Matsuoka on the technical aspect of the treaty, but Mr. Shiratori's opinion was not asked in any respect and at any stage of the negotiations. The text of the treaty was drafted in English by Matsuoka, Stahmer and Ott, and was afterwards translated into Japanese and German. Mr. Shiratori had nothing to do with the drafting of the original text but was first shown it in a finished form in English. Later he was asked to translate into English the preamble of the treaty which I had drafted in Japanese by Mr. Matsuoka's order.

"Mr. Shiratori was entirely uninformed concerning Mr. Matsuoka's trip to Europe in the spring of 1941.

"In April 1941 Mr. Shiratori became seriously ill and he remained convalescing in almost complete retirement for about a year. He resigned as adviser in July 1941.

"Mr. Shiratori and myself often met the German Ambassador in a social way but there was to the best of my knowledge nothing to indicate that Mr. Shiratori was on any specially intimate terms with Mr. Ott or any other member of the German Embassy in Tokyo.

"In October 1940 Mr. Shiratori was appointed a member of the directorate of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Although I was with Mr. Shiratori almost daily at that period at the adviser's quarters of the Foreign Office, I was not aware that he was playing any important part as a member of the said directorate. In fact, I remember his telling me once that he expected nothing of real value or significance from this organization. He generally stayed away from the meetings of the Association which were held quite frequently at its initial stage."

Testimony of Shiratori

29. Shiratori described himself as "a faithful votary of the Shidehara diplomacy of conciliation" during the decade and a half between World War I and the Manchurian Affair.

"At the time of the Manchurian Incident, the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, of which I was chief, followed instructions of the Foreign Minister and did all it could in its attempt at mobilizing the public opinion in favor of a peaceful adjustment of the affair, but the press which until then had generally been supposed to be sympathetic to the Foreign Office, did not this time so willingly respond to our appeal as at the time of the London Disarmament Conferences, when, with their support, the Government could carry the treaty through in the face of strong opposition at home.

"After serving three years as Minister to the four Scandinavian countries, I was recalled and placed on the waiting list in 1936. I neither sought nor was offered any new assignment for nearly two years.

"In August 1938 Foreign Minister Ugaki wanted me to call on him at his official residence and asked me if I would go to Rome as ambassador. It was a promotion indeed, but it did not at all appeal to me; I declined at first but later accepted upon advice of Premier Konoye.

"The prosecution states that I advocated, contrary to instructions, an all-out military alliance without reservations with Germany and Italy. That is not true. The text of the draft treaty accepted by all three nations concerned at an early stage was a very weak and harmless document partaking more of the character of a treaty of mutual consultation and assistance than of a military alliance. I never for a moment imagined that such a pact would by any means drag Japan, against her will, into a war of Germany's or Italy's making. Nor did I think that it would in the least stand in the way of Japan concluding separate arrangements with England and America concerning China and the Far East. On the contrary, the existence of such a pact, or its very possibility or imminence, was in my opinion calculated to serve as a sort of leverage in moving the Anglo-Saxon countries to reconsider their Far Eastern Policy, thereby making it possible for Japan speedily to wind up, with their friendly cooperation, the unfortunate conflict with China.

"When the worst that I had feared came true, and the non-aggression pact between Germany and Soviet Russia was concluded, I saw no sense in staying any longer in Europe. My request for recall was granted by the Government.

"When Mr. Matsuoka became Foreign Minister, he desired me to call on him. We had not met for more than 10 years before that. He told me that he intended to effect a wholesale dismissal of senior diplomats and suggested that I show the way by resigning the position of ambassador which I had held nominally until then. By way of compensation he offered me an advisorship in the Foreign Office. By common, though tacit, consent my position was to be a sinecure from the beginning. I was never consulted by the Foreign Minister on any matter of policy. Moreover, important documents and information concerning the policies of the Government in foreign affairs were withheld from me.

"Mr. Matsuoka seemed determined from the outset that no person, not excepting Prince Konoye himself, should share with him either the blame or the credit for the new diplomatic venture he

was embarking upon (the Tripartite Pact). He made it a point of distinguishing this pact from that abortive attempt of 1938-39, and refused to study documents or consult persons that had anything to do with the previous negotiations. In deference to that sentiment of his, I carefully refrained from all attempts at butting in at any stage of the whole affair."

DEFENSE OF TEIICHI SUZUKI

30. Former General Suzuki was president of the Cabinet Planning Board and Minister without Portfolio under Prime Ministers Konoye and Tojo. His defense was heard 12-15 December.

Testimony of Prince Higashi-kuni

31. "On the evening of 15 October 1941, the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, called at my residence and asked me to head the next cabinet since his cabinet had decided to resign.

"Early the next morning Teiichi Suzuki, president of the Planning Board, called on me and made a statement to the following effect:

"I have been directed by the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, to explain to Your Highness the present condition of our national strength so that the same may duly be taken into account by Your Highness in the event Your Highness forms the next cabinet. Recently the elements clamoring for a discontinuance of the American-Japanese negotiations and commencing a war against America and Britain are in the ascendant, but it is incumbent upon us to do our utmost to avoid such a war, and especially in view of the present condition of our national strength. Considering the negative attitude of the Navy, which has to bear the brunt in the event of a war with America, it must be declared highly dangerous that army people should be urging for war. But since Prince Konoye is, after all, a mere subject, it is beyond his power to evade the war. There is no other alternative than to rely upon the prestige and influence of Your Highness. I, therefore, beg Your Highness' permission to explain the present state of our national strength as revealed in the "Materials Mobilization Program" so that Your Highness might take that into account when the next cabinet is formed by Your Highness."

"So saying, he explained the matter on the basis of relevant figures and he added, 'Not only Prince Konoye, but I personally respectfully solicit Your Highness to condescend to form the cabinet, as this is most essential in view of the present conditions of our country.'

"But on the evening of the same day, however, Prince Konoye sent a letter to me, through his private secretary, notifying me that the question regarding the resignation of his cabinet and the consequent cabinet formation by me had been shelved."

Testimony of Suzuki

32. Suzuki admitted after lengthy cross-examination that the problem of creating one or more new governments in China was the most important matter which came to the attention of the China Affairs Board during the period in which he was chief of the Political Section of the Board.

The proposed puppet regime was at first referred to in Japanese Government documents as the "Wu Project," the prosecution brought out in cross-examination. The name "Wu" referred to Wu Peifu, a retired North China warlord. Wu died, however, and then Wang

Ching-wei was approached by letter and exhorted to "make every effort for peace."

Suzuki linked Kenji Doihara, codefendent, with the Wu Project.

In February 1940 the China Affairs Board recommended advisers to the New Central Government in China, Suzuki admitted.

On 4 April 1941 Suzuki became president of the Cabinet Planning Board and a Minister of State. When the Tojo Cabinet came into office on 18 October 1941, Suzuki continued in his same capacity.

When General Tojo became Prime Minister he asked Suzuki not to meddle in political affairs but to concentrate his energy on the work of economic mobilization.

Suzuki explained in further cross-examination that the greatest stumbling blocks in the negotiations Japan was conducting with America were, first, the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from southern Indo-China and, second, the question of the withdrawal of troops from China.

"In the last days of November 1941, the Government was inclined to the opinion that the opening of hostilities for national self-defense against America, Britain and the Netherlands might be unavoidable in view of the surrounding circumstances."

Suzuki also testified, "The Cabinet on 28 November decided to organize a committee to work out plans for the development, acquisition and control of resources in the southern area which might possibly be occupied. On 2 December, when the opening of hostilities had been decided upon, the Prime Minister ordered me to act as chairman of the Committee.

"I signed the Imperial Rescript declaring war. War was certainly not what I desired, but I thought that the opening of hostilities was unavoidable for defensive purposes so long as an ultimatum had already been delivered to us and we were placed in a situation liable to be militarily attacked at any moment."

Suzuki declared that he first heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 8 December.

DEFENSE OF SHIGENORI TOGO

35. Togo served as Foreign Minister and Minister for Overseas Affairs under Tojo October 1941 to March 1942, and as Foreign Minister and Minister of Greater East Asia under Suzuki. His defense was presented 15-26 December.

Testimony of Elji Tomiyoshi

34. Tomiyoshi, a member of the present House of Representatives, identified Togo as "a senior of mine from the same province."

Tomiyoshi testified that he had visited Togo soon after he became Foreign Minister and at that time asked him:

"You being a peace lover, how can you realize your diplomatic policy by entering the Tojo Cabinet of the military clique?" Foreign Minister Togo replied, "I entered the Cabinet since Tojo has assured me he would endeavor to solve the situation through negotiations. I will do all I can for the success of the negotiations, so that war can be averted."

"In the middle of November 1941 I again called on Foreign Minister Togo at the Foreign Ministry, and asked him, 'Is not the dispatch of Ambassador Kurusu a trick?' Mr. Togo replied to my question sharply, saying, 'Not at all. I sent him for the sole purpose of solving the situation through negotiations, and it is entirely wrong to say that it is a trick.'

"Then later, in October 1942, when Mr. Togo returned to Kagoshima after having resigned from the Foreign Ministership, I called on him and asked why he resigned. He replied:

"The reason I was opposed to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry was not, as people generally said, that the scope or power of the Foreign Ministry is diminished, but that it is contradictory to the idea of treating the East Asiatic countries as fully independent states. I resigned because the military interfere with diplomacy on every matter, forcing their self-willed way through."

In cross-examination he explained that he had referred to the Tojo Cabinet as the military clique "because the Cabinet was constituted largely of military men and because I believe that it was organized for some military action."

But in elaborating on his explanation he said he "did not necessarily mean that it was devoted to, or that it was organized for military action, because military actions take place in accordance with or dependent upon the course of diplomacy and international conditions, and it was not my interpretation that this particular cabinet was established for the purpose of military action."

Asked to explain what he meant by his inquiry whether the dispatch of Ambassador Kurusu was not some sort of trick, he replied that he meant was not Japan pretending to be seeking peace when it was not desiring peace, were not hostilities going to be commenced while the other party was placed off guard.

Testimony of Togo

35. Togo testified that he made it quite plain that he would agree to join the Tojo Cabinet only if several conditions were fulfilled, including the re-examination of the Japanese-American negotiations.

Gaining an affirmative assurance from Tojo concerning these conditions, Togo joined the Cabinet at the time of its organization, on 18 October 1941.

Liaison conferences began immediately. At the 23 October meeting General Sugiyama, then chief of the General Staff of the Army, asserted that the intent of the Imperial Conference of 6 September was to accord diplomacy primary emphasis during September with military preparations subordinated, but from the beginning of October preparations for military operations would be the primary, and diplomacy the secondary, concern.

Then came an unceasing acceleration of preparatory military actions by the High Command. Meanwhile an impasse was reached in the negotiations and Ambassador Kurusu was sent to Washington in early November to aid in working for the success of the negotiations.

Japan submitted two proposals in November to break the impasse but they were not accepted. Then the Hull note of 26 November came. "Ignoring all past progress and areas of agreement in the negotiations, the United States had served upon us what we viewed as an ultimatum containing demands far in excess of the strongest

positions theretofore taken. We felt that clearly the United States had no hope or intention of reaching an agreement for a peaceful settlement, for it was plain to us and must have been plain to the Americans that this document demanded as the price of peace total surrender by Japan to the American position. Japan was now asked not only to abandon all the gains of her years of sacrifice, but to surrender her international position as a power in the Far East. That surrender, as we saw it, would have amounted to national suicide. The only other way to face this challenge and defend ourselves was war.

"On 1 December the actual decision to commence war was made. Those present were all members of the Cabinet, chiefs and vice-chiefs of Army and Navy General Staffs, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, directors of Military and Naval Affairs Bureaus, and the President of the Privy Council. Again explanations were made by the Premier of the circumstances compelling us to go to war, and by me of the negotiations and the impossibility of continuing them after the 25 November note. Explanation of various other matters by the other cabinet ministers and the High Command followed. There was then unanimous agreement on the necessity of going to war.

"Concerning the question of procedure--how and when to notify the commencement of hostilities--Admiral Nagano, chief of the Naval General Staff, told me that the Navy wished to carry out a surprise attack and that Vice-chief Ito demanded that negotiations be left unterminated in order that the war be started with the maximum possible effectiveness. I rejected this suggestion, replying that it was contrary to the usual practice and highly improper.

"Later, in the following Liaison Conference Admiral Ito announced that the Navy had no objection to delivering the notification note at 12:30 p.m., 7 December, Washington time.

"I have fought throughout my life for what I thought was right, and now at the end of it I am determined, for the sake of history as well as the purposes of this Tribunal, to the best of my ability and recollection to tell the full truth as it is known to me, neither attempting to evade responsibility which is mine nor accepting that which others would transfer to me.

"The Hull note of 26 November we regarded as being beyond any possible question an ultimatum from the United States--it offered to Japan the alternatives of abject surrender or war. Japan's answer to the American ultimatum, rejecting it, we felt to be sufficient as a notification that hostilities would be resorted to, and in effect a declaration of war. It seemed to me, in considering and approving the form of the final note, that it was in any point of view tantamount to a declaration of war: the expression 'the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific. . .has finally been lost,' I thought, clearly imported that peace was ended, with war to follow. I did not feel that the document would have been made any more unequivocally a declaration of war by the inclusion in it of such stock phrases as 'a state of war exists between our countries.'

"Later Admiral Ito requested, on behalf of the High Command, a postponement of the delivery of the final note from 12:30 until 1 o'clock. No one opposed this and it was approved.

"Disagreement of views concerned with the policy of direction of the war had developed early after the start of the war between myself and the Premier. The Premier and others believed that it was going to be a long war of 10 to 20 years' duration--and that the United States would not be able to undertake a counter-offensive before 1944. They began to concentrate on strengthening

the political position of the Government rather than in trying to establish Japan in an impregnable position.

"My differences with the Premier continued to grow and led to a head-on clash and my resignation over the Greater East Asia Ministry question in September 1942.

"The Premier had proposed in establishing the new Ministry that all outpost agencies in the area of Greater East Asia (excluding Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin) were to be placed under its control and supervision, excepting matters which were 'pure diplomacy.'

"All political, economic and cultural affairs concerning foreign countries in the Greater East Asia area—such as Manchukuo, China, Thailand, French Indo-China, etc.—were to be placed in charge of the new Ministry. With its establishment, the Taiman Jimukyoku, the Koain and the Ministry of Overseas Affairs were to be abolished. The avowed purpose of the plan was to place those countries under special treatment as brother nations, and to contribute to the attainment of the objectives of the war by carrying out a general mobilization of material power throughout Greater East Asia.

"By 'pure diplomacy'—the domain of the Foreign Ministry—was meant such things as matters of protocol and the formalities relating to conclusion of treaties.

"I opposed this proposal of the Premier on the following four grounds:

- "(1) The foreign policy of Japan would be in the hands of two different ministries, according as it related to Greater East Asia or to the rest of the world. Such an arrangement would render it impossible for Japan to conduct a unified and consistent diplomacy, and neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Ministry of Greater East Asia would be able to function properly.
- "(2) The countries of Greater East Asia, because of being treated differently than other foreign countries, would entertain distrust and suspicion of Japan and their pride would be hurt. Any treatment of this sort is certainly contrary to the spirit of respecting the independence of other countries.
- "(3) The proposed plan meant the extension of the jurisdiction of the Koain, which had excited ill-feeling among the Chinese people, and it would thus be a failure.
- "(4) It was urgently necessary to concentrate our efforts toward the execution of emergency measures, and it was not the time to undertake the changing of the administrative structure.

"On 1 September 1942 I retired from the Foreign Ministry and was out of office until I accepted the same office in the Suzuki Cabinet on 8 April 1945.

"Upon becoming Foreign Minister in this cabinet my chief concern was how to realize my long-cherished desire, prompt restoration of peace.

"Events moved rapidly. The Doenitz regime surrendered unconditionally toward the end of April. In early May I reported to the Emperor on the course of defeat of Germany, pointing out that

air raids were a major factor and added that air raids on Japan now were becoming severer and therefore we should promptly bring the war to an end. As a result of meetings of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, which were called by my advice, it was decided that proper measures for ending the war should be expedited.

"On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration was issued. On 6 August the atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima. Then on 14 August the Imperial Rescript accepting the Potsdam Declaration was issued."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION
of
NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES
in
JAPAN

Number 27

December 1947

PART III
ECONOMIC

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SECTION 1

AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

C O N T E N T S

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NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE

Advisory Committee Functions

1. A Resources Committee within the Economic Stabilization Board was established on 13 December. The Committee will collect and compile data on utilization of natural resources in relation to economic planning and make reports and recommendations to the president of the Economic Stabilization Board. Its first concern will be with government activities relating to land and water use. The Committee will also provide coordination and long-term economic planning for efficient use of resources.

Organization

2. The director general of the Economic Stabilization Board was appointed chairman of the Resources Committee by the Prime Minister's Cabinet order which set up the organization. A full-time government official, nominated by the chairman and appointed by the Prime Minister, will be vice-chairman. Counsellors to advise the vice-chairman will be appointed by the Prime Minister when necessary.

The order also provides for a full-time 22-member Executive Board, including a director who is also a member of the Advisory Committee.

The Advisory Committee will have a maximum of 20 part-time members who will meet at least once a month. They will be nominated by the chairman of the Resources Committee and appointed for two-year terms by the Prime Minister. Subcommittees of the Advisory Committee will be composed of members of the Executive Board and Advisory Committee with specialists in other fields who may be called in on specific problems.

AGRARIAN REFORM

Agricultural Cooperatives

3. The Agricultural Cooperative Association laws, which became effective on 15 December, provide for the dissolution of all agricultural and practice associations before 15 August 1948, with

the exception of those that have not completed segregation of their financial accounts under the Law for the Reorganization and Reconstruction of Financial Institutions. Any association may be ordered into dissolution or be voluntarily dissolved at any time prior to 15 August 1948. No association shall continue its business functions after 14 August.

Pamphlet Distribution

4. Prefectural governments received 11,965 copies of "Summary of the Agricultural Cooperative Association Law" and the "Law Applicable to Dissolution of Agricultural Associations" from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The pamphlets will be read at the preliminary dissolution meetings of each agriculture association before 15 February.

In addition, prefectural governments received 30,000 posters urging farmers to attend the dissolution meetings.

5. The Ministry started distribution of 5,800,000 copies of "1-2-3 of Agricultural Cooperatives" to farmers. The publicity program also includes 125,000 posters entitled "How to Organize Agricultural Cooperatives" and "Let Us Form Agricultural Cooperatives."

Agricultural Insurance

6. The Law for Compensation Against Agricultural Loss, passed by the Diet on 24 November, became effective on 27 December. The Law, planned to encourage agricultural production, replaces the Insurance Acts of 1929 and 1939 and corrects the financial and administrative defects of the former system. The program will be administered through local and prefectural agricultural mutual relief insurance associations.

The Law is retroactive so as to cover paddy rice crop losses incurred during 1947. It includes compulsory insurance of silkworms and cocoons, paddy rice, wheat, barley and oats at premiums determined by records of past losses in each area. Ordinary crop damages will be paid from member premiums and extraordinary losses by government subsidy. Livestock insurance is voluntary and no government subsidy is authorized.

Crops are insured against damage by wind, flood, drought and seismological phenomena; silkworms against disease injury to worms and cocoons, and wind, flood, drought, frost and hail damage to mulberry leaves; livestock against disease, injury and death.

Land Sales

7. Government land sales to tenant farmers totaled 138,981 cho (137,833 hectares) on 30 November, an increase of 27,267 cho over the sales reported on 31 October. Monthly sales have averaged about 28,000 cho since the program started in June.


Government Land Purchases

8. Government land purchases of 471,636 cho (467,740 hectares) of land on 2 December were 122,906 cho more than in October and brought the land purchased for resale to 1,168,652 cho. Lands accepted in lieu of tax payments were revised to 242,248 cho (240,247 hectares), making a total of 1,410,900 cho of land available for resale to tenant farmers under the agrarian reform program.

LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

9. Of 193 goats donated to Japan by the Brethren Service Committee in December, 61 were distributed to agricultural experiment stations and 132 to welfare institutions.

10. Livestock slaughtered in October totaled 43,407, an increase of 8,801 over September. Cattle slaughtered gained 5,574 to 27,041, horses increased 1,196 to 7,177, hogs from 6,010 to 8,131 and calves, sheep and goats fell from 1,148 to 1,058.



RECONNAISSANCE SOIL SURVEY

Chugoku Region

11. Reconnaissance soil survey field work was completed on 10 December in Hiroshima, Shimane and Yamaguchi Prefectures in the Chugoku region, the sixth area in the program to classify the soils of Japan.

The latest survey revealed that approximately 78 percent of the area were lithosols or "rock soils," mostly on slopes well above 35 percent gradient. Favorable climate and proximity to large industrial centers, rather than suitable soils, are responsible for wide use of these lands for tangerines as well as sweet potatoes, soybeans and vegetables in summer and small grains in winter.

Twelve percent of the area has alluvial soils which are mostly terraced or diked and used for irrigated rice followed by fall vegetables and small grains.


Less than six percent of the area was in yellow podzolic soils, mostly on slopes of 15-35 percent gradient with good surface and internal drainage. Some portions are terraced to form fields for irrigated rice and many areas could be cleared and used for close-growing vegetation. Less than four percent fell into the red podzolic group, on slopes of 12-35 percent gradient, surface drainages good to excessive while internal drainage is slow but not restricted. Some of these lands are used for vegetables, soybeans and sweet potatoes in summer and small grains in winter. The land is well suited to hay, forage crops and pasture.

The remainder of the area was in modified planosols and Ando soils. There were few forest or cutover lands suitable for cultivated crops and only three percent of the present nonagricultural areas could be used for hay and forage crops.

FISHERIES

Fishing Fleet

12. Steel and wooden fishing vessels over five gross tons totaled 16,169 with a combined tonnage of 402,736 gross tons on 30 November, a gain of 552 ships over the October total of 15,617. Wooden vessels comprised 64 percent of the total tonnage.



EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

13. Cement allotments of 3,000 metric tons to the fishing industry for the period from January to March 1948 included 2,100 metric tons for fishing harbors and local anchorages, 700 for

general fisheries and 200 for refrigeration facilities. An additional 361.4 metric tons were allotted to the Bureau of Fisheries for construction against flood damage.

14. Allocations of petroleum to the fishing industry in December were.


ALLOCATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
(barrels) a/

	<u>November</u>	<u>December b/</u>
Fuel oil	143,903	142,554
Gas oil	21,751	21,751
Kerosene	3,618	3,617
Gasoline	723	723
Lubricating oil	11,209	11,209
Grease (metric tons)	94	15

a/ One barrel equals 42 U. S. gallons.

b/ Preliminary.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
Bureau of Fisheries.



WHALING

Whale Oil Export

15. Nine hundred tons of whale oil produced on the 1946-47 antarctic expedition were shipped to Bremen, Germany, for distribution in the British and American occupied zones. The oil is the first shipment of 7,200 tons of exportable whale oil.

Antarctic Whaling

16. The antarctic whaling expedition, which began whaling operations on 8 December, reported a 10-day catch of 222 whales

including 175 blue and 47 fin whales aggregating 198.5 blue whale units.

Intercoastal Whaling

17. Intercoastal whalers caught 52 whales during November with a total yield of 716.26 metric tons of products. The catch, 142 less than October, included two fin, one sei and 49 sperm whales.

WHALING PRODUCTION
2-30 November
(metric tons)

Meat	286.92
Blubber for food	235.35
Sperm oil	46.93
Bone meal	18.37
Blubber for leather	5.98
Whale oil	.62
Other	122.09

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
Bureau of Fisheries.

SECTION 2
FORESTRY AND MINING


C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Forestry.	1
Mining.	10

FORESTRY

Log Production

1. November production of logs declined to 50,143,300 cubic feet (401,146,400 board feet), 8,387,700 cubic feet under October, as shown in the chart on the following page. Stockpiles declined to 216,471,100 cubic feet, 13,357,900 under the October total.






Log and Mine Timber Production

2. During the first six months of the 1947 fiscal year, log production reached 58 percent of the annual goal with the output of five of six months exceeding the average monthly production target. During the same period, logs for general use amounted to 69 percent of the annual goal, 27 percent greater than last year's output. General-use logs included timber for Occupation use,

LOG, LUMBER AND PLYWOOD PRODUCTION

1930-1947



* FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING 1 APRIL
 ** ALL LOGS CUT IN THE WOODS FOR USES OTHER THAN FUEL. CONVERTED FROM KOKU BY RATIO OF 80 BOARD FEET PER KOKU
 *** CONVERTED FROM KOKU BY RATIO OF 120 BOARD FEET PER KOKU.

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY.
 GHQ - SCAP JAPAN - DEC 47 NUMBER 10

repairs packing, Japanese construction, shipbuilding, railroad cars, wagons, furniture, crating stock, rice-drying poles and other items.

3. Cutting of mine timbers from May through October did not equal monthly allocations despite a strong demand. The production deficiency was attributed to overcutting of pine forests where most mine timbers are obtained from thinning operations.

Plywood, Pulp and Veneer Logs


4. Plywood production in the first half of the fiscal year reached 40 percent of the production goal for the year and was 11 percent higher than in the same six-month period last year. Pulp logs also increased 11 percent but totaled only 33 percent of the annual production goal. Veneer logs gained 38 percent over last year's production and fulfilled 45 percent of the goal for the fiscal year.

Railroad Ties and Telephone Poles

5. Output of railroad ties fell below the average monthly goal but telephone pole production increased 307 percent over May-October output last year and reached 40 percent of the quota for the year.

Firewood and Charcoal

6. October firewood production increased 31,362 cubic meters over September to 733,801 and deliveries gained 15,648 cubic meters to 410,289. Charcoal output totaled 129,330 metric tons, 3,132 more than September, and October deliveries of 115,672 metric tons were 16,425 over the previous month. Production of gasumaki (wood blocks used as auto fuel) declined 5,233 metric tons to a total of 21,818. Deliveries also decreased from 20,857 metric tons to 19,635.



Wood Fuel Production

7. Deficiencies in firewood and charcoal production were attributed largely to the gradual depletion of raw materials. Charcoal production during the first six months of the fiscal year was

10 percent higher than the revised production of the previous year but only 29 percent of the annual production goal. Firewood production increased six percent over the revised output of last year and met 21 percent of the annual quota.

8. Gasumaki output gained 103 percent over the first six months of the last fiscal year and reached 62 percent of the 1947 goal. The relatively high rate of production was attributed to the short supply of petroleum products, increased use of gasumaki as a substitute and the simple manufacturing process.

Pulpwood Deliveries

9. Pulpwood deliveries to pulp mills in October totaled 374,318 koku (3,678,423 cubic feet), over 40 percent more than the deliveries of 265,942 koku in October 1946. Pulpwood deliveries during the first 10 months of 1947 totaled 3,297,269 koku.

PULPWOOD DELIVERIES
(koku) a/

	<u>October</u>	<u>January- October</u>
Spruce (<i>Picea Jezoensis</i>)		
Fir (<i>Abies mayriana</i>)	144,562	1,567,413
Red pine (<i>Pinus densiflora</i>)		
Black pine (<i>Pinus thunbergii</i>)	199,367	1,481,416
Sugi (<i>Cryptomeria japonica</i>)		
Hinoki (<i>Chamaecyparis obtusa</i>)	11,882	99,727
Fir (<i>Abies firma</i>)		
Hemlock (<i>Tsuga sieboldii</i>)	1,958	55,242
Beech and other hardwoods (<i>Fagus crenata</i>)	15,831	78,589
Live oak (<i>Shiia cuspidata</i>)		
Juniper (<i>Thuja standishii</i>)	338	13,073
Cypress (<i>Chamaecyparis pisifera</i>)		
Larch (<i>Larix kaempferii</i>)	330	1,809

a/ One koku equals 9.827 cubic feet.

SOURCE: Japanese Pulpwood Association.

MINING


	Paragraph
Coal	10
Oil	17
Mining Industry	19

COAL


10. Coal production in the first 20 days of December was 1,978,900 metric tons, 25.1 percent or 396,700 metric tons more than the revised output 1-20 November.

COAL PRODUCTION

SINCE 1930



11. Total November production increased to 2,481,400 metric tons, 44,500 over revised October production and 268,870 tons or 9.8 percent under the quota. The steadily climbing production reflects in part efforts of field representatives of the Japanese Government to increase production by contacts with labor and management.



Deliveries

12. Coal deliveries in November were 2,397,000 metric tons, 84,400 under the month's production and 20,000 under revised October deliveries.

COAL DELIVERIES BY INDUSTRIES
(thousands of metric tons)

<u>Industries</u>	<u>October a/</u>	<u>November b/</u>
Iron and steel	184	174
Coal mining	201	229
Gas and coke	155	176
Salt	13	4
Railways	563	514
Domestic uses	165	131
Ship bunkering	89	87
Shipbuilding	10	8
Metals	11	10
Metal mining and refining	18	15
Subtotal	1,409	1,349

<u>Industries</u>	<u>October a/</u>	<u>November b/</u>
Carried forward	1,409	1,349
Electric power	163	197
Chemicals	70	72
Ceramics	115	109
Fibers and textiles	92	79
Food	69	68
Liquid fuel	1	1
Briquette	34	36
Machinery	38	29
Government (civil)	29	31
Chemical fertilizer	150	131
Other	22	25
Total	2,192	2,126
Occupation Forces	153	189
Hongkong	10	19
Korea	62	61
Bunkering for British ships	0	2
Total	225	271
Grand total	2,417	2,397
Reserves not delivered	7	35

a/ Revised.
b/ Preliminary figures.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.

13. The revised total of coal deliveries during October was 2,417,000 metric tons, 237,000 more than September and 19,900 metric tons under final October production.

Stockpiles

14. Stockpiles of available coal reached 572,400 metric tons on 30 November, 45,700 more than in October.

COAL STOCKPILES ON 30 NOVEMBER (metric tons)

	<u>Hokkaido</u>	<u>Eastern Honshu</u>	<u>Western Honshu</u>	<u>Kyushu</u>	<u>Total</u>
Available under present conditions	38,700	47,900	3,300	38,000	127,900
In transit	158,700	30,400	53,700	201,700	444,500
Total	197,400	78,300	57,000	239,700	572,400

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.

Mine Employees


15. Employees of the coal-mining industry, of which approximately 10 percent were office workers and engineers, totaled 495,952 on 20 December, an increase of 9,271 over October.

Lignite

16. Preliminary figures show November lignite production was 224,715 metric tons, 43,875 under the revised October output; stockpiles increased from the revised total of 311,671 metric tons to 340,709; and deliveries declined from 188,776 metric tons in October to 156,514.

OIL

17. Crude oil production in November was 15,814 kiloliters, with a daily average production of 527 kiloliters, 41 less than in October. Low production was attributed to seasonal electric power stoppages which affected pumping operations and gales which blew down derricks and power lines in two prefectures.



Drilling Operations

18. The Imperial Oil Company brought in one new oil well during November with an initial daily production of 1.24 kiloliters. Three wells were restored to flowing production during the month. One which is being redrilled after a blowout last March had a daily production of five kiloliters of oil and 40,000 cubic meters of gas from a zone at 940 meters. Two others which ceased flowing over seven months ago were restored and have a combined daily production of 25 kiloliters.

DRILLING OPERATIONS
November

	<u>Exploitation</u>	<u>Exploration</u>	<u>Total</u>
Completed as oil producers	1	0	1
Completed as gas producers	0	0	0
Abandoned	0	1	1
Standing suspended	0	0	0
Commenced during month	1	1	2
Other wells drilling	2	11	13
Total strings active	3	12	15

SOURCE: Imperial Oil Company.

MINING INDUSTRY

19. October production increased in 13 of 30 mineral commodities with principal gains in the production of fire clay, lead and gold. Output of tin and iron ore declined.

20. Shortages of electric power and freight cars limited mine output. In northeastern Honahu the shortage of railroad freight cars was the principal obstacle to increased pyrite production.

MINERAL AND METAL MINE PRODUCTION

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Form</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Antimony	metal in concentrate	kg	10,338	9,203
Arsenic	metal in concentrate	MT	53	153
Asbestos	fiber	MT	261	436
Barite	concentrate	MT	140	97
Chromite				
High grade	concentrate (55% Cr ₂ O ₃)	MT	164	155
Low grade	concentrate (32% Cr ₂ O ₃)	MT	0	0
Cobalt	metal in concentrate	kg	764	844
Copper	metal in concentrate	MT	1,916	1,749
Fire clay		MT	10,698	18,402
Fluorite	concentrate	MT	16	8
Gold	metal in concentrate	gm	149,410	185,328
Graphite				
Crystalline	crude ore	MT	759	407
Amorphous	crude ore	MT	582	518
Gypsum				
	concentrate +40%	MT	1,444	1,220
	concentrate -40%	MT	3,903	3,380
Iron ore	concentrate (52% Fe)	MT	57,296	48,807
Iron sand	concentrate (50% Fe)	MT	125	160
Lead	metal in concentrate	MT	447	513
Limestone		MT	503,779	512,428
Manganese				
Battery grade	concentrate (71% MnO ₂)	MT	528	596
Metallurgical grade	concentrate (37% Mn)	MT	3,111	2,818
Mercury	metal in concentrate	kg	2,845	2,939
Molybdenum	concentrate (76% MoS ₂)	MT	0.997	0.957
Pyrite	concentrate (42% S)	MT	84,549	87,755
Pyrophyllite		MT	12,223	12,253
Silver	metal in concentrate	kg	5,918	5,800
Sulfur	refined	MT	3,546	2,942
Tin	metal in concentrate	kg	10,700	7,352
Tungsten	concentrate (65% WO ₃)	MT	0.240	0.020
Zinc	metal in concentrate	MT	2,481	2,494

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Bureau of Mines.

SECTION 3

HEAVY INDUSTRIES

C O N T E N T S

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COKE


1. Coke production in November increased 9,650 metric tons over October output to a total of 175,580 metric tons. This was 9.7 percent below the scheduled output of 194,500 tons. Coke stockpiles at the end of November totaled 29,480 tons, a decrease of 230 tons from the previous month.

2. During November coke was allocated and distributed to industries as follows:

NOVEMBER COKE ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION
(metric tons)

	<u>Allocation</u>	<u>Distribution</u>
Consumed by producers	67,170	61,316
Chemical industry (including fertilizer)	52,593	43,342
Metal industry	26,412	22,225
Industrial machinery	21,185	18,581
Rolling-stock manufacturing	11,950	10,680
Electrical machinery	4,883	4,231
Ceramic industry	4,182	3,785
Shipbuilding	2,850	2,694
Repair of coal mine machinery	800	671
Others	2,763	2,398
Reserves	<u>2,202</u>	<u>1,580</u>
Total	196,990	171,803


SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.



METAL INDUSTRIES


Iron and Steel

3. Preliminary reports for November showed total production of pig iron at 37,501 metric tons compared with October's revised total of 31,572 tons. Due to lack of power rolling mills were forced to curtail production and many electric furnaces stopped



INDEXES OF METAL PRODUCTION

1930-1934 AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION = 100



* 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING 30 NOVEMBER 1947.
 ** COMPOSITE INDEX COMBINES FIVE INDICATED METAL PRODUCTION INDEXES WEIGHTED BY BASE-PERIOD (1930-1934) EMPLOYMENT.
 NOTE: NOVEMBER 1947 DATA PRELIMINARY; NA = DATA NOT AVAILABLE.
 SOURCE OF BASE DATA: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY; JAPAN IRON AND STEEL FEDERATION.
 GHQ · SCAP JAPAN · DEC 47 NUMBER 17


operating. Open-hearth steel ingots and steel rails were the only products to show increases over previous months with November figures of 58,360 metric tons and 1,445 tons over October's 54,787 and 800 metric tons respectively.

Output of secondary steel products remained generally at the October level. Bolts and nuts, special nails and wire rope increased to 5,320, 450 and 1,360 metric tons respectively in November from 4,460, 430 and 1,301 metric tons in October.

Light Metals

4. Lack of scrap aluminum curtailed slightly the total aluminum output in four primary and 10 secondary plants to 798 metric tons. This was a drop of 218 metric tons from October's total as reported by six primary and nine secondary plants.

5. November output of aluminum sheet, aluminum forgings and aluminum foil increased to 519, 4 and 10 metric tons respectively. Aluminum alloy sheet decreased from 949 to 918 metric tons.




Copper and Copper Alloys

6. Blister copper production continued to rise with preliminary figures for November of 4,319 metric tons compared with 4,071 tons for the previous month; refined copper dropped slightly to 3,185 metric tons for November compared with 3,190 for October. Nine smelters and eight refineries reported production.

Output of rolled copper sheet and products by 205 rolling mills decreased 158 metric tons, with 850 tons produced in November compared with 1,008 tons for October.

Brass and bronze rolling production also decreased with totals for November of 3,374 and 90 metric tons respectively compared with 3,560 and 102 metric tons in October.



Zinc and Lead

7. Refined zinc output decreased 23 metric tons from 1,474 tons in October to 1,451 tons in November. Of the total production 821 tons were electrolytic zinc and 630 metric tons were distilled zinc.

Zinc plate increased 21 tons above October to 453 metric tons in November.

8. Crude lead and refined lead increased to 908 and 811 tons in November compared with 730 tons and 794 tons respectively for October. See the first chart on the next page.

Other Nonferrous Metals

9. Preliminary November figures for nonferrous metals showed a decrease in all products except crude tin which increased one metric ton over the October figure of 12 metric tons. Mercury dropped in production from October figures of 4.9 metric tons to 2.5 tons in November.

Ferrous Alloys

10. Ferroalloy production in November totaled 663 metric tons, a decrease of 468 metric tons from the 1,131 tons produced in October, as shown in the second chart on the next page.

RUBBER



11. Crude rubber stocks decreased 913 metric tons during November while latex rubber receipts rose from 160 metric tons in October to 176 metric tons in November.

RUBBER INVENTORY (metric tons)

	<u>Crude Rubber</u>	<u>Latex</u>	<u>Scrap a/</u>
Inventory 1 November	4,478	160	2,832
Receipts during month	785	31	364
Consumption during month	1,698	15	535
Inventory 1 December	3,565	176	2,660

a/ In hands of collection agencies only.


SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.



PETROLEUM


Refined Petroleum

12. Total crude runs to stills amounted to 23,678 kiloliters in November, a decrease of 785 kiloliters from the previous month's run. Output of refined products amounted to 22,722 kiloliters of which 20,885 kiloliters were finished products and 1,837 semi-finished products.



CEMENT

13. Thirty-one operating plants produced 88,551 metric tons of cement and 82,170 metric tons of clinker in November compared with production by 32 plants of 89,193 metric tons of cement and 98,431 tons of clinker in October.



CONSTRUCTION

Coal-miners' Housing

14. Since 1 January a total of 11,645 new miners' houses, 72 dormitories and 289 units for dispensaries and recreation centers have been constructed. A total of 58,000 persons have been provided with new homes. Repairs and rehabilitation of 28,004 dwellings since January have benefited 198,074 persons.

Building Permits

15. Building permits issued during November for new construction totaled 48,782, an increase of 76 units above October; permits issued for repairs increased 906 units above October to 12,548.

16. Rural new construction completed in November, totaling 22,452 units, continued to lead urban construction which totaled 14,720 units.

NEW CONSTRUCTION
November

	<u>Urban</u>		<u>Rural</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>Floor Area a/</u>
<u>Started</u>						
Dwellings	13,723	514,014	29,719	1,192,765	43,442	1,706,779
Combined dwellings and shops	5,619	230,799	2,012	106,317	7,631	337,116
Nonresidential buildings	<u>3,280</u>	<u>377,160</u>	<u>8,082</u>	<u>423,541</u>	<u>11,362</u>	<u>800,701</u>
Total	22,622	1,121,973	39,813	1,722,623	62,435	2,844,596
<u>Completed</u>						
Dwellings	7,549	309,297	15,897	600,052	23,446	909,349
Combined dwellings and shops	4,211	178,899	1,107	55,905	5,318	234,804
Nonresidential buildings	<u>2,960</u>	<u>282,074</u>	<u>5,448</u>	<u>275,625</u>	<u>8,408</u>	<u>557,699</u>
Total	14,720	770,270	22,452	931,582	37,172	1,701,852

a/ Square meters.

SOURCE: Board of Reconstruction.

SHIPBUILDING


17. Shipyards completed repairs on 519 vessels totaling 1,095,185 gross tons during the period 10 November to 10 December.

From 20 November to 20 December four steel cargo vessels totaling 2,990 gross tons were launched and three steel cargo vessels totaling 4,500 gross tons were completed. During the same period 23 steel fishing vessels totaling 11,883 gross tons were completed; two wooden ships were launched and two wooden ships were completed.

18. Wooden tugs and barges are under construction in six shipyards in Southern Honshu for the U. S. S. R. Note the chart on the opposite page.

CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES

19. Chemical production was considerably below the October level with an index of basic heavy chemicals at 39 percent of the requirements for a balanced minimum economy. This was the lowest



registered since April. All of the index chemicals with the exception of sulfuric acid dropped five to six percent. Output of some products not covered by the index improved. There was a large seasonal increase in ethyl alcohol production to 3,503 kiloliters compared with 1,208 kiloliters for the preceding month. See chart on the next page.

Fertilizers

20. Calcium superphosphate increased 158 metric tons over October's total of 74,583 metric tons.


During November 54,219 metric tons of ammonium sulfate (20-percent-nitrogen content) were produced, a decrease of 7,552 metric tons from October's total of 61,771 tons.

Calcium cyanamide production in November declined 21 percent below the October level with production of 14,519 metric tons (composed of 16-percent-nitrogen content) which was equal to 11,615 metric tons of 20-percent-nitrogen content. Carbide furnaces during November operated at greatly reduced capacity. November production of calcium carbide was 16,080 metric tons, which represented 84 percent of the October production; note the first chart on page

Although supplies of coal, coke, pyrite and sulfuric acid are adequate, production of chemical fertilizers is restricted by lack of electric power, as shown in the chart on page 127.

PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CHEMICALS

1946 AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION=100




CHEMICAL	UNIT	1946 AVERAGE MONTHLY	1947* AVERAGE MONTHLY	NOVEMBER 1947
AMMONIA	MT	11,738	17,011	15,707
AMMONIUM SULFATE	MT	38,902	59,171	54,219
BENZENE	MT	377	583	752
CALCIUM CARBIDE	MT	17,106	19,866	16,080
CALCIUM CYANAMIDE	MT	12,107	14,949	11,615
CALCIUM SUPERPHOSPHATE	MT	14,263	55,854	74,741
CAUSTIC SODA	MT	2,380	3,521	3,324
DYESTUFFS	MT	148	226	236

CHEMICAL	UNIT	1946 AVERAGE MONTHLY	1947* AVERAGE MONTHLY	NOVEMBER 1947
ETHYL ALCOHOL	KL	1,309	1,327	3,503
HYDROCHLORIC ACID	MT	1,478	2,531	2,103
METHYL ALCOHOL	MT	381	338	416
NITRIC ACID	MT	575	643	1,063
SALT	MT	29,912	12,808	11,797
SODA ASH	MT	1,956	2,958	4,031
SODIUM BICARBONATE	MT	297	226	176
SULFURIC ACID	MT	76,550	120,464	138,841

* 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING 30 NOVEMBER 1947.


NOTE: KL - KILOLITERS, MT - METRIC TONS.
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY; MINISTRY OF FINANCE.
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
Sulfuric Acid

21. Sulfuric acid production decreased slightly from a revised October total of 142,209 metric tons to 138,841 metric tons in November.



Soda Industries

22. Due to increasingly short supply of electric power and coal there was a 25-percent drop in production of caustic soda by the electrolytic process. A 15-percent increase in production of soda ash was obtained in the solvay process but by-products of the solvay process, caustic soda and sodium bicarbonate, were reduced 18 and 40 percent respectively.



Salt


23. Total indigenous production from all licensed plants (producers with 100 metric tons or greater capacity per year) decreased to 11,797 metric tons in November from October production of 13,094 tons.

The critical salt shortage is to a large extent being alleviated by increased import tonnage; note the chart on the following page.

Paint and Oil

24. There was a seven-percent decrease in the production of paint in November. Shortages of good drying oils are greatly curtailing paint production, resulting in use of larger quantities of inferior semidrying oils in order to keep paint production at its present level.

25. Soap production through the use of oil from imported copra rose 67 percent to 1,073 metric tons in November. Insufficient oil is available to maintain production at this level.



26. Glycerine production increased by 135 percent in November as a result of October's large increase in soap production.

27. Industrial explosives increased by three percent in November due to increased manufacture of gelatine dynamite made possible by a larger supply of glycerine.


Dyes and Intermediates

28. Production of dyes declined sharply from 362 metric tons in October to 236 tons in November due largely to shortage of electric power. Stocks declined from 665 metric tons in October to 657 tons.

29. Total production of intermediates showed little change. Although phthalic anhydride decreased from 16 to four metric tons, chlorosulfonic acid from 308 to 268 metric tons and H acid from 32 to 22 metric tons, an increase in nitrobenzene from nine to 28 metric tons and continued steady production of benzidine base, nitrobenzene, chlorobenzene and B naphthol helped to balance over-all production.

Camphor


30. Production of refined camphor, crude camphor and camphor oil for November totaled 1.4, 109 and 127 metric tons respectively compared with 28, 115 and 150 metric tons for October.



MACHINERY

Machine Tools

31. Output of 375 machine tools in November was reported by 53 plants, a decrease of 60 units from October output. November production averaged 440 kilograms per unit compared with 1938 figures of 5,600 machine tools produced per month with average weight of 1,500 kilograms each.



Small Tools

32. Consumption of steel in the small tools industry in November decreased to 189 metric tons compared with 263 tons the previous month.

SMALL TOOLS PRODUCTION

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Straight-shank drills	544,127	511,044
Taper-shank drills	26,359	23,190
Taps and dies	203,895	201,639
Milling cutters	21,502	20,344

SOURCE: Japan Small Tool Association.

Industrial Machinery

33. The value of production and repair of all categories of industrial machinery in November totaled ¥ 608,443,000, an increase of ¥ 48,411,000 over October's production. The output by weight for new units continued to decline slightly while percentages by weight for parts and repairs gained 25.7 and 3.0 percent respectively for November. See chart on the following page.

November's largest gains in industrial machinery production were made in prime movers, power transmission and mining machinery.

INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY PRODUCTION, PARTS AND REPAIRS (thousands of yen)


	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Chemical	89,718	76,777
Woodworking	66,625	53,044
Pumps	56,774	58,254
Mining	44,008	61,854
Prime movers	39,717	57,446
Fans and blowers	36,450	36,526
Cranes and hoists	34,565	47,159
Printing and bookbinding	32,182	31,202
Iron and steel manufacturing	31,909	28,654
Metal forming	26,446	29,250
Conveyors	20,778	20,768
Power transmission	17,717	25,247
Crushers	12,391	16,170
Food products	10,707	16,542
Rubber	9,834	8,383
Foundry equipment	7,244	5,048
Pulp and paper	4,873	7,133
Miscellaneous	<u>13,094</u>	<u>23,966</u>
Total	560,032	608,443

SOURCE: Industrial Machinery Association, Printing and Bookbinding Association and Woodworking Machinery Association.

34. Steel, coke and electric power used by the reporting factories decreased in November.

INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY PRODUCTION

PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES · BY WEIGHT · MONTHLY SINCE JULY 1946



* DATA ON PRODUCTION OF PARTS AND REPAIRED MACHINERY NOT AVAILABLE.
 SOURCE: INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY ASSOCIATION, WOODWORKING MACHINERY ASSOCIATION, PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING ASSOCIATION.
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RAW MATERIAL AND FUEL CONSUMPTION
(metric tons)

	October <u>a/</u>	November
Steel	8,509	8,802
Iron	11,002	11,338
Coke	9,054	8,689
Coal	7,987	8,520
Power <u>b/</u>	11,030	9,221


a/ Revised.


b/ Thousands of kilowatt hours.

SOURCE: Industrial Machinery Association.

RAILWAY ROLLING STOCK

35. Production of new steam locomotives decreased by three in November from October's five while electric locomotives increased to four from October's three. General and partial repairs to both types of locomotives increased by seven units over October.





38. Value of new production, parts and repairs of cotton machinery decreased slightly in October from the September level. Production aggregated 3,922 metric tons, 52 tons over September total weight.

COTTON MACHINERY PRODUCTION (thousands of yen)

	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
New units	142,126	139,249
Parts	107,079	101,530
Repairs	<u>47,996</u>	<u>45,027</u>
Total	297,201	285,806

SOURCE: Japan Textile Machinery Association.

39. Production, parts and repairs of silk machinery increased in value in October. Weights of production, parts and repairs rose sharply from the September total of 755 metric tons to 1,178 metric tons in October.

SILK MACHINERY PRODUCTION (thousands of yen)

	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
New units	31,360	43,451
Parts	2,294	17,530
Repairs	<u>8,061</u>	<u>8,067</u>
Total	41,715	69,048

SOURCE: Japan Textile Machinery Association.

40. Value of new production in wool and worsted machinery decreased ¥ 5,940,000 in October from September production while repair and parts and total weight increased considerably.

WOOL AND WORSTED MACHINERY PRODUCTION
(thousands of yen)

	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
New units	23,792	17,852
Parts	4,079	6,394
Repairs	<u>13,552</u>	<u>19,485</u>
Total	41,423	43,731

SOURCE: Japan Textile Machinery Association.

41. Production, parts and repairs of finishing and dyeing machinery aggregated 50 metric tons in October compared with the September total of 43 metric tons. The value of new production in October showed a large increase over September.

FINISHING AND DYEING MACHINERY
(thousands of yen)

	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
New units	1,011	2,247
Parts	919	315
Repairs	<u>2,667</u>	<u>2,331</u>
Total	4,597	4,893

SOURCE: Japan Textile Machinery Association.

SECTION 4
MANUFACTURING

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Food Processing	1
Tobacco Products.	6
Pulp and Paper Production	7
Glass and Ceramics.	8
Medical Equipment	18
Electrical Manufacturing.	19
Transportation Equipment.	20
Rubber Manufacturing.	27
Leather	28
Agricultural Equipment.	30
Handicrafts	31
Miscellaneous Manufacturing	34

FOOD PROCESSING

1. A decline in releases of imported grains caused a drop in flour output in November. The flour industry utilized 19,531 metric tons of indigenous wheat and 62,547 tons of imported wheat to produce 78,023 metric tons of flour, a decline from October production of 157,107 metric tons.

2. The October sweet potato harvest and the anticipated rice harvest in November lessened the demand for cereal products, resulting in a decrease in output of rolled grains from 90,869 metric tons in October to 38,026 tons in November.

3. Output of vegetable fats and oils continued to decline, dropping from 1,334 metric tons in October to 770 tons in November, because of lack of imported oil-bearing materials. Note the chart on the following page.




Brewing and Distilling

4. Production of sake in November remained at the October level with output of 446 hectoliters. During November sweet potatoes became available for alcohol production and output of imitation sake rose from 7,896 hectoliters in October to 13,022 hectoliters in November. Beer production dropped from 71,247 hectoliters in October to 63,032 hectoliters in November, reflecting the normal seasonal decline of the winter months. See the chart at top of page 139.


Containers

5. Consumption of tin plate for containers in November remained at the October level with 504 metric tons used.

FOOD PROCESSING




* 1947 = 12-MONTHS' PERIOD ENDING 30 NOVEMBER 1947.
NOTE: P = PRELIMINARY; * = REVISED.
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY.
GHQ · SCAP JAPAN · DEC 47 NUMBER 36




TOBACCO PRODUCTS

6. There was a decrease in all types of tobacco products in November below October due to electric power restrictions. November output totaled 1,482,000,000 pieces of cigarettes, 1,197 metric tons of cigarette tobacco and 1,015 metric tons of Japanese-style pipe tobacco.



PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTION

7. Pulp production in November was 30,754 tons compared with 31,035 tons in October.



During the first 10 months of 1947 pulp production increased 74,292 short tons above last year to a total of 255,172 short tons. Output of 31,035 short tons during October was 9,002 tons greater than production in October 1946.


PULP PRODUCTION
(short tons)

	January-October Cumulative		October	
	1946 a/	1947 a/	1946 a/	1947
Groundwood	113,757	150,423	12,317	16,820
Unbleached sulfite	51,019	68,266	8,197	8,736
Bleached sulfite	11,046	24,013	474	3,816
Unbleached kraft	4,693	11,227	937	1,554
Soda and others	801	1,343	108	109

a/ Revised.

SOURCE: Japanese Pulp and Paper Association.

Total output of paper in November remained at approximately the October level although newsprint production reached a new postwar peak of 9,899 tons.



GLASS AND CERAMICS

8. Window glass production in November increased about one percent above October while output of figured sheet glass decreased two percent. No polished plate glass was produced in November. Note the chart at top of the next page.


Fiber glass output in November totaled 12,094 kilograms, a decrease of 24 percent below October.

9. Glassware production decreased six percent below October with output of the following items:

GLASSWARE PRODUCTION (metric tons)

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Ampoule and syringe tubing	347	283
Other glass tubing	97	84
Art and decorative ware	24	8
Beverage bottles	976	1,005
Electrical products	877	1,021
Food containers	1,681	1,213
Glass buoys	198	186
Medical containers	2,121	2,152
Table and kitchenware	357	312
Thermometer tubing	56	52
Toilet bottles	2	0
Miscellaneous	<u>321</u>	<u>298</u>
Total	7,057	6,614

SOURCE: Nippon Glass Industry Cooperative Association.



Optical Instruments


10. Output of cameras increased slightly over the revised October level while production of binoculars and opera glasses decreased 10 percent in November.

INSTRUMENT PRODUCTION
(units)

	October	November
Cameras	4,961 ^{a/}	4,996
Projectors	686	718
Binoculars and opera glasses	3,538	3,166
Microscopes	1,155	747
Transits	171	250
Engineers' levels	541	507
Hand levels	250	0
Sextants	50	101
Alidades	100	50
Gas indicators	51	30
Interferometers for gas indicators	100	0
Toolmakers' microscopes	2	2

^{a/} Revised.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.



Refractory Industry

11. Output of refractory bricks in November decreased eight percent below October.

REFRACTORY BRICK PRODUCTION
(metric tons)

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Fire clay	15,720	13,435
Silica	5,043	5,427
Others <u>a/</u>	<u>783</u>	<u>901</u>
Total	21,546	19,763

a/ Includes chrome, magnesia, corhart, forsterite and high alumina.

SOURCE: Central Association of Fire Brick Companies.

12. November graphite crucible production totaled 858,000 ban (one ban equals capacity to melt one kilogram of metal), a 22-percent decrease below October.

Abraasive Industry


13. Output of grinding wheels with vitreous bonds totaled 474 metric tons in November compared with 376 tons in October, and production of wheels with elastic bonds totaled 50 metric tons, one ton less than October.

14. Total output of abrasive paper and cloth in November was 6,406 ren (one ren equals 480 sheets or their equivalent), a nine-percent decrease below October.

15. Production of all types of abrasive grains totaled 79 metric tons compared with 56 tons in October.

Structural Clay Products

16. Building brick production decreased from 8,410,000 in October to 6,837,000 in November due partly to unfavorable climatic conditions in the northern regions. Output of clay roofing tile decreased from a revised total of 15,151,000 in October to 14,604,000 in November.



Asbestos Cement Production

17. November production of high-pressure pipe, concrete pipe and cement slates increased 199 percent, 25 percent and 19 percent respectively above October with the release of larger amounts of raw material stocks to the industry. A shortage of electricity was responsible for a seven-percent decrease in output of corrugated sheets and shingles and a 12-percent decrease in wallboard production.

ASBESTOS CEMENT PRODUCTS

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Asbestos cement high-pressure pipe	metric ton	85	254
Concrete pipe	metric ton	6,700	8,389
Corrugated sheets and shingles	tsubo <u>a/</u>	99,370	92,859
Wallboard	tsubo <u>a/</u>	33,918	29,710
Slates	tsubo <u>a/</u>	10,100	12,000

a/ One tsubo equals 36 square feet.

SOURCE: Japan Asbestos Cement Production Association.

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

18. Total output of medical instruments including electro-medical instruments in November was valued at ¥ 36,545,732 compared with a revised value of ¥ 40,164,563 for October's output.

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Amoule cleaning apparatus	9	55
Basins, sterilizing	2,400	338
Basins, wash	17	70
Cotton wool carriers	18,000	28,370
Distilling apparatus	85	65
Dressing drums	685	798
Electric drying ovens	54	43
Electric incubators	135	164
Forceps	8,981	11,732
Gauze containers	1,185	1,030
Ice-pillow buckles	15,000	3,000
Illuminating lamps	122	54
Ligature carriers	175	0
Needles, suture	12,000	12,500
Operating tables	53	159
Percussion hammers	1,800	600
Spatulas	200	200
Speculums	6,865	3,353
Sphygmomanometers	90	350
Steam inhalers	4,596	8,780
Sterilizers	783	1,436
Stethoscopes	750	1,000
Sun lamps	30	20
Surgical knives	1,752	5,189
Surgical needles	1,572,517	1,326,400
Surgical scissors	3,923	6,854
Tongue depressors	1,000	0
Vaporizers	270	230

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Ultrashortwave therapy, ultraviolet and infrared ray therapy apparatus	87 <u>a/</u>	119
X-ray apparatus and accessories	220 <u>a/</u>	115

a/ Revised.

SOURCE: Tokyo Medical Instrument Manufacturing Association and Japan Electromedical Apparatus Association.

ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING

19. Shortages of silicon steel, insulating materials and electric power continued to limit output of many critical items in November.

MAJOR ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURES a/

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Motors (except railway)		
Fractional HP	3,466	3,756
Standard HP		
1-15 HP	6,580	7,530
16-100 HP	409	411
Over 100 HP	67	58
Portable tools	3,400	3,444
Other	5,079	5,084
Generators, converters and M-G sets, except turbogenerators and welders		
DC generators	278	296
AC generators	23	28
Other	821	1,299
Transformers		
Distribution, 100 KVA and under	4,142	4,309
Power, over 100 KVA	83	82
Instrument	1,394	1,338
Other	924	959
Rectifiers		
Steel tank	4	1
Mercury vapor	49	44
Selenium and other	1,811	237
Power condensers	2,608	2,434
Furnaces		
Arc	3	4
Low-frequency induction	7	5
High-frequency induction	3	2
Resistance	103	96
Welding apparatus		
AC arc	40	40
Resistance	40	17
Railway equipment		
Main motors	205	233
M-G sets	34	30
Blower motors	8	6

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Railway equipment (continued)		
Locomotives		
Railway	3	4
Battery	11	14
Control apparatus	44	34
Battery-operated vehicles	23	22
Railway signal equipment		
Signal mechanism	99	103
Electric levers	0	80
Interlocking relays	6	19
Switch machines	42	63
Circuit controllers	108	23
Line transformers	39	56
Signal transformers	493	481
Rectifiers	9	3
Approach indicators	243	0
Signal relays	957	1,159
Insulation material		
Mica (kilograms)		
Moulding plate	8,017	7,324
Commutator segment	4,922	4,454
Heat-resisting plate	203	0
Flexible plate	1,576	1,550
Paper	17,321	16,546
Paper (rolls)	5,969	6,071
Varnished cloth (square meters)	36,410	32,802
Varnished tubes (meter)	539,361	223,836
Varnished tape (rolls)	2,200	0
Black tape (rolls)	193,631	143,641
Rubber tape (rolls)	36,500	44,383
Control apparatus		
Hand control		
Starters	288	216
Controllers	210	213
Other	489	378
Remote control		
Contactors	796	314
Contactor panels	46	17
Resistors	109	108
Lifting devices	45	49
Other	793	133
Switchboard apparatus		
For standard motors	1,511	709
3,300 volts and under	3,135	1,884
Over 3,300 volts	370	462
Meters		
Watt-hour	31,676	37,455
Pyrometers	947	1,398
Other	48,642	44,394
Household appliances		
Flatirons	13,234	6,126
Cooking ranges	285	308
Other cooking equipment	11,326	8,795
Heating devices	24,078	6,863
Fans	4,688	6,869
Refrigerators	406	421
Vacuum cleaners	701	398
Washing machines	92	97
Other appliances	15,647	40,269

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Illuminating equipment		
Fixtures	428,638	275,688
Light bulbs		
General use <u>b/</u>	7,857,870	9,293,549
Special <u>c/</u>	497,653	944,343
Flashlight <u>d/</u>	3,595,938	1,445,634
Wire and cable		
Bare copper (metric tons)	877	1,250
Rubber insulated (kilometers)	15,621	19,885
Weatherproofed (kilometers)	14,546	13,013
Cotton and silk covered (metric tons)	582	692
Enameled (metric tons)	105	121
Power cable (kilometers)	186	195
Other (kilometers)	654	924

a/ All production stated in pieces unless otherwise indicated.

b/ Includes bulbs of 15 to 300 candle power.

c/ Includes bulbs over 300 candle power and special applications for railroads, etc.

d/ Motor vehicle, flashlight and Christmas tree lamps.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT

Trucks

20. Output of standard-size trucks declined four percent below October to 744 in November. Eighteen heavy diesel trucks were produced, one less than October. Small-truck output dropped to 178 in November, 14 less than October.

Tractors and Trailers

21. Trailer truck output totaled 15 in November, one less than October, while 45 semitrailers were produced. Output of agricultural tractors dropped seven units below October to 10 in November.

Automobiles

22. Nissan, the only manufacturer of small passenger cars in November, produced 15. Forty-three small electric passenger cars were produced in November, six more than in October. Small electric truck output totaled 52 and standard electric bus production was 17.

Three-wheel Motor Vehicles


23. Output of three-wheel motor vehicle cargo carriers increased 124 units above October to 852 in November.

Motorcycles and Motor Scooters

24. Twelve motorcycles were produced in November, four more than in October, while 15 motorcycles with sidecars were produced compared with 27 in October. Motor scooter output increased from 219 in October to 282 in November.

MOTOR VEHICLES

RATE OF MONTHLY PRODUCTION 1930-1947



MOTOR VEHICLE TYPES	NUMBER OF VEHICLES PRODUCED DURING NOV 47										
	0	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	800	900	1000
STANDARD-SIZE TRUCK CHASSIS	[Bar chart showing production of approximately 800 units]										
STANDARD-SIZE CARS	[Bar chart showing production of approximately 200 units]										
SMALL-SIZE CARS AND TRUCKS	[Bar chart showing production of approximately 200 units]										
ELECTRIC CARS	[Bar chart showing production of approximately 100 units]										
THREE-WHEEL CARS	[Bar chart showing production of approximately 800 units]										
MOTORCYCLES AND MOTOR SCOOTERS	[Bar chart showing production of approximately 200 units]										

NOTE: NA = DATA NOT AVAILABLE.
SOURCE: AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION.
GHQ-SCAP

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Bicycles


25. Bicycle output dropped from a final total of 14,211 in October to 9,631 in November.

Light Carts

26. November output of light carts was 29,034 compared with 29,527 in October. Manufacturers and repair shops totaled 4,144 and employed 20,259 persons compared with 4,146 manufacturers and repair shops employing 20,251 persons in October.

RUBBER MANUFACTURING

27. Preliminary reports for November showed a decrease in crude rubber consumption for manufactured products with 1,391 metric tons consumed compared with the revised October total of 1,466 metric tons which was the highest since September 1946. Makers of auto tires and tubes, bicycle tires and tubes and mechanical goods were the three largest users of rubber in November.



LEATHER


28. The reduced supply of hides in the hands of the sellers as a result of the collection drive in October was responsible for a 128,000-pound decrease in receipt of hides by tanneries during November.

Production of tanned leather in November decreased 18,900 pounds below October while inventories of leather held by tanneries remained approximately the same.

29. A price adjustment in leather goods was reflected in a 421,800-pound increase in output of leather goods in November. Manufacturers reported that during November 485,565 pounds of leather and 672,580 inch-feet of machinery belting were produced from leather made from released hides formerly held in military stocks. Note the chart at top of the facing page.

AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT

30. The 245 reporting members of the Japan Agricultural Implement Industry Cooperative Union, employing 21,033 persons, produced




agricultural implements valued at ¥ 203,245,000 in November, 12 percent less than October production value. See the chart on the following page.

AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT PRODUCTION

	October	November
Baling presses	410	410
Barley cleaners	530	591
Barley rollers	35	18
Cultivating hoes	1,178	1,332
Earth-scattering scoops	24,000	46,087
Ensilage cutters	103	87
Farm carts	1,493	2,673
Farm fans	341	160
Flour-milling machines	532	270
Forks	36,550	31,633
Grain dryers	100	114
Grain fans	2,299	2,052
Grain screens	712	934
Harrows	4,754	6,749
Hoes	44,228	34,362
Horse stump cutters	530	550
Milk buckets	80	0
Milk cans	60	0

SELECTED AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS

INDEXES OF MONTHLY PRODUCTION (1940 AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION=100)



	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Mowers	20	40
Flows	18,476	13,518
Potato cutters	0	450
Power cultivators	732	17
Pruning shears	1,850	850
Radish graters	800	0
Rakes	0	280
Rice hullers	3,753	3,384
Rice polishers	3,263	1,710
Ridge scoops	1,205	1,536
Sickles	234,326	329,250
Simple weeders	1,000	500

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Sowing machines	641	600
Sprayers	11,797	8,469
Straw cutters	2,071	1,419
Straw cutters with feeders	6,162	2,680
Straw-mat machines	1,074	1,222
Straw-rope finishers	0	20
Straw-rope makers	12,776	10,293
Straw-softening machines	1,390	1,290
Stump pullers	50	0
Tea-leaf finishers	37	71
Tea-leaf shears	2,171	1,380
Threshers	17,601	12,348
Tobacco dryers	47	0
Vermicelli machines	2,135	133
Vertical pumps	95	0
Weeders	5,300	4,780

SOURCE: Japan Agricultural Implement Industry
Cooperative Union.

HANDICRAFTS

Silverware

31. Although 14 additional factories were in operation in November, bringing the total to 78, output of stainless-steel and chrome-plated flatware declined 38 percent to 74,584 dozens in November due to scarcity of raw materials. An additional 9,052 items of kitchen and table service were produced in November.

Lacquerware

32. Output of wooden-base lacquerware increased slightly in November to 1,151,641 pieces while production of metal base lacquerware dropped 61 percent to 2,180 pieces due to the shortage of electricity.

Antimony Ware

33. Production of antimony ware in November continued at the October level with output of 47,200 pieces.

MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING

Business Machines

34. Value of new production was ¥ 13,340,829 while value of parts and repairs totaled ¥ 1,247,213 in November, decreases of five and 51 percent respectively below October production due to unsolved labor-management problems in three plants of the Nippon Typewriter Company.

BUSINESS MACHINE PRODUCTION

	<u>October</u>	<u>November</u>
Japanese typewriters	188	104
Communication typewriters	0	9
Calculating machines	101	137
Mimeographs	4,742	4,440