

stressed by the delegates of the Democratic Party and of financial circles in their attempt to hamper the measure."

26. No agreement was reached at the round-table conference held 8 April which was devoted chiefly to the Social Democratic Party's projected plan for suspension. The party's delegate, Kimura, asserted that losses incurred from suspension must be absorbed by old accounts. The following counter arguments were advanced:

- (1) If additional compensatory measures were not taken, too great a burden would be imposed upon banking organs.
- (2) Suspension of interest payments would cause bond prices to drop 20 percent, thereby adversely affecting the stability of banking institutions.
- (3) Imposition of such an unusual burden on banking organs alone was contrary to the spirit of the new Constitution.

#### Subcommittee Meetings

27. In deference to an opinion that if an inconclusive report were submitted to the Government the conference would lose dignity, formation of a five-member subcommittee to review all aspects of the problem was agreed upon. Members of the subcommittee were Kimura, Inagaki and Takeyama, representing the Social Democratic, Democratic and People's Cooperative Parties respectively, Chairman Kato of the State Railway Workers' Union, and President Sato of the Teikoku Bank. No agreement was reached in a subcommittee meeting 9 April and an additional series of conferences was scheduled.

After discussing evidence presented at several conferences between 9 and 16 April, the subcommittee decided to adopt as its report the divergent opinions for and against the suspension issue, assuming an equal weight for both sides of the controversy. The report was to be submitted to the Government after its formal adoption by the War Bond Interest Payment Council at a conference 22 April. In this way it was expected that solution of the issue would be evolved as a result of negotiations among the three government parties.

#### Statements by Leaders

28. Meanwhile, speaking at Osaka 15 April, Chairman Mosaburo Suzuki of the Political Affairs Research Committee of the Social Democratic Party and the chief advocate of suspension, charged that two cabinet ministers, both Democrats--Director General Kurusu of the Economic Stabilization Board and Minister of Finance Kitamura--were reluctant to see an early solution of the issue. Suzuki declared: "I do not mean to say that suspension of interest payments on war bonds will suffice to check inflation and eliminate national budget deficits. The important point is that, with political power inadequate to settle even this comparatively minor problem, execution of an over-all socialist policy will be difficult. Democratic Party Ministers Kurusu and Kitamura, both of whom are ex-bankers, hesitate to bring the problem to the fore and settle it immediately on the ground that banks have a large number of depositors and, therefore, they must be protected."

29. On 19 April, speaking to the round-table conference of financial and business leaders of the Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe area held

in Osaka, Minister of Finance Kitamura declared that the three-party policy agreement must "of course be respected" but that Japan must assume a cautious attitude in the light of marked changes that have occurred in the general situation since the conclusion of the agreement. "I believe that the three-party policy agreement should be revised accordingly whenever revision is called for," declared Kitamura, adding that the Government might decide to drop the interest suspension proposal.

30. At a press conference 22 April, Deputy Prime Minister Nishio, a right-wing Social Democrat, declared that the Government would not suspend interest payments on war bonds in drawing up the national budget. Nishio asserted that "changed circumstances" had made the entire issue of interest suspension "quite meaningless," adding that "if any confusion arises over this issue within the Social Democratic Party, I am confident of settling it." Nishio termed Mosaburo Suzuki's arguments regarding the interest suspension issue and his attacks on the Government as "Suzuki's private opinions, not representing the majority of the Social Democratic Party."

31. Left-wingers of the Social Democratic Party continued, however, to regard the suspension of interest payments as an important element of the three-party policy agreement and one of the chief reasons they had agreed to support the Ashida cabinet.

#### CABINET POLICIES

##### Prime Minister on Economic Problems

32. On 10 April a conference of 70 industrial, economic and political leaders was called to consider various phases of the Government's economic program. Prime Minister Ashida told the gathering that foreign aid would be contingent on what the Japanese people do to help themselves.

An abbreviated text of the Prime Minister's statement follows:

"A survey of economic conditions during the period since the war's end shows the first ray of hope that Japan will be able to shuffle out of the ominous economic clouds. Internally, thanks to the patriotic spirit of the farmers, the delivery of rice in the 1947 rice year was 100 percent, and it would not be too much to say that this laid the cornerstone for the reconstruction of the nation's economy. Another favorable development is that, contrary to fears entertained all around, the tempo of inflation has slowed down, and the production of key materials is now on the upward grade.

"In addition to these favorable internal conditions, external conditions have taken a better turn. Present indications are that, contrary to our fears, the collection of reparations will be eased and the prospect of ushering in foreign capital is good.

"In view of these favorable developments the Government considers that the present year is an important time which will decide the success or failure of the economic reconstruction of Japan. The Government is determined to effectuate all measures necessary to make the economic rehabilitation of Japan a success. Needless to say, these measures will be focused on 'putting our own house in order' to make the most of the foreign capital that may be pump-primed into the country.

"As stated, all government measures will be focused on paving the way for introducing foreign capital, but the most

important thing is for the entire people to show in their actual conduct the spirit of self-help as a peace-loving and cultural nation worthy of the trust of world nations. For this purpose not only will the Government effect educational reform but it will also stage a nationwide campaign to attain this end.

"Another important thing to do in order to pave the way for foreign capital is to arrest spiraling inflation and to increase the efficiency of labor. To halt spiraling inflation it is necessary to place public finances and banking on a sound and healthy basis. On his recent visit to this country Under Secretary of the Army Draper particularly emphasized the importance of placing public finance on a sound and healthy basis. In grim determination to place public finances, both central and local, on a well-balanced basis, the Government proposes to stop all unnecessary and non-urgent enterprises, to revise the taxation system on a broad scale and to effect a fundamental reform in the tax collection system. Parallel with placing public finances on a well-balanced basis, it is necessary to absorb all fluid purchasing power. The Government has already mapped out a plan to absorb such purchasing power and it will announce the formula in the near future.

"The efficiency of labor not only will have a direct bearing upon the importation of foreign capital but it is also the key to the success or failure of Japan's industry, becoming a link in the chain of world economy. Since termination of the war, the ground has been well broken for trade-unions to develop normally. It is, however, greatly regretted that in recent months there has been a tendency on the part of a small number of labor leaders to exploit labor movements politically. The Government cannot remain indifferent to such a tendency. On the other hand, the Government is greatly interested in bettering working conditions. Therefore, by taking into consideration various economic factors the Government intends to improve the treatment of all government employees in the future."

#### Statement of Minister of Finance

33. Minister of Finance Kitamura 17 April expressed his views on the related problems of inflation, the budget, prices and wages, taxation, banking and the introduction of foreign capital. Following is the text of his statement:

**"Inflation:** The currency situation is moving toward stabilization chiefly because of the favorable progress of tax collections. On the other hand, however, a stringency of funds seems to have been apparent in various quarters because of the excessive recalling of government funds. However, this phenomenon is inevitable if the stabilizing tendency is to be maintained.

"Increased food rations, which have an important bearing upon the elimination of economic and labor unrest, can be expected to be realized about November.

**"Budget:** The delay in formulating a regular budget has not been caused by political considerations. I expect that there will be no need for a provisional budget after July. I cannot approve a budget balanced on paper alone. However a balance on paper is better than no balance at all.

**"Prices and wages:** I am opposed to establishing a new stabilization level. I am of the opinion that revision of official prices should not go beyond an amendment of the existing structure. As for the method of amendment, I prefer a gradual revision of prices of essential commodities, settling problems resulting from

time-lag through financing. Pegging of wages cannot be effected at this time. The only feasible policy is to secure real wages mainly in relation to staple food.

"Taxation system: Reduction of the earned income tax and the corporation tax will decrease the nation's revenues by ¥ 40,000,000,000 to ¥ 60,000,000,000. However, this decrease will be covered by increasing rates of indirect taxes such as the sake tax and by creating a sales tax. The rate of a sales tax will be held down so low that its effect on the lowest-level prices will be less than three to five percent.

"Banking: Reconstruction and reorganization of financial organizations are expected to be completed before the end of this month. Preparations are being pushed to introduce a Financial Organization Bill to the Diet at the earliest date. Rumors are circulating that government-sponsored financial institutions will be created. However, I say that, since there are already enough institutions of this sort, no more will be created.

"Introduction of foreign capital: As my private opinion, I hope that aid commodities will be introduced in the way of food, transportation materials and raw materials for the production of export commodities. In order that this form of foreign aid may be encouraged and effectively introduced, it is desirable to enact a Foreign Capital Invitation Law incorporating the Foreign Exchange Control Law.

"It may be expected that introduction of capital on a government-to-government basis will begin to take concrete shape in July and will be finally realized in the fall. The Government is exerting efforts along these lines. I recommend that a committee be set up to take charge of formulating an over-all policy for introduction of capital."

#### Economic Rehabilitation

34. Addressing a conference of Japanese industrialists on 19 April, Director General Takeo Kurusu of the Economic Stabilization Board offered the following outline of the Government's five-year program of economic rehabilitation:

- "(1) The Government is now formulating a five-year program for reconstruction of Japan's economy by which the present living standard will be restored to the 1930-34 level by 1952.
- "(2) Economic Stabilization Board studies have determined that the Japanese population will increase to 82,930,000 by 1952, as compared with the 1930-34 average of 66,330,000. On the basis of these figures, efforts are being made to work out suitable plans.
- "(3) To restore the present population's livelihood to the 1930-34 standard of living, it is necessary to raise the production level to 125 percent of the 1930-34 level.
- "(4) The Government is proposing that the general industrial level be increased by 40 percent over the 1930-34 standard, and that the export industry level be raised by 10 percent over the 1930-34 level.
- "(5) It is absolutely impossible to refreeze or devalue the new yen.

"Plans formulated by the ministries will be considered by the Cabinet as soon as they are integrated by the Economic Stabilization Board."

#### Problems of Small Business

35. Minister of Commerce and Industry Chosaburo Mizutani held a conference with Japanese businessmen 19 April to consider the problems of small-scale business and industry.

He told the assembly that the Government would introduce in the Diet a bill setting up a Board of Medium and Small Enterprises, emphasizing that the decision was motivated by the Government's policy of promoting the sound development of small business and industry.

According to Mizutani, the present predicament of the country's medium and small enterprises can be attributed to: (1) the general tendency to give preference to big business and industry, (2) the absence of an articulate group representing the interests of small businessmen and (3) the insecurity and low operational level of many small businesses. He explained that the projected Board of Medium and Small Enterprises would devote itself to the task of solving these problems, which stand in the way of sound development by small business and industry in Japan.

#### Agricultural Policy

36. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kezuo Nagae made the following statement 19 April on agricultural policy:

"Now that the farmers have delivered their rice quotas in full, we wish to do our best to 'distribute back' as much rice as possible to the farmers. As for the producers' price of rice, we are hoping to revise last year's figure, together with the general price schedule. If so revised, the new price will be made effective retroactively and farmers will be paid additional sums in monthly installments for the 1947 rice.

"The farmland reform program (third stage) will be decided by the special committee which is now studying the matter in accordance with the three-party policy agreement. It is not the intention of the Government to convert all woodlands into farms, but only those portions which are suitable for farming.

"In determining the new price for rice, we intend to approach the question from an entirely new angle. Redistribution of farmlands will be effected by enacting new legislation for the purpose.

"In regard to taxation in the rural communities, the Government is planning to urge the various communities concerned to negotiate collectively with the local tax offices for suitable arrangements on a mutually agreeable basis."

#### BUDGET ACTION

##### Provisional Budgets

37. The Diet on 1 April passed two budget bills introduced 27 March: a provisional budget of the General Account totaling ¥ 24,590,461,000 for April, the first month of the fiscal year of 1948, and a provisional Special Accounts budget for the same month amounting to ¥ 66,700,000,000 in revenues and ¥ 64,418,046,000 in expenditures. Pending completion of investigations appropriations

for the 6-3-3 educational system and for public works and flood damage rehabilitation were excluded from both budgets.

The Cabinet decided 1 April to formulate a supplementary budget appropriation of ¥ 910,000,000 to provide for the 6-3-3 educational system and for public works rehabilitation projects. The following day the Cabinet requested the Diet to appropriate ¥ 647,000,000 for expenses for building middle schools under the 6-3-3 educational system as Supplementary Budget No. 1. The details of revenue in the bill were outlined as follows: collection of income tax from new wages of government officials, ¥ 61,000,000; Revenues from government hospitals, ¥ 58,000,000; revenues from public corporations ¥ 339,000,000; electric power overconsumption charges, ¥ 19,000,000; other revenues, ¥ 170,000,000. This budget bill was enacted by the Diet 5 April.

The appropriations for flood damage rehabilitation projects were not incorporated in this bill, since it was decided that such expenses would be defrayed from public utility expenditures carried over from the preceding fiscal year.

#### General Budget Deliberations

38. On 5 April the Cabinet began its deliberations toward drafting the General Budget for the 1948-49 fiscal year. It was decided to study jointly the following related subjects: (1) proposed revision of prices, (2) proposed suspension of interest payments on war bonds, (3) proposed revisions of income on corporate taxes, (4) the question of increasing the prices of tobacco, railway traffic rates and communication service charges, (5) administrative adjustments and rationalization of industries and (6) enforcement of the 6-3-3 educational system.

Although the Cabinet met daily until almost the middle of the month to discuss the Finance Ministry's ¥ 300,000,000,000 budget draft, little progress was made because of the difficulties of predetermining problems of price revision, fixing of the wage scale, revamping of the taxation system and problems of administrative adjustment. On problems of price adjustment there was wide divergence of opinion between officials of the Economic Stabilization Board and of the Price Board.

In the face of these difficulties the Cabinet decided 21 April to postpone deliberations on the General Budget and to formulate provisional General and Special Accounts Budgets totaling ¥ 71,674,000,000 for May. The Provisional General Account Budget (Supplementary Budget No. 2 of the General Account for 1948-49) amounting to ¥ 23,537,000,000 and the Provisional Special Accounts Budget (Supplementary Budget No. 1 of the Special Accounts for 1948-49) amounting to ¥ 48,137,000,000 were submitted to the Diet 24 April.

The Cabinet failed to surmount the difficulties connected with calculating standards for setting new prices and presentation of the General 1948-49 Budget to the Diet was again delayed.

39. The Cabinet decided 28 April to formulate another provisional budget for June while proceeding with its deliberations to compile a General Budget for the fiscal year incorporating the June budget. The Cabinet indicated it would still attempt to submit the General Budget to the Diet by the middle of May.

Diet opinion favoring a separate June budget is based on the view, already manifested among the members of the House of Representatives Rules Committee, that even if the general budget were

presented 15 May it would be impossible for the Diet to act on it before the end of May.

#### LOCAL GOVERNMENT

##### Prefectural Governors' Conference

40. Prefectural governors conferred in Tokyo 6 and 7 April to receive information concerning major government programs.

During the conference Mosaru Nomizo, chairman of the Local Finance Commission, made the following statement concerning finance problems of local government bodies:

". . .The existing local finance system must be revised based on two objectives: (1) establishment of an autonomous local finance system and (2) establishment of a system adaptable to all changes of the economic situation.

"With these two points in mind, an extensive study of the existing local taxation and finance system has been conducted. As a result of the study, the present system is expected to undergo epoch-making revision on four points: (1) rational division of shares in both national and local expenditures, (2) establishment of an independent and versatile taxation system, (3) rationalization of credit extension to local bodies and (4) rationalized management of reconstruction expenses for local disasters.

"Aiming at maintaining sound finance for local governments and facilitating credit whenever necessity arises so that financial functions of local public organizations may be smoothly carried out, local bonds will be limited to those for production purposes. With this point in view, a new central bank for public organizations capitalized by mutual investments is now under study. Frequent natural disasters and the imperfection of local financial conditions resulting from this are prompting the authorities to create a local disaster rehabilitation fund in an effort to eliminate local financial stringencies.

"In view of the fact that a new revision of the taxation system will, it is feared, be delayed for a variety of reasons, the local police under the newly effected police system will have to be placed under the mutual control of the Government and the local prefectures for the time being.

"The funds to meet improved treatment for government workers on the new ¥ 2,920 base will be raised from government credit to avoid the possibility of deficits in estimates. For the subsidies necessary for the 6-3-3 educational system and the natural disaster rehabilitation expenditures, negotiations are now going on among the interested parties. It is expected that these subsidies will be granted."

##### Resolutions Adopted

41. Following extensive discussion of current problems, the conference adopted the following resolutions: (1) that the Government establish a long-term drought damage policy, (2) that government and public workers' wage adjustment agencies be established in eight districts, (3) that an administrative board be created by the National Labor Government Council, (4) that a governors' conference to discuss economic problems be held after the national budget has been formulated and (5) that a committee be established to promote disposal of the central government's local agencies.

Amendment of the Local Autonomy Law

42. The Diet enacted Amendment No. 1 to the Local Autonomy Law 31 March to strengthen local autonomy and to combat political corruption. The revisions provided that:

- "(1) The consent of more than two thirds of the assemblymen in attendance is necessary when important property and buildings designated by law are to be disposed of, or a permit for their exclusive use is to be granted for more than 10 years.
- "(2) Consent of more than two thirds of the assemblymen in attendance is necessary when property is to be sold, deeded or leased, or when enterprises are to be contracted.
- "(3) When chief cashiers, treasurers or other personnel of local public organizations are found to have illegally used or misappropriated public funds, the citizens can investigate the auditors and demand control or injunction, and when the citizens are dissatisfied with the conduct of their chiefs, they can bring suit in court.
- "(4) In cities, towns and villages whose boundaries were changed during the period between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945, citizens of affected districts who are dissatisfied with the change can, when a petition signed by more than one third of the inhabitants has been filed, have the former boundaries restored if approved by more than one half of the voters of the city, town, or village to which the persons concerned formerly belonged.
- "(5) When chiefs of local public organizations raise an objection to the decision of the assembly concerning the enactment, revision, or abolition of laws or budgets, they can ask for a reconsideration within 10 days after the decision. However, if the decision is reapproved by more than two thirds of the assemblymen in attendance, the decision will stand."

HOARDED GOODS

43. Large-scale investigations were conducted in April by procuratorial agencies in more than 20 places throughout Japan to discover illegal dealings and other irregularities contained in the records of the various "war materials disposal committees," which disposed of army and naval stores after the surrender in August 1945. According to an announcement by the Supreme Procurator's Office, 24 local procuratorial offices have been instructed to re-examine all documents seized by the Arms and Weapons Disposal Committee.

Former Minister of Finance Tanzan Ishibashi, former Chief Mikishi Abe of the Reconstruction Board, former Chairman Takashi Komatsu of the Arms and Weapons Disposal Committee and a number of others were questioned by the Tokyo District Procurator's Office between 19 and 26 April on the disposal of former armed forces materials.

Illegal Transactions Investigation Committee

44. The Illegal Transactions Investigation Committee opened its investigations of the "Army Coffee Sale Case" in Gunma Prefecture 5 April. The case involves the sale of over 90 tons of coffee



from army stores to private merchants, a transaction which is alleged to have yielded huge profits to prefectural authorities since April 1946.

#### Tsuji Case

45. Highlight of the Committee's activity since the start of current investigations 5 April was the hearing delving into the political donations of Karoku Tsuji, described as a powerful behind-the-scenes political operator.

This case emerged from the "contribution" of ¥ 2,500,000 that Tsuji is alleged to have received from Ikutaro Nakasone, unsuccessful Liberal candidate to the House of Representatives and key figure in the so-called "Army Uniform Fraud Case."

In the trial of Nakasone, which opened in the Tokyo District Court 27 January, it was charged that Nakasone and his accomplices, between February and April 1946, defrauded agricultural associations in Yamagata, Gifu and Aichi Prefectures of advance payments for the delivery of former military uniforms acquired on the strength of fraudulent "Seko directives." Because the uniforms were never delivered, the entire transaction came to light. The money collected amounted to ¥ 6,450,000 of which ¥ 2,500,000 was reported to have been handed to Tsuji for "political purposes."

Additional testimony received by Unjiro Muto, chairman of the Illegal Transactions Investigation Committee of the House of Representatives, alleged that Tsuji had received other contributions totaling ¥ 6,500,000 from various businessmen, including ¥ 3,000,000 from Hikotaro Yoshida, president of the Midori Industry Company; ¥ 1,000,000 from Shigekichi Kogen, president of the Shin-Yukan Press; ¥ 1,500,000 from Isamu Aoki, owner of a trading company; and ¥ 1,000,000 from Kaichi Sugiyama, president of the Asahi Tool Manufacturing Company.

The evidence indicated that these funds received by Tsuji were parceled out as campaign funds to a number of small and big politicians. Tsuji's testimony revealed that he distributed the money among 70 or 80 persons. A press statement by Chairman Muto of the Illegal Transactions Investigation Committee disclosed that some 39 politicians shared the ¥ 2,500,000 handed by Nakasone to Tsuji during the last general elections. Among them, 10 are present Diet members; the others failed to be elected.

Testimony of witnesses summoned before the Illegal Transactions Investigation Committee revealed that each had received campaign funds from Tsuji in amounts ranging from ¥ 20,000 to ¥ 50,000, claimed to be personal contributions with no political meaning. In each instance the recipient professed ignorance of the fact that the donations had originated from illicit dealings in hoarded or concealed goods. Witnesses Ichiro Kono, former Secretary General of the Liberal Party and political purgee, and Kohei Kimura, Liberal member of the House of Representatives, denied the charges of the prosecution authorities and flatly disclaimed that they had received political contributions. At the request of Social Democratic Committeeman Shizuo Kajikawa, Kono's testimony that he had collected election campaign funds one year after his political purge was placed in the record.

The Committee questioned 43 politicians in the course of its hearing on the Tsuji case.

Testifying 14 April, Mutsunosuke Kato, former Liberal representative, stated that Tsuji gave money to politicians in financial difficulties regardless of political affiliation.

#### Hatoyama Testimony

46. The following day Ichiro Hatoyama, former president of the Liberal Party and a political purgee, was called to testify before the Committee regarding Tsuji's alleged donations to the Liberal Party. Considerable interest was evoked by the appearance of this former Liberal Party leader who was purged on the very eve of his nomination to the prime-ministership two years ago.

Hatoyama denied that he or the Liberal Party had ever received funds from Tsuji, but admitted that Tsuji exercised an "undeniable individual influence" in political affairs. Hatoyama disclosed that until the time of his purge, Tsuji had indirectly provided the funds to purchase the Jiyu Restaurant to serve as a meeting place for the Liberal Party. He denied that Tsuji played any role in organizing political parties but admitted under questioning that he could not say that Tsuji was entirely disinterested in the affairs of the Liberal Party at the time of its organization.

Regarding the allegation that Tsuji had spent ¥ 1,000,000 to build Hatoyama a new house in 1946, Hatoyama declared: "We are old friends; I do not know how long we have been friends, but our intimacy grew particularly after I retired from political circles. There were occasions when I extended monetary help to Tsuji when he was in need. It is a fact that Tsuji offered to have a house built for me because my house had burned. There were quite a few other people who offered to have a house built for me, so I thought Tsuji was going to talk matters over with these people for me. However, when I appeared at the Procurator's Office I learned for the first time that Tsuji had received money from Nakasone. I was under the impression that the construction of my house would cost roughly ¥ 1,000,000." The house was not completed, according to Hatoyama, because Tsuji ran out of funds.

Under questioning by Committee Chairman Muto, Hatoyama insisted that Tsuji had not contributed to the Liberal Party, but that all donations made by Tsuji were meant for individuals, not for the party. When asked by Shiro Nakano, Japan Farmers' Party committee member, what direct part Tsuji played in founding the Liberal Party, Hatoyama replied that he, together with Masasumi Ando, purged Liberal leader, and Hitoshi Ashida, had established the party. He denied that Tsuji had had any part in formulating the party program and platform. Upon being reminded by committee member Nakano of current rumors that Tsuji is not only influential as a behind-the-scenes political boss but is also involved in a so-called "underground government," Hatoyama asserted that such rumors were "preposterous" and a "national disgrace." He also denied emphatically the truth of rumors mentioned by Kyuichi Tokuda, Communist committee member, of Hatoyama's relationship with a rightist organization in Aomori Prefecture known as the Patriotic Youth League (Aikoku Seinen Renmei).

#### Testimony by Seko

47. On 27 April the Committee heard the testimony of Koichi Seko, former Liberal Diet member and central figure in the so-called "Seko Case." Seko denied having received any "political funds" from Tsuji, but went on to say: "When I was appointed Parliamentary Vice-minister of Home Affairs, I received ¥ 10,000 from Tsuji as a token of congratulation. I received ¥ 10,000 or ¥ 20,000 from Tsuji at the time of the last election. However, this money was to buy books which Tsuji had promised to contribute to a police station."

#### Other Testimony

48. Another witness before the Committee, Isamu Aoki, a merchant in Atami, testified that he donated from ¥ 1,400,000 to ¥ 1,500,000 of his own accord to Tsuji in 1945. Mrs. Maoruko Sugita, a former Liberal representative, affirmed that she had received ¥ 20,000 from Tsuji shortly before the 1947 general elections, adding that she had been introduced to Tsuji at the home of Hatoyama.

Reizo Otsuka, unsuccessful Liberal candidate for the House of Representatives, testified that he had received ¥ 20,000 shortly before the last general elections. Similar testimony was submitted by Kunie Uda, former People's Cooperative Party representative.

49. The Committee also adopted a motion by Eikichi Takahashi, Democratic Liberal member, to investigate allegations that Prime Minister Hitooshi Ashida and two other state ministers had received political funds from certain construction companies.

#### Interrogation of Tsuji

50. On 28 April, three members of the Committee--Chairman Muto, Kaneichi Hashimoto, Democrat, and Eikichi Takahashi, Democratic Liberal--travelled to Zushi, Kanagawa Prefecture, to interrogate Karoku Tsuji who at that time was hospitalized.

Tsuji testified that he had received a total of ¥ 9,000,000, ¥ 6,500,000 from Hikotaro Yoshida of the Midori Industry Company and three others, and ¥ 2,500,000 from Nakasone.

Tsuji added that (1) he had not given any money to the Liberal Party, although he had paid some of the expenses of its meetings, (2) he had not given money to Hatoyama, (3) he had contributed "political funds" to 70 or 80 politicians, including Kono, and (4) he had no relations with the so-called Kodama Agency, a war-time intelligence agency which had handled war loot and whose funds Tsuji was reported to have disbursed to political parties.

Tsuji added that of ¥ 6,500,000 which he had received, ¥ 300,000 were used in paying for building contracts; ¥ 1,300,000 were used as a loan to Shinkichi Nakajima, operator of a mining firm; ¥ 900,000 were paid to Aoki; ¥ 200,000 were given as indemnity to Matsuhei Matsuoka, former Liberal Party Diet member, for "losses incurred"; ¥ 500,000 were paid for restaurant and other miscellaneous fees and expenses at the time the Liberal Party was organized; ¥ 1,800,000 were used for living expenses during the past three years; ¥ 1,000,000 were used for social expenses; ¥ 400,000 were paid out in taxes and ¥ 100,000 were not accounted for.

#### Committee Statement

51. Chairman Muto issued the following statement regarding the aims and scope of the investigations being conducted by the special committee of the House of Representatives:

"The democratic revolution in Japan started so recently that there still remain many undemocratic elements. One of these is black-market dealings in political, official and financial circles. Particularly, postwar illegal property transactions centering around concealed and hoarded materials have not only obstructed Japan's economic revival but have made Japanese society corrupt. Democratization of Japan cannot be accomplished unless Japanese society is rid of such corruption.

"The Illegal Transactions Investigation Committee is

vested with the important mission of attaining this purpose. It is because of this purpose, common to all of the people, that this committee is given a superparty character in the House of Representatives, which presupposes existence of plural parties and heated rivalry among them.

"I have often been asked what type of conclusion this committee will produce on problems which are brought before it. This committee clarifies illegal property transactions and pursues responsibilities of persons involved. However, since this committee is not a criminal court, it will not necessarily corroborate criminal facts, nor apply penal laws to these facts and announce sentences. My private opinion is that these things are out of the jurisdiction of the committee.

"This is not to say that the only duty of the committee is to examine, record and report facts. The committee will not fail to give conclusions on problems which come under its examination. It must be remembered, however, that the committee's conclusions do not represent the final will of the House of Representatives as is the case with most of the other committees in the same House.

"In short, conclusions of the committee will be many-sided. The committee may recommend punishment of representatives concerned or it may demand the House to move for appropriate legislation. In some other cases, the committee may submit cases to the Attorney-general's Office and urge action by procurators or courts.

"Further, if actual results of investigations are presented to the people through the media of radio and press, persons involved will be put to strict judgment by the people. This is a type of committee conclusion in a broad sense of the word.

"Of course, this committee lacks ideological and authoritative unity which courts possess. Ideologies and influences of individual parties are reflected on the committee just as they are. The committee must keep close watch on problems before them while checking contradictions and frictions within itself. This lack of unity may hinder investigations and make it difficult for the committee to find conclusions.

"However, the democratization of Japan, which is the mission of the committee, is a historical necessity. For this objective, all parties and factions have the duty of carrying proceedings smoothly by surmounting differences of standing and exerting efforts to reach conclusions.

"Some people go so far as to blame the committee for attempting to cover up scandals. This kind of attitude toward the committee, whether it is conscious or not, constitutes a major obstacle to activities of the committee.

"To repeat, the purpose of the committee is purification of political, official and financial circles, which is a prerequisite of Japan's democratization. In this sense, the mission of the committee has a historical importance. Considering that the success or failure of the committee depends solely upon support by the people, I sincerely hope that they will offer hearty cooperation."

#### Cases of Bribery

52. Simultaneously with the exposures disclosed by the Illegal Transactions Investigation Committee, government circles and the press were stirred by revelations that the number of cases of

government officials charged with accepting bribes had increased from 30 in 1946 to 44 in 1947. Of these 44 cases 11 were found to have occurred in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which controls production commodities; four each were discovered in the Ministry of Communications and in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; eight in various tax offices and the remainder were scattered among several other governmental agencies.

53. The press commented extensively on this situation, especially since the public announcement 18 April of the arrest of Vice-minister Shigejiro Ino of the Ministry of Transportation on charges of corruption and bribery. The complicity of several other officials of the Tokyo Railway Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Transportation was also reported.

Vice-minister Ino was arrested 18 April by officers of the Metropolitan Police Board on suspicion of having accepted bribes amounting to over ¥ 500,000 while serving as director of the Business Affairs Bureau of the Transportation Ministry's Railway General Board. Ino and other officials connected with the Shimbashi Division of the Tokyo Railway Administration Bureau were suspected of having received large monetary gifts over a period of time from Tomesaburo Uematsu, at one time head of the Uematsu Sangyo Company, for making special freight-car allocations to the company.

Uematsu was indicted on the charge of having acquired a ¥ 6,000,000 profit from large amounts of illegally diverted work clothing entrusted to him by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for distribution to members of the Shimbashi Railway Control Office.

It was further alleged by the National Rural Police headquarters of Gunma Prefecture that Ino profited to the extent of ¥ 500,000 in other illicit transactions, including the illegal shipment and sale of 450 bales of charcoal and quantities of lumber. Ino resigned his post in the Ministry of Transportation 19 April and was formally indicted 27 April by the Tokyo District Public Procurator's Office.

54. Kenji Osumi, Democratic member of the House of Councillors, was indicted by the Yokohama District Procurator's Office 22 April for embezzlement and theft of former military supplies. A three-month procuratorial investigation of Osumi, who had been operating a large construction and transport firm in Yokosuka resulted in accusations that he had stolen some 40 drums of heavy oil, formerly belonging to the Tokyo Bay Strategic Zone Headquarters, and that he had embezzled 360 koku of timber which had been placed in his custody by the mayor of Yokosuka.

#### National Inventory

55. On 27 March the Government, in compliance with a SCAP directive, ordered a national inventory of all undeclared goods.

The government ordinance provided for immediate diversion into official channels of all hoarded, illegally acquired or illegally held critical items. Specific classifications were set up by the Economic Stabilization Board, including illegally held and hoarded goods, excess and idle goods regardless of ownership, and concealed goods whose owner is not known. Illegally held or hoarded goods were defined to include goods illegally acquired at the termination of the war from the Japanese Army and Navy, goods acquired on the black market, and goods legally acquired but unreported or falsely reported.

The cabinet order directing the inventory also stipulated penalties for noncompliance. All materials and stocks not registered will be subject to confiscation as illegally held goods. Materials subject to confiscation will be seized and put into distribution channels without waiting for a court decision. In cases of wrongful confiscation the owner will receive the official price for the goods.

Occupation authorities aided in supervision of the inventory and advised the appropriate Japanese prefectural governors and officials of their particular responsibilities in carrying out the program. Japanese officials publicized the availability of excess materials so that small industrial concerns would know of their existence.

POLITICAL PARTIES

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People's Cooperative Party. . . . .	70

DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Party Concept of "Modified Capitalism"

56. In the course of an interpellation in the House of Councillors 25 March Prime Minister Ashida explained the Democratic Party's concept of "modified capitalism" as follows:

"Capitalism, as it appeared economically in the nineteenth century, was a 'ruling power of wealth.' It is the purpose of the new concept of modified capitalism to restrict this ruling power, to render equal status to all who are engaged in industry by correcting the inequality between the wealthy and the poor, and to operate social economy by mutual cooperation. This means that the welfare of individuals is considered a problem for society as a whole.

"Under this concept, the object of economic activity is not 'quantitative wealth,' but qualitative social welfare. The interests of the general consumer, not those of the individual producer, are first considered under modified capitalism."

Party Prospects

57. During April Democratic Party leaders maintained an optimistic attitude regarding the political outlook for the immediate future. This attitude was maintained despite repeated criticisms on the part of opposition groups and predictions in certain circles that the issues of suspension of interest payments on war bonds, the national wealth investigation taxes and a third land reform program, all proposed and supported by the Social Democrats, would cause an upset of the Ashida cabinet and bring disorganization in the ranks of the Democratic Party.

Prime Minister Ashida and other leaders of the Democratic Party made serious efforts to maintain close contact with the Social Democrats, and some political observers reported at the end of the month that the left-wingers of the Social Democratic Party would moderate somewhat their attitude on controversial issues.

#### Rumors of Merger

58. The recurrent rumor of a merger between Democrats and Democratic Liberals brought denials from both Ashida and Democratic Liberal President Shigeru Yoshida. At a press conference on 25 April Ashida issued the following statement:

"The Democrats and the Democratic Liberals are pitted against each other since their policies are not similar. They cannot be fused as easily as is supposed. The Democratic Liberal Party is considered to be reactionary by foreign observers and it is controlled by 70-year-olds. Amalgamation is unthinkable until ascendancy in the party shifts to the hands of younger members."

#### Party Secessions

59. Mrs. Masa Nakayama, Democratic member of the House of Representatives from Osaka, resigned from the party 16 April and two other Democrats, Sadakichi Oshima and Kikuji Okada, both members of the House of Councillors, resigned 23 April, all joining the Democratic Liberal Party. The secessions left the strength of the Democratic Party in the House of Representatives at 92 and in the House of Councillors at 44 members.

#### SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

#### Suspension of War Bond Interest

60. Political activities of the Social Democratic Party during the month were concentrated mainly in defending the party's stand on the issue of suspending interest payments on war bonds as formulated in the three-party policy agreement. The party's official position was taken after a decision of the Social Democratic Party's Central Executive Committee 31 March.

#### Satsuki-kai Policies

61. Early in the month, differences between the left-wing Satsuki-kai group of the party and Minister of Labor Kanju Kato, existing since Kato's entrance into the Ashida cabinet, were resolved and as a result the Satsuki-kai group decided to support the Kato labor administration.

Twenty members of the Satsuki-kai group decided 6 April to strive for the adoption of Social Democratic policies in the formulation of the 1948-49 budget. The group decided to support Minister of Labor Kato, who declared at the meeting that he would oppose any revision of existing labor laws. The group also agreed that the Satsuki-kai should try to win acceptance for the party's policy of suspending war bond interest payments, and reaffirmed its previous position calling for (1) absolute opposition to any large increase in government railway rates and (2) absolute opposition to the Government's plan for inauguration of a ¥ 20,000,000,000 tax on agricultural enterprises to replace the tax on the use of land.

62. The war bond controversy and the government-labor dispute led Satsuki-kai leaders to attack the Ashida cabinet. Speaking at a Social Democratic Party rally in Wakayama 16 April, Mosaburo Suzuki, chairman of the party's Political Affairs Research Committee, declared that a general election should be held in order "to stabilize the current unsettled political situation." Suzuki expressed doubts that the Ashida cabinet would be able to weather the difficulties confronting it, claiming that it was "as stable as an inverted pyramid."

Left-wingers also were irritated, according to some observers, by policy statements made by Prime Minister Ashida and other state ministers at the round-table conference with financial and business leaders held at Osaka earlier in the month. These statements, they claimed, indicated policy plans running counter to the three-party policy agreement.

63. The Satsuki-kai group avoided spearheading an "offensive" against the Cabinet. It was held that if such a movement should cause collapse of the Ashida administration, the only party to gain would be the conservative Democratic Liberals. On 27 and 28 April more than 30 left-wingers met informally to discuss the current political situation. They agreed once more that the policies of Minister of Labor Kanju Kato and Minister of State Masaru Nomizo should be supported solidly since "they are waging a desperate battle for the cause of the workers and leftists" within the Cabinet.

#### Katayama "Stumping Tour"

64. During the month Chairman Tetsu Katayama undertook a "stumping tour" of the country in an effort "to popularize party policies rather than to publicize the party itself."

In Kobe on 10 April the former Prime Minister denied current rumors of a general election in the near future. He also declared that the Social Democratic Party solidly supported the Ashida cabinet in prosecuting its policies on the four pressing problems of the budget, the price structure, suspension of interest payments on war bonds and the labor offensive.

In Gifu 23 April, Katayama expressed regret over the tendency of government employees to become involved in labor disputes. He added that though the labor offensive was "quite strong" it would not seriously affect the Ashida government. Labor, he declared, must give primary attention to the imperative need of rehabilitating the nation.

#### Party Accessions

65. Shoichi Aoyama, a member of the House of Councillors and formally affiliated with the Ryokufu-kai (Green Breeze Society), announced 6 April that he had joined the Social Democratic Party.

Junsei Hanazuki, member of the House of Representatives from Shiga Prefecture who bolted the Liberal Party at the time of its reorganization into the Democratic Liberal Party, joined the Social Democratic Party 12 April.

An independent member of the House of Representatives, Junsei Kagetsu, formally joined the Social Democratic Party 15 April. This brought the number of Social Democrats in the House of Representatives to 123.

### DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL PARTY

#### Party Statement

66. Secretary General Takeshi Yamazaki of the Democratic Liberal Party made the following statement 14 April explaining the party's attitude concerning important political issues:

"The present instability of the political situation comes from the fact that the difference of numerical strength between the government and nongovernment parties is so small that the Government is unable to lead the National Diet. The Government lacks sufficient strength and vigor to deal with the difficult situation.



The proposal to cancel interest payments on war bonds reveals the defectiveness of the three-party policy agreement. Minister of Finance Kitamura stated that the payment of interest on war bonds would be cancelled after May. We would, however, oppose such bad measures.

"In order to increase the people's confidence in the Government, it announces, with tongue in cheek, that the flow of Bank of Japan notes into circulation is slowing, a good sign that the inflation spiral is being retarded. However, it is very dangerous for the Government to be satisfied with this temporary phenomenon. Drastic anti-inflation policies are needed. Now that the wage standard of labor is being increased, the present relatively stable monetary situation will not last until autumn.

"The move to effect general unification of conservative fronts, which our party advocated last autumn, lost momentum after the Democratic Liberal Party was formed. However, we are ready to cooperate with the Democrats and other conservatives at any time. The tendency toward unification of the conservative front is now prevailing throughout the country, especially in such prefectures as Osaka, Hyogo, Yamaguchi, Chiba, Saitama, Aomori and Niigata. At the same time, we have already formed a solid combination with the opposition parties headed by the Reform Socialist Party, Farmers' Party and the First Diet Members' Club. Understanding has already been reached with them on such issues as taxation and revision of the election law.

"With the object of forming a unified national conservative front, our party has mobilized all its members to lecture throughout the country. With the support of public opinion, we will put pressure upon the Ashida cabinet. Although no party decision has yet been made on whether we should move a nonconfidence vote in the Diet or demand Diet dissolution in the near future, we shall make every possible effort to hasten the resignation of the present government."

#### Plans for Political Offensive

67. Democratic Liberal plans to launch an offensive against the Government as soon as the Diet ended its recess were revealed by Secretary General Yamazaki in a statement 30 March.

Since the election of Hitoshi Ashida as Prime Minister two and a half months ago, Yamazaki declared, the country has been in a "political vacuum." All the blame for this should be placed squarely on the Ashida administration because of its "paucity of policy," he charged, and added that the present cabinet, neglecting the all-important question of national budget formulation, was "wantonly making a political issue of delicate international issues such as prospective foreign investment, deliberately to deceive the people." Serious disagreement among cabinet members on major issues, including labor policy, the proposed suspension of wartime bond interest payments, railroad and freight rate increases, government personnel cuts and increased food rations, highlighted the policy shortcomings of the Government, he declared.

"The Democratic Liberal Party feels compelled to call the Government to account for this political inadequacy and to bring it under a severe fire of criticism," Secretary General Yamazaki said, adding, "This is the way our party proposes to discharge its political responsibilities to the people." According to Yamazaki the Democratic Liberals would demand that House of Representatives Speaker Komakichi Matsuoka call a meeting of the Lower House Rules Committee to hear testimony of Prime Minister Ashida, Minister of Finance Kitamura and other cabinet members concerning causes of

repeated delays in compiling the 1948-49 national budget. With the Diet session scheduled to end early in May the Government's "fumbling" of the budget question may necessitate formulation of another provisional budget for June, he said.

68. Yamazaki revealed that his party would challenge the government-inspired partisan activities of the Lower House Illegal Transactions Investigation Committee. Every effort would be made to arrest the Committee's "partisan digression" from its original objective, he said, adding that party leaders were convinced that the time had come for the party to take the initiative in "cleaning up politics, government and business."

#### Rumors of Merger

69. Democratic Liberal President Shigeru Yoshida said 24 April that if the Democratic Party should desire a merger of conservative forces the Democratic Liberal Party would cooperate. He urged the necessity of forming a new cabinet based on a broad merger of conservative forces to "fill the current political vacuum."

#### PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE PARTY

70. The People's Cooperative Party was troubled by threats of secession by its chapter in Aichi Prefecture, where local leaders complained of "dictatorial actions" by the national leadership.

#### Statement of Views

71. The party's views on current political issues were discussed by President Takeo Miki 17 April when he said:

"The Ashida cabinet was extremely unpopular among the people at the time of its formation. But Japan was given much hope and courage when America's intention to aid Japan was made clear by Under Secretary of the Army Draper and others who visited Japan.

"In view of this development, the present cabinet can be said to have made a good start under favorable international conditions. Therefore, I believe the opinion that the Ashida cabinet will be short-lived is erroneous.

"The present cabinet has the responsibility of accomplishing two great missions: stabilization of the political situation and preparation for receiving American aid.

"The Government should take concrete measures to hasten the reconstruction of Japan without worrying about the Diet. It is necessary that the government parties act in concert in order to steer the Diet smoothly. For this purpose the three government parties should hold interparty conferences more often because cooperation among these three parties is the key to stabilization of the political situation.

"There is no need for dissolving the Diet, though there are many rumors to the effect that the Diet will soon be dissolved.

"It is said that the Ashida cabinet is weak, but I think it will last for quite some time.

"The present situation is favorable. Increased production will be stimulated by American aid. As a result, inflation will be minimized, and there will be plenty of goods.

"However, an economic crisis will eventually overtake the cities as well as rural districts. This is expected around February

or March of next year. Hence, many people will be thrown out of work. This would increase the danger of an Ashida cabinet breakdown.

"I think, therefore, that the general election will take place in February or March of next year.

"The general public is apt to think lightly of the People's Cooperative Party. But I believe the party is most promising, for the cooperative principle is the best principle that the nation can support.

"Our party will strongly insist on a budget that will pave the way for the full development of agricultural cooperative associations and the 6-3-3 school system."

#### THE DIET

##### Extension of Session Proposed

72. Prime Minister Ashida, testifying before the House of Representatives' Rules Committee 22 April on the progress achieved in the formulation of the 1948-49 budget, requested that the current Diet session, scheduled to end 7 May, be extended until the end of May to provide adequate time for deliberation on the budget bill.

##### Diet Absenteeism

73. House of Representatives Speaker Komakichi Matsuoka issued a statement 6 April urging all Diet members to attend Diet sessions regularly and diligently to fulfil their obligations to the people. Three days earlier SCAP had dispatched a letter to Prime Minister Ashida on absenteeism in the Diet which on several occasions had made it impossible for the House of Representatives to transact business. The text of the letter follows:

"It is becoming a matter of increasing concern that members of the House of Representatives are absenting themselves from its sessions to such an extent that it is difficult at times to secure even the quorum necessary to conduct legislative affairs. In addition, committees considering bills before the House are hampered in the discharge of their functions and responsibilities similarly for lack of attendance.

"It has been asserted that this absenteeism has been brought about by the anticipation in some quarters of an early general election, with a resulting members' anxiety to discuss the public issues of the day with their respective constituencies. The cause of this misapprehension is not clear, as there is no present constitutional or other legal basis for the holding of a general election.

"It is therefore suggested that the leaders of the political parties be urged to take the necessary steps to increase attendance at plenary sessions and committee meetings in order that the Diet may discharge its legislative responsibilities in a manner consistent with the spirit of the Constitution and the urgency of the times."

74. On 6 April the Management Committee of the House of Representatives approved a proposal by Speaker Matsuoka canceling the recess scheduled to begin 8 April. The Committee also approved a request by Matsuoka that attendance records of each representative be published monthly in the Official Gazette as a means of inducing better attendance.

### Bills Introduced

75. The following bills were introduced into the Diet between 25 March and 25 April:

	<u>Introduced into House of Representatives</u>	<u>Introduced into House of Councillors</u>
Bill for Inquest of Prosecution	27 March	29 March
Code of Administrative Procedure	2 April	2 April
Bill Amending Code of Civil Procedure	2 April	2 April
Bill for Administrative Execution by Proxy		2 April
Bill for Sum of Fees for Registration of Families		9 April
Bill Amending the Mail Law		9 April
Bill for Construction of Roads and Bridges		9 April
Bill Amending Fire Defense Organization Law	13 April	9 April
Small Denomination Notes Disposal Bill	14 April	14 April
Bill No. 2 Amending Local Autonomy Law	15 April	15 April
Bill Establishing Special Account for Special Measures of Unjustly Possessed Materials	22 April	24 April
Bill for Payment in Registered National Bonds Value of Unjustly Possessed Materials	22 April	24 April
Bill Amending Law for Filing April Provisional Tax Return	23 April	24 April
Bill for Temporary Measures Pending Enforcement of National Government Organization Law	23 April	24 April
Bill for Payment of Tobacco Premiums Issued by the Government	24 April	24 April
Supplementary Budget No. 2 for Provisional Budget for General Account 1948-49	24 April	24 April
Supplementary Budget No. 1 for Provisional Budget for Special Accounts 1948-49	24 April	24 April

### Laws Enacted

76. The following laws were enacted by the Diet during the period:

	<u>Passed House of Representatives</u>	<u>Passed House of Councillors</u>
Bill for Exceptions to Submission of Estimated Income Tax Return of April 1948, etc.	26 March	29 March
Amendment No. 1, Local Autonomy Law	27 March	31 March
Bill Amending Tobacco Monopoly Law and Others	29 March	31 March
Bill Amending Temporary Demand and Supply Adjustment Law	31 March	31 March
Bill for Measures in Pursuance of Abrogation of Temporary Funds Adjustment Law	1 April	1 April

	<u>Passed House of Representatives</u>	<u>Passed House of Councillors</u>
Bill Amending Gold Fund Special Account Law	1 April	1 April
Bill to Abrogate Temporary Funds Adjustment Law	1 April	1 April
Provisional Budget, Special Accounts, 1948	1 April	1 April
Bill for Transfer of Funds from General to Special Accounts to Cover Deficit in Revenue of Special Accounts, 1948	1 April	1 April
Bill for Special Treatment for Imposition of Income Tax on Tobacco Premiums Issued by the Government	5 April	5 April
Supplementary Budget No. 1 General Account, 1948	5 April	5 April
Bill No. 1 Amending Securities and Exchange Law	5 April	6 April
Bill for Temporary Appointment of Parliamentary Vice-ministers	5 April	7 April
Bill Amending Reconversion Finance Bank Law	6 April	7 April
Bill for Exceptions to Article 3, Public Finance Law	6 April	7 April
Bill Amending Police Law	6 April	7 April
Bill Establishing Coal Board	13 April	14 April
Maritime Safety Authority Bill	15 April	14 April

#### Lower House By-election

77. A by-election held in the third electoral district of Hiroshima Prefecture to fill two vacancies in the House of Representatives resulted in a victory for the Democratic Party candidate, Teiichi Takahashi, and the People's Cooperative Party candidate, Atsuo Hirakawa.

Takahashi polled 60,010 votes and Hirakawa 57,041 votes. The runner-up was the Democratic Liberal Party candidate, Wataru Kojima, who received 48,924 votes.

#### Appointment of Parliamentary Vice-ministers

78. The Diet enacted a bill 7 April re-establishing the position of parliamentary vice-minister. The bill provided that: (1) 22 parliamentary vice-ministers shall be appointed, each House to name 11; (2) parliamentary vice-ministers shall be of the first grade in official rank; (3) official positions which can be held concurrently by National Diet members shall be those of Minister of State and Chief Cabinet Secretary, in addition to posts as parliamentary vice-ministers; (4) the position of parliamentary councillor to each ministry shall be abolished and (5) this law shall remain in force until the second National Diet session closes.

79. On 15 April 22 parliamentary vice-ministers were appointed by the Government with the consent and approval of the Diet. Following are the appointees:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Takaharu Ito, 50, Democratic member of the House of Councillors and vice-chairman of the Political

Affairs Research Committee.

Ministry of Finance - Masuo Araki, 47, Democrat, member of the House of Representatives, and Masakazu Morishita, 53, Social Democrat, member of the House of Councillors.

Attorney-general's Office - Yoshio Matsunaga, 57, Social Democrat, member of the House of Representatives and of the Social Democratic Central Executive Committee.

Ministry of Education - Michio Hosono, 51, Social Democrat, member of the Lower House, and Tetsuo Iwaki, 47, Democrat, member of the Upper House.

Ministry of Welfare - Narajiro Kita, 49, Democrat, member of the Lower House and Chairman of the Commerce Committee, and Miss Tsuneko Akamatsu, 51, Social Democrat, member of the Upper House.

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry - Yoshiharu Oshima, 54, member of the Social Democratic Central Executive Committee and of the Lower House, and Yoshijiro Hirano, 46, Democrat, member of the Upper House.

Ministry of Commerce and Industry - Kiyoshi Masaki, 48, Social Democrat, member of the Lower House, and Tohei Komai, 68, Ryokufu-kai, member of the Upper House. Masaki is chairman of the Lower House Transportation and Traffic Committee and member of the Social Democratic Central Executive Committee.

Ministry of Transportation - Sakae Kinoshita, 66, People's Cooperative central committeeman and member of the Lower House, and Haruhiko Uetake, 50, Democrat, member of the Upper House.

Ministry of Communications - Shigeo Gotsubo, 59, Democratic Party Executive Board member and member of the Lower House, and Kyodei Shimojo, 48, Social Democrat, member of the Upper House.

Ministry of Labor - Shozo Oya, 56, Social Democratic Executive Committeeman, member of the Lower House, and Tesaku Mizuhashi, 53, Social Democrat, member of the Upper House.

Economic Stabilization Board - Eiichi Nishimura, 44, Social Democrat, member of the Lower House, and Heigo Fujii, 42, Ryokufu-kai, member of the Upper House.

Construction Board - Hisahi Amano, 56, Democrat, member of the House of Representatives.

Local Finance Committee - Kichinosuke Saigo, 42, Ryokufu-kai, member of the Upper House.

THE PURGE

Screening Results

80. During the period 4 January 1947 through 17 April 1948 a total of 711,026 persons were screened by the Central or Local Public Office Qualifications Examination Committees. Of the 55,696 persons screened by the Central Government Committee, 740 were barred from public service and 2,997 were removed. On the local government level, 655,328 persons were screened, of whom 1,883 were removed and 2,136 were barred.

As of 17 April 204,170 persons had been provisionally designated by both the Central and Local Screening Committees.

Of this number, 189,162 were finally designated and 10,103 were passed on the basis of counterevidence showing cause why the provisions of the memorandum should not be invoked in their individual cases. The remaining 4,905 either submitted letters of exception on which action had not been completed or their cases were pending expiration of the 30-day period granted to all provisional designees for the submission of counterevidence.

81. Provisional designation of public information media officials who fall under the purge criteria was completed but final designation of such persons continued. In April 72 more officials of black-listed companies were finally designated, bringing the total to 490. There remained 78 provisional designees whose counterevidence would be considered and whose status would be determined before the conclusion of the program 10 May. The Government also continued its review of allegedly ultranationalistic books published during the decade preceding the war to determine whether the authors are subject to purge. Sixty-one writers were provisionally designated at the beginning of April, bringing to 331 the total number of individuals provisionally designated under this phase of the Public Information Media Purge.

Between 1 and 22 April the Appeals Board disapproved 135 appeals for purge exemption and acted favorably in eight cases. All cases on which the Board took final action in April were submitted to SCAP for review.

#### Replacement of Records

82. Replacement of purge records destroyed in the fire of 26 February proceeded rapidly. Initially it was estimated that restoration would not be accomplished until the end of June, but the Central Screening Committee currently expects the task to be concluded in May.

#### Special Investigation Bureau

83. Organization of the Attorney-general's Special Investigation Bureau, established by law 15 February, was completed in April. The Bureau will maintain a central office in Tokyo with subheadquarters in each of nine regions of Japan: Hokkaido, Tohoku, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu and Kanto.

84. On 20 April all local investigative officials were summoned to a meeting in Tokyo to receive a briefing on their new duties and responsibilities. In the course of this conference the two principal missions of the Investigation Bureau were explained.

The first mission of the Bureau is to observe and investigate compliance with the purge injunctions contained in Articles X, XI, XII, XIII and XIV of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947. If in the course of its investigation the Bureau uncovers evidence indicating that the ordinance has been violated, this information is referred to the Public Procurator who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the law and for the enforcement of the penalty provisions contained in Article XV. According to Tsunemori Kiuchi, Assistant Attorney General in charge of prosecution, the Bureau had already begun to investigate the activities of 10 purgees who are believed to be exerting their authority and influence in violation of the injunctions.

The Bureau's second mission is to observe compliance with Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946. To ensure that ultranationalistic and militaristic societies banned by this ordinance do not

attempt to resume their proscribed activities, the Bureau will check on former leaders of dissolved organizations and on the existence of possible successor groups. The Bureau will also observe and if necessary investigate societies which, though formed since the promulgation of Imperial Ordinance No. 101, may still be subject to dissolution under its terms because of their activities, memberships, aims or purposes. When on the basis of the Bureau's investigation a society is dissolved, the Attorney General will designate as a purgee "any person who has at any time been a founder, officer or director of, or occupied any post of authority in, or been an editor of any publication or organ of" an organization dissolved under the terms of Imperial Ordinance No. 101. This power, formerly held exclusively by the Japanese Government's screening committees, was granted to the Attorney General by amendment to Article VII, Imperial Ordinance No. 101. The Attorney-general's Office is currently investigating approximately 500 organizations in order to determine their status under the ordinance.





SECTION 2

PUBLIC SAFETY

C O N T E N T S

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LAW AND ORDER

Civil Disturbances

1. In protest against a government order issued 9 April closing certain of the schools operated by Korean communities in Japan for failure to comply with the Japanese Education Law, Koreans in Osaka staged mass demonstrations 23-25 April in which a total of 23 Koreans and 58 policemen were injured and 183 rioters were arrested.

In Kobe, Occupation Forces on 24 April assumed surveillance and assisted Japanese police in dispersing crowds after a group of 200 Koreans and Japanese held prisoner the governor, public procurator and other officials of Hyogo Prefecture and coerced them into signing proclamations rescinding the order to close Korean schools and freeing a group of Koreans who were arrested by police for rioting in connection with the school issue. Approximately 1,200 rioters were detained and subsequently 30 Koreans and eight Japanese were charged. By 26 April the situation in the Kobe and Osaka area was quiet and completely under control.

In Tokyo 17 principals and officials of Korean schools were arrested on 27 and 28 April for not complying with the Government's school closure order. Koreans in Tokyo staged protest rallies but no violence occurred.

Black-market Activities

2. Hoarded and concealed goods uncovered by the Economic Stabilization Board and placed in legal distribution channels in February amounted to ¥ 81,149,526 of which approximately 39 percent was metal and metal products.

HOARDED AND CONCEALED GOODS UNCOVERED a/  
February  
(yen)

Foodstuffs	728,356
Textiles	19,260,131
Metal and products	31,252,106
Petroleum products	739,847
Crude rubber and products	5,647,286
Leather and products	16,990,020
Paper	247,450
Lumber	1,190,800
Medicine	2,039,536
Miscellaneous items	<u>3,053,994</u>
Total	81,149,526

a/ All Japan.

SOURCE: Economic Stabilization Board.

Crime

3. Criminal offenses reported in February numbered 149,885 and arrests totaled 79,220, compared with 146,669 and 76,802 respectively in January. Violations of the Criminal Code accounted for 112,413 of the offenses and 39,476 of the arrests, as charted opposite. Among the violations of the Criminal Code approximately 84 percent of the reported offenses and 50 percent of the arrests involved larceny.

4. Tokyo reported the highest criminal offense rate, 53.98 per 1,000 population per annum, while Fukuoka, Osaka, Hyogo and Miyagi Prefectures reported rates ranging from 32.08 to 48.19 per 1,000 population per annum. There were eight prefectures with rates less than 10.88 per 1,000 population per annum.

5. Of the 79,220 persons arrested in February 76,186 were Japanese, 2,995 were Koreans, nine were Chinese, 21 were Formosans and nine were of other nationalities.

POLICE


6. A budget for establishment and operation of a National Rural Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory was approved by the Ministry of Finance and ¥ 1,907,000 was provided for operation in May. The laboratory will begin operations with 26 persons and as equipment is obtained and the volume of work increases the staff is to be increased to 52 persons. Facilities of the laboratory will be available to all municipal police forces and other government law-enforcement agencies as well as to the National Rural Police units.

7. In a program designed to improve police communications and to conserve materials by avoiding unnecessary duplication of facilities, the Ministry of Communications is providing telephone circuits for exclusive police use. Circuits down to the prefectural headquarters level are being established and are scheduled to be completed by June.


8. A four-day city-wide traffic safety campaign was conducted by the police in Tokyo from 19 to 22 April. This was the ninth campaign held by the police since the surrender.

# CRIMINAL OFFENSES


RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION PER ANNUM



## OFFENSES AGAINST CRIMINAL CODE - FEBRUARY 1948



## RELATION OF PREFECTURAL RATES TO NATIONAL RATE DURING FEBRUARY 1948



SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS.  
GHQ-SCAP

JAPAN • APR 48


NUMBER 2

Maritime Safety

9. The Maritime Safety Authorities Bill was passed by the Diet on 15 April and is scheduled to become effective on 1 May 1948. The law provides for the establishment of the Maritime Safety Board under the Ministry of Transportation which will be responsible for ensuring maritime safety and preventing, detecting and suppressing violations of laws of the Japanese Government in harbors, bays, sounds and coastal waters on the high seas adjacent to Japan. It also provides for a maximum of 10,000 men and 125 vessels. The total tonnage of vessels is limited to 50,000 gross tons and no single vessel will exceed 1,500 gross tons displacement or be capable of exceeding 15 knots.

PRISONS

10. The prison population 31 March was 87,233 of whom 68,389, including 3,070 juveniles, were sentenced and 18,844 were awaiting trial, compared with 83,872 persons of whom 66,999 were sentenced and 16,873 awaiting trial during the preceding month. There were 37 persons awaiting execution in March and prison deaths totaled 93, compared with 35 and 76 respectively in February.



11. A school for illiterate prisoners was established at the Chofu prison 1 April. The course is conducted three times a week and is scheduled to last one year.

**ACCIDENTS**


12. Government and private railway mishaps in March numbered 548 with 227 persons killed and 578 injured. The number of deaths and injuries increased 32 percent and 75 percent respectively over the preceding month.

**RAIL ACCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES**

	February		March	
	Government Railways	Private Railways	Government Railways	Private Railways
Accidents	344 a/	159 a/	370	178
Killed	123	49	127	100
Injured	218	111	219	359
<b>Causes of casualties</b>				
Falling from trains	78	32	97	22
Jumping from trains	84	34	76	18
Struck by trains	134	51	137	63
Casualties caused by collisions and derailments	34	39	23	344
Others	11	4	13	12


a/ Revised.

SOURCE: Ministry of Transportation.



**FIRES**

13. Fires and fire losses reported in February were 13 and 10 percent greater than the preceding month. Embers continued to be the leading cause of these fires.



#### FIRES

Causes	January		February	
	Number of	Losses (yen)	Number of	Losses (yen)
	Fires		Fires	
Embers	475	180,952,636	496	273,473,355
Careless smoking	52	22,108,067	65	30,125,142
Electrical	161	155,546,093	138	287,160,895
Incendiary	44	11,889,340	38	10,832,130
Inflammable liquids	72	66,363,470	79	95,115,225
Miscellaneous	649	464,444,796	823	270,424,507
Unknown	137	138,991,098	167	177,855,085
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,590</b>	<b>1,040,295,500</b>	<b>1,806</b>	<b>1,144,986,339</b>

SOURCE: National Fire Defense Board.

14. The national fire damage rate in February was ¥ 14.66 per person. The highest prefectural fire damage rate of ¥ 67.14 per person was reported from Hyogo Prefecture, while Fukushima, Tokyo, Kochi and Kanagawa Prefectures had rates ranging from ¥ 30.65 to ¥ 41.80 per person.

15. Deaths from fires totaled 56 in February and the injured numbered 153, compared with 74 and 169 respectively in January.

16. The Fire Research Institute of the National Fire Defense Board was formally dedicated on 30 April. Facilities of the Institute include two special laboratories for large-scale fire tests and regular laboratories for mechanical, chemical, physical and electrical research.

SECTION 3

LEGAL AFFAIRS AND WAR CRIMES

C O N T E N T S

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LEGAL AFFAIRS

The Judiciary

1. Constitutionality of capital punishment was established by the Supreme Court 12 March when it upheld a decision of the Hiroshima High Court to sentence a defendant to death after conviction on charges of parricide. The defendant had appealed on the grounds that Article 36 of the new Constitution forbids the infliction of torture and cruel punishments and thereby nullifies Articles 199 and 200 of the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court held that the death penalty, except when executed by such a law prescribing crucifixion, gibbeting or boiling, could not be regarded as a cruel punishment.

High Marine Court of Inquiry

2. The High Marine Court of Inquiry was established in Tokyo 1 April pursuant to the Enforcement Regulations for the Sea Casualties Inquiry Law. The Marine Courts, similar to boards of investigation and under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation, are to inquire into the causes of sea casualties and contribute to the prevention of the occurrence of such casualties. Chimune Nagaya was appointed president of the High Marine Court.

Domestic Relations Courts

3. The Courts of Domestic Relations which were established as branches of the District Court 1 January had received 20,277 trial cases, 4,820 arbitration cases and 82,462 consultation cases up to 15 March and had disposed of 12,196 trial cases and 1,516 arbitration cases.

Public Procurators' Office Law

4. The Public Procurators' Office Law was amended by the Diet 15 April to provide, beginning in 1949, for examination of a procurator's record to be made every three years by a Committee of Qualifications of 11 members. The Attorney General is required to act upon recommendations of the Committee.

INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

5. One hundred twenty-nine atrocity investigations were completed during the April reporting period, reducing cases on hand to 972.



ATROCITY INVESTIGATIONS

	Cases	Cases Received	Cases Completed	Cases
	on Hand <u>24 Mar</u>	24 Mar - 24 Apr	24 Mar - 24 Apr	on Hand <u>24 Apr</u>
POW camp conditions	3	0	0	3
POW atrocities	79	0	4	75
Flyers	288	17	40	265
POW ships	17	0	4	13
Kempei-tai (Military Police)	25	0	2	23
Miscellaneous	<u>671</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>593</u>
Total	1,083	18	129	972 <u>a/</u>

a/ Represents cases still under active investigation which may or may not result in prosecution of an undisclosed number of war criminals.

APPREHENSION OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

6. The Japanese Government was directed to apprehend and deliver to Sugamo Prison 30 persons wanted in connection with war crimes, of whom 17 were former Army and Navy officers, 12 were civilians and one was a former enlisted man.

The Government was notified of the deletion of six names from previous apprehension directives, the clarification of status of six previously suspected war criminals and the release of one person from hospital arrest.

PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

7. By 20 April 610 war crimes suspects had been tried of whom 572 were found guilty and 40 acquitted. Of the total guilty 94 were given death sentences; five death sentences have been executed, three have been commuted and 86 are awaiting approval. The remaining 476 war criminals were sentenced to terms ranging from six months to life at hard labor. Of the suspects tried, two have been tried twice.

From 21 March to 20 April 13 trials were completed involving 25 war criminals of whom 14 were former Army officers, eight were civilians and three were former enlisted men. In addition, six suspects were acquitted.

TRIAL OF WAR ATROCITY CASES

<u>Name</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
OTAKE	Hq		8 Mar 48-	
Michiji	Commander	Lt Col	22 Mar 48	3 years
-----				
HATAKEYAMA	Camp		4 Mar 48-	
Toshio	Commander	Col	24 Mar 48	12 years
-----				
ISHIKAWA	Camp		23 Mar 48-	
Tsuneo	Commander	Lt	24 Mar 48	4 years
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<u>Name</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
NAGAHARA Keiji	Camp Commander	Capt	8 Mar 48- 25 Mar 48	2 years
MAKINO Umetaro	Camp Foreman	Civ	25 Mar 48	2 years
YAMAMOTO Yasumasa	Camp Commander	Lt	3 Mar 48- 30 Mar 48	3 years
MIURA Soichi	Admin NCO	Sgt		3 years
TAKASHIMA Teizo	Guard	Civ		3 years
KAMADA Shuji	Inter- preter	Sgt		4 years
HATAKEYAMA Iseo	Camp Commander	Lt		3 years
KURATA Masanosuke	Medical NCO	Cpl		3 years
OSANAI Shigeru	Guard	Civ		3 years
TAMURA Ipppei	Squad Commander	2nd Lt	11 Mar 48- 30 Mar 48	12 years
NOGUCHI Etsuji	Kempei- tai	W/O	29 Mar 48- 31 Mar 48	12 years
SATO Kazuo		Civ	29 Mar 48- 1 Apr 48	7 years
FUNARI Kaoru		Civ		10 years
WACHI Takaji	Asst C/S	Lt Gen	15 Mar 48- 13 Apr 48	6 years
YASUKAWA Masakijo	CO	Maj		1 year 6 months
TESHIMA Fusataro	Com Gen	Lt Gen		3 years
NUMATA Takazo		Lt Gen		7 years
FUKUNAGA Kiyozo	CO	1st Lt	5 Apr 48- 16 Apr 48	Life imprisonment
HIRANO Kenji	Med Off	1st Lt	7 Apr 48- 19 Apr 48	Life imprisonment
KIMURA Goro	Guard	Civ	7 Apr 48- 20 Apr 48	8 years
TANAKA Kumataro	Guard	Civ		9 years

<u>Name</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Results of Trials</u>
MATSUOKA			7 Apr 48-	
Tomezo	Guard	Civ	20 Apr 48	9 years

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Former Lieutenant Generals Takazo Numata and Takaji Wachi, chief and assistant chief of staff respectively of the Southern Theater Army, and Fusataro Teshima, commanding general of the 16th Army in Batavia, Java, were convicted for knowingly violating international law by illegally using a Japanese hospital ship for transportation of healthy troops, military supplies, weapons and munitions of war.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMINALS

Paragraph

Summation by Defense. . . . . 9

8. Regular court sessions were held 1-2, 5, 7-9 and 12-16 April. On 15 April the defense summation was completed and on 15-16 April the prosecution's reply was heard.

The court adjourned 16 April to prepare its judgment and sentence for the 25 accused.

SUMMATION BY DEFENSE

Jiro Minami

9. The Minami defense summation was presented 16 and 17 March. Minami was War Minister from April to December 1931 and Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army from 1934 to 1936.

In reviewing the evidence presented against Minami the defense declared that "the charges against this defendant are based on mere rumors and hearsay and he is accused of the very acts which he exerted himself to prevent.

"All the direct evidence, either oral or documentary, points only to the fact that he did his duty at every stage of his career, neither exceeding his authority nor ever negligent thereof. If patriotic devotion to duty and believing in the declarations of one's government agencies is to be any offense either national or international, we have to submit that there can be no stability or security from injustice for the citizens of any nation in the world."

The defense contended that "General Shigeru Honjo acted within his authority when he decided to use force on the night of September 18th, 1931. The Kwantung Army regulations provided that 'the commander may resort to force when he deems it necessary for the defense of Kwantung Province and for the protection of the rail-ways.'

"Contrary to the allegation of the prosecution, Minami never attempted to whitewash himself and place all responsibility on the Supreme Command. He frankly admits that he was responsible for all administrative matters," the defense continued.

"As to the operational matters (of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria), the War Minister was a liaison man between the Cabinet and the Supreme Command. He transmitted the wish of the Cabinet to the Chief of the General Staff, but he could not compel the latter to accept it. He cannot be held responsible for matters which were under the exclusive control of the Chief of the General Staff who

was directly responsible to the Emperor. However, in spite of all the difficulties arising from the peculiar position of the War Minister under the Japanese Constitution, he succeeded in upholding the nonexpansion policy by prohibiting through the Chief of the General Staff the dispatch of troops either to Harbin or to Chin-chow. On the other hand, he failed in restoring the status quo in the face of the rapidly changing situation in Manchuria, for it was humanly impossible for him to stop the torrential overflow of a long pent-up antagonism between China and Japan. That is why he resigned on December 10th, 1931, after 83 days of a hard struggle for the maintenance of the aforesaid Government policy."

Answering the prosecution's allegation that Minami from 1927 to 1945 occupied policy-making positions of great authority where action had to be taken to advance or halt acts of military aggression, the defense asked "if he should be blamed for acts performed in the natural course of his duty in every stage of his career."

#### Koki Hirota

10. The Hirota summation was heard 17 and 18 March. Hirota served as a diplomat for 27 years before beginning his cabinet career, was Foreign Minister in the Saito, Okada and Konoye cabinets and was Prime Minister and Foreign Minister concurrently from March 1936 to February 1937.

Hirota was described by the defense as a liberal and real pacifist.

"Hirota," the defense stated, "as Foreign and Prime Minister was obliged to handle the affairs of government within his competence and authority in the wake of the Manchurian Affair and the emergence of Manchukuo which were fait accompli before he assumed public office. The China Incident occurred and developed under circumstances beyond his control or competence. As to the Pacific war, his opposition was the voice of a mere private citizen without competence or authority. He did his best to check the spread of hostilities and the tragic outbreak of war notwithstanding, as no other pacific-minded statesman could, but in vain because of circumstances over which he had no real voice or control.

"The standard of criminal responsibility for one's act or nonfeasance under any system of law should be that required of any ordinary common man, not that of a superhuman," the defense continued. "Hirota did everything that an ordinary statesman under similar conditions could do in pursuing the path of peace.

"The prosecution has wholly failed to sustain its burden of proof as against this accused," the defense concluded. "Instead Koki Hirota, upon an impartial review of the entire record in this case, should be acquitted of all the charges brought against him."

#### Kingoro Hashimoto

11. The summation for Hashimoto, who allegedly commanded an artillery regiment at the "Rape of Nanking" and the Japanese forces which shelled H. M. S. Ladybird and the U. S. S. Panay, was presented 18-19 March.

Hashimoto, who was dismissed from the Army in rank of colonel, had stated in his affidavit:

"I was never in any official position to participate in any conspiracy, planning or preparation of the Manchurian and the China Incidents and the Pacific war. Nor did I ever participate in any such conspiracy, planning or preparation."

The defense declared that no evidence had been introduced by the prosecution to sustain its charge that the accused commanded an artillery regiment at the "Rape of Nanking," and added that evidence had been submitted to show that the leader of the Japanese forces that shelled the Panay was not the accused Hashimoto.

On 12 December 1937, when firing at Chinese vessels at Wuhu carrying Chinese troops, the defendant shelled the British gunboat Ladybird in mistake owing to the thick fog peculiar to the Yangtze River, the defense declared, but this accident was incurred in consequence of his performance of unavoidable duties by order of the Army Commander Yamagawa.

Concerning the defendant's authorship of books and articles, the accused Hashimoto, in accordance with the freedom of speech and publication as assured by Article 29 of the Japanese Constitution, made public personal views of his own, the defense continued.

The prosecution failed to show that Hashimoto, in writing books and articles, "acted in communion with the rest of the conspirators," the defense charged.

In conclusion the defense stated:

"The accused Hashimoto Kingoro is a true type of traditional Japanese in whom the spirit of 'bushido' is exquisitely embodied. He does not like to conceal what he did or to simulate what he did not do. In reply to the charges of the indictment he has offered evidence in a candid and upright manner, withholding nothing and adding nothing to the truth. In case any of his acts in the past be held criminal, he will be ready to receive the penalty prescribed therefor."

#### Takazumi Oka

12. The summation for Oka, a Navy career officer, was submitted on 19 March.

The defense contended that Oka, who became director of the Naval Affairs Bureau in October 1940, was never in a position to originate or formulate government policies.

"Oka performed the routine administrative duties connected with this department under the supervision and direction of the vice-minister, pursuant to orders of the Navy Minister. There has not been one iota of evidence which has shown that Oka conspired or attempted to conspire with anyone, or that he committed any act or acts outside of his regular routine duties as outlined in the regulations," the defense claimed.

It was admitted by the defense that Oka attended the Imperial and Liaison Conferences and Investigation Committee meetings of the Privy Council, but never as a member. He attended as a secretary and, as Oka testified, "never without his superior, the Navy Minister."

"All of the positions occupied by Oka from October 1931 to October 1940," the defense concluded, "were nonoperational functions with the exception of one year, from December 1937, when he was appointed captain of the warship Jingei and served on coastal patrol duty in Japan. Therefore, his work gave him no opportunity to participate in the Manchurian Incident, the Anti-Comintern Pact, and the China Incident. Nor did his work give him any opportunity to participate in the Japanese-Netherlands East Indies negotiations,

the Japan-French Indo-China Protocol, and the advance of Japanese troops into north French Indo-China, or the Tripartite Pact."

Heitaro Kimura

13. The summation for Kimura, who served as Vice-minister of War 1941-1943, was presented 19 March.

Kimura was an ordnance administrative expert. "The reason for his appointment to the post of Vice-minister of War was to have him assist the Minister in professional technical administration of ordnance and harmonize all the Ministry by his sound character. His appointment has no personal, special implication in connection with Tojo," the defense stated.

Since Tojo as War Minister personally controlled and commanded the important bureau and department chiefs, "Kimura could not play his part positively," the defense asserted. "His efforts were chiefly directed towards ordnance administration which was his strong point. At the same time he tried to harmonize the routine work of the office with a view to enabling the skilled Minister, bureau and department chiefs to display their abilities to the fullest extent. This he accomplished."

Concerning POW matters, Tojo testified that regulations and orders with respect to POW's were either made or approved by the war ministers.

The prosecution previously charged that Kimura personally issued the order for the death penalty on captured Doolittle airmen. In answer to this the defense referred to testimony of Ryukichi Tanaka who testified that "the matter was decided in the Imperial Headquarters by the Chief of the Army General Staff," and further testified that the responsibility of the Vice-minister in connection with the note relating to the treatment of POW's was merely to transmit the note.

From 30 August 1944 until the surrender Kimura was commander of the army in Burma. In answer to the prosecution's charge that Kimura was responsible for certain atrocities and ill-treatment of POW's in Burma, the defense stated that construction of the Siam-Burma Railway had been completed a year before General Kimura arrived at his post. The testimony of Ichida, Kimura's chief of staff in Burma, that "not one single instance of unlawful conduct was ever reported to the Army Headquarters and that he was certain that no orders were ever issued by Kimura for perpetration of atrocious acts," was also cited.

Kuniaki Koiso

14. The summation for Koiso, who was Prime Minister from July 1944 to April 1945 and prior to that time Minister of Overseas Affairs and Vice-minister of War, was heard 22 March.

"At the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Koiso was director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and later became Vice-minister of War. Matters pertaining to the dispatch of troops to and military operations in Manchuria were outside the competence of his office as clearly shown by the testimony of Reijiro Wakatsuki, of Kazushige Ugaki and of Jiro Minami," the defense stated.

"The military actions with which Koiso was related while Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army were actions taken for the maintenance of law and order within Manchukuo, based upon the Japan-Manchukuo protocol, and were believed to be legitimate acts based

upon the right of suppression of banditry, which right Japan had been able to reserve at the council of the League of Nations as well as having been authorized under treaty between what was believed by Koiso and others to be two independent nations."

The defense pointed out that Koiso had no connection whatsoever with the China Incident during the years 1934 to 1938, since during this period he was in active military service in Japan and Korea.

As Minister of Overseas Affairs during two periods, 7 April to 30 August 1939 and 16 January to 22 July 1940, Koiso did not participate in matters pertaining to the Supreme Command or in matters discussed by the Five Ministers' Conferences, the defense declared.

In conclusion, the defense stated: "Neither has he participated in a common conspiracy to commit aggression against the territory of another country or to commit any of the unlawful acts listed as crimes in the indictment, nor has he ever initiated, planned, prepared or acted as an accomplice in such acts, nor has he, utilizing his authority, ordered or permitted such acts."

Naoki Hoshino

15. The summation of Naoki Hoshino, a career civil servant, was heard 22-23 March.

Hoshino was persuaded by his superiors in the Finance Ministry to go to newly founded Manchukuo in 1932 where he served successively as a bureau chief in the Manchukuoan Finance Department, Vice-minister of Finance and Chief of General Affairs, the defense began.

In his capacity as a Manchukuoan government official Hoshino admittedly worked in liaison with the Kwantung Army, the defense stated, but he was only one of many officials there who did so.

"Soon after Hoshino became chief of the General Affairs Board in 1936, he took steps to combat the opium evil," the defense continued. "Despite the strong criticisms and widely held belief that opium smoking could not be eliminated in less than 20 years, Hoshino advocated a 10-year opium elimination policy which was supported by young, native Manchurian officials. He contributed much toward the adoption of the latter policy based upon the program prepared by Yuan Chan-chi, native Manchurian official. He opposed the use of opium monopoly revenues for general government expenditures and insisted that prohibition should be carried out without stinting the expense. It is submitted that all the evidence relating to this subject has demonstrated the fact that the Manchukuo opium policy was a success not only in reducing the number of addicts but in eradicating this evil from the home and social life of the people. The number of registered addicts, reaching its peak of 590,000 or thereabouts in 1937, went down gradually to something over 200,000 in 1945."

The defense stated that Hoshino as chief of the General Affairs Board "faithfully discharged his duties strictly within their limits and for the benefit and welfare of Manchukuo and its people."

Hoshino served as president of the Japanese Planning Board from 22 July 1940 until 4 April 1941 under the jurisdiction of Premier Konoye, the defense stated. The duty of the Planning Board was to draft an economic plan and make general arrangements for the various departments.

As the prosecution witness Liebert admitted, the Board made plans only and submitted them to the Prime Minister; the final decision was always made by the Cabinet and executed by the ministries concerned.

Simultaneously with his appointment to the Planning Board, Hoshino was made a Minister of State Without Portfolio. He attended Privy Council meetings, but only as an "explainer." He could not vote and could only speak when called on by the president to make an explanation, the defense asserted.

From October 1941 until July 1944 Hoshino served as Chief Secretary of the Cabinet under Tojo.

"Hoshino was chosen by Tojo," the defense asserted, "purely from the consideration of his being fit for the secretarial work and not for his political ability. It is quite reasonable to infer that Tojo should have appraised Hoshino's abilities and inabilities in his experience in the second Konoye cabinet, from which Hoshino had resigned in disappointment. It is suggested that Tojo stated his true view of Hoshino when he said, 'Hoshino having been one of my colleagues in the second Konoye cabinet, I considered him the ideal man for the post of the Chief Secretary both in point of previous career and personal ability.'"

As Chief Secretary, Hoshino's duties were secretarial in nature--to assist the Prime Minister, take charge of confidential documents and manage the general affairs of the Cabinet. He attended Liaison and Imperial Conferences in a secretarial capacity but did not participate in discussions and was not allowed a vote, the defense stated.

#### Akira Muto

16. The summation of Muto, a career soldier, was presented 23 March.

On opening Muto's summation, the defense emphasized "that he had never, throughout his career as a military man, had an assignment which carried command responsibility, except for the period in Sumatra, when he was entirely blameless. There can be no question then," the defense continued, "that he was in no responsible position with regard to the initiation of either the China Incident or the Manchurian Incident."

The defense disclaimed any responsibility on the part of Muto for the attack of Nanking. "At that time Muto was a colonel and deputy chief of staff of the Central China Area Army. His duties consisted in playing an intermediary role with regard to supply of necessary personnel, food, arms and ammunition, and he had no power to make independent decisions."

Muto served as chief of the Military Affairs Bureau at the commencement of the Pacific war and continued there until around 20 March 1942. "The responsibility for opening and prosecution of the war was that of the Army General Staff or the Imperial Headquarters," the defense declared. "But Muto was a member of neither, attending, if at all, merely as an attendant of the War Minister."

Concerning Muto's alleged responsibility for the Japanese Army's maltreatment of POW's and atrocities against Filipinos, the defense countered by explaining that Muto did not take his post in the Philippines until 20 October 1944, two days after the United States' forces landed on Leyte. "Further, the Japanese Army in the Philippines was, soon after Muto's arrival there, scattered into



small isolated groups by the United States forces, which planned and operated to bring about such separation of the Japanese units. Yamashita's chain of command was destroyed and communications were impossible. Such being the case, Muto and others were totally unaware of such atrocities as alleged by the prosecution; and even if they had been aware of such, there was nothing that they could do to prevent them. In brief, it was beyond Muto's control.

"Muto, as Chief of Staff, had no power to decide anything by himself. He was with Commander-in-Chief Yamashita always and acted according to the commander's intentions. Consequently, from the legal point of view, he cannot be held responsible," the defense concluded.

#### Kenryo Sato

17. The summation of former General Sato, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry from April 1942 until December 1944, was presented 23 March.

In opening this summation, the defense observed that the prosecution had contended that Sato, as chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, was concerned among other things with "making domestic and external plans for the conduct of propaganda and drafting replies to protests forwarded from the Foreign Office in regard to the treatment of POW's."

The defense admitted the former but denied the latter contention.

For its evidence against Sato, the prosecution relied on Ryukichi Tanaka, whom the defense characterized as an "ever-present witness whose livelihood has been provided while testifying before the Tribunal." The defense declared that Tanaka's failure to attain the post of chief of the Military Affairs Bureau had bred resentment within him against Sato.

"Were it not for the fact that the prosecution predicates its case against the accused Sato largely on this witness' utterances, we would be inclined to pass him off without comment," the defense stated, continuing, "We contend that Tanaka has demonstrated that he was, firstly, interested in avoiding indictment himself; secondly, in reaping what personal benefits he could; and thirdly, obtaining revenge upon certain of the accused whom he dislikes."

In concluding, the defense declared:

"As to the planning, preparation and initiation of aggressive war, the evidence both of the prosecution and defense solidly discloses that there is no basis for a consideration of guilt.

"As to the waging of war--Sato accepted his assignment as chief of the Military Affairs Bureau after the commencement of hostilities. The evidence leads us to the second conclusion," the defense stated, "that he perpetrated no wrong cognizable by the charter of this Tribunal."

#### Seishiro Itagaki

18. The summation for former War Minister Itagaki was presented 24-25 March. Itagaki was War Minister under Prime Ministers Konoye and Hiranuma after serving in the Kwantung Army until 1937.

The defense denied the prosecution's argument that Itagaki directed army operations in Mukden on the night of 18 September 1931. Those operations were directed by Hirata, the defense

stated. However, when asked by Hirata to advise him, Itagaki, knowing General Honjo's views, gave Hirata assurance.

At the end of October 1931 General Honjo issued a general policy statement in which he said:

"The Kwantung Army should be indifferent to all political affairs of Manchuria. It should leave all the administrative matters of the new state to the independent and autonomous regime of the Manchurian people to assist the maintenance of law and order. However, the national defense should be a problem for the joint strength of Japan and the new state, and for the time being the Kwantung Army should appoint itself to this task." Itagaki and all other staff officers acted upon this instruction, the defense declared.

On 4 January 1932 Itagaki, representing General Honjo, reported in Tokyo to military headquarters and the War Ministry "that the general tendency of Manchuria was toward an independent state. After having assiduously sounded the prominent authoritative persons and men of real worth on the outside of official circles, I could affirm that they were all earnestly advocating the creation of an independent state, and that the general public, too, were against not only the return of Chang Hsueh-liang's regime to Manchuria, but also against the advance of Kuomintang government in Manchuria.

"That the Commander Honjo was of the opinion that there remained no other way than to adopt the theory of an independent state and that undoubtedly an independent state would be formed."

"War Minister Araki informed me that he would not interfere, one way or the other," Itagaki previously testified.

Concerning Itagaki's interviews with Pu-Yi before he was made Emperor of Manchukuo, the defense stated that they were made upon orders of General Honjo.

From 1 March 1937 until 3 June 1938 Itagaki was commander of the 5th Division, which was ordered to China on 27 July 1937.

The defense denied the prosecution's allegations that Itagaki participated in the attack on Nanking since he was stationed at Fao-ting at that time. Moreover, the defense stated that no officers or men of Itagaki's division have ever been reported to be war criminal suspects since the end of the war.

Itagaki's appointment as War Minister was based on the firm belief of Premier Konoye that Itagaki's trust in and concern for China made him the best man to bring about an early peaceful settlement of the unhappy Sino-Japanese war, the defense stated.

Itagaki favored withdrawal of troops and quick settlement of difficulties with China. "That he was never able to accomplish these desires does not mean that he did not entertain them," the defense concluded.

#### Shigetaro Shimada

19. The summation of former Admiral Shimada was heard 25-26 March.

Shimada, when nominated by Navy Minister Oikawa to be his successor, declined, and accepted only after persuasion by Oikawa, Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano and Prince Fushimi, the defense stated.

The defense then quoted Oikawa's testimony to disprove the prosecution's assertion of any connection, political or personal, between Tojo and Shimada.

Continuing, the defense declared, "The prosecution does not and cannot seriously contend that Shimada had any direct responsibility concerning the operational orders for the opening of hostilities but it does charge that he is to be held answerable for the alleged failure to give proper notice of the commencement of such hostilities in compliance with Hague Convention III."

The defense contended, however, that the final notification to the United States fell within the category of duties under the Foreign Minister.

In concluding, the defense stated that "in carrying out the functions of his high office there is nothing to show that Shimada's actions were at any time accompanied by criminal intent, impelled by criminal motive or the result of criminal negligence based on inadequate factual provocation."

#### Teiichi Suzuki

20. Before 1941 the witness Suzuki served in the Army. From 1941 to 1943 he was president of the Cabinet Planning Board and Minister Without Portfolio under Prime Ministers Konoye and Tojo. His summation was heard 24 March.

Suzuki was assigned as an Army officer to serve on the China Affairs Board as chief of the Political Affairs Section. In this capacity he was not in a position to formulate policies for the Board, the defense stated. His duty was to help the secretary general of the Board in the execution of such policies as already had been decided, so far as the functions of his own section were concerned.

On the Planning Board Suzuki's main function as president, the defense continued, "was to safeguard civilian requirements by suppressing the exorbitant and insistent demands by the armed forces. Immediately after the assumption of his post, therefore, he set up a section in the Board to investigate by scientific methods the quantities of materials absolutely required for the nation's livelihood. Backed by accurate figures he vigorously resisted the demands made by the armed forces in favor of those for general civilian requirements. He succeeded in persuading the Army and Navy to concede a substantial reduction of 40 to 50 per centum of their original demands. How can such behavior as the president of the Planning Board be interpreted as having been actively engaged in the formulation of plans of aggressive war?"

On joining Tojo's cabinet, Suzuki received this injunction from the Prime Minister:

"It is my desire that you concentrate your energy on the work of economic mobilization (i.e., the work of the Planning Board) and not meddle in political affairs. You should especially keep in mind that the president of the Planning Board is to function under the control of the Prime Minister."

Suzuki testified that he followed this injunction.

Not being an expert on foreign diplomacy and not having access to copies of important cables, Suzuki had to rely on the judgment of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in regard to the American-Japanese relations, the defense pointed out.

In giving his assent to the decision on 1 December 1941 to commence hostilities, Suzuki honestly and reasonably believed that the opening of hostilities was inevitable for the defense of the country, and all of his actions after 1 December 1941 must also be interpreted on the same hypothesis, the defense asserted.

Sadao Araki

21. The summation for former General Araki was presented 26-31 March. Araki was Minister of War from December 1931 until July 1934 and Education Minister from May 1938 until August 1939.

Replying to the prosecution's allegation of conspiracy, the defense declared that Araki "never participated with any person, including any of the accused, in a conspiracy for wars of aggression. The purpose of Araki's actions were to stop wars and establish a way for peace and humanity, and therefore he naturally never propagated, educated for, nor incited aggressive war." Araki was characterized as an active exponent of Kodo (The Way of the Emperor) which, the defense stated, is founded on benevolence and the inherent freedom of men--a philosophy diametrically opposed to ideas of aggression.

After Araki accepted the post of Minister of War, he took steps "to maintain peace and order and to stop the fighting in Manchuria, disregarding the strong arguments of the political and military circles, but carrying on according to his own ideas; and after a year and a half was able to attain his purpose," the defense asserted.

The Lytton Report was quoted to show the origin of the Manchukuan independence movement:

"At the time when the Inukai cabinet was formed, i.e., when Araki took the office of War Minister, this movement for independence seemed to have already been progressing to a considerable extent among the influential Chinese, but the Inukai cabinet naturally adopted the same policy in this problem as the preceding cabinet and it never became an important question before the cabinet meeting immediately following its formation. It was in the early part of January 1932 that Araki came to know of this matter definitely from Colonel Itagaki who came up to the capital in order to make a direct report to the War Minister. Therefore, it is clear that Araki had no knowledge of this matter prior to that period and consequently entertained no interest which would enable him to form an opinion for or against the matter. He was devoting himself entirely to the means by which to restore peace and order and to bring the hostilities to an end."

Concerning Japan's obligations under the Nine-power Pact, Privy Councillor Ishii, an authority on Japan's foreign diplomacy, stated in a current Privy Council Meeting, the defense asserted, that, ". . . The independence of Manchukuo was due to the disintegration of China and the territorial integrity of the Republic of China was broken by none other than Manchukuo. This will nullify the argument that Japan violated the Nine-power Pact."

After becoming Minister of Education, Araki continued his teachings, the defense stated, "to practice the imperial virtue of benevolence."

The prosecution had charged that Araki brought educational institutions under the influence of militarism. Replying to this, the defense relied on the testimony of Tokiomi Kaigo, professor of history of Japanese education, to show that military

education at Japanese educational institutions is of long standing. Kaigo testified that military education has been taught continuously since 1934; that officers on active duty were first attached to schools and colleges prior to 1925.

Kaigo testified further that indoor drill with rifle was instituted in November 1939, when Araki was no longer Education Minister.

Araki's order that attendance at Young Men's schools be made compulsory had been decided upon by educational advisory organs long before, the defense claimed. Araki's confirmation and effectuation of the recommendation was routine, the defense added.

Concerning the first Shanghai Incident in March 1932, it was at first wholly a Navy affair, but as it developed the Cabinet decided to dispatch troops. In all, about 10,000 were sent to Shanghai. Araki directed that the Japanese Army accomplish its object of reinforcing its forces in Shanghai with minimum casualties to be inflicted upon the Chinese. After a brief fighting engagement, hostilities ceased. Toward the end of March a division and a half were recalled to Japan. The truce agreement was formally concluded on 5 May 1932.

#### Okinori Kaya

22. The defendant Kaya was Finance Minister in the first Konoye and Tojo cabinets. His summation was heard on 29 and 30 March.

The defense presented Kaya's summation in four periods:

- (1) Pre-cabinet career in the Finance Ministry until 4 June 1937.
- (2) Finance Minister, first Konoye cabinet, 4 June 1937 to 26 May 1938.
- (3) President of North China Development Company, ending 17 October 1941.
- (4) Finance Minister, Tojo cabinet, ending 19 February 1944.

During the first period Kaya was a subordinate official of the Finance Ministry and was not in a position to decide on the budgets. During this time, 1931 to 1936, the Army increased tremendously in power and used its power in demanding an increase in military budgets. Even under such a difficult situation, the defense stated, Kaya aided the two Ministers Takahashi and Fujii in preventing the budgets from becoming larger. The military men believed that it was Kaya who was instrumental in enforcing the anti-military policy of Finance Minister Takahashi, which became one of the causes of the February 26 Incident in which Takahashi was assassinated.

A month after Kaya became Finance Minister the China Incident broke out. "The Incident," the defense pointed out, "made increase in military expenditures inevitable. Kaya endeavored to keep the increase as low as possible and the consensus of the knowing Japanese at that time was that no one could have done better than Kaya. The best proof of this is that the military was dissatisfied with Kaya and forced his resignation.

"When he was president of the North China Development Company he performed his functions within the confines of his duty as an administrator," the defense continued. The North China

Development Company, as admitted by the prosecution, was not to engage directly, and did not, in business enterprises. As president of the North China Development Company, he was under the direct control and supervision of the China Affairs Board. He had nothing to do with the armies in North China and Manchuria and the evidence is uncontradicted that the North China Development Company did not furnish these armies with financial or other assistance.

During his period in the Tojo cabinet, Kaya accepted and believed the explanations of Togo and Tojo on the Japanese-American situation, including their statement that the Hull note was a virtual ultimatum, the defense asserted. Kaya admittedly attended certain liaison and imperial conferences but he was never a party to the deliberations on the warlike operations, nor was he informed of them beforehand as to when, where and how operations would take place.

Kaya testified that he did not resign, although he was against the war, because he felt it his duty to carry out his responsibility.

#### Mamoru Shigemitsu

23. Summation for the accused Shigemitsu was presented 1 April. He was Foreign Minister under Tojo, April 1943 to July 1944, and Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister for Greater East Asia under Koiso, July 1944 to April 1945.

Prior to his entry into the Tojo cabinet, Shigemitsu was on diplomatic assignments in Shanghai, China, Russia, Great Britain and Nanking, China.

From Shanghai he wrote Baron Shidehara after the Mukden Incident:

"In this situation it is most earnestly desired that arbitrary action of the military should be interdicted so as to make the word of the State emanate solely through the channel of the Government, that irresponsible and disadvantageous propaganda of the military circles should be stopped, and that, making its stand clear, the Government should re-establish political leadership. . ."

At the time of the first Shanghai Incident, Shigemitsu, the defense stated, "during the course of the fighting, persuaded the officers in command of the Japanese forces to limit the fighting to Shanghai and the adjacent area and not to advance farther into China, and in fact, the Japanese forces did not advance further than the environs of Shanghai. By March 15 Japanese forces had started to withdraw, and by March 20 were not far above the number normally stationed in Shanghai. On March 24 Sino-Japanese conferences on the cessation of hostilities began and the Truce Agreement was signed on May 5, 1932.

The defense quoted from testimony of Lord Killearn and Nelson T. Johnson, respectively British and American diplomatic representatives in Shanghai at the time, to credit Shigemitsu for his efforts in terminating the Incident.

In Russia Shigemitsu brought the Changkufeng Border Incident between Japanese and Russian troops to a close by his negotiations with Litvinov. The defense contended that there was no evidence against the defendant on the counts involving Russia.

Concerning Shigemitsu's responsibility with respect to atrocities while he was Tojo's Foreign Minister, the defense stated:

"In order to have an assigned duty with respect to atrocities committed during operations or for neglect or maltreatment of prisoners of war, it must be proved that this defendant had the legal duty and the power of command by which he could command or forbid and it is submitted that he had none."

The Foreign Office at that time received protests from foreign nations and forwarded answers. At this point the defense explained that "it was the authority and duty of the Minister of War, not the Foreign Minister, to investigate the facts alleged in the protests and to communicate the information on which answers to the protecting powers were based."

The prosecution charged, but did not support with evidence, that, "Shigemitsu did not permit visits by the representatives of protecting powers to POW camps," the defense asserted. Only the War Minister could authorize these visits, the defense added.

However, as a result of the efforts of the Foreign Office, permission to visit such camps on a reciprocity basis was at last granted in December 1944, the defense asserted.

From the time Shigemitsu became Foreign Minister under Koiso, one of his chief objectives was to terminate the war, the defense declared. "Kido testified that from the time of his appointment until the day of the surrender, he worked with Shigemitsu for the termination of the war. The first conference recorded in his diary was on 13 May 1943, within a month of Shigemitsu's appointment. Again in January 1944, Shigemitsu stated to Kido that he believed that unconditional surrender was unavoidable. Kido's diary shows that they conferred again on 26 June 1944, and he testified that they worked out a plan under which Kido would assume responsibility for the Imperial Court and Shigemitsu for the Government. They conferred again on 6 and 15 July and throughout the summer and fall of 1944. Another conference is recorded on 8 March 1945."

On 9 August 1945, after the Koiso cabinet had resigned, Shigemitsu called on the Lord Keeper to urge that the Potsdam Declaration be accepted without any conditions, the defense declared.

On 2 September 1945 Shigemitsu signed the surrender on board the U. S. S. Missouri in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government.

#### Toshio Shiratori

24. The summation for Shiratori, Ambassador to Italy in 1939 and Minister to Scandinavian countries 1933-1936, was heard 31 March and 1 April.

Shiratori was indicted, the defense began, only on the conspiratorial counts--the counts common to all the accused. The prosecution contended in its summation that the evidence adduced "leads to the inescapable conclusion that Shiratori joined the conspiracy at an early date as a propagandist and apologist for the establishment of a new world order by means of force and aggression, and that not only did he continue his attempt to influence public opinion throughout the life of the conspiracy but he worked actively both in and out of public office to influence successive governments to take the steps necessary to effectuate the aims of the conspiracy."

The defense declared that the prosecution's summation on Shiratori, as perusal will show, mostly comprised "argument, presumption, assumptions and conclusions without satisfactory evidence to substantiate any such contentions."

Shiratori never held but one position that could be called that of a propagandist. This was chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry--a position he held as a bureau chief, subject to the orders and directions of the Foreign Minister, who was Baron Shidehara.

While testifying as a prosecution witness "Baron Shidehara stated that Shiratori conducted the affairs of his bureau in line and in accord with all directives from him, and cooperated in every respect toward a peaceful solution of the Manchurian Incident."

After being relieved of this information position in 1933 he at no time occupied any other information-disseminating position, the defense asserted.

In writing and lecturing as a private citizen, Shiratori "did what every free individual under democratic laws has a right to do, that is, express his own mind," the defense stated.

The Nuremberg trial case of Hans Fritzsche, a radio propagandist under Goebbels, was pictured by the defense as a case somewhat parallel to Shiratori's. Fritzsche rose under Goebbels to a position where he had the entire German radio system at his command. He broadcast or caused to be broadcast various false information and anti-Semitic propaganda to incite the German people against the Jews and performed various other propaganda activities.

The statements and articles of Shiratori were so inferior to this man's that they are hardly worthy of mention, the defense continued. There were only 14 articles in evidence, all of which were published in monthly magazines of small circulation. His lectures, witness Mishima stated, were attended by audiences ranging from about 10 people at some, to 700 or 800 at others.

"Not by the wildest stretch of the imagination, in the use of which the prosecution appears to be very adept, could Shiratori be classified with Fritzsche. Yet it was determined that Fritzsche was not guilty," the defense observed.

The defense also recalled the Fritz von Papen case at Nuremberg--a case in which it was shown that von Papen carried on "manipulations of devious and underhanded character in Austria and Turkey on behalf of the Nazi Party while he served as German Ambassador in both countries. Also the trial showed how he tried to undermine the Schuschnigg government and how he advised Hitler what action to take in bringing about anschluss in Austria. Also, he arranged a meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938, and at its conclusion advised Schuschnigg to comply with Hitler's demands which amounted to surrendering Austria to Nazi Germany. However, in its conclusion, the Nuremberg Tribunal found von Papen not guilty.

"Nor could Shiratori's activities be classified as even remotely comparable to those of von Papen, and if the decision at Nuremberg is in any manner a criterion on international law governing the issues here involved, Shiratori is certainly not guilty of the charges relating to propaganda."

The only ambassadorial post Shiratori ever held was the ambassadorship to Rome--the tenure was a few days over eight months. Shiratori had no part whatsoever in the negotiations or conclusion of the Tripartite Pact of 1940, as shown by both prosecution and defense witnesses, the defense stated.

It was conclusively shown, the defense concluded, that Shiratori did not or could not have had any part whatsoever in the planning or waging of the Pacific war.



Koichi Kido

25. The summation for Kido was heard 2 and 5 April. The accused served as Education Minister and Welfare Minister under Konoye in 1937 and 1938 respectively, as Home Minister under Hiranuma in 1939, and as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal from 1940 to 1945.

The defense presented this summation in three principal parts: (1) Crimes Against Peace; (2) Conventional War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and (3) Mitigation. Nearly all of the summation was devoted to a defense against alleged crimes against peace.

In order to show instances in which Kido opposed aggression, the defense submitted the following entries from Kido's diary:

22 September 1931 - "The determination of the military circles towards Manchuria is so strong that it is feared that orders given by the central authorities may not be thoroughly understood."

13 November 1931 - "Agreement in opinion has been reached regarding the fact that a deep concern rather than grief is being caused over the present state of the country having no national measures relating to the so-called 'Northward Advance Continental Policy' held forth by the military, by which the country is being vainly dragged along."

4 February 1932 - "Harada said that when he saw Finance Minister Takahasni, the Minister was deeply anxious about the positive actions of the Army, saying that if things went on as they were, Japan would lose the confidence of the powers and reported the purport to the Lord Keeper."

16 February 1932 - "At 4 p.m. had an interview with Dr. Tachi at Harada's and heard his opinion about the relations between the new state in Manchuria and Mongolia and the Nine-power Treaty. His opinion is that from the standpoint of international common law the open intervention on the part of our countrymen could not but be regarded as violation of Article I of the treaty."

31 July 1941 - "There are several means to be tried regarding the relationship between America and Japan. We must deliberate patiently on the matter in a constructive manner. I would urge the premier's careful consideration on this point."

6 September 1941 - ". . . The Emperor should give a warning in conclusion that the Supreme War Command should exert every effort in order to bring about a diplomatic success inasmuch as the present decision was such an important one that it might lead to a war in which our national fortunes would be staked."

26 November 1941 - "Once the final decision is made this time it would truly be the last and irretrievably final one. Thus if there should be any doubt or any better idea to surmount the difficulties in Your Majesty's mind, I pray that Your Majesty be pleased to elucidate the same without the least reserve and take appropriate steps which Your Majesty might not repent of afterwards."

From 1930 to 13 June 1936 Kido, as Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, gathered information for the Lord Keeper, so that he could be well informed if the Emperor asked for advice, the defense asserted. Kido was not permitted to hold audiences with the Emperor. His diary during this period records innumerable instances of his opposition to the military plotting and injecting itself into and gaining control of the Government, and his firm conviction that the various branches of the Government should be

conducted in a constitutional manner. Substantiating diary entries were cited.

There was no competent evidence, the defense stated, to show that Kido, as Minister of Education in 1937-1938, used his position to further militarism or aggression.

From 26 May 1938 to 5 January 1939 Kido was Minister of Welfare. The appointment of Lieutenant General Itagaki as War Minister was intended for the settlement of the China Affair, while the selection of Ugaki as Minister of Foreign Affairs was aimed at facilitating a rapprochement with Chiang Kai-shek, the defense continued.

On 18 June 1938, according to testimony of the defendant Itagaki, Kido expressed his personal opinion to him that the China Incident must be speedily settled.

Kido's tenure as Home Minister lasted about eight months, 5 January to 28 August 1939. During that period he was mainly concerned with averting trouble arising from an impasse reached by the Army and Navy over the projected alliance with Germany.

On 1 June 1940 Kido became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.

The prosecution had charged that the Senior Statesmen's meeting of 17 October 1941, in which Tojo was selected as prime minister designate, was one of the two Kido attended at which a decision was made preparing for and leading to the Pacific war. The defense challenged this charge, replying that there was no statement made by Kido at the Conference to support the claim. Kido's support of Tojo for the position was based on the belief that he, as against Prince Higashi-kuni and Admiral Oikawa, would be able to restrain the militarists.

On 19 November 1941 Kido counseled the Emperor to strongly deprecate entering into a state of war at the end of the month.

The second alleged war-planning conference Kido attended, as charged by the prosecution, was the one of 29 November 1941, a meeting of ex-premiers. However, the defense states that no decision was made at this meeting.

"The prosecution criticizes Kido for offering no further advice to avert war after the Imperial Conference of December 1. This is not understandable. The evidence shows that he did his utmost to avert it before the final decision was made and when it was finally made by the Government and High Command on December 1, 1941, he was powerless. It must be remembered that Kido was not an adviser to the Throne on these matters," the defense stated.

On 14 August 1945, the defense concluded, Kido urged the Emperor to command the Government without further loss of time to go through the formalities for terminating the war. As the High Command did not approve of the convocation of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, Kido and Prime Minister Suzuki advised the Emperor to invoke an Imperial Conference, which was done, and at 11 a.m. on 14 August 1945 it was finally decided to terminate the war.

#### Hiroshi Oshima

26. The summation of Oshima, Ambassador to Berlin 1938-1939 and 1941-1945, was presented on 7 and 8 April.

The prosecution's contention that Oshima participated in

a conspiracy for the planning or preparation of aggressive wars between 1 January 1928 and 2 September 1945 is not sustained by the facts, the defense declared.

Charges against Oshima for having initiated the Pacific war cannot be upheld, the defense stated, inasmuch as the outbreak of this war was a complete surprise to Oshima. He was not informed of the Japanese situation during the period. Also, as an ambassador Oshima was not in a position to determine or to participate in the determining of such an important national policy as the initiation of war.

The charges for having waged an aggressive war against China should be rejected, the defense claimed, because no evidence exists to show that he participated in the decision of the Japanese Government when these matters were considered. "Once war broke out and was continuing, it was the duty for Oshima as Military Attache, as Ambassador, or as a Japanese subject, to do his best to comply with the national policy adopted by his government."

Answering the prosecution's charges of those counts alleging that Oshima, together with other defendants, between 1 June and 8 December 1941 participated in the common plan or conspiracy for executing murder, by initiating unlawful hostilities against the United States of America, Great Britain and other countries, the defense stated:

"We cannot agree with the prosecution's contention that the killing as a result of war constitutes the crime of murder. Even assuming that such a contention could be sustained, it must be established that the accused recognized the war as unlawful, in order to sustain the charge of murder against him. No fact exists that Oshima tried to influence, or in fact influenced, the commencement of hostilities with the intention to start the Pacific war. Oshima never recommended to anybody to commence hostilities without proper warning, nor did he anticipate such a matter."

Although charged with having connection with atrocity crimes, the defense pointed out that Oshima was, during this period, Ambassador to Germany. No evidence was produced to show that the position of the Ambassador in Germany had anything to do with it. In fact, Oshima had no authority to be concerned with the matter.

The defense answered the prosecution's contention that "Oshima played an important part in effectuating the common plan of conspiracy by negotiating the various treaties" by stating that the negotiation of treaties and conventions was and is a primary function of an ambassador.

The defense concluded its summation by making a plea for applying the principle of diplomatic immunity for Oshima.

#### Iwane Matsui

27. The summation for former General Matsui was heard on 8 and 9 April.

The defendant Matsui continuously held posts of importance, one after the other, in the central (military) circles of Japan, but on no occasion did he occupy a post of responsibility for the decision on planning and waging of war as set forth in the conspiratorial counts, the defense declared.

In 1935 he was relieved from active service and then called back in 1937 and was in active service for about six months, until February 1938, the defense asserted.

"The defendant Matsui is also charged with murder. Though he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the Japanese Forces in Central China in the period between August 1937 and February 1938, he never made during that period any common plan or conspiracy with anybody regarding the murdering of prisoners of war and enemy persons. Nor did he order or permit its being done by Japanese troops. He knew nothing of the events which occurred at other times.

"Matsui is charged with Conventional War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. But as for the treatment of war prisoners and civilian internees, he was never in any post vested with any authority over them."

Concerning the alleged atrocities at Nanking, the defense stated that "no evidence has been adduced showing that he either directed, countenanced, knew of, or afterward approved or acquiesced in anything untoward which occurred there. He has in respect to the alleged atrocities at Nanking an alibi. He was not at the scene where the crimes are alleged to have been committed. He obviously could not have and did not see them. His non-presence at Nanking, the evidence shows, was due to illness with which he was confined at Soochow, 140 miles away from Nanking."

Hideki Tojo

28. In summarizing its summation for former Prime Minister Tojo, which was heard on 9 and 12 April, the defense submitted two points to the Tribunal for special consideration:

- (1) "Since each nation is the sole judge of what constitutes its own right of self-defense, any judgment by anyone other than the nation exercising such right would amount to an ex-post-facto law."
- (2) "The idea of a Greater East Asia was not of a criminal nature.

"The other party to a war in self-defense," the defense set forth, "is usually a state that fought the war denying the right of self-defense to its opponent. It is quite clear that no fair judgment could be expected from such a state or from those acting on its behalf."

The defense recalled that the author of the Kellogg-Briand Pact stated that each nation had the exclusive right to adjudge what constituted its own right of self-defense. When this question was renewed in the American-Japanese negotiations, the Secretary of State also supported the above view. The negotiations failed and a war broke out on account of the necessity for Japan to assert her privilege of self-defense.

"The accused Tojo," the defense stated, "will not, of course, evade his responsibility as the Premier of the Japanese Empire for the decision for the opening of the Pacific war. It was, however, because he really believed that war was inevitable for the self-defense and self-preservation of his fatherland that he, together with other leaders, voted for war."

"The defense posed the question, "What would have occurred had Japan yielded to the American Note of 26 November," and answered it:

"Japan would have tumbled from the position she had held for years among the powers of the world; the trade network which she had worked out since the Meiji Era would have been utterly

broken down; the daily life of her people would have undergone extreme hardships; a greater part of her territories would have been torn away from her; and the confidence which her allies had placed in her would be dissipated. In view of all this, the Japanese leaders were honestly and firmly convinced that they were acting in legitimate self-defense."

Then when, as the defense claimed, Japan resorted to an overt act, the United States took up arms and, repeatedly accusing Japan of unlawfulness, fought through and through until at last, by means of indiscriminate bombardment and the atomic bomb, she succeeded in defeating Japan. Then she made Japan sign an instrument of surrender, declaring that the Allied Powers did not intend to enslave the Japanese and that stern justice should be meted out to all war criminals.

"Now to reverse the interpretation of international law accepted at the time the war began and to contend that the self-defense issue be adjudged by a group of persons nominated by the Powers which were attacked by Japan in self-defense would be to deprive these accused of their inalienable rights inherent in every free citizen and to put them in a state of slavery in pronounced violation of the Potsdam Declaration enunciating that the Japanese should not be enslaved," the defense argued.

Concerning the idea of Greater East Asia, "Tojo and other leaders of Japan at that time believed that it would be in conformity with the will of God, that countries geographically, racially and historically bound together by common ties should assist each other and incorporate themselves into a common sphere of peace and happiness and that the spheres thus formed cooperate in turn with each other for the maintenance of durable world peace."

Based on that hypothesis, the defense asked, "What, then, is the crime?"

"Nothing would be more absurd than to contend that the efforts which Japan made to emancipate the oppressed nations in East Asia, to ensure fraternity among the nations in their region by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence, to cultivate cordial friendship with the World Powers, to abolish discriminations and to open resources throughout the world constituted a crime," the defense declared.

#### Shigenori Togo

29. The summation for former Foreign Minister Togo was presented 13-15 April.

"There is no evidence," the defense stated, "of Togo having participated in any conspiracy prior to October 1941. The evidence fails to show any act of the defendant's from 1928 to 1941 constituting a crime under the Charter or demonstrating aggressive or criminal intent."

The defense then traced the defendant's diplomatic career from 1928 to 1941. During his ambassadorship in Germany, 1937-1938, he was, the defense stated, "uncooperative with the German Government's efforts to obtain special rights in China, was openly anti-Nazi in sentiment, and was strongly opposed to the proposal for a three-power alliance of Germany, Japan and Italy concerning which negotiations were then under way. Although the negotiations were not being conducted by him, he expressed his opposition to the proposed alliance, and when matters reached the stage where he was to be charged with carrying on the negotiations he was so obstinate in objecting that he was removed from his post and transferred to Moscow.

From October 1938 to October 1940 the defendant was Ambassador to the U. S. S. R."

During these two ambassadorships there has been shown nothing in the conduct of the defendant which constitutes a crime cognizable under the Charter, the defense declared.

In assuming his position in the Tojo cabinet, "there is no evidence," the defense continued, "that he undertook this post with intention to commit aggression, or that he joined a conspiracy, if one existed, at that time. He accepted the portfolio of foreign affairs upon the express understanding that the new cabinet would re-examine the national policy completely with a view to successfully concluding the Japanese-American negotiations then in progress. Throughout October he waged a singlehanded fight against the militarists in the Liaison Conference to obtain consent that the negotiations be continued, and especially to win agreement to the relaxation of the Japanese terms in the negotiations. There is no evidence that anyone supported him in this struggle; as the price of gaining his point, the defendant had to agree to the Liaison Conference decision that if negotiations failed a decision for war would be made. The new proposals were presented to the United States, who however regarded them as valueless, and the negotiations failed with the presentation on 26 November of the Hull note. The defendant honestly and reasonably believed that the Hull note forced upon Japan a war in self-defense, which he therefore agreed to on 1 December."

The defense concluded: "After the decision for war the defendant had to fight again, singlehanded, against the demand of the Navy that the negotiations be left unterminated in order that the war might commence with an effective surprise attack; he succeeded in securing consent to the giving of notice to the United States breaking off the negotiations. The time for delivery of the notice was set by the Navy High Command, and approved by the defendant upon the assurance that it would leave a sufficient time before commencement of hostilities. The notice was drafted by Foreign, War and Navy Ministry officials jointly, the contents being those dictated by the Liaison Conference discussions and decisions. The notice was distributed at the Liaison Conference and was unanimously approved, as it was upon being reported to the Cabinet. It was delivered to the United States Government later than the time arranged, the fault for the delay being in the Embassy in Washington. There is no evidence of malice or negligence of the defendant in connection with the delay. Hostilities commenced earlier than the hour at which delivery of the notice was scheduled, but the defendant was unable to obtain knowledge of the time set for hostilities, which was an operational secret of the High Command, and cannot incur any liability in connection with it.

"There is no evidence to show that the defendant agreed to initiation of the war against the United States and Great Britain with the intent of committing aggression. There is no evidence of participation by him in any scheme to use negotiations as a cloak for the making of military preparations. For the evidence shows that he expected, reasonably, that the negotiations would be terminated before the war would be opened by a proper notification, tantamount to a declaration of war, delivered in good season."

Yoshihiro Umezu

30. The summation for former General Umezu was heard on 15 and 16 April.

"General Umezu is charged in the counts relating to the planning, preparation and initiation of the Pacific war," but, the

defense stated, "there is of course no evidence to connect him with those charges."

Concerning Umezu's five years as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, 1939 to 1944, the defense set forth that "Umezu did not create Manchukuo, nor create any policy in connection with it. If the Manchukuo venture was aggression he is submitted to bear no part of responsibility for it."

On 18 July 1944 General Umezu was appointed Chief of the General Staff. His Vice-chief of Staff Ikeda, who had chanced to be with him at the time he received notification, testified that Umezu said:

"Since from the very beginning I have opposed the war against the United States, I hate to accept this appointment."

On that occasion he asked Ikeda "whether it was not possible to refuse, pointing out that there was no longer anything that a Chief of the General Staff could do to save the situation." Realizing, however, that military assignment could not be declined the defense stated he took over the post. At the same time he mentioned that the war must be ended as soon as possible, diplomatic or other necessary measures being taken to that end.

There are three points during his tenure to be considered, the defense stated: "These are the question of responsibility for the Pacific war, which he undoubtedly waged for the 13 months of it which remained; that of responsibility for maltreatment of prisoners of war; and that of the ending of the war."

Concerning the first point, the defense referred to the prosecution's own admission in its general summation of the nonresponsibility of one who merely carries out policy already adopted. "General Umezu having had nothing to do with creation or adoption of the policy which brought about the Pacific war, but having merely been called in when conditions had become desperate, on the usual assumption that he, if anyone, could solve the grave problems of management and enforcement of control involved, he merely carried out a soldier's duty, to fight," the defense claimed.

The defense placed the responsibility for prisoners of war upon the Minister of War, citing Hague Convention IV, ratified by Japan. "Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them."

Additionally it was mentioned that Umezu first had knowledge of the facts of illegal punishment of Allied airmen in Japan only after the end of the war.

"General Umezu was one of those taking the initiative in bringing about the meetings of the six principal members, of whom he was one, of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, with the object of promoting official endeavors for peace in the only quarter where it was possible to discuss the question," the defense stated. "Even when the Potsdam Declaration had at last been accepted, General Umezu had yet to act to bring about peace, for there was in the Army a faction of bitter-enders who proposed carrying out a coup d'etat to permit of continuing the war. Condemning such an attitude, General Umezu secured the commitment of all the senior commanders of the Army to an agreement that 'the Imperial Army will conduct itself to the last according to the decision of the Emperor.' That was on 14 August. In accordance with the decision of the Emperor, General Umezu at 10 a.m. on 2 September 1945 on the battleship Missouri appended his signature to the document which brought to an end that World War II which he had no part in the making of."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SUMMATION  
of  
NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
in  
JAPAN

Number 31

April 1948

PART III  
ECONOMIC

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SECTION 1  
AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

C O N T E N T S

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AGRARIAN REFORM

Land Sales

1. Land sales to tenant farmers totaled 146,558 cho (145,347 hectares) in March, an 84,701-cho increase over February, bringing the cumulative sales under the agrarian reform program on 31 March to 427,320 cho (423,790 hectares).

Tax Lands

2. Lands received by the Government in lieu of taxes were revised to 283,993 cho (281,646 hectares) as of 29 February, an increase of 2,800 cho over the preliminary January report.

Government Land Purchases

3. The Government purchased 257,679 cho (255,550 hectares) of reclaimable land on 2 March, bringing the total to 571,934 cho (567,210 hectares) of reclaimable land available for resale to tenant farmers under the agrarian reform program.

Information Media

4. Eighteen radio programs of 5 to 30 minutes duration were broadcast in April instructing farmers on the organization of agricultural cooperatives.

Agricultural Cooperatives

5. All 12,051 agricultural cooperative associations completed preliminary organization meetings by 15 March. Of this number, 8,292 held constituent general meetings and 892 completed the transition from associations to cooperatives and were approved by prefectural governors.

Land Reclamation

6. From 1 November 1945 to 29 February 1948 an average of 10,519 hectares of land were reclaimed per month.

LAND RECLAMATION PROGRESS  
1 November 1945 - 29 February 1948  
(hectares)

	<u>Paddyland</u>	<u>Upland</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 November 1945 - 31 March 1946	3,573.4	64,995.2	68,568.6
1 April 1946 - 31 March 1947	10,482.0	142,245.7	152,727.7
1 April 1947 - 29 February 1948	<u>3,065.4</u>	<u>70,161.0</u>	<u>73,226.4</u>
Total	17,120.8	277,401.9	294,522.7

7. During the same period 499,725 families received acreage made available by land reclamation projects. These were chiefly farmers who received additional acreage but also included 140,564 new settlers.

FARMERS SETTLING ON RECLAIMED LAND  
1 November 1945 - 29 February 1948  
(households)

	<u>New Settlers</u>	<u>Farmers Adding to Cultivated Area</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 November 1945 - 31 March 1946	42,415	138,830	181,245
1 April 1946 - 31 March 1947	65,434	167,737	233,171
1 April 1947 - 29 February 1948	<u>32,715</u>	<u>52,594</u>	<u>85,309</u>
Total	140,564	359,161	499,725

DAIRY PRODUCTS

8. Milk production during January declined to 10,714,000 liters, 607,000 liters under the December output.

INSECT CONTROL

9. A census of insect control devices listed 4,989 insecticide and fungicide power sprayers in working condition and approximately 55,000 fluorescent light traps, for rice stem borer control, available for use in 1948.

10. Spray machines, run by two- or three-horsepower gasoline engines, were chiefly used in orchard areas but were converted to field crop use with the emphasis on staple-food production.

11. The high cost of DDT emulsion favored light trapping rather than use of insecticides. Cost of an installed light trap averages about ¥ 5,500 with a bulb that lasts two years and simultaneously services about five hectares, while DDT costs average ¥ 580 for the one kilogram of 20 percent emulsion required to spray one hectare of land. From four to six applications are required per hectare to combat the rice stem borer.

FISHERIES

Marine Production

12. February marine production totaled 110,464 metric tons, 3,656 over the January catch. See the chart on the following page. Increases in five of 12 selected species reported both months brought fish landings to 90,920 metric tons in February, 9,049 over the previous month. Other marine products including shellfish, sea animals and seaweed totaled 19,544 metric tons, 5,393 under January.


Fishing Fleet

13. On 31 December 848 powered steel vessels totaling 173,770.80 gross tons and 19,133 wooden vessels totaling 332,569.02 gross tons were registered with the Bureau of Fisheries.

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES



14. Manufacturers of fish nets and twine received 5,700,000 pounds of cotton in April, purchased with GARIOA funds.

15. Five of six petroleum products allocated to the fishing industry declined in April with kerosene showing the only gain.



# FISHERIES PRODUCTION


REPORTED PRODUCTION OF JAPAN-BASED FISHERIES



## FEBRUARY 1948 · BY SPECIES\*

SPECIES	THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS
HERRING	1
ATKA MACKEREL	1
SARDINE	1
BONITO	1
TUNA	223
MACKEREL	3
HORSE MACKEREL	3
FLOUNDER	223
SEA BREAM	223
COD AND POLLACK	223
YELLOWTAIL	223
SHARKS	223
OTHER FISH	223
SHELLFISH	223
CRUSTACEANS	223
CUTTLEFISH/OCTOPUS	223
SEA CUCUMBER	223
WHALES	223
SEAWEED	223

## FEBRUARY 1948 · BY DISTRICTS\*



\* THE ABOVE DATA INCLUDE ONLY OFFICIAL REPORTS OF FISH LANDINGS. DUE TO THE INCOMPLETE COVERAGE OF THE FISH REPORTING SYSTEM THE REPORTED LANDINGS SHOWN ABOVE ARE ESTIMATED TO BE 80 PERCENT TO 70 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL FISH PRODUCTION.

NOTE: NA = DATA NOT AVAILABLE.

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, BUREAU OF FISHERIES.

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ALLOCATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS  
(kiloliters)

	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
Fuel oil	28,818	24,500
Gas oil	4,322	3,867
Lubricating oil	2,200	2,000
Kerosene	715	786
Gasoline	158	118
Grease (metric tons)	16	15

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Bureau of Fisheries.

WHALING

Antarctic Whaling

16. The two fleets of the 1947-48 antarctic whaling expedition, which returned to home ports in Osaka and Yokohama during April, reported a total catch of 713 blue, 608 fin and two sperm whales, not counted in international units, during operation from 8 December to 10 March. Three of the blue whales were lost. Production included 17,544.6 long tons of whale oil, 5.4 of sperm oil and 4.5 of spermaceti.

Bonin Islands Whaling

17. Two whaling fleets operating in the Bonin Islands area from 14 March to 10 April took 30 sei, 25 sperm and three fin whales with a total of 899.88 metric tons of whale products.

Intercoastal Whaling

18. Intercoastal whalers between 1 and 27 March took four fin whales with a total yield of 68.74 metric tons of products. The catch dropped 19 whales under February due to seasonal factors.

Whale Oil Export

19. Two shipments of 986 and 910 metric tons of whale oil left Japan on 12 and 25 March enroute to Bremen, Germany, for distribution in the British- and American-occupied zones. The shipments were part of the scheduled export of 7,163 metric tons of whale oil taken in the 1946-47 antarctic expedition. Approximately 2,041 metric tons are awaiting shipment.



SECTION 2  
FORESTRY AND MINING

C O N T E N T S

	Paragraph
Forestry . . . . .	1
Reforestation . . . . .	3
Mining . . . . .	8


FORESTRY

Log Production

1. March log production totaled 88,984,500 cubic feet, an increase of 17,850,800 cubic feet over the February output. See the chart on the next page. March stockpiles gained 6,925,100 cubic feet over February to a total of 245,047,100 cubic feet.

Firewood, Charcoal and Gasumaki

2. February firewood production increased to 977,054 cubic meters stacked volume, 136,078 over January, and deliveries gained 77,741 cubic meters to a total of 535,605. Charcoal output in February of 186,747 metric tons was 15,750 over January and deliveries of 160,973 metric tons showed an increase of 20,118 over the preceding month. Production of gasumaki (wood blocks used as auto fuel) dropped 7,643 metric tons to 26,071 and deliveries fell from 25,428 in January to 24,713.




REFORESTATION

3. Approximately 2,865,884 cho (2,842,957 hectares) of forest land were in need of reforestation 1 April, 442,075 cho more than a year ago. The seed supply available for the project totaled 169,003 kilograms, more than 22,000 short of the demand. The reforestation program was aided during the first nine months of the 1947 fiscal




# LOG PRODUCTION\*



# FOREST INDUSTRY INDEXES

1930-1934 AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION = 100



AVERAGE MONTHLY	UNIT	1930-34	1935-39	1940-44	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
LOG PRODUCTION	1,000 CUBIC FEET	40,075	62,176	79,474	53,155	58,631	62,743		
PULPWOOD UTILIZATION	1,000 CUBIC FEET	3,381	4,331	6,164	1,987	2,364	3,325		
LUMBER PRODUCTION	1,000 BOARD FEET	233,948	369,678	378,004	193,820	237,320	286,935		
PLYWOOD PRODUCTION	1,000 SQUARE FEET	14,719	52,498	37,631	7,921	14,446	14,425		

\* FISCAL YEARS THROUGHOUT.  
 \*\* EXCLUDES PULPWOOD AND BARKING.  
 NOTE: NA=DATA NOT AVAILABLE.  
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY, JAPAN PULPWOOD ASSOCIATION.  
 GHQ-SCAP JAPAN - APR 48

NUMBER 10

year by 2,198,462 meters of new roads, built through formerly inaccessible forest land. The roads opened an area of 153,961 cho.

4. Complete statistics available for 1 April 1947 show that in addition to forest lands approximately 67,891 cho (67,348 hectares) of sand dune and other nonforest areas required reforestation. Carried forward, this brought the 1948 forest and nonforest lands requiring reforestation to 2,933,775 cho.

5. The 1947 cutting in excess of reforestation prevented progress in the program. During the 1947 fiscal year approximately 430,810 cho were reforested in comparison with the cutting of 866,170 cho.

AREA IN NEED OF REFORESTATION  
1 April 1947  
(cho) a/

Type of Reforestation Required	Type Forest	National b/	Private	Community and Prefectural	Community c/	Shrine and Temple	Total
Artificial planting	Timber	212,714	425,368	174,693	40,544	10,750	864,069
	Fuelwood	53,183	106,342	20,203	2,134	0	181,862
	Bamboo	40	400	0	0	0	440
	Total	265,937	532,110	194,896	42,678	10,750	1,046,371
Artificial seeding	Timber	0	10,960	3,471	0	0	14,431
	Fuelwood	0	2,740	0	0	0	2,740
	Total	0	13,700	3,471	0	0	17,171
Aid to natural reforestation	Timber	271,964	248,567	59,626	0	0	580,157
	Fuelwood	75,989	11,853	0	0	0	87,842
	Total	347,953	260,420	59,626	0	0	667,999
Total artificial	Timber	484,678	684,895	237,790	40,544	10,750	1,458,657
	Fuelwood	129,172	120,935	20,203	2,134	0	272,444
	Bamboo	40	400	0	0	0	440
	Total	613,890	806,230	257,993	42,678	10,750	1,731,541
Natural	Timber	33,280	66,010	21,122	0	880	121,292
	Fuelwood	101,448	178,712	24,650	0	2,054	306,864
	Bamboo	32	8,587	360	0	90	9,049
	Total	134,760	253,289	46,132	0	3,024	437,205
Total	Timber	517,958	750,905	258,912	40,544	11,630	1,579,949
	Fuelwood	230,620	299,647	44,853	2,134	2,054	579,308
	Bamboo	72	8,987	360	0	90	9,489
	Total	748,650	1,059,539	304,125	42,678	13,774	2,168,746 d/

a/ One cho equals 0.992 hectares or 2.451 acres.

b/ Includes former imperial forests.

c/ National Government contracts to reforest community land in return for a share of the yield.

d/ Does not include the following potential and actual protection forest:

Ownership	Damaged Forest Area	Sand Dune Area	Damage Prevention Area	Total
National	22,940	11,140	3,349	37,429
Private and other	232,123	30,950	22,452	285,525
Total	255,063	42,090	25,801	322,954

Total forest area requiring reforestation, 2,423,809; total area requiring reforestation, 2,491,700.

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Bureau of Forestry.

6. The seed supply for national and private forests fell approximately 22,768 kilograms short of the 1948 demand. The 1947 fall collection of 164,261 kilograms of seed was augmented by 4,742 kilograms carried over from previous planting, making a total supply of 169,003 kilograms.

1948 TREE SEED  
(kilograms)

	<u>Supply</u>	<u>Demand</u>
National forests		
Conifers	61,624	74,673
Broadleaves	<u>11,754</u>	<u>11,754</u>
Total	73,378	86,427
Private forests		
Conifers	46,270	44,514
Broadleaves	<u>49,355</u>	<u>60,830</u>
Total	95,625	105,344

SOURCE: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Bureau of Forestry.

7. About 79 percent of the road building plan into inaccessible forests was completed by 31 December 1947.

ROAD BUILDING INTO INACCESSIBLE FORESTS  
1 April - 31 December 1947

<u>Ownership</u>	<u>New Roads to Forest Areas</u> (meters)		<u>Areas Made Accessible</u> (cho)	
	<u>Quarterly</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>	<u>Quarterly</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
1 April - 30 June				
National forests	87,866	87,866	6,276	6,276
Other forests	<u>69,744</u>	<u>69,744</u>	<u>5,300</u>	<u>5,300</u>
Total	157,610	157,610	11,576	11,576
1 July - 30 September				
National forests	308,466	396,332	22,033	28,309
Other forests	<u>796,699</u>	<u>866,443</u>	<u>53,518</u>	<u>58,818</u>
Total	1,105,165	1,262,775	75,551	87,127
1 October - 31 December				
National forests	428,735	825,067	30,624	58,933
Other forests	<u>506,952</u>	<u>1,373,395</u>	<u>36,210</u>	<u>95,028</u>
Total	935,687	2,198,462	66,834	153,961

MINING


	Paragraph
Coal . . . . .	8
Oil . . . . .	17
Mining Industry . . . . .	19

COAL

8. Coal production in the first 20 days of April was 1,606,800 metric tons, 11.1 percent or 200,500 tons under the revised output 1-20 March.

9. Total March coal production increased to 2,862,500 metric

tons, 107,600 over revised February output and 4.2 percent under the quota of 2,987,500.



10. The 29,330,000 metric tons of coal produced during the fiscal year ending 31 March was 30 percent more than that in the previous year and 51.4 percent of the 1940 peak production of 57,000,000 metric tons. The amount fell 670,000 metric tons short of the 30,000,000-ton quota for the year.

#### Deliveries

11. Coal deliveries in March were 2,907,000 metric tons, 44,500 more than the month's production and 111,000 over revised February deliveries. See the graphs on pages 100 through 102.


12. The revised total of coal deliveries in February was 2,796,000 metric tons, 68,000 above revised January deliveries and 41,100 over final February production.

#### Stockpiles

13. Stockpiles of available coal decreased to 572,000 metric tons 31 March, 40,100 under February.

# COAL PRODUCTION

BY DISTRICTS




\* 1930-1938 ARE CALENDAR YEARS  
 \*\* EASTERN HONSHU: TOHOKU, KANTO, AND TOKAI REGIONS. WESTERN HONSHU: KINKU, CHUGOKU AND SHIKOKU REGIONS.  
 NOTE: MARCH 1949 DATA PRELIMINARY, FEBRUARY 1949 DATA REVISED.  
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.  
 GHQ - SCAP JAPAN - APR 48 NUMBER 12


0433

# COAL DELIVERIES

BY CONSUMER CATEGORIES



# COAL DELIVERIES BY CONSUMER CATEGORIES




NOTE: MARCH 1948 DATA PRELIMINARY. DATA FOR 1930-1934 ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REVISED.  
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.  
 GHQ-SCAP JAPAN - APR 48 NUMBER 13B



# COAL DELIVERIES

BY CONSUMER CATEGORIES



\* 1930-1938 ARE CALENDAR YEARS, DATA FOR 1930-1934 ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REVISED  
 NOTE: MARCH 1948 DATA PRELIMINARY, FEBRUARY 1948 DATA REVISED, NA=DATA NOT AVAILABLE  
 SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY  
 GHQ-SCAP JAPAN - APR 48 NUMBER 13C

COAL STOCKPILES  
31 March  
(metric tons)

	<u>Hokkaido</u>	<u>Eastern Honshu</u>	<u>Western Honshu</u>	<u>Kyushu</u>	<u>Total</u>
Available for current shipment	38,000	47,900	17,200	46,700	149,800
In transit	<u>116,000</u>	<u>32,200</u>	<u>44,100</u>	<u>229,900</u>	<u>422,200</u>
Total	154,000	80,100	61,300	276,600	572,000

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.

Mine Employees

14. Mine employment increased 23 percent in the 1947 fiscal year ending 31 March with the greatest gain in surface workers. Average annual employee production was 57.2 metric tons, 3.2 metric tons over the 1946 fiscal output.

15. Coal mine employees 20 April totaled 516,897, a gain of 5,753 over March.

COAL MINE EMPLOYEES  
20 April a/

	<u>Underground</u>	<u>Surface</u>	<u>Total</u>
Employees paid daily wages	246,317	222,207	468,524
Employees paid monthly wages	<u>15,208</u>	<u>33,165</u>	<u>48,373</u>
Total	261,525	255,372	516,897

a/ Preliminary.

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.

Lignite


16. Preliminary figures for March lignite production totaled 253,963 metric tons, 8,907 more than the revised February output. Stockpiles gained from a revised total of 514,354 metric tons to 558,907 and deliveries increased to 163,695 metric tons, 1,802 over the revised February deliveries.

OIL

17. Crude oil production in March was 16,016 kiloliters with a daily average production of 517 kiloliters, 20 more than for February. See the chart on the next page.

Drilling Operations

18. The Imperial Oil Company brought in one new oil well in Niigata Prefecture in March. The initial daily production was 3.7 kiloliters.



#### DRILLING OPERATIONS March



	<u>Exploitation</u>	<u>Exploration</u>
Completed as oil producers	0	1
Completed as gas producers	0	0
Abandoned	1	1
Standing suspended	0	1
Commenced during month	4	4
Other wells drilling	4	9
Total strings active	8	13

SOURCE: Imperial Oil Company.

#### MINING INDUSTRY

19. February production increased in 16 of 33 mineral commodities. Principal gains were in antimony, pyrite, mercury, graphite and limestone. Output of iron ore and petroleum declined.

# MINE PRODUCTION



COMMODITY	FORM	UNIT	MONTHLY AVERAGES				
			1930-1934	PEAK YEAR SINCE 1930	1946	MONTHLY	
ANTIMONY	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	MT	2,833	(1943) 79.8	5.2	5,024	7,584
ARSENIC	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	151.35	(1940) 243.	91.	132.	123.
ASBESTOS	FIBER	-	NA	NA	NA	272.	259.
BARITE	CONCENTRATE APT 90% BaSO <sub>4</sub>	-	NA	(1943) 1,300.	80.	29	53
CHROMITE	CONCENTRATE APT 50% Cr <sub>2</sub> O <sub>3</sub>	-	1,286,667	(1944) 5,900	261	182	253
	CONCENTRATE APT 30% Cr <sub>2</sub> O <sub>3</sub>	-	2,597,750	(1940) 4,776,000	1,877,000	2,858,800	2,794,900
COAL	-	-	2,597,750	(1940) 4,776,000	1,877,000	2,858,800	2,794,900
COBALT	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	NA	(1944) 128.	0.6	0012	0.008
COPPER	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	NA	NA	NA	1,821.	2,127.
FIRE CLAY	-	-	NA	NA	2,700.	15,235.	14,289.
FLUORITE	CONCENTRATE	-	NA	(1944) 664.	24.	0	0.
GOLD	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	NA	NA	NA	0.164	0.153
GRAPHITE	CRYSTALLINE CRUDE ORE 10-20% C	-	34,933	(1945) 1,037.	111.6	95	298.
	AMORPHOUS CRUDE ORE 20-45% C	-	NA	NA	372.8	518	532.
GYPSUM	CONCENTRATE +40% SO <sub>3</sub>	-	4,385,333	(1941) 17,350.	4,041,667	2,345.	2,942.
	CONCENTRATE -40% SO <sub>3</sub>	-	2,597,750	(1944) 292,400.	49,800.	52,299.	36,107.
IRON	DRE CONCENTRATE APT 50% Fe	-	25,935,333	(1944) 292,400.	49,800.	52,299.	36,107.
LEAD	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	548,333	(1943) 1,747.	388,917	566	583
LIGNITE	-	-	9,924,517	(1943) 239,568.	200,187.5	262,156	245,056
LIMESTONE	-	-	562,433,233	(1943) 1,155,000.	381,479.75	297,592.	360,921.
MANGANESE	BATTERY GRADE CONCENTRATE APT 70% MnO <sub>2</sub>	-	NA	NA	NA	470.	335.
	INDUSTRIAL GRADE CONCENTRATE APT 40% Mn	-	NA	NA	NA	2,676.	2,360.
MERCURY	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	0.417	(1944) 20.39	4.71	2,584	318
MOLYBDENUM	CONCENTRATE APT 60% MoS <sub>2</sub>	-	0.067	(1944) 26.2	7.904	0.6	0.725
CRUDE OIL	-	-	23,087,533	(1937) 32,720.	17,354.	15,058	14,440
PYRITE	CONCENTRATE 30-50% S	MT	45,870.	(1941) 178,000.	51,462,334	69,735.	82,658.
PYROPHYLLITE	-	-	13,358,333	(1939) 38,000.	9,300.	13,421.	15,567.
SILVER	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	NA	NA	NA	6.612	5.517
SULFUR	REFINED	-	7,781,417	(1937) 19,200.	1,903,083	2,667.	2,559.
TIN	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	125.	(1937) 180.	6.9	7.288	8.578
TUNGSTEN	CONCENTRATE APT 70% WO <sub>3</sub>	-	0.883	(1942) 40.83	4.851	0.4	0.22
ZINC	METAL IN CONCENTRATE	-	1,888,167	(1943) 7,363.	2,033,917	2,840	2,617.

NOTE: 1/ - CALENDAR YEAR; 2/ - FISCAL YEAR; 3/ - CALENDAR OR FISCAL YEAR; 4/ - GRADE UNKNOWN; 5/ - MINERAL CONTENT OF CONCENTRATE; 6/ - CASINGHEAD GASOLINE INCLUDED SINCE 1937; NA - DATA NOT AVAILABLE; KL - KILOGRAMS; MT - METRIC TONS; REVISED.  
SOURCE: PRIOR TO 1946: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, CONTROL ASSOCIATIONS, INDIVIDUAL MINE OPERATORS; 1946 AND SUBSEQUENTLY: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, LIMESTONE MINING ASSOCIATION.  
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SECTION 3  
HEAVY INDUSTRIES

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
COKE

1. Total coke production in March was 221,910 metric tons, an increase of 29,340 tons over the previous month's production. Coke stockpiles at the end of March amounted to 46,440 metric tons, 2,590 tons more than on 29 February. See charts on the following two pages.

MARCH COKE ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION  
(metric tons)

	<u>Allocation</u>	<u>Distribution</u>
Consumed by producers	95,330	77,014
Chemical industry (including fertilizer)	54,570	44,524
Metal industry	28,060	22,892
Industrial machinery	29,681	27,397
Rolling-stock manufacturing	15,411	13,369
Electrical machinery	6,620	6,160
Ceramic industry	4,658	4,333
Shipbuilding	2,319	2,214
Repair of coal mine machinery	1,000	719
Others (government and daily necessities)	7,487	6,328
Reserves	<u>174</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	245,310	204,950

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Coal Board.




#### METAL INDUSTRIES

2. Steel mills surpassed all postwar records in the output of ingot and rolled steel products in March. Among the factors contributing to the record month were larger deliveries of fuel and electric power and more efficient use of materials, equipment and labor. Preliminary reports for March placed pig-iron production at 44,777 metric tons, compared with the revised February figure of 36,878 tons. All items registered production gains with the exception of tin plate, which decreased to 1,050 metric tons from the revised February figure of 1,122 tons. Total production of rolled steel products was 76,927 metric tons compared with the February revised figure of 66,119 tons. Note chart on page 110.

#### IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION (metric tons)


	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>
Pig iron		
For steel	22,404	26,116
For casting	<u>14,474</u>	<u>18,661</u>
Total.	36,878	44,777
Steel ingots and steel for castings		
Open hearth	67,798	76,227
Electric furnace	<u>32,121</u>	<u>34,691</u>
Total	99,919	110,918



	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>
Rolled steel products		
Rails	3,775	5,475
Sheets (below 3-mm)	10,158	14,559
Tin plate	1,122	1,050
Pipe	5,939	6,813
Other	<u>45,125</u>	<u>49,030</u>
<b>Total</b>	66,119	76,927
Steel castings	5,270	6,313
Steel forgings	2,805	3,182

SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.





#### Secondary Iron and Steel Products

3. Improved fuel and electric power supplies and increased efficiency in use of labor, materials and equipment were the principal reasons for March rises in the output of all secondary iron and steel products.

#### PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL SECONDARY PRODUCTS (metric tons)

	<u>February</u>	<u>March</u>
Bolts and nuts	6,233	8,132
Wire nails	2,476	3,901
Special nails	385	413
Wire	962	1,994
Hard steel wire	402	482
Galvanized sheet	1,538	3,132
Wire rope	965	1,421
Screws and rivets	537	633
Cast iron pipe	2,338	2,602


SOURCE: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

#### Light Metals

4. A decrease of 70 metric tons from February totals to 374 tons was reported in March aluminum production by four primary and nine secondary plants. Output of alumina from scrap increased from

# INDEXES OF METAL PRODUCTION

1930-1934 AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION = 100




\* COMPOSITE INDEX COMBINES FIVE INDICATED METAL PRODUCTION INDEXES WEIGHTED BY BASE-PERIOD (1930-1934) EMPLOYMENT  
 NOTE: MARCH 1948 DATA PRELIMINARY, FEBRUARY 1948 DATA REVISED, NA: DATA NOT AVAILABLE.  
 SOURCE OF BASE DATA: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, JAPAN IRON AND STEEL FEDERATION, GHQ-SCAP  
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368 metric tons in February to 308 in March, and production of aluminum from alumina rose to 195 tons from 179, while output of aluminum and aluminum alloys from scrap decreased to 179 from 265 metric tons.

5. Preliminary February figures for light-metals rolling production as reported by 44 operating plants was 1,909 metric tons, an increase of 201 metric tons over the previous month's production of 1,708. All items except miscellaneous aluminum rolled products and tin foil increased during the month.



#### Copper and Copper Alloys

6. Eleven smelters and eight refineries reported preliminary March production figures for blister copper and refined copper which were higher than those reported for February. Blister copper increased in output from 4,607 metric tons to 4,946 and refined copper from 3,994 to 4,578 metric tons.


7. March output of rolled copper sheet and products by 200 rolling mills, five less than reported for the previous month, was 1,153 metric tons, an increase of 92 tons over February's output of 1,061 tons. Bare copper wire manufactured increased to 4,196 metric tons from February's 3,723.

8. Production of all brass items rose in March to a total of 3,535 metric tons, compared with the previous month's 3,452. Bronze rolling production increased to 118 metric tons from 83 for February. See chart at top of opposite page.

#### Zinc and Lead

9. Increases were made in production of electrolytic zinc, distilled zinc and zinc plate as preliminary March figures were reported. Electrolytic zinc output increased to 1,022 metric tons, distilled zinc to 758 and zinc plate to 636, compared with figures of 724, 644 and 511 tons in February.

10. Crude lead and refined lead production improved in March, totaling 915 metric tons and 912 tons respectively, compared with February's 821 and 834 tons.



Other Nonferrous Metals

11. Preliminary figures indicated expanded production of bismuth, from 2,067 kilograms in February to 2,538 in March, and of mercury, from 2,952 to 3,798 kilograms.

Antimony output dropped to 6,750 kilograms in March from February's 9,126. Crude tin production in February was 16,875 kilograms.

Ferroalloys

12. Production of all ferroalloys increased in March, totaling 810 metric tons compared with the revised February figure of 433 tons.

