

- 9 -

Eager New Deal beavers slapped together a new constitution which was to be the ark of the new covenant of democracy. General MacArthur took great personal interest in it. Several passages of rich, beautiful prose, including a total renunciation of war and of the right to maintain armed forces, standing out like the phrases in capital letters in a Hearst editorial, were universally ascribed to the General himself. It was —of course— officially a Japanese constitution, promulgated not by SCAP but by the Japanese authorities, Japanese delicately intimated that they knew what the score was by circulating the story, after the Japanese text had been published, "What do you think of the new constitution?" "I don't know; I can't read English." And indeed, there were many passages difficult to translate into intelligible Japanese.

In spite of its inevitable touches of irony and pathos, this was a good period. Real democracy cannot be given. It must be earned, and won against opposition. Above all, it is impossible to "give" democracy under an alien military occupation. What General MacArthur really gave to the Japanese people—and it was the best and wisest thing in his power to give them—was a schooling in the practices of democracy. They were allowed to act as if they had won and

created

- 10 -

created some of the basic rights and duties of democracy. They were put through their paces. The difference between all this and real democracy is like the difference between taking the subway to a riding school in Manhattan and being turned loose with a horse in Montana and told to find your own way to Arizona; but the practice was invaluable for a people who will one day sign a peace treaty and see the occupation end, and will then have to find their way from their own Montana to their own Arizona.

Then came the period in which policies in Tokyo echoed first the approach and then the arrival of the Eightieth Congress. The equivalent of the end of price controls in America was permission for American businessmen to take advantage of the American government's practical monopoly of control over Japan to resume private enterprise. The costs of occupation were paid by the taxpayer (though nominally charged to the Japanese government, to be paid in some unknown future). Any profits that could be made by private enterprise stayed private. In order that the government, in the public interest, should determine the proper scope of business interests, influential businessmen were assigned to one official mission after another and sent out to Japan.

The equivalent

0470

0471

- 11 -

The equivalent of the Taft-Hartley Act was a tightened control of labor unions. Strikes which the unions were likely to lose were of course permitted. Important strikes which the unions might have won were called off by administrative order. The program for breaking up the Zaibatsu, the great combined vertical and horizontal trusts, was put in the icebox.

In this period it became evident that the society of Japan is still, like the society of Germany, a sick society. Imperialism, like fascism, is a disease that bites deep. Those who wish to cure it simply by drafting well worded constitutions and circulating some improving literature should face the facts.

The grip that imperialism or fascism gets on a people depends on whether they get anything out of it. For decades, long before Pearl Harbor, a lot of Japanese got a lot out of imperialism. Formosa, Korea, and later Manchuria provided not only big profits for big shots, but jobs and the interest of travel and the feeling of belonging to a superior people for hundreds of thousands of Japanese who otherwise would never have had anything except the humblest employment. Engineers, technicians, newspaper correspondents, and traveling salesmen benefited as well as army officers. The feeling grew that the Japanese were entitled to be better off than their neighbors, and to have their neighbors pay for it.

In their

0472

- 12 -

In their post-surrender New Deal period the Japanese took their new democracy seriously, because that was the period in which it seemed most certain that they were going to have to work their own passage into the future. They could not do so unless they abandoned the feelings of superiority and privilege. In the Eightieth Congress period the old disease came back on them because the American emphasis on the American interest in making Japan the workshop of Asia and a bulwark against Russia seemed to assure them once more of a higher position in life than the one they actually earned: the American would support them in the style of life to which they had become accustomed while lording it over the Formosans, the Koreans, and the Chinese.

It is with this feeling well revived and going strong that the Eightieth Congress period of American policy in Japan has merged into the present period. Our policy now aims at creating a Japan which is to be the counterpart in Asia of the kind of Germany we are trying to create in Europe. It is to be less and less a conquered enemy, a ward, or even an instrument of policy, and to become more and more an overt ally. As the workshop of Asia, it is to be closely integrated with America, so that American economic policy will flow unobstructed through Japan into the rest of Asia.

As an

0473

- 13 -

As an ally, it is to be not only an ally against Russia, but an ally taking precedence over China, our own former ally and Japan's former enemy, in which we are now so sadly disappointed.

3

There remains the necessity of scrutinizing our hopeful policy for the future. We must realize that nothing ties Japan down to be America's permanent ally in Asia. A Japan made strong enough by American subsidy to hold an economic ascendancy over the rest of Asia, and strong enough to be an American ally against Russia if it wants to be, is automatically a Japan strong enough to double-cross America and make its own deals both with Russia and with the rest of Asia.

It is true that Japan must be included in the eventual balance to be struck between the American interest in Asia and the Russian interest. But it is equally true that America cannot force the striking of that balance by trying to make Japan or any other single country in Asia the primary instrument of American policy. The general stabilization that will eventually emerge between America and Russia will in large part result from the realization

- 14 -

realization that Asia cannot be brought fully under the control of either of them. It is unwise to overlook the historical part played by Japan in transforming an Asia under control into an Asia out of control. There are Japanese who realize that Japan will only be able to become free by taking its place---not a dominant place---in an Asia out of the control of either of the two super-powers.

It is in this light that we must study the real Japan that underlies all the other partly historical, partly transitory, and partly illusory Japans. This real Japan is undergoing internal changes. More than one outcome is possible. Our policy problem therefore ranges beyond "what to do with Japan." We must also think of the effects in Japan of our policy about Japan.

Unlike Germany, Japan has no Ruhr. In attempting to make Japan the workshop of Asia and a bulwark against Russia, there are certain advantages that we can exploit; but there are also serious deficiencies to be overcome. The balance sheet is not in our favor.

What Japan does not have is coking coal, iron, oil, bauxite for making aluminum, or the capacity to produce

on

0474

0475

- 15 -

on a large scale some of the important agricultural raw materials for industry, such as cotton. Japan does not have enough salt to sustain its chemical industry or enough wood of the right kind to sustain its rayon industry; and both of these were formerly important earners of foreign exchange. In addition, of course, Japan has about a 20 per cent deficiency in food production; and this problem is aggravated by lack of fertilizers, which have to be imported.

What Japan does have is hydroelectric energy, one of the big requirements of both heavy and light industry; coal other than coking coal, though not enough of it; and silk, Japan's most important resources, however, are human: the most advanced and diversified technical and managerial know-how in Asia, and the largest pool of skilled industrial labor.

With these resources and in spite of these deficiencies Japan in fact was for a while the workshop of Asia. The use of military power was what bridged the deficiencies. By imperial control of Korea and Formosa, later of Manchuria, and for a while of much of China and all Indochina, Siam, Malaya, Burma, and Netherlands India, Japan

was

0476

- 16 -

was able to plan the extraction of raw materials and to regulate processing and distribution. The form of control made it possible not only to obtain raw materials, but to dictate exchange values. Raw materials were extracted at colonial or coolie wage rates. When processed, one portion was set aside to maintain the military machine that kept the whole business going. Another was allocated to consumer goods for the countries that produced the raw materials. A third, before Pearl Harbor, went into world trade and earned dollars and pounds sterling.

The United States cannot put Japan back in business as a workshop of this kind. America made enormous sacrifices to break Japan's imperial grip on Asia and the Pacific. Even war scares about Russia are not enough to make American public opinion reverse itself and demand an American reconquest, on Japan's behalf, of Japan's old fields of aggression in Asia.

4

A program for making Japan a workshop must depend either on American subsidies or on direct agreements between Japan and parts of Asia which America cannot control. Direct American grants to Japan jumped from 96 million

dollars

0477

- 17 -

dollars in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946, to 292 million dollars in 1947 and 423 million dollars in 1948. In addition, loans and credits totaled 116 million dollars in 1947 and 81 million dollars in the fiscal year ending in 1948. Adding the costs of actual military occupation--- which nominally are chargeable to the Japanese government at some time in the future when Japan becomes solvent--- it is a reasonable estimate that the total American expenditure on Japan, including military costs, approaches a billion a year.

Japan now gets its major imports of food and raw cotton from the United States, on a government basis. In 1947, 53 per cent of the value of Japan's imports was in grain and starch, 13 per cent in raw cotton, and 12 per cent in fertilizers. By 1948, Japan attained a favorable ratio of eight to one in its exports to the Orient as compared with imports from other countries, but was able to export to the United States only one twenty-fifth of the value of its imports from the United States. These ratios indicate an increasing indebtedness to the United States, with no increase in the ability to pay off the debt, since the "soft currency" income

from

0478

- 18 -

from Japanese sales to Asia is not wanted by the United States.

Meanwhile it is apparent that China will soon be in a position to make economic offers to Japan. The northeastern provinces (Manchuria), formerly so closely integrated with Japan, have a surplus of food to offer. Most of this surplus never was marketed in China; the established channels of trade do not run in that direction. There will be an overall food deficiency in China until the 1949 harvest, because of the civil war; but after that, offering food to Japan would not cause hardships in China.

This food could be offered to Japan at prices much lower than food from America. Soybeans, of which there are big accumulated stocks, are useful for many industrial purposes, as well as for food. The cake that is left after pressing out the bean oil is of high value both as cattle feed and as fertilizer, of which Japan is desperately short.

More important still, the northern and northeastern provinces of China are traditionally Japan's greatest sources of iron and coking coal, and of salt for the

chemical

0479

- 19 -

chemical industry. Japan formerly used China's iron ore and coking coal to make first pig iron and then steel.

An important variation on this pattern is now possible. China could offer pig iron and later, as the Chinese iron and steel industries develop, semiprocessed and processed iron and steel in various forms. In this way Japan could retain a useful and profitable steel and machine-building industry, which step by step could contribute to the industrialization of the rest of Asia. A high level of employment could be sustained, and a full scope of usefulness for Japan's managers and technicians. Yet Asia and the world would be secured against a revival of Japanese militarism and aggression because Japan would no longer control the sources of supply. By withholding raw ore and supplying Japan only with pig iron and other semiprocessed materials, China would have absolute power to cut off the revival of Japanese war industry.

Moves and offers of this kind are now practical politics. Their political importance is sharpened by the fact that Japan, while under American control, is not a free agent. China can make offers which flatter

the

0480

- 20 -

the Japanese with the prospect of honorable economic interdependence, on terms of costs and prices that suit both countries. These offers can be worded in such a way that if Japan, under American control, is constrained to turn them down and to continue in a growing dependence on America and indebtedness to America, it will be very difficult for American policy to escape looking like a dog in the Japanese manger.

Such moves would affect the conditions under which both America and Russia maneuver for economic, political, and strategic advantage. They would also do more than that. They would promote new groupings in Japanese domestic politics. Both the labor union movement and the parties of the Left would be able to press demands for friendly reintegration with Asia, based not simply on political sympathy but on arguments of solid economic advantage. The effort of the Japanese Communists to take over a large part of the membership of the Socialists and Democrats would be strengthened. General MacArthur would find military occupation and administrative control less and less adequate for chastening the labor unions, manipulating political parties, and jockeying the Communists on America and indebtedness to America, it will be and difficult for American policy to escape looking like a dog in the Japanese manger.

0481

- 21 -

and the rest of the radical Left out of position. America would slip from ascendancy over the whole of Japan to the awkward position of partisan support of the Right in a divided Japan.

Rightist interests in Japan are already aware of these possibilities, and are preparing their countermoves. Without giving any hint that they might, if it ever suits them, refuse to let Japan be used as America's vanguard against Russia, they will, as time passes, steadily build up the emphasis on America's obligation to protect them from Russia. When the end of the war forced Japan out of colonial Southeast Asia, the conservatives saw clearly what the next phase of colonial politics was going to be like and what opportunities it held for them. Japanese conservatives and leftists have one thing in common: they realize that as a defeated and occupied nation, Japan has a long and rough road to travel to get back to independence and freedom of action in international politics. In this, it is like the colonial countries which are struggling to get as much independence as they can from a Europe backed by America.

It

0482

- 22 -

It is dangerous for America to overlook this fact. There is an important area of political maneuver in which Japanese conservatives and leftists and right-wing and left-wing colonial nationalists can get together. As maneuvering goes on, it will be possible for Japan to emerge, suddenly and without warning, and with the hearty participation of some of the most powerful Japanese conservatives, in a position more anti-American than anti-Russian. Once the occupation has ended, it will be possible for Japan to make such a move at any moment when it appears that the combined strength of Japan and the colonial peoples has reached a point where they can form a solid front against an American-backed Europe. The move, when made, might either be permitted without interference from Russia and China, or actually be assisted by them.

An Asia out of control may settle into a new position in world politics during the next few decades by a series of landslips, each causing a series of alarming tremors but no general earthquake. During one or another of these landslips Japan, after talking a wonderful anti-Russian line up to the very last moment, and after

getting

0483

- 23 -

getting every possible kind of help out of America, may see an opening which makes it possible to slip out from under America's control without coming under Russia's control. And Russian policy, for decades to come, may be guided by the belief that if it is not possible to bring under Russian control, or into a federation dominated by Russia, any part of Asia that may break away from European or American control, then it is wisest to settle for an Asia out of control.

The mere possibility of such developments affects the American interest in Japan and American policy toward Japan as a part of Asia. The possibility that as Japan goes, so Asia can be made to go, is in fact a decreasing possibility. The increasing probability is that as Asia goes, so Japan will go---in its alignments with other countries, and in the alignments and oppositions of its own political parties.

--- End ---



三月七日付「新時代誌」記事「日本の武装」

取扱注意

昭一六三三課  
調査局第三課

日本の武装 (新時代誌一九五一、三、七)

I 東京便り I

K、クルイロフ

基地へ通ずる都市の大小道路には武器弾薬を運ぶトラックの縦列  
 が疾駆し、その飛行場から土地の病院に運ぶ衛生自動車の長い行  
 住民は負傷者を飛行場から土地の病院に運ぶ衛生自動車の長い行  
 列に同行する米軍警備隊の断えずアメリカの飛行機が修理してい  
 安気に聞かせる。飛行機は自動車の武器を生産し、修理してい  
 る。日本も軍事工場は、飛行機、自動車、武器を生産し、修理してい  
 る。日本も軍事工場は、飛行機、自動車、武器を生産し、修理してい  
 がら、共同戦線は、遠くを叫ぶ。新開戦は、戦争は、日本は、積極  
 心の中心に、海峡だけ隔て、どかか、朝、日、行、わ、れ、て、い、な、く、と、い、う、見、が、本  
 んで、狭い海峡だけ隔て、どかか、朝、日、行、わ、れ、て、い、な、く、と、い、う、見、が、本  
 怖が、忍び込み、つ、あ、る、し、ら、か、も、こ、の、戦、争、に、日、本、は、積、極、的、に、参、加、し、恐  
 て、日本は、戦略的、朝鮮半島と軍事的、潜在力なしでは、合衆国は、この上  
 うに、広い規模で、朝鮮半島と軍事的、潜在力なしでは、合衆国は、この上  
 で、広、ま、つ、て、い、る、日、本、は、現、在、ア、ジ、ア、の、多、くの、戦、略、的、な、頭、脳、で、  
 合衆国は、この上、で、広、ま、つ、て、い、る、日、本、は、現、在、ア、ジ、ア、の、多、くの、戦、略、的、な、頭、脳、で、  
 ある、だけ、で、な、く、て、日、本、は、最、後、に、侵、略、の、た、め、に、準備、さ、れ、つ、つ、あ、る、教、育、す  
 通信施設、そ、し、て、最、後、に、侵、略、の、た、め、に、準備、さ、れ、つ、つ、あ、る、教、育、す

盟者に訓練すみの兵士の予備を米軍の指揮下に提供した不可欠の同盟者なりつづつあるのみである。朝鮮戦争の最初の日本は米干渉の基本的基地となつた。朝鮮の土地に死と破壊を無畏に強いる米軍宿営地から各積載港にアメリカの諸師団が統率して在る。李承晩の軍隊のため武器弾薬その他の軍資材を積んだ日本軍の船が朝鮮の軍向つて出航してゐる。日本では秘密の朝鮮線向けの元日本兵が徴集訓練され、米占領軍の自動車運手と日本軍の運手とを動かすための指下朝鮮へ送られた。米占領軍の自動車運手と日本軍の運手とを動かすための指下朝鮮へ送られた。運搬通信手段は朝鮮当局の命で行つた。日本軍の指下朝鮮へ送られた。特別班が朝鮮へ送られた。日本軍の指下朝鮮へ送られた。用列車を運送して向けた。日本軍の指下朝鮮へ送られた。の諸港から艦隊が出たとき、仁川の上陸軍をおろすため仁川港に陸揚がおり、彼らは戦火の下で米軍の兵器廠は新たな作業を開始した。米当局が完全に整備していた朝鮮戦争に奉仕するため切換えられた。

東京の日本製鋼の諸工場では戦車、砲、銃が生産修理されてゐる。日産の豊田、日野の自動車会社は軍用自動車を生産修理されてゐる。日本の諸造船所では上陸用舟艇が建造され、朝鮮水域で破損した軍船の修理が行われ、旧飛行機工場、朝鮮水産航空の諸工場は米飛行機の修理と各種武器の生産を行つてゐる。化学資材の生産は切換えられてゐる。弾薬、爆薬、その他の軍用化学資材の生産

多日本工業は米軍への奉仕に向けられ、食糧品から重兵器に至るまで、米軍の要求に応じて生産される。米軍の駐在は、米軍の基地を築くためのものである。米軍の駐在は、米軍の基地を築くためのものである。米軍の駐在は、米軍の基地を築くためのものである。

日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。

日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。

日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。

日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。

日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。日本は、米軍の駐在を許すことによって、米軍の基地を築くことができる。

説をこの政府が再軍備問題に關しては、自由上も一つと見て、中庸な立場をとっている。吉田といふ再軍備に賛成しないといふ公けに、聲明したところでは、思へる。自衛権の欺まんに外ならない。吉田政府は、日本独占資本の利益を守りながら、欺まんに外ならない。吉田政府は、日本独占資本の利益を、益しよと試みて、一諸に全速力で日本軍國主義を再興して、保存する。カシ親方たちと一期の頃、本当局は、日本の軍國主義の基幹要員を保存する。未だ凡ゆる初めの頃、泥棒も、犯罪者は、極めて明確な目的のため、たぬれ多額の老い、これら泥棒も、犯罪者は、極めて明確な目的のため、たぬれ免れ得た。今これら泥棒も、犯罪者は、極めて明確な目的のため、たぬれ。罰金を得た。今これら泥棒も、犯罪者は、極めて明確な目的のため、たぬれ。に、つと前か、マカ、サ、司令部の許に「EARO」機關なるものがある。寺少将の性、一命を失つた。田中、有末、兩中将、および、日軍再建準備少将の性、一命を失つた。田中、有末、兩中将、および、佐本、再建準備少将の性、一命を失つた。田中、有末、兩中将、および、左軍、再建準備少将の性、一命を失つた。田中、有末、兩中将、および、なると、再建準備少将の性、一命を失つた。田中、有末、兩中将、および、行つた軍事作戦の経験、研究普及し、第二次世界戦争の時に、日本軍

ならびに作戦的計画を作成して、朝鮮作戦研究に基本的な仕事を援助し、そのついでに日本の将軍選は、朝鮮作戦研究に基本的な仕事を援助し、て、この目的のため、日本軍の戦術提督連は、米軍兵器の使用、法、司令部の許で、再教育を受け、米軍の戦術提督連は、米軍兵器の使用

大規模な諸兵連合部隊の編成という仕事は極めて複雑である。日本軍の再建が国内および日本以外の平和愛好諸国民の中の民主的勢力の抗議を呼起すことを知つた米占領当局と日本軍閥は暫くの間陸海軍の再建に與する自分たちの指圖を隠そうと努めた。陸軍は警察の形で編成されはじめ、その数は今では二〇万人を越えてゐる。その構成員は大部分はほんど普通の警察勤務をとらずに、軍事教育を受け、練下部隊および部隊の通成における行動を習つてゐる。例えば東京の皇居前広場では東京警察の諸部隊が大抵の場台訓練をやつてゐるが、突撃戦闘のうちに、普通の警察勤務にとつて全く余計な純軍事的な教育を彼らの職業が要素として含んでゐることを確信するに、このことを散歩するだけであらゆる予備警察隊も本質的に軍事編成部隊である。

再建されたつある海軍は海上保安庁というつましい看板の陰に隠れ、すでに一九五〇年にこれにアメリカのフリゲート艦が引渡された。それ以上著しい数の船舶がかつて日本海軍のために軍艦を建造したその同じ諸工場で造られた。

軍事教育はまた各種の民族主義的団体、スポーツ団体その他を通じて偽裝された形で行われた。朝鮮に於けるアメリカ

の侵略開始後二週間を経た一九五〇年七月八日、マッカーサーは七万五千名より成るいわゆる一警察予備隊を日本に設ける命令を発した。これによつて軍の組織が開始された。間もなく同隊の成員が歩兵、砲兵、戦車部隊、通信、給理、衛生、軍事警察、そしてさらに航空の各兵科に分れてゐること、米人教官指導の下に行われ、教育はアメリカのシステムにより、米人教官指導の下に行われ、同隊成員のほとんど半分は旧軍人である。マッカーサー司令部の命令により、一九五〇年に約八千名の旧職業軍人の追放が解除された。基本的には彼らの中から同隊の幹部が補充されたのである。はじめのうちに幹部は最大級の海軍基地たる吳地区の江田島にあるアメリカの学校で、中下級教育を受けていた。今では高級幹部のための学校が東京に、中下級幹部のための学校が国内の主要行政中心地にそれぞれつくられてゐる。同隊の各部隊は主として旧米軍兵舎に分散してゐるが、これらの兵營は米軍師団が日本から朝鮮へ出發したのちに空いたものである。ほんの少し日本調に作り直されたところである。

しかし今では最後の偽裝も放棄された。新聞は同隊が未来の日本軍の中核であると直接書いてゐる。同隊の司令官である増原総監は同隊が武裝のためには軽機関銃を受取り、約三千台のトラックと通信器材を持つてあろうと言明した。日本の政界、特に例の国民民主党は同隊成員の今後の増加計画を審察してゐる。









8

(8) 米軍の日本及び琉球長期滞留関係

## BULLETIN

## U.S. TROOPS TO STAY IN JAPAN FOR QUITE LONG TIME

BY STELLA HENSLER

WASHINGTON, Apr. 3.--(UP)--United States forces will remain on Okinawa and other Ryukyu islands "indefinitely" and American occupation troops in Japan likewise will be there "for quite a long time."

These were highlights of testimony by United States Army officials before a House Appropriations subcommittee early in March which was made public today.

Other features of testimony by the then Army Undersecretary Tracy Voorhees and other high officials were:

1.--The Army has slashed its request for United States aid to Japan during the fiscal year beginning next July 1 from \$320,000,000 (m) to \$299,500,000 (m) but this will mean no reduction in the actual amount of assistance provided those areas.

2.-- Army officials believe the United States must retain a "friendly" Japan as the strongest asset in the "cold war" in Asia.

3.-- It has been decided for the time being that it would be "definitely not practicable" to transfer control of Japan from the Army to the State Department.

Voorhees made the first official pronouncement to Congress of American intention to stay in the Ryukyus indefinitely when he said in a statement to the subcommittee that "the decision that United States forces would remain indefinitely in the Ryukyu islands and inauguration of a large military construction program had far-reaching effects on that group of islands' economy."

Voorhees disclosed that one-third of arable land in the Ryukyus was to be occupied by American military installations. He added, however, "prospective indefinite occupation of the Ryukyus" also would help the natives because they could earn money by sale of goods and services to occupation personnel.

- more -

## 2. WASHINGTON, UP (personnel.)

"It seems quite apparent that our troops will have to be in Japan for quite a long time," Voorhees said, and it was therefore necessary to improve housing conditions.

Voorhees flatly declined to estimate how long it would be before the peace treaty could be signed, declaring he would refer the questioner to the State Department. He did disclose, however, that he had strongly opposed any suggestions that the State Department take over administration of Japan from the Army.

He said, firstly, "the relationship of General MacArthur to the Japanese people" was of extreme value and should be maintained; and secondly, it would be impossible to recruit and transport adequate civilian personnel to replace army officers in charge of Japan.

Voorhees said that it had been found possible since President Truman submitted his budget request to Congress in January to trim \$20,500,000 (M) off the original \$320,000,000 (m) requested for Japan without however actually cutting the program.

He said it had been found possible to eliminate one unspecified item of \$6,500,000 (m) by buying supplies from a non-dollar source and it had been discovered the Army would have \$14,000,000 (m) left in Germany because of savings on wheat buying in the past and this could be transferred to Japan funds.

The largest item in the \$299,500,000 (m) budget request is for "grain food and kindred products" for which the Army asked \$199,856,000.

Requests for other items were:

Fertilizer materials and seeds \$3,437,000; petroleum products \$21,401,000; raw and semi-finished industrial materials \$101,313,000; reorientation supplies, services and equipment \$3,194,000; industrial machinery repair and replacement parts \$615,000; supplies and service equipment \$6,873,000; motor vehicles, and parts \$408,000; pay of American civilian employees \$14,548,000; travel of civilian employees \$873,000; transportation of commodities \$42,166,000; interchange of persons \$1,154,000 and education of American dependents \$1,382,400.

参考

聯合國軍進駐狀況  
終戰連絡事務局並  
委員會所在地一覽表

外務省





進駐軍関係の略語

A.P.O.	Army Post Office	陸軍の海外郵便局
A.R.C.	American Red Cross	アメリカ赤十字社
A.T.I.S.	Allied Translators Interpreters Service	連合國翻譯通譯班
C.C.D.	Civil Censorship Detachment	民間検閲班
C.C.S.	Civil Communication	民間通信局
C.I.C.	Counter Intelligence Corps	對謀叛部隊
C.I.&E.	Civil Information and Education (Section)	民間情報教育局
C.I.S.	Civil Intelligence Section	民間情報部
C.P.C.	Civil Property Custodian	民間財産保管者
C.P.S.	Civilian Personnel Section	民間人事部
E.M.	Enlisted Men	下士官兵
E.S.S.	Economic and Scientific Section	經濟科学局
F.B.I.	Federal Bureau of Investigation	アメリカ聯邦調査局
F.C.C.	Federal Communication Commission	聯邦通信統制局
F.E.A.F.	Far Eastern Air Force	極東空軍
F.E.C.	1. Far Eastern Command	極東軍司令部
"	2. Far Eastern Commission	連合國極東委員會
G.H.Q.	General Headquarters	總司令部
G.I.	Government Issue	兵隊
G.S.	Government Section	政治局
M.G.	Military Government	軍政部
M.P.	Military Police	憲兵
N.R.S.	Natural Resources Section	天然資源局
OFF LIMITS	Off Limits	出入禁止

O.P.A.	Office of Price Administration
O.W.I.	Office of War Information
PARKING	Parking
P.X.	Post Exchange
R.A.F.	Royal Air Force
R.C.A.F.	Royal Canadian Air Force
R.T.O.	Railway Transportation Office
S.C.A.P.	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
U.N.	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNRRA	(Fapkals) (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Authority)
U.S.A.	United States Army
U.S.M.C.	United States Marine Corps
U.S.N.	United States Navy
U.S.O.	United Service Organization
W.V.T.R.	
G.O.P.	Grand Old Party
E.R.P.	European Recovery Program
W.A.A.C.S.	Womens Auxiliary Army Corps
B.C.O.F.	British Commonwealth Occupation Forces

物價管理局  
 戦時情報局  
 駐車  
 酒保  
 イギリス空軍  
 カナダ空軍  
 鉄道運輸局  
 連合國最高司令官  
 國際連合  
 國際連合教育科学文化団体  
 國際連合救済復興委員会  
 アメリカ陸軍  
 アメリカ海軍隊  
 アメリカ海軍  
 軍人傾向連合団体  
 東京極東地域放送局  
 の符号  
 アメリカ共和黨  
 ヨーロッパ復興計画  
 女性軍補充隊  
 英帝領軍



連合軍の本土進駐並に軍政関係件

A'1.0.0.2

才一巻  
○才二巻  
才三巻

目次

注  
 一、連合軍進駐に付する連合軍司令部の  
 日本政府、大本營の指示、命令、打合せ関係  
 二、連合軍進駐に付する日本政府の措置は、A-1-0-0-1-2にある。  
 三、軍政府関係は、A-1-0-0-1-1にある。

第一卷  
 (1) 連合軍の進駐に付する交渉 及び 我が方の措置  
 自昭和二十年八月

第二卷  
 (2) 進駐軍の駐屯費支出方法 及び 為替換算率関係  
 (経費関係)  
 自昭和二十年八月

第三卷  
 (3) 厚木、横浜における米軍の進駐関係  
 自昭和二十年八月

第四卷  
 (4) 各地区(厚木、横浜を除く)における米軍の進駐関係  
 — 連合軍の状況、動静報告を含む —  
 自昭和二十年九月

第五卷  
 (5) 英、蘇、中国軍の進駐関係  
 自昭和二十年九月

第六卷  
 (6) 連合軍の進駐状況関係  
 自昭和二十年九月

外務省

第七卷  
 (7) 連合軍進駐に伴う警備状況関係  
 (連合軍進駐に伴う警備関係は、C-0-0-0-6にある) 自昭和二十年九月

第八卷  
 (8) 日本と領軍に付する外国文書 及び 新聞論調  
 自昭和二十年九月

第九卷  
 (9) 米軍の月干、及び 琉球長期滞留関係  
 自昭和二十年九月

自昭和二十年九月

自昭和二十年九月