

LOCATIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF EIGHTH ARMY  
MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNITS

Assigned or Attached	APO	Location	MG Gd	MG Co	Prefectural Responsibility
Hq 8th Army (APO 343)	343	Yokohama	104		None (Administrative)
USASCOM-C (APO 404)	404	Yokohama	108	89	Kanagawa
I CORPS (APO 301)	24	Okayama	94		Adm of 36, 76, 81, 91, and 109 Co's
	24	Okayama		36	Okayama, Tottori
	24	Kure		76	Shimane, Hiroshima
	24	Kochi		81	Kochi, Tokushima
	24	Matsuyama		91	Ehime, Kagawa
	660	Osaka		109	Osaka, Wakayama
	929	Kurume	95		Adm of 29, 37, 92, and 93 Co's
	929	Sasebo		29	Nagasaki & Saga
	929	Fukuoka		37	Yamaguchi & Fukuoka
	929	Kagoshima		92	Kagoshima & Miyazaki
	929	Fumamoto		93	Kumamoto & Oita
	660	Osaka		107	Adm of 30, 31, 83, 90, and 103 Co's
	25	Nagoya		30	Aichi, Gifu, Shizuoka
	660	Kobe		31	Hyogo & Kyoto
	660	Nara		83	Hyogo & Nara
	301	Kanazawa		90	Ishikawa & Toyama
	301	Tsuruga		103	Fukui & Shiga
IX CORPS (APO 309)	309	Sendai	105		Adm of 74, 75, 84, 85, and 86 Co's
	928	Sapporo		74	Hokkaido
	248	Aomori		75	Aomori
	468	Akita		84	Akita
	468	Morioka		85	Iwate, Miyagi
	468	Yamagata		86	Yamagata
	471	Kawasaki	106		Adm of 32, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 87, & 88 Co's
	343	Tokyo		32	Tokyo & Yamanashi
	445	Maebashi		77	Gumma
	445	Nagano		78	Nagano
	445	Urawa		77	Saitama
	445	Utsunomiya		90	Tochigi
	181	Chiba		82	Chiba & Ibaraki
	547	Niigata		87	Niigata
	445	Fukushima		88	Fukushima

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LOCATIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS OF EIGHTH ARMY MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT UNITS

APO	Location	MG GP	MG Co	Prefectural Responsibility	Commanding Officer
	Hq 8th Army (APO 343)			None (Adm)	Maj R E Quaintance
343	Yokohama	104			
404	Yokohama	108		Kanagawa	Lt Col R E Pike
404	"		89	"	Maj K F Shippey
301	Kure	94		Hiroshima	Maj M B Walker
				Adm of 36, 76, 81, 91, and 109 Co's	
24	Okayama		36	Okayama	Lt Col B C Foster
301	Kure		76	Shimane & Tottori	Lt Col W H Gordon
301	Kochi		81	Kochi	Lt Col H B Neff
301	Matsuyama		91	Ehime	Lt Col W I Goodwin
301	Kyoto		109	Kyoto	Lt Col W V R Fretts
929	Kurume	95		Adm of 29, 37, 92, & 93 Co's	Lt Col R R Young
301	Nagasaki		29	Nagasaki & Saga	Capt C B Nines
301	Fukuoka		37	Yamaguchi & Fukuoka	Maj E F Sexer
301	Kagoshima		92	Kagoshima & Miyazaki	Lt Col M B Miller
301	Kumamoto		93	Kumamoto & Oita	Maj G B Lourie
660	Osaka	107		Osaka & Wakayama	Lt Col G L Atwood
				Adm of 30, 31, 83, 90, 103 Co's	
301	Nagoya		30	Aichi, Gifu, Shizuoka	Maj J M Balch
301	Kobe		31	Hyogo & Kyoto	Lt Col F W Scott
301	Nara		83	Hyogo & Nara	Lt Col R H St Clair
301	Kanazawa		90	Ishikawa & Toyama	Maj W F Darke
301	Tsuruga		103	Fukui & Shiga	Lt Col J F Hyland
309	Sapporo (Det. at Sendai)	105		Miyagi	Lt Col M Malezewski
77	Sapporo		74	Hokkaido	Lt Col E P Geesy
247	Aomori		75	Aomori	Lt Col A G Cowison
468	Akita		84	Akita	Lt Col D B Borden
468	Morioka		85	Iwate	Lt Col J B Shepard

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Kyoto L.L.O. June 10, 1946



468	Yamagata	86	Yamagata	Maj L W Bardin
471	Kawasaki	XI Corps (APO 471) 106	Adm of 32, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 87, & 88 Co's	Lt Comdr T L Alexander Maj D H Boone
343	Tokyo	32	Tokyo & Yamanashi	Lt Col P F Hickie
445	Maebashi	77	Gumma	Lt Col K L Springer
445	Nagano	78	Nagano	Lt Col R W Malloy
445	Urawa	79	Saitama	Lt Col T J Ryan
445	Utsunomiya	80	Tochigi	Lt Col R W Reed
445	Chiba	82	Chiba & Ibaraki	Lt Col J McDavid Jr
547	Niigata	87	Niigata	Maj E A Linbaugh
445	Fukushima	88	Fukushima	Lt Col J H Brewer

HQ. I Corp	Unit	CP	Area of Responsibility	Commanding Officer	Liaison Office
	94 M.G. Gp	Osaka		Lt.Col.F.L. Atwood	Osaka L.O.
	109 M.G. Co	"	Osaka-Wakayama	Lt.Col.W.VR. Fretts	"
	Wakayama office	Wakayama		Maj.G.E. Hodges	Wakayama L.O.
	107 M.G. Co	Gifu	Gifu-Shiga	Lt.Col. Raymond Watts	
	Shiga office	Otsu		Maj. Ernest Brubaker	Kyoto L.O. Otsu Branch Office
	30 M.G. Co	Nagoya	Aichi-Shizuoka	Maj. Geiser	Nagoya L.O.
	Shizuoka office	Shizuoka		Maj. R.L. Stanley	
	31 M.G. Co	Kobe	Hyogo	Lt.Col. Scott	Osaka L.O. Kobe B.O.
	Mie Office	Tsu		Cap. F.W. King	
	90 M.G. Co	Kanazawa	Toyama-Ishikawa	Lt.Col. G.H. Barrows	Kyoto L.O. Kanazawa B.O.
	Toyama office	Toyama		Cap. N.Z. Medalia	
	103 M.G. Co.	Tsuruga	Kyoto-Fukui	Lt.Col. Hyland	Kyoto L.O. Tsuruga B.O.
	Kyoto office	Kyoto		Maj. Sheffield	Kyoto L.O.
	Maizuru office	Maizuru		Lt. Prager	Kyoto L.O. Maizuru B.O.
	95 M.G. Gp	Kurume		Lt.Col. Link	Kurume L.O.
	25 M.G. Co	Sasebo	Nagasaki-Saga	Major Fipin	Sasebo L.O.
	Nagasaki office	Office		Capt. William Brager	Sasebo L.O.
	37 M.G. Co	Fukuoka	Fukuoka	Maj. S. Palo	Fukuoka L.O.
	92 M.G. Co	Oita	Oita-Miyazaki	Lt.Col. Lowrey	
	Miyazaki office	Miyazaki		Maj. Mosamin	

第一軍團管下軍政部組織表(五四六頁)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>CP</u>	<u>Area of Responsibility</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>	<u>Liaison Office</u>
93 M.G. Co	Kumamoto	Kumamoto- Kagoshima	Lt Col. Scott	Kumamoto L.O.
Kagoshima office	Kagoshima		Maj. Wiggins	
36 M.G. Co	Okayama	Okayama- Tottori	Lt. Col. D.C. Foster	Okayama L.O.
Tottori office			Cap. J.B. Sullivan	
76 M.G. Co	Kure	Hiroshima Shimane Yamaguchi	Col. M.H. Ellis	Kure L.O.
Yamaguchi office	Matsue		Maj. H.H. Osborne	
Yamaguchi office	Yamaguchi		Cap. R. Boswell	Kure L.O. Yamaguchi B.O.
81 M.G. Co	Kochi	Kochi-Tokushima	Maj. Grant	
Tokushima office	Tokushima		Cap. Kinzer	
91 M.G. Co	Takamatsu	Ehime-Kagawa	Col. Dark	Takamatsu L.O.
Ehime office	Matsuyama		Cap. Borish	Takamatsu L.O. Matsuyama B.O.

圖覽一地在所會員委並局務事絡連戰終·況狀駐進軍國合聯



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日本占領軍に對する外國と論並に新聞論調

同電11.10.1-5に編入あり。



昭和二〇 一一二六一 略

不ツクホルム 九月二十二日一六〇〇 発政  
本省 二十四日〇五二〇 着

吉田外務大臣

岡本公使

第五九五号

(日本占領軍兵に関するマツカーサー声明に対する反響)

日本占領軍の兵力は二十万をもつて足るべしとのマツカーサー声明は米國において問題となり米各紙はマ及び國務省を非難し居りヘラルド・トリビューンは國務省の能率増進を見るまで現地司令官があたかも同時に國務長官たるかの如く振舞うことを止めざるべしと述べ又華府方面にては二十万の兵士をもつてしては数千万の日本國民を充分に監督し且つ民主政治の下に置くことは不可能なるのみならず太平洋より撤兵の報道は在欧兵士の士氣を悪化せしむべしと見居れりと報じ居り更に二十日國務次官アツチンソンも新聞会見においてマの行過を非難せり右極東より米軍撤退問

外務省

題に関連し二十日ボルチモアサンは在華府メイトランド・ウイルメン元師同誌記者に対し米國が大々的に占領軍撤退と徴兵制限を行方においてはソ連の独り舞台となるべく米國にして歐洲における軍事的勢力を減せばソ連のバルカン制覇を防ぐものなきに至るべしと述べたる旨報じたることは現在機微なる対ソ關係上一大衝動を惹起し居れり外務省は本件に関し真相判明せざるも右声明は個人的資格において爲せるものにして政府とは何等關係なしと声明せり

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Note to Editor's: It is suggested the following may be run in a column parallel to the New York dispatch quoting Hallett Abend's article on the Occupation of Japan. --- UPA, Tokyo.

TOKYO, Jan. 6 -- (UP) -- Hallett Abend's article on the Occupation of Japan under General MacArthur in the current issue of the magazine "Look," was described in responsible American quarters today as "the most amazing collection of mis-statements and downright falsehood," which has appeared in any American publication to date with regard to the situation in this country.

It was pointed out that Abend, so far as is known, has not been in Japan since the Occupation and never was a permanent Japan correspondent, but was stationed in China during most of the years he spent in the Far East from about 1926 to about 1938.

Checking through the Abend article point by point, it was noted that Abend was in error in quoting General MacArthur as stating the Occupation would be a failure if it lasted longer than three years. What the General actually has said is that a study of military occupations of conquered countries in past eras has shown that they usually were not successful if they lasted for periods longer than three to five years. This statement was made prior to the beginning of the acute phase of the "cold war," between the United States and Soviet Russia, which has changed the whole world outlook and made the conclusion of an early peace between the Allied nations and Japan -- for which General MacArthur had hoped -- impossible.

One American authority said that the Abend article "certainly will provide excellent fodder for Soviet Russian and other Communist propaganda," and added that the fact it is being circulated in Japan, where the Japanese Communist party has an official newspaper, is ample proof that there is no censorship in this country.

Abend's assertion that Japan is "not much nearer being self-sustaining than it was immediately after the surrender," was described as "patently false." At the time of the surrender, it was pointed out, Japan's entire economy was military. Today it is entirely peaceful and hundreds of factories which were devoted to military production are turning out peace-time goods. Buildings which were housing Japanese military establishments now are used for peace-time purposes. Millions of men who were engaged in non-productive military effort now are engaged in peace-time production.

To state that occupation authorities have failed in "making Japan over into a Christian democracy," is equally an obvious falsehood, it was said. There has been no claim that the task of making Japan over into a Christian democracy has been completed, it was pointed out, but it has been claimed that steady progress in this direction has been made. That progress should be apparent to anybody who has made even a cursory study of events in this country since V-J Day.

ADD COMMENT ON LOOK ARTICLE, TOKYO X X X DAY.

It was pointed out, too, that all observers in Japan agree that the economic situation of the country has improved vastly since V-J Day and is continuing to improve. One Allied observer described the measure of the improvement as "extremely good, when one considers the fact that Japan emerged from the war stripped of her great overseas empire which had been the base for her entire economic structure."

Abend's assertion that the Japanese Communists are "gaining ground steadily," was described as "disproved by the facts." It was pointed out that the chief strength of the Communists in this country was in the labor movement and that their influence in that movement now largely has been broken by SCAP's recent action in prohibiting strikes by government workers.

One authoritative Allied informant said: "It is my opinion that Communist influence in Japan is decidedly on the down grade and that this fact will be demonstrated by the Communist party vote in the impending parliamentary elections."

With regard to Abend's conclusion that MacArthur has lulled the American people "into a false sense of security about the perilous situation in the Far East," informants said that the opposite is the truth and that this fact is proved by General MacArthur's letter the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in Washington, on March 3, 1948. In that letter the General dealt at length with the need "to bulwark the frontiers of freedom (in Asia) against the assaults of political despotism."

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### The Strange Case of MacArthur in Japan

He defeated Japan -- but he has failed us in the occupation. His regime, high-handed and inept, has left the country desperate and confused.

By HALLETT ABEND

Noted for Eastern correspondent, author of Japan Unmasked

Any military occupation of a conquered territory that lasts longer than three years defeats its own ends and is bound to be a failure.

This was the declaration of Gen. Douglas MacArthur soon after he landed in conquered Japan in the early autumn of 1945. So far, the American military occupation of Japan has already been prolonged into its fourth year. Yet the end is not even in sight. We will certainly not bring our troops home this year, and probably not even in 1950.

History, it seems, will have to record the sardonic verdict that General MacArthur was the prophet of his own failure as the administrator of the conquered Japanese Empire. It will have to record that the triumphant victor of a brilliant military campaign made a costly botch of the unfamiliar task of rebuilding the fallen Empire's shattered political and economic structure.

Japan faces economic, political crisis,  
but censorship has hidden the truth.

The grim facts in Japan today are these:

1. The nation is not much nearer being self-sustaining than it was immediately after the surrender.
2. It is costing the American taxpayer about \$ 400,000,000 a year—more than \$ 1,000,000 a day—to keep Japan alive on meager rations. This figure does not count the cost of the enormously expensive military occupation.
3. MacArthur's hope of making Japan over into a Christian democracy has tragically failed.
4. The country is in dire economic straits and in dangerous political turmoil, with the Communists gaining ground steadily.

#### Our Position Is Imperiled

Today, when the whole world is fearing a war between Soviet Russia and the West, our position in the entire Far East is one of peril. In case of war, our few thousand men in China could last no longer than could our forces in Berlin itself. Our army of occupation in Korea, a mere 25,000 men, would probably meet the fate which MacArthur's army in the Philippines met in Bataan in 1941 and early 1942. And in Japan itself, where we might by this time have built a great bastion of defense, we face further peril. The Communists are so strong that if war with Russia is thrust upon us, sabotage

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and domestic unrest will probably seriously weaken our already shaky position.

Knowledge of all the facts about the situation in Japan has been kept from the American public by a curious and unannounced system of censorship. It is a system as vicious as it is effective, one for which General MacArthur must be held personally accountable.

Every American newsman and magazine writer in Japan knows the consequences if he sends to this country facts that displease General MacArthur or the all-powerful members of the high command. He will find all official avenues of information closed tight against him. Besides that, he will very shortly be forced by some means to leave the Far East, with no possibility of returning.

#### MacArthur Even Dislikes Friendly Criticism

This system of censorship in Japan was probably a natural development under an administrator like General MacArthur. He is supersensitive even to friendly criticism, and is naturally inclined to imperious and dictatorial attitudes.

The case of the Japanese press is hardly better. Official censorship of news before publication was abolished last July 15 for all the principal Japanese newspapers. Under a new directive, Japanese editors must be their own censors. They are told that they may publish everything except "inaccurate news" or news and views "criticizing the occupation." Actually, after-publication

censorship

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censorship continues in full force. MacArthur's headquarters retains the authority to suspend from publication or otherwise punish any newspapers that are guilty of infractions of the new press code.

What is the truth? What are the facts that many correspondents dare not report and many newspapers dare not publish?

Domestically, Japan is down a blind alley. The people are developing a fatalistic attitude akin to despair. Most of the causes are economic.

A stage has been reached where paltry profits from production amount to only a fraction of what black marketeers can make selling hoarded goods. As a result, production has dropped to a point where there seems no hope of restoring any balance between supply and demand. Labor is in no mood to work because the value of wages has fallen so low. Government spending continues to increase at a rate out of all proportion to what the people can endure in taxation. This brings all the evils of violent inflation.

The Japanese yen, worth around four to the American dollar in 1941, is now down officially to 270 to the dollar. The black-market rate is much higher than this.

The situation is further aggravated by bitter public disappointment over the continuation of an acute housing shortage. In spite of all the bright promises and prophecies of the occupation authorities, not much has been done. To date, only 13.4

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per cent of the 744,895 Tokyo dwelling units destroyed by our fire bombs during the war have been replaced, and the average is about the same for the entire country. Living space throughout Japan averages only 18 square feet of space for families ranging from two to six persons. This figure makes the housing shortage in the United States seem trifling by comparison.

Closer examination of business, industry and government shows that all three are staggering under a terrible burden of uselessly large staffs. But the economical cutting down of payrolls would bring initial unemployment and hardship. And the labor unions, fostered to new strength under the MacArthur policies, are violently opposed to any reduction in the number of useless employees.

#### Payrolls Are Swollen

A measure of this intolerable load of swollen staffs is shown by a few official statistics. Before the war, the government-owned railways employed about 50,000 people. Now their payroll exceeds 600,000 men and women. The Foreign Office continues to maintain its diplomatic and consular staffs at the prewar level, though the Japanese government today does not have a single diplomat abroad. The newspaper Asahi, which puts out only a two-page daily newspaper for most days of the week, must find money to maintain more than 6,000 people on its payroll.

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Acting on his own, MacArthur has flouted the Potsdam agreement

At the beginning of the occupation, we tried to institute a liberal policy in Japan. General MacArthur, a remarkably able and harsh realist in military matters, is something of an impractical visionary and idealist in civilian affairs. At first, the General was surrounded by a group of advisers who became known as "the last of the New Deal boys." Their policies did not work and were grandually modified one by one, as the anarl of administrative affairs brought no beneficent results.

#### Reforms Led to Abuse

We started the program of economic reforms with the announced intention of splitting up all "concentrations of excessive economic power." We confiscated lands, private properties and holdings of individuals and corporations, often selling them at a small fraction of their real value to "good" elements of the population. Abuses were monumental.

Then we catered to labor, ignoring the fact that the Russian and Japanese Communists had infiltrated deeply into the labor unions. Under the occupation directives, management may not reduce useless and overlarge staffs in the interests of economy and efficiency. The result is that production continues to lag, the output is largely second class and the black market thrives.

During the period of Japanese expansion into Manchuria from 1931 on through the war, radicalism was sternly suppressed in

Japan.

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Japan. Labor unions were kept almost powerless. As a result, the labor leaders were not trained nor prepared for the new liberties and powers given them by MacArthur's officials. Today, encouraged by the Communists, those leaders have distorted ideas of the rights of the Japanese working man.

Through the workings of a peculiar institution called the Labor-Management Council, the unions can interfere in the management of any firm. For instance, the Kyodo News Agency cannot pay its executives more than 80,000 yen a month - a little less than \$ 30 in American money at the official exchange rate. If the pay of any particularly able executive is raised, the pay of all union members must also be proportionately increased. This may sound just in theory, but in practice it paralyzes initiative at the top and makes the whole pay structure stiff and unwieldy.

Under these many handicaps, it is no wonder that, today, after three years of occupation, Japan's industrial production is lagging badly. It amounts to only 53 per cent of the average production in the years 1930-1934. And the living standard of Japan's 80,000,000 people is still 30 per cent lower than the very low standards which existed there from 1930 to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. If the American contribution of more than \$ 400,000,000 a year were to cease, hunger and malnutrition would inevitably result.

How much has General MacArthur been to blame for this state of affairs?

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#### He Has a Free Hand

The Allied Commander in Japan has had more freedom of decision and action than any military man in charge of any conquered area in either Europe or the Far East.

Theoretically, there have been only three checks upon his independence, aside from orders from the White House in Washington. These three checks are the Potsdam declaration, the eleven-power Far Eastern Commission sitting in Washington and the abortive Allied Council for Japan. The latter first met in Tokyo in April, 1946.

If any White House orders have ever been sent to General MacArthur that were at variance with his policies, the fact is not known in Tokyo or elsewhere. The Far Eastern Commission has occasionally advised upon the manner of carrying out general directives. But it has never questioned General MacArthur's policies, actions or authority. The Allied Council for Japan, supposed to be an advisory offshoot of the Far Eastern Commission, has been the victim of petty wrangling from the first--with MacArthur always having his own way.

In the beginning, the British and Chinese members of the Allied Council unhesitatingly supported General MacArthur and all American moves and policies. But they have been rudely treated and, latterly, tempers have often flared. In his personal introductory talk to the Allied Council, General MacArthur haughtily declared that that body would not be permitted to "divide the

heavy

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heavy administrative responsibility of the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority."

#### Jap War Leaders Have Jobs

The Potsdam declaration has suffered heavily. It promised to eliminate permanently "the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest." The very fact that war leaders Yoshida and Shidehara both have headed Japanese governments under MacArthur proves the extent to which the Potsdam declaration has been flouted. Even the notorious Hatoyama, after he had been purged, acted openly as advisor to succeeding cabinets.

Pledges of freedom of thought and speech also have been tacitly broken. MacArthur's headquarters, for instance, had helped reactionary newspaper publishers to break strikes of editorial department workers—strikes not due to wages or working conditions, but to censorship.

Time and his own political aspirations seem to have combined to work against General MacArthur's success in Japan. As late as last May, members of his inner circle expected the General to leave Japan in June and to contend more actively for the Presidential nomination. Even before that, the General had had to change his plans because of lengthening military occupation. At the start, in September 1945, he had confidently expected the negotiation and ratification of a peace treaty within less than three years. At the conclusion of peace, he would have

pulled

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pulled out, and left the Japanese to work out their own hard destiny.

#### Haste Made Waste

The occupation was expected to end before the autumn of 1948, and so a mania developed at headquarters for piling up impressive statistics, to do the job in a hurry. This resulted in confusion, some corruption and much shabby patchwork achievement.

The Japanese government, for instance, was ordered to hasten the sales to small farmers of lands from the confiscated large estates. Sales had been slow because the government wanted, first, to work out various engineering problems of conservation, road building, irrigation and utilization of marginal lands. But these careful plans had to be shelved and sales had to be rushed. Headquarters wanted impressive statistics about the breaking up of large estates and the number of former slave-tenants who had become independent landowners.

#### Peace Treaty Was Lacking

When it became evident that a peace treaty would have to wait upon a general world-wide American-Soviet agreement, MacArthur realized the need to revise occupation policies fundamentally. The commission headed by Under Secretary of the Army Draper went to Japan, investigated and drafted plans and recommendations. Its report, briefly summarized, said, "Turn the wheel to the right."

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The Draper report quickly resulted in a brusque discard of the remaining schemes of the so-called "New Deal boys." Management was suddenly encouraged to begin asserting its rights; labor was no longer coddled; many directives against "big business" were rescinded.

#### Reds Get Propaganda Grist

This revision of policy played directly into the hands of the Communists. They were quick to make the most of the propaganda opportunities offered. The occupation headquarters' announcement that Japan invited the investment of foreign capital was immediately distorted by the radical left. "Proof" was seen that the United States was bent upon exploiting Japan and reducing the Empire to the level of a "colony."

Russia has made propaganda capital out of General MacArthur's difficulties more than once. Take the recent and continuing controversy over the General's policy of having the government prohibit strikes by workers in government employment.

The Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, in a general denunciation, declared that the MacArthur policy was grossly repressive. In August, Maj. Gen A. P. Kislenko, of the Embassy staff, issued another aggressive attack. In early September, Lt. Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko, just back in Tokyo after conferences in Moscow, charged that the new law violated the Potsdam declaration. Later that same month, Alexander S. Panyshkin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, charged MacArthur with "gross violation" of

international

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international agreements providing for the democratization of Japanese trade unions.

In reply to the Russian Ambassador's attack in Washington, General MacArthur issued in Tokyo a sweeping denial that his labor policy violates the Potsdam agreement.

But the controversy is being ended by high-handed and undemocratic methods. At MacArthur's direction, the present cabinet's temporary order against strikes by government employees has been drafted into a permanent statute by the Japanese attorney general. When the wording has been approved by MacArthur's headquarters, it will be sent to the Diet with orders for enactment.

The danger of high-handed methods of this kind is shown by the fact that Japanese Communists already dominate unions representing over half of Japan's more than 6,000,000 unionized workers.

Nearly all labor unions in Japan, even those not already dominated by the Reds, have organized Young People's Action Corps. These younger members, almost without exception, are Communists. At their demonstrations, they sing the Internationale, wave red flags and display enlarged photographs of Lenin and Stalin.

#### They Boast a "Unity of Steel"

Without hesitation, they obey the orders of Communist executive committees. They boast a "unity of steel." And they avow their willingness to "brave death for the cause," as did the

suicidal

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suicidal Kamikaze pilots during the last months of the Pacific war.

The Communists have also penetrated successfully into the schools and colleges, and most of the university newspapers and magazines heartily support Soviet policies.

The ranks of Japanese Communists are being increased every month by adroit Russian drafts upon a very large reservoir of new converts. As General MacArthur pointed out in a note to General Derevyanko last September, Russia still holds about 523,000 former Japanese soldiers, who surrendered late in 1945, in Manchuria.

The United States, Britain, France, Holland and China have all kept their promise to repatriate all surrendered Japanese. But Russia has kept these men in Siberian and Mongolian slave labor camps.

#### Red Converts Return Home

For more than three years, these hapless prisoners, who originally numbered more than 625,000, have been subjected to continuing pro-Communist propaganda. Of late, the converts have begun to return to their homeland in increasing numbers. Nearly 15,000 were repatriated in September. Those who persist in an anti-Communist attitude continue to labor as slaves.

What lies ahead for Japan? Three divergent and contradictory lines of thought are developing concerning the country's future.

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A number of Japanese foresee a military comeback and a war of revenge—with or without the aid of Soviet Russia. Many highly placed members of the occupation forces see the probability of Japan turning anti-American and pro-Russian. General MacArthur blandly assumes that all is sweetness and light and that Communism has no chance.

Those who speak of a war of revenge are former national leaders who became heroes to the people during the Tokyo war crimes trials. They pose as national martyrs who are being penalized for their devotion to the Emperor and to the greater power and glory of Japan. Today, however, the thoughts of most Japanese are fixed upon a war between Russia and the West—a war much more imminent than a Japanese war of revenge against us.

The second possibility—that Japan will turn Communist—was discussed not long ago by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, who served until recently as commanding general of the army of occupation under MacArthur.

"There is grave danger," said Eichelberger, "of communism spreading in Japan. Trouble might develop if we were to leave.... It must be considered that the Japanese have nothing with which to defend themselves; no navy, no army, no airplanes. All they have are a few policemen—not even an organized constabulary to protect themselves internally. If United States troops are pulled out, trouble might develop."

General

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General MacArthur's viewpoint was expressed about a week later, in a statement he issued on the eve of the third anniversary of the signing of Japan's surrender. It described Japan as "an asset upon which the free world may confidently count." It added that the allies' self-imposed task of "erecting upon Japanese soil a bastion to the democratic concept" is in an advanced state.

#### MacArthur Ignores Truth

Then the General, the incurable optimist, linked Japan with the powerless and bankrupt Philippine government and with the shaky and endangered South Korean Republic as a "triangular buttress" for democracy in Asia.

"And today," MacArthur added, in the following phrases he loves so well, "those practical weapons needed to repel the totalitarian advance—liberty, dignity, opportunity—now safely rest in every Japanese hand."

In pronouncements of this kind, General MacArthur ignores the fact that the Japanese today are a disillusioned and embittered people—pauperized by our failure to make them self-supporting.

He has lulled us into a false sense of security about the perilous situation in the Far East. He has misled the American people.

END

"Look"

January 18, 1949.

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#### MacArthur Hits Occupation Story, Hallett Abend Replies

TO THE EDITOR: As requested by you, I have read the article on the occupation appearing in the latest issue of LOOK (January 18 - The Strange Case of MacArthur in Japan, by Hallett Abend, former New York Times Far Eastern correspondent) and I send you herewith my frank comment thereon.

It is completely unrealistic. It follows the exact line of false propaganda now being put forth almost daily by Moscow with reference to the occupation, and is calculated to achieve the same purpose, undermining of the confidence of public opinion in the integrity of American efforts, American efficiency and American personnel.

It contains a mass of untruths and half truths with vital omissions, written by a man who had not been to Japan since the end of the war, who was never assigned here even before the war, who has no personal knowledge whatsoever of conditions here, who has never talked with or even seen the various participants, either American or Japanese, and who writes with a degree of virulence and vitriolic bitterness which is the hallmark of irrationalism and nonobjectivity.

#### Many Observers Disagree

It is at entire variance with the opinions of scores of distinguished observers and writers who have at first-hand objectively explored the situation here and written

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fully of their investigations and observations.

I refer to such men as George Creel, Noel Busch, Roger Baldwin, Roy Howard, Frank Gannett, Erwin Canham, Barry Faris, Russell Brines, Nora Waln, Herrymon Maurer, Harold Noble, Miles Vaughn, Darrell Berrigan and many others of equal reliability and proven ability, to say nothing of the eminent educational, scientific, business, ecclesiastical and medical groups which have visited Japan to observe and advise, and the corps of trained correspondents, numbering approximately half a hundred, who daily report untrammelled the events here.

To belittle and disregard such evidence and such men is to prevaricate realism and factuality.

The article offers nothing constructive but unduly does real and unwarranted harm to the American cause in the Far East at a serious and anxious moment.

DOUBLAS MACARTHUR

Mr. Abend has replied to Gen. MacArthur's charges as follows:

TO THE EDITOR: One would think from General MacArthur's cable about my article in LOOK that there was not a single statement in it which contained an undeniable truth. Fortunately for me, his rage and unmeasured denunciation show how correct was my analysis when I wrote, "He is super-sensitive even to friendly criticism and is naturally inclined to imperious and dictatorial attitudes."

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I think it is noteworthy that the General, in his violent reaction, has not had the wisdom to say that this or that particular statement or paragraph or sentence in my article contains an untruth or a half truth. He has studiously avoided details and instead has chosen to issue a sweeping condemnation and denial of all the facts and figures which I presented. Not a single fact or figure as such is challenged.

He's Fooling Himself.

It is true that I have not been in Japan since the occupation began. But the General is mistaken in assuming that I have not talked to people who have been there, or to many of those who have participated in the occupation. And he is deceiving and fooling himself if he sincerely believes that everything in Japan is going well today.

The General says that my article is entirely at variance with the opinions of writers and observers whom he names. That is true. What he does not know is that an equal number of observers, many of them official, have returned from Japan thoroughly disillusioned and lamenting the fact that, under the system of censorship prevailing there now, the news and magazine men assigned to Japan do not dare to write the whole truth.

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The charge that my article is an attack that follows "the line of false propaganda put out daily from Moscow," and that it was designed to undermine public confidence in the efficiency and integrity of the occupation personnel, is shocking. It is an attempt to protect himself by trying to smear me with a red brush. Fortunately, my reputation and my record for the last 20 years entirely confound this attempt.

#### I Stand by My Article

The General makes what he would term a "will assertion" when he says I was never in Japan before the war. I lived and worked as a newspaperman in the Far East -- in China, Japan, Manchuria and the Philippines -- for the 15 years just preceding Pearl Harbor. And in those years, I probably knew more Japanese military and government leaders than MacArthur did.

After a study of General MacArthur's indignant attempt at rebuttal of my statements and conclusions, I unqualifiedly stand in support of all the assertions made in my article.

HALLETT ABEND

FEBRUARY 15, 1949.

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AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN (SUMMARY)

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AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN SUMMARY

The following pages contain the record of how American post-surrender policy toward Japan has been formulated—without the knowledge of the general public and often without the knowledge of policy-making officials—by a small group in the government both in Washington and Tokyo. It would not be proper for this paper to pass upon the motives of individuals in this group. It would be fair to say, however, that as a group they favored a planned, collectivized economy, the extreme regulation of business that often goes under the guise of anti-monopoly, a government of men, not laws, and in foreign policy the building of "freindsip bridges" to Russia. As applied to Japan, these ideas were calculated to result in:

- 1) Tearing down the Japanese social structure even though the predictable result was chaos leading to Communism
- 2) Depriving the business, managerial and governmental career classes—classes traditionally oriented toward the United States—of their influence, wealth and livelihoods through a "purge" by occupational categories.
- 3) The "deconcentration" of Japanese businesses into single-plant units under the guise of breaking up monopolies.
- 4) Reducing Japan to a subsistence level at which it could never become self-supporting and the United States would have to continue the relief expenditure

of \$1,000,000 per day or see Communism overwhelm the country.

- 5) Transferring power to radical labor and political organizations, including the Communist Party

Whatever the intent of the group, either individually or collectively, their policy served Russia so well that the Soviet Union has only occasionally and recently complained about American actions in Japan. Related and partly successful steps have been taken—mostly by Republicans in the Truman administration—to change this policy.

INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY

In Feb. 1945, the Far East Sub-Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was set up with Eugene H. Dooman, assistant to Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, as its chairman. The Committee's function was to prepare a "statement of general initial policy relating to Japan." Most of the social, political and economic policies embodied in the statement were worked out by a State Department group known as the Far East Area Committee. A major role in preparing policy toward Japan and presenting it before the Post-War Committee of the State Department was played by Joseph W. Ballantine, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.

Grew, Dooman and Ballantine, with long experience in Japan, were convinced that the Emperor system in some form had to be recognized, because otherwise the Japanese would never surrender

(this conclusion has been verified by nearly every competent observer in Japan since the end of the war). Furthermore, they knew that the Emperor system—good or bad—was the cement that held together the Japanese social structure and that without it, Japan might be impossible to govern during the occupation. They also felt that the Japanese business class on the whole had formed the strongest opposition to the militarist clique which precipitated the war.

A group which had by this time infiltrated the State Department along with other government agencies violently opposed these view both from within the State Department and by a campaign of vilification against Grew in left wing New York City newspapers and magazines. The leaders of this group were Owen Lattimore, former Deputy Director, Pacific Operations of the OWI; John Carter Vincent, chief of the China Division of the State Department and Lauchlin Currie of the Board of Economic Warfare. It was suspected that through Currie confidential information was leaked to the press and used in the attacks against Grew. Vincent and Lattimore had accompanied Henry Wallace on his 1943 flight to China and Siberia. The group's Bible was Lattimore's then newly published book, "Solution in Asia", which recommended the abolition of the Japanese monarchy, the banishment for life to China of all members of the Imperial Family, the dissolution of Japanese big business and the purge of business executives. The group's chief protector was Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson. To what extent Acheson was

aware of where their policies were bound to lead is unknown.

The group's immediate objective was to remove Grew, Dooman and Ballantine. After the broadcast of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese—as predicted—refused to surrender until they received assurances regarding the status of the Emperor. These were contained in the final message sent by Secretary Byrnes which the Japanese interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as a tacit recognition of the Emperor's position. Byrnes, the new Secretary of State, had asked Grew to continue as "Under Secretary until Byrnes's return from Potsdam. Grew then submitted his resignation and Byrnes accepted it and appointed Acheson as Under Secretary. Grew did not feel that he could accept Byrnes's suggestion that he go to Tokyo as Political Adviser to General MacArthur. Dooman also resigned at this time. Acheson immediately appointed Vincent in Dooman's place as chairman of the Far East Sub-Committee. Ballantine asked to be relieved of his post and was replaced by Vincent.

As these changes took place, the post-surrender policy evolved under Grew was officially adopted on Aug. 29 at the last SWNCC meeting attended by Dooman. The substance of the policy was cabled to General MacArthur in Tokyo that day. The document was then sent to him on Sept. 6. But the version sent to MacArthur on Sept. 6 contained several highly important insertions

that

that had not been in the document adopted at the Aug. 29 SWNCC meeting. The key additional clauses read:

"Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade."

"To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

- a. To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends;
- b. To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Japan's trade and industry."

In the Initial Post-Surrender Directive—an elaboration on the policy statement—these clauses were expanded to read:

"23. You will prohibit the retention in or selection for positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, of those who have actively participated in the organizations enumerated in paragraph 5 (g) (Page 3 (35)), Part I, General and Political of this directive, and of any who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends. (In the absence of evidence, satisfactory to you, to the contrary, you will assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression)."

"25. (b) (1) Require the Japanese to establish a public agency responsible for reorganizing Japanese business in accordance with the military and economic objectives of your government. You will require this agency to submit, for approval by you, plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking combines or other large concentrations of private business control."

WASHINGTON

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WASHINGTON AND SCAP

The Lattimore-Gurrie-Vincent group thus put themselves in a position to control the formulation of policy in Washington. Whether by accident or design, individuals who shared their views quickly infiltrated the agencies in SCAP in Tokyo which were charged with executing Washington's directives. The late George Atcheson, who had also served in China with Vincent, became MacArthur's diplomatic adviser. Edward D. Welsh, an OPA economist, became chief of the Anti-Trust and Cartels Division. Dr. S. M. Fine, another economist, became economic adviser to General Marquat, head of the Economic and Scientific Section. Colonel C. L. Kades, a Treasury Department lawyer, became deputy chief of the Government Section. Theodore Cohen, a State Department employee, became head of the SCAP labor division and is an economic adviser to General Marquat.

SCAP lent itself readily to shadow control by such groups. It was organized along army lines and the titular heads of most divisions were officers unacquainted with economic affairs who were glad to have advisers. These advisers to a considerable extent were drawn from the OPA and other New Deal agencies and appeared in Tokyo as War Department civilian employees. General MacArthur has frequently complained—off the record—to visitors about the "beatloads" of New Dealers sent to Tokyo. About three months ago, he informed an intimate friend that in his opinion, economic affairs should be turned over to the Japanese and the United States Army confined to a military role.

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