

いつてまずとりあげなければならぬものに日本の再軍備問題がある。マ元帥は、このほど平和條約が締結されたあかつきには、日本は、再軍備されるべきだとの見解をのべた。マ元帥のような有力な人物の意見は、当然ワシントンも初め世界各国の首都で大きな反響をよんだ。実際マ元帥の声明は忠実にホワイト、ハッスの見解を反映したものである。したがって、マ元帥とダレス大使の会談では、初めに、この問題がとりあげられるだろう。

ワシントン消息筋によると、米国は、日米同盟條約の問題に關してドイツの十個師団創設を提案した五〇年九月の禍を繰り返えしたくないと切望している。だから、日本は日本人が承認する程度においてのみ再軍備されることにならう。これが、現在の米政府の考えである。

日本の地理的立場と戦略的価値から考えて、日本は世界戦争において中立を維持することはできないという点が指摘されている。したがって、日米間の平和條約には附帯條項として日本を防衛するため、米国が日本に海軍基地をもち、米軍を駐在させる權利をもつような相互援助條約をどうしても仲わねばならぬと考えられている。米国の専門家は、この代価を拂うことによつてのみ、日本は独立と主權を再び獲得できると述べている。

要するに、平和條約と同時に日米間に共同防衛條約を締結して米軍の日本留駐を實現したいということは判然とておる。日本の再軍備については、慎重な態度であつて、マ元帥以外に、責任ある地位にある人から積極的な再軍備論が公式に表明されたことは、まだない。慎重考察中という感触をうけるのである。

18/10 條約部長

講和会議をめぐる国際情勢判断

(二六、八、一七)

本稿は従来随時行つてきた情勢判断の継続として、明年三月頃までを一応予測の目安としたものである。資料及び情報のきわめて不十分な条件下にはあるが、客観的判断を下すに努めた。関係各位のなんら御参考までに供覧する。

解除
第7回公開



- 一 米ソ戦争はいぜん勃発する危険はないが、ソ連の大規模な平和攻勢によつて、米ソ関係はいよいよ複雑微妙となり、アジアを中心とする冷戦はソ連のサンフランシスコ会議参加によつても今後ともつづくことが予想される。
- 二 米国の対ソ强硬政策は変更されず、西欧の同調も一応期待できる。ソ連はこゝ当分各種の平和攻勢に出るであろう。
- 三 朝鮮休戦は迂余曲折の後、今秋末までには成立を期待できるが、本格的な解決は見込がない。
- 四 対日講和は結局米国の原案通り調印され、明春には発効するものとみられる。ただしソ連の謀略的調印の可能性も絶無ではない。
- 五 その他ヨーロッパ、アジア各地域では、こゝ当分国際情勢に重要な影響を及ぼす如き動きはない。

三 中共 (一) (四) 台湾

るだけ会議をひき伸し、場合によつては一時決裂に至らしめて責任を米國に転嫁し、民主陣營の分裂を策することもありうる。

(四) もとより休戦が成立するにしても、その水鏡性は余り期待できない。休戦成立の後には全鮮の民主的選挙、南北統一政府の樹立などの問題がとり上げられるであろうが、その妥結は覚束ない。したがつて米國軍の駐屯は継続する。

(五) 対日講和

(1) ソ連としては対案の提示、修正の要求などに全力を注ぎ、平和條約の妨害を行ない、あるいは米英共同草案に対する不満を利用してアジア諸國の反日、反米感情をあおるなどの真意に努めるであろう。もしソ連が非難を加えつつも講和條約に参加(調印、批准を含む)するとすれば、それは露略である。

(2) 米國はソ連の右工作を封殺するに努め、嚴重な議事手續を強行し、できればソ連の妨害工作を逆用してアジアを含む民主各國の團結強化を計るであろう。

(3) 圓かくて対日平和條約は予定期日を若干は越えるかも知れないが、米英共同草案のまま調印され、明春には発効しよう。ただしソ連が中共代表問題、台湾帰屬問題などを留保して調印することなしとしなす。

國府は米國の援助によつてその存続は確守となつたが、米國の軍事援助も國府軍の本士逆上騒ぎを可能にするほどのものではなない。一方第七艦隊の撤退前には、中共の台湾攻撃は行われなす。

(六) その他アジア諸國

アジア諸國特にイラン、インド、ビルマ、インドネシアではせん根強い民族主義運動が存在する。共産陣營はそれを利用してこれら地域のいわゆる「中立化」をはかるが、ソ連のイラン派兵、中共のインドシナ、ビルマ派兵は行われなす。

(七) ヨーロッパ情勢

(1) 西歐一般 (前記(一)(四)参照)

(2) 西歐再軍備案の大綱は恐らく今年中に決定され、その実施は遅くも来春頃までに着手されるものと思われる。西歐連合國の対独戦争状態終結は既に三十数カ國により宣言されており、米國も早晩宣言の運びとなると思われ。西歐の地位向上の妨害を狙つて「早期講和」、「全独統一」、「自武装反対」の叫びは強化されよう。

(3) 東歐諸國における軍事体制は強化されつつあるが、ソ連がユーゴに対して武力攻撃を加える可能性は乏しい。

() その他諸国
 の加入は、一軍部基地問題の反対はあつても、トルコの北大西洋條約
 時間の問題である。

Source: N.Y. Times,
Aug. 27, 1951

Indian Note
EMBASSY OF INDIA
Washington, D. C.

Aug. 23, 1951.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am desirous to convey to you the following reply on behalf of the Government of India to your Government's invitation to participate in a conference to conclude a treaty of peace with Japan to be convened on Sept. 4, 1951, in San Francisco:

Begins: The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge with thanks for the receipt of the reply of the Government of the United States of America to the representations which they had made on the Japanese peace treaty in their communication dated July 30, 1951. They fully appreciate the consideration given to their views by the United States Government and wish to assure them that the present reply is conceived in a spirit of frankness and sincere friendship for the Government and people of the United States of America.

(2)

Throughout the negotiations that have taken place between the two Governments on the subject of the treaty the Government of India have laid emphasis upon two fundamental objectives:

- (1) The terms of the treaty should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality and contentment among the community of free nations;
- (ii) They should be so framed as to enable all countries specially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the treaty sooner or later.

The Government of India have after most careful thought come to the conclusion that the treaty does not in material respects satisfy either of these two criteria.

(3)

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(3)

CONDITION (I)

(a) It is only natural to expect that Japan should desire the restoration in full of her sovereignty over territory of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country. The Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands fully satisfy this description. Nevertheless, the treaty proposes that until the United States Government seek and obtain trusteeship over these islands they should continue to be subject to the legislative and administrative control of the United States. It is apparent to the Government of India that such an arrangement cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people and must carry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East.

(b) The Government of India recognize that as a sovereign nation Japan should have the right to make arrangements for her defence as provided in Article 5 of the treaty. If in exercise of this right Japan should decide to enter into defensive agreements with a friendly power no one could reasonably object to this. But the right should be exercised by the Government of Japan when Japan has become truly sovereign. A provision in the treaty which suggests that the present occupation force may stay on in Japan as part of such a defensive agreement is bound to give rise to the impression that the agreement does not represent a decision taken by Japan in the full enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign nation. The effect of this not only on the people of Japan but upon large sections of people in Asia is bound to be most unfortunate.

(4)

CONDITION (II)

As already stated, the Government of India attach the greatest importance to the treaty providing that the island of Formosa should be returned to China. The time and manner of such return might be the subject of separate negotiations, but to leave the future of the island undetermined, in spite of past international agreements, in a document which attempts to regulate the relations of Japan with all governments that were engaged in the last war against her does not appear to the Government of India to be either just or expedient. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same argument applies to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin.

(5)

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- 3 -

(5)

For the foregoing reasons, the Government of India have decided, with regret, that they cannot be parties to the treaty. It is their sincere hope that lasting peace will prevail in the Far East and, to that end, they will continue to cooperate with the United States Government and other governments in such manner as may be open to them, consistently with the principles on which their foreign policy is based. As a first step, it is their intention, as soon as this may be practicable, to put an end to the state of war between them and Japan, and to establish full diplomatic relations with that country.

(6)

It has already been announced that the conference convened at San Francisco to consider the draft peace treaty with Japan will not be open to negotiations, though attending governments will be free to state their views on the treaty. The India feel that the statement of their views on the treaty contained in this reply should be adequate to clarify their own position to the conference. It is their intention, if the United States Government have no objection, to communicate this reply to their own Parliament, which is now in session, on August 27. Once the document has been published, it will be available for the information of the conference, and the Government of India will be glad if the Government of the United States, which will act as host to the conference, will have this reply circulated to its members. As, for reasons already stated, the Government of India will be unable to sign the treaty, they think that it is not necessary for them to send representatives to it. Ends.

The Government of India would be glad to know if the United States Government have any objection to their informing our Parliament of this reply on Monday, August 27, 1951.

With assurances of my highest esteem,

M. K. KIRPALANI,
Chargé d'Affaires ad Interim.

The Honourable John Foster Dulles,
Consultant to the Secretary of State,
U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.

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COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL FOREIGN
STATEMENTS ON JAPANESE
PEACE TREATY

VOLUME II.

(From: September 14, 1950
To: May 25, 1951)

Public Information Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

May 1951

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This Collection is a compilation of the texts of official foreign statements and documents concerning the Japanese peace treaty.

It is planned to compile and print collections of this kind from time to time. Volume II contains the texts of statements and documents published since September 14, 1950, when the President of the United States issued a statement regarding preparatory talks for a Japanese peace treaty.

Director, Public Information Division


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TEXT OF MR. TRUMAN'S STATEMENT

Washington, September 14, 1950

It has long been the view of the United States Government that the people of Japan were entitled to a peace treaty which would bring them back into the family of nations.

As it is well known, the United States Government first made an effort in 1947 to call a conference of the nations holding membership in the Far Eastern Commission to discuss a peace treaty with Japan.

However, procedural difficulties at that time and since have prevented any progress.

The United States now believes that an effort should again be made in this direction, and I have therefore authorized the Department of State to initiate informal discussions as to future procedure, in the first instance with those governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission, the ones most actively concerned in the Pacific War.

It is not expected that any formal action will be taken until an opportunity has been had to assess the results of these informal discussions.

This policy in regard to a Japanese peace treaty is in accord with the general effort of the United States to bring to an end all the war situations.

We have long pressed the U.S.S.R. for an Austrian treaty and we are exploring the possibility of ending the state of war with Germany.

TEXT OF MR. DULLES' STATEMENT ON
INFORMAL TALKS WITH U.S.S.R.

Lake Success, October 20, 1950

In response to an inquiry Mr. (deputy Foreign Minister) Jacob A. Malik of the Soviet Delegation has indicated that the Soviet Government will be prepared to discuss with us informally the possibilities of a Japanese treaty. The time and place of the discussions probably will be arranged within the next few days.

TEXT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM

Washington, November 24, 1950

There is given below a brief, general statement of the type of treaty envisioned by the United States Government as proper to end the state of war with Japan. It is stressed that this statement is only suggestive and tentative and does not commit the United States Government to the detailed content or wording of any future draft. It is expected that after there has been an opportunity to study this outline, there will be a series of informal discussions designed to elaborate on it and make clear any points which may be obscure at first glance.

The United States proposes a treaty with Japan which would end the state of war, restore Japanese sovereignty and bring back Japan as an equal in the society of free peoples.

As regards specific matters, the treaty would reflect the principles indicated below:

- (1) ~~Parties~~—Any or all the nations at war with Japan who are willing to make peace on the basis proposed and as may be agreed.
- (2) United Nations. Membership by Japan would be contemplated.
- (3) ~~Territory~~—Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) agree to the United Nations' trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and (c) accept a future decision of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China and the United States with reference to the status of Formosa, the Pescadores, South Sakhalin and Kuriles. In the event of no decision within a year after the treaty came into

effect, the United Nations General Assembly would decide. Special rights and interests in China would be renounced.

(4) Security. The treaty would contemplate that, pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements such as United Nations' assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and the United States and, perhaps, other forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

(5) Political and Commercial Arrangements. Japan would agree to adhere to multilateral treaties dealing with narcotics and fishing. Pre-war bilateral treaties could be revived by mutual agreement. Pending the conclusion of new commercial treaties, Japan would extend the most-favored nation treatment, subject to normal exceptions.

(6) Claims. All parties would waive the claims arising out of war acts prior to September 2, 1945, except that (a) the Allied Powers would, in general, hold Japanese property within their territory and (b) Japan would restore Allied property, or, if not restorable intact, Yen to compensate for an agreed percentage of the lost value.

(7) Disputes. Claims disputes would be settled by a special neutral tribunal to be set up by the President of the International Court of Justice. Other disputes would be referred either to diplomatic settlement, or to the International Court of Justice.

TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT
AIDE-MEMOIRE TO MR. MALIK

Washington, December 28, 1950

On November 20 of this year Mr. Malik presented to Mr. Dulles an aide-memoire expressing the desire of the Soviet Government for clarification of a number of points in a tentative United States statement of principles respecting a Japanese peace treaty given to Mr. Malik by Mr. Dulles on October 26. After careful study of the Soviet aide-memoire of November 20, the United States Government has concluded that most of the questions raised by the Soviet Government have in fact been answered by the statement of principles given to Mr. Malik on October 26. However, in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding, the points raised by the Soviet Government are further discussed as follows:

1. The United States Government hopes that all nations at war with Japan will participate in the conclusion of peace. The United States does not, however, concede that any one nation has a perpetual power to veto the conclusion by others of peace with Japan. The wartime declaration of January 1, 1942, referred to by the Soviet Union, was designed to assure that all nations at war with Japan, or with the other Axis Powers or their associates, would continue to fight until victory had been won. That they did. The United States does not accept the thesis often put forward by the Soviet Union, that there cannot be peace except on terms that one Power dictates. Japan, after its defeat, has now for over five years loyally complied with the agreed Terms of Surrender and is entitled to peace. The United States should be glad to know whether it is the view of the Soviet Union that there can never be

any peace with Japan unless terms can be found which are fully satisfactory to each one of the 47 nations which signed or adhered to the Decralation of January 1, 1942.

2. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China. That Declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final settlement where relevant factors should be considered. The United States cannot accept the view, apparently put forward by the Soviet Government, that the views of other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also the United States believes that declarations such as that issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the United Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other international agreement.

3. The United States Government does not understand the reference by the Soviet Union to 'territorial expansion' in connection with suggestion that the Ryukyu and Bonin islands might be placed under the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.

Article 77 of the United Nations Charter expressly contemplated the extension of the trusteeship system to territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the second World War—and certainly the trusteeship system is not to be equated with territorial expansion.

The Government of the United States also does not understand the suggestion of the Soviet Union that because the Ryukyu and Bonin islands are not mentioned in either the Cairo Declaration or the Potsdam Agreement, their consideration in the peace settlement is automatically excluded.

The Government of the Soviet Union seems to have ignored the fact that the Potsdam Declaration provided that Japanese sovereignty

should be limited to the four main islands, which were named, and such minor islands as we determine. It is, therefore, strictly in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement that the peace settlement should determine the future status of these other islands.

4. It is the view of the United States Government that, upon conclusion of a peace settlement, the military occupation of Japan would cease. The fact that a "new order of peace, security and justice", as envisaged in the Potsdam Declaration, has not been established, and that irresponsible militarism has not been driven from the world, would at the same time make it reasonable for Japan to participate with the United States and other nations in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense, such as are envisaged by the United Nations Charter and particularly Article 51 thereof. These arrangements could include provision for the stationing in Japan of troops of the United States and other nations. The United States does not propose for Japan a peace settlement which will deny to Japan what Prime Minister Stalin has described (March 10, 1939) as "the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors".

5. Referring to a policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission, which decisions have been commonly considered to be legally operatable only for the period of the occupation except as the substance of particular provisions may be embodied in the peace settlement, the Soviet Government raises two questions relating to the security of Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty. Both questions are answered by Paragraph Four of the statement of principles handed to Mr. Malik on October 26 and by the comment expressed above.

6. The United States considers that the Japanese peace treaty should not limit the Japanese peacetime economy nor deny Japan access to sources of raw material or participation in world trade. The United States, without awaiting the formal conclusion of peace,

has made very large financial grants to Japan to enable it to acquire food and raw materials needed for its economic livelihood and has encouraged the establishment by Japan of trade promotion offices in many parts of the world in an effort to help Japan to develop a prosperous peacetime economy and steadily advance the living standards of the Japanese people.

7. The present conversations are being conducted by the United States through diplomatic channels and; as the Soviet Union well knows, the Government of the United States has no diplomatic relations with the so-called "Government of the Chinese People's Republic".

It is the earnest hope of the United States that the close attention which the Government of the Soviet Union has given to the peace proposals of the United States in relation to Japan signifies the desire and intention of the Soviet Union not only to enter into discussions of a peace treaty for Japan but to act in cooperation with other nations at war with Japan to make peace a reality.

Department of State, Washington,
December 27, 1950

TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT ON MR. DULLES' APPOINTMENT

Washington, January 10, 1951.

The President has designated John Foster Dulles as his special representative with the personal rank of ambassador to conduct on behalf of the United States such further discussions and negotiations as may be necessary to bring a Japanese peace settlement to an eventual successful conclusion.

Last September the President authorized the Department of State to initiate informal discussions with interested nations on problems connected with a Japanese peace treaty. Mr. Dulles was designated by the Secretary of State to take charge of these discussions. It was contemplated at that time that, upon conclusion of the initial series of discussions, it would be necessary for a representative of the United States Government to visit Japan and confer with General MacArthur and, through and in cooperation with him, with Japanese leaders on the means of making progress toward a peace settlement.

Mr. Dulles will, therefore, shortly leave for Japan as head of a Presidential Mission to carry on such discussions. The membership of the Mission and the time of departure will be announced by the Department of State as soon as the information is available.

TEXT OF MR. ACHESON'S STATEMENT ON
DEPARTURE OF DULLES MISSION

Washington, January 17, 1951

John Foster Dulles, special representative of the President, expects to depart the first of next week by a military transport plane.

Mr. Dulles, as announced on January 11, will confer with General MacArthur and with Japanese leaders on the means of making further progress toward a peace settlement.

John M. Allison, foreign service officer, has been assigned to the Office of the Political Adviser in Tokyo as special assistant with the personal rank of Minister and will serve as Mr. Dulles' deputy.

Accompanying Mr. Dulles on his trip will be Assistant Secretary of Army Earl D. Johnson who has general responsibility for occupied areas, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder who has for some time dealt with occupation problems in both Japan and Germany and Col. C. Stanton Babcock of the Department of Army.

John D. Rockefeller III who had extensive experience in cultural, humanitarian and social affairs will serve in a consultant capacity to discuss with Japanese civic leaders opportunities for developing long-range cultural relations opportunities for developing long-range cultural relations between the United States and Japan.

Robert A. Fearey of the Department of State and Miss Doris A. Doyle, secretary to Mr. Dulles, will also be in the party.

TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON
MEETING OF PRESIDENT AND
MR. DULLES

Washington, January 18, 1951

The Secretary of State and Mr. John Foster Dulles called on the President and discussed fully with him the program for achieving a peace settlement with Japan.

The President reexpressed his desire to push ahead vigorously in cooperation with our Allies toward a peace which will restore sovereignty to the Japanese nation.

Mr. Dulles and his party.....plan to leave for Tokyo next Monday.