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TEXT OF MR. DULLES' STATEMENT ON TRIP TO JAPAN

Washington, January 22, 1951

We are going to Japan to find a way to put our future relations on a long-term friendly basis. We shall in our effort rely greatly on the advice and consultation of General MacArthur, who has already laid a good foundation for our present effort. We are working in close contact with our Allies and we have talked over our plans with the Committees of Congress.

For over five years, the Japanese have loyally complied with the Surrender Terms. We believe that they are now entitled to the peace which will make them the masters of their own destiny and give them the opportunity to take part in all the varied, peaceful aspects of national and international life.

Restored freedom will come to the Japanese people at a critical time. Even before World War II has been formally ended, new armed aggression has broken loose in the word.

It is showing its viciousness close to Japan. The present state of the world places a heavy responsibility upon all free people. We have confidence, however, that the Japanese people, now that their militaristic ambitions have been buried, will become worthy members of the free world, sharing honorably its opportunities, its responsibilities and the common purpose to surmount the dangers.

TEXT OF MR. DULLES' STATEMET ON "CONSULTATIONS"

Tokyo, January 31, 1951

We are having useful consultations which will help us to apply the principles which we beiteve should govern the peace settlement.

I shall set forth these principles in the address which I shall make at the Japan-American Society luncheon February 2.

Consultations, such as are now in progress, are not the same thing as negotiations. Consultations are exchanges of views from which both sides learn. From our talks and from the study of responsible memoranda submitted to us, we are acquiring the knowledge which should precede decision. We are aware of the deep interest which the whole Japanese nation takes in the re-establishment of peace. That is a healthy condition which we welcome. I want to assure all those who communicate their views to our Mission that what they write is considered by us.

After our visit here is ended, we shall confer further with our Allies and then will come the time for decision.

I should like to make two things clear: First, neither our present consultations nor future decisions can be expected to re-open specific decisions already made and accepted by the Surrender Terms. Secondly, our Mission has no responsibility to deal with Occupation matters. These are, and remain, the sole responsibility of the Supreme Commander, of the Far Eastern Commission, and of the Allied Council for Japan.

I wish to express personally, and on behalf of the Mission, our appreciation of the great goodwill with which our Mission has been greeted.

TEXT OF ADDRESS BY MR. DULLES AT JAPAN-AMERICAN SOCIETY

Tokyo, February 2, 1951

I am happy to be again in Japan on a task of peace which the President has asked me to pursue in cooperation with General MacArthur. Already we are actively engaged in conversations with Japanese leaders and I am glad to have this opportunity to explain publicly the principles which animate our Mission.

Peace May be Won

Let me say first of all that we have faith that we are really building for peace, and not for war. Many feel that it is unrealistic to talk about peace when battle rages in nearby Korea. It is indeed ominous that the peaceful Republic of Korea should have been suddenly attacked by heavily armed forces, and that hundreds of thousands of North Korean and Chinese Communists are being driven to sloughter in order to gain a strategic position which has been coveted by Russia since the days of the Czars.

Irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. That clearly exposed fact carries a grave warning to us all. But it is not a warning which calls for panic or for a fatalistic assumption that general war is bound to come.

The United States, I can assure you, is proceeding on the assumption that general war is avoidable. But also we assume that peace will not be gained merely by wishing for it. History has taught that, time after time, but the lesson seems never to be learned. The reality is that to win peace requires vigorous, sustained and well-directed efforts which compare, in magnitude and sacrificial

quality, with the efforts required to win a war.

The United States and others are now making such efforts. I think we are making them in time, and because of that I can bring you a message of hope, not of despair.

No one can, of course, foresee surely what others may do. But it is possible to see how to gain a probability of security. It can come if the nations follow internationally the simple and tested rules of conduct which, in a domestic community, give individuals a probability of security.

Elemental Rules for Security

Most of us have homes within which we live and where we keep our personal belongings and valuables. The first responsibility for making them secure falls on the head of the household. He must have only trustworthy people in the home. Otherwise, the household goods will probably be stolen. There is little safety, and little sympathy, for those who run their households so carelessly that criminals have the freedom of the home.

The prudent householder also keeps his valuables behind closed doors and often under lock and key. He does not leave them lying about where they can be picked up by sneak thieves. Locked doors and cabinets are no insuperable obstacle to bold robber gangs, but they deter the lesser criminals.

That leaves to be dealt with the extreme criminal elements who are capable of breaking in and entering with violence. As against them, collective measures are the only dependable deterrent. It is not practicable to keep armed guards in every house—that would be too expensive. But communities normally create a central law enforcement group, which can move quickly and surely into action if there is violent robbery, and probably catch and punish those who violate the law. That generally frightens off even those who have the temperament for violent robbery. The result is that, in

a well-ordered community, robbers rarely indulge their evil ambitions. The likelihood of failure is a deterrent to aggression.

International Negligence

Most of the post-war international robberies that have occurred have been because nations failed to take internal precautions, such as are the personal responsibility of the householder himself. Nations have given opportunities within their own homeland to those who were the secret agents of international gangsters and they did not put their valuables behind the national equivalent of lock and key. The result has been that, without any open armed attack, without a shot being fired, all or large parts of many nations have been robbed of their freedom and brought under the bondage of imperialist communism.

In some cases the governments and people woke up to the danger when the agents of the foreign gang had stolen much, but not all, of the power. Then there ensued an open fight, a civil war, to see who would control.

Bolshevik Communism has, however, showed a desire to avoid the possible consequences of a breaking and entering with open violence. Even in Korea, the attackers pretended that they were engaged only in civil war and that the Chinese Communist armies came in as "volunteers".

Japan, as it looks forward to restored sovereignty, can draw some useful lessons from these elemental security principles, and from the consequences of ignoring them.

National Responsibility to Prevent Indirect Aggression

The Japanese Government and people will, themselves, have the primary responsibility to take care of the dangers, often referred

to as those of "indirect" aggression, which fall short of invasion in force.

Japan will have the duty to keep its homeland reasonably free of criminal agents. That requires, most of all, a healthy and vigorous Japanese society. A national household of 80,000,000 people is too numerous to be protected merely by trying to catch all the communist agents. There is need for vigilance, but not for a police state which, itself, creates the resentments which make alien penetration easier. It is impossible to prevent communism from penetrating into, and breeding in, societies where there is repression, misery and injustice on a large scale.

The United States has been trying to help Japan to build a good society and while peace will not end the friendly disposition of the United States, it will change the form of our relations and place primary responsibility upon Japan itself.

The Japanese Government and people will also then have the primary responsibility to maintain in their homeland a protection corresponding to that of a householder who keeps his valuables under lock and key, so that they cannot be stolen except by a breaking in with violence. Any people who avoid that precaution are guilty of contributory negligence and receive and deserve little sympathy. Five years ago I said to my own countrymen:

> "If we neglect our military establishment, that may lead to a dangerous misjudgment of us by the Soviet leaders. They take it for granted that those who have precious things will, if they are able, maintain a force-in-being to protect them. They assume that a man who does not put a lock on the door of his house has nothing in it that be greatly values."

Just as the prudent householder has a duty to create protections which deter all who do not have the boldness to rob with violence, so every nation which wants to preserve its liberties has its own duty to maintain a sufficient screen so that its boundaries cannot be

passed by hostile armies unless they are willing to take the consequence of open violence and killing.

In the case of Japan, the problem in that respect is simplified by the fact that Japan is an island country, separated by water from the aggressive land mass of communism.

Collective Defense Against Direct Aggression

When we turn from the dangers of "indirect" aggression to those of direct aggression—that is, armed attack in force from without—a different type of protection must be found, because while individual nations can singly cope with "indirect" aggression, few nations can cope with full-scale armed attack by a powerful aggressor. As against that, the individual nation, like the individual householder, needs a collective security arrangement.

The United Nations was formed for that purpose and its first stated purpose is "to take effective collective measures for the prevention of threats to the peace." The Security Council was given the duty to create all international force to deter aggression. However, this has been prevented by the Soviet Union, through use of its veto power.

At the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, the members took note of this dangerous paralysis and, with only the five Soviet bloc votes in opposition, recommended that each Member nation should create forces which would serve as United Nations units.

We can, therefore, expect gradually the bringing into being of an adequate international force, subject to direction by the United Nations. Until then, the deterrent to international robbery by large-scale violence resides in the commitment of national power to regional and collective security arrangements such as are authorized by the United Nations Charter.

Japan is Invited

Today, the principal deterrent power is possessed by the United States. We do not, however, intend to reserve that power only to protect ourselves. We are prepared to combine our power with that of others in mutual committals, in accord with the United Nations Charter, so that the deterrent power which protects us will also protect others. Japan, if it is disposed to protect itself against indirect aggression, can, if it wishes, share collective protection against direct aggression.

That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct. That is the stock-in-trade of the communist world. We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice.

Under such a security program as we have outlined, based on cooperation with Japan and our other friends, the United States would sympathetically consider the retention of United States armed forces in and about Japan, as a testimony to the unity between our countries.

Such an arrangement would create, for Japan, a situation very different from that of the Republic of Korea prior to June, 1950. The United States had withdrawn its armed forces from Korea and it had no responsibility there other than as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations had never made it clear that an attack by North Koreans on the Republic of Korea would lead to an invoking of the immense power that was available to strike at the roots of aggression. The aggressors were tempted by the probability that the reaction to their attack would be localized, so as to give the aggressor every advantage and so as to subject the defenders to every disadvantage. Thus, the deterrent of powerful counter-attack was wholly lacking.

The Deterrent of Retaliatory Power

If, however, there were in Japan the conditions I suggest, no aggressor could rely upon enjoying what General MacArthur has well called a "privileged sanctuary". Then an armed aggressor would be subjected to a striking power, the immensity of which defies imagination.

The United States produces many times as much steel, oil, aluminum and electric power as does any other nation. We are now turning much of that into actual military power, because we are not sure that those with aggressive intent respect any other form of power. Other free people are doing the same.

All of that creates a powerful deterrent to a possible aggressor. That is not mere speculation. We already know that nations with proved aggressive intent and great military power have not used the method of open military conquest. That is not because of moral restraints, which they openly disdain, or because of the power of local resistance, but because of fear of retaliatory power used in the interest of collective security.

You will have noted that the security program we outline does not require that the Japanese nation should become militaristic and create such land, sea and naval forces as tempted Japan down the road to destruction. Against that, the new Japan has rightly set its face. The program would realize the United Nations ideal, which is that the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" shall be so implemented that "armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest". In that way there can be security and peace.

Economic Welfare Attainable

But what is peace?

Peace is not just the drab business of seeking security. Peace is a positive and creative state which can and should enrich the life

of every individual, of every nation and of the whole society of nations. Only that kind of peace is self-perpetuating.

In Japan, there is natural concern as to how to lift up the standards of material existence. That is a hard problem. It needs to be studied. Our own study convinces us that the industry, the aptitude and the ingenuity of the Japanese people can assure the possibility of a rising economic standard through trade and commerce with the rest of the world. There is no reason for discouragement merely because Japan is itself relatively barren and densely populated.

I come from an Island, Manhattan, where over 2 million people are crowded into 22 square miles. That island has no natural resources, except a harbor. Yet it is one of the most prosperous areas of the entire world.

There is no folly greater than that of measuring people's economic potential in terms of square miles per capita. The most sparsely settled areas are usually the poorest.

Of course, new arts and new markets cannot be developed over-night. There are bound to be periods of difficulty. Also, defense programs are going to create temporary stringencies of most raw materials. There will be need for patience and persistence, and for some sacrifice and perhaps for some outside help. Bnt Japan can have a good economic future if she cultivates the good will of potential customers and if she devotes to industrial effort even a small fraction of the energy which, in the past, she devoted to building a war machine.

Realization of Spiritual Aspirations

Life, of course, is far more than mere physical living, and men are more than bodies. They have minds and spirits and the joy of life depends largely upon non-material things. Here there is no limit to the capacity for creative development. The Japanese

people have already demonstrated over the centuries the capacity to appreciate and to creat beauty and culture. The distinctive position which the Japanese have already won in that respect holds out great promise for the future. The richness of the free world depends largely on the stimulus of diversity. The entry of Japan into the free world can greatly increase that richness for the benefit of us all. Some have much to give. All have much they can usefully receive. The Japanese people have distinctive qualities, the fruits of which we of the West would like to share.

The great difference between the free world and the communist captive world is that the captive world stamps out all diversity and forces each individual into a strait jacket of conformity which is ignoble and in the long run, destructive of human welfare and progress. The free world stands for the right of men to be different and for each to develop peacefully in accordance with his own genius. That is what the other members of the free world will expect of a free Japan. It is in that way that the Japanese nation can realize its worthy ambitions.

The Cultivation of Worthy Ambition

The Japanese have always been ambitious people. That is a good thing. Nations, like individuals, have the right to be ambitious. Indeed, that is a duty, for people without ambition are a liability to society. Ambition becomes dangerous only when it employs fraud and violence. The Japanese people, for a time, fell under leadership which tried, by force, to promote Japanese ambitions at the expense of the legitimate aoitions of others. The fact that that was a wrong method, which failed, does not mean that ambition itself is wrong.

The new Japan has a great opportunity to exert an influence in Asia by what the founders of the United States called: "conduct and example". Our founders had faith that the United States could

exert a great liberating influence throughout the world. That was their ambition and it was realized, although during that period of history the United States was a weak nation in the sense that it was economically poor and it had virtually no military establishment. Nevertheless our nation won for itself a position of leadership and influence in the world and despotism receded under the force of our example.

There is a certain parallelism between the present opportunity of Japan in Asia and the 19th century opportunity of the United States in the West. Then, most of Europe and South America was under the heel of despotisms and Russia, under Czar Alexander, had founded the so-called Holy Alliance to extend imperialism throughout the world. The Holy Alliance, after initial successes, collapsed because it could not compete with political liberty. The high tide of despotism steadily receded and the peoples of the European Continent and South America won freedom.

Japan's Opportunity to Achieve Greatness

That history can be repeated. Despotism such as now overruns much of Asia can never stand the nearby contrast of freedom so practiced by another Asiatic power as to produce the manifold richness of which free men alone are capable. The Bolshevik leaders know the powers of example, and that is why they have invented the Iron Curtain in the hope of cutting off the magnetic influence which freedom always exerts upon the subjects of despotism. Iron Curtains can delay, but they cannot prevent, the inevitable. The world will not persist half slave, so long as it is half free. The collapse of communist despotism is a certainty, provided the free peoples exalt freedom by demonstrating what freedom means.

It is that fact which presents the Japanese people with their new and historic opportunity in Asia. It calls for the finest qualities of which men are capable. No one who knows the Japanese—as

friend or foe—doubts that they can develop these qualities. There have been ample demonstrations of Japanese valor and willingness to sacrifice. Unhappily these qualities have too often been used in efforts which misconstrued the nature of true greatness. Greatness is not measured by ability to impose on others what they do not want. Rather, it resides in the ability to find new ways whereby all men can better realize their aspiration. Those who do that, attain a moral leadership and authority, which all will welcome.

Trust and Opportunity

These are the principles which inspire our Mission. To realize them is not an easy task. It is not just a matter of finding words to write into a treaty. That would be simple. But good results are rarely achieved in such an easy way. The total dictionary of noble words has already been exhausted by treaties which today are merely crumpled bits of paper littering the cruel path which humanity has had to tread.

We do not believe any longer that treaty words are self-executing, whether they be words of promise or words of repression. A peace settlement cannot usefully attempt to dictate the future. It can, at best, create conditions which will make likely the good future that is sought.

To find those conditions is the purpose of the exploratory talks upon which we are now engaged here at Tokyo, following similar talks with the allied nations which are principally concerned. It is still too soon to prophesy the final outcome. There will probably be disappointments and what, to some, may seem injustices. It is never possible to put into effect lofty principles for the future without some compromise with the existing realities created by the past. We can, however, already say that we seek a peace which will afford Japan opportunity to protect by her own efforts the integrity of the full sovereignty which peace will have restored;

opportunity to share in collective security against direct aggression; opportunity to raise her standard of living by the inventiveness and industry of her people; and opportunity to achieve moral stature and respected leadership through the force of good example.

These are the opportunities which we shall seek to create through a peace which will reflect a feeling by the victors that Japan is now a nation to be trusted. There are still, in some respects, understandable reservations. But confidence has grown during the period since surrender, as the Japanese people, responding to the just policies of the Supreme Commander, have loyally fulfilled the Surrender Terms. It is upon that solid foundation of justice and loyalty that we plan to build our peace—a peace of trust and opportunity.

MR. DULLES' SPEECH IN MANILA

Manila, February 12, 1951

(UP)—United States State Department adviser John Foster Dulles said the United States is determined not to repeat the errors of the Treaty of Versailles which ended the first world war in writing a peace treaty for Japan.

Dulles made the statement in a luncheon speech before the Philippine Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations shortly after his conference with President Elpido Quirino. The Institute gave the luncheon in Dulles' honor.

Dulles indicated it is wrong to believe the objectives of peace would be realized simply by forcing a defeated enemy to accept the terms of a treaty as in the case of Germany. He said the lesson of the Versailles Treaty was that that was not the case.

Dulles said he knew the Filipino people are particularly concerned about the mater of reparations from Japan. He said this was but inevitable and natural in view of the great devastation wrought in the Pilippines by the war and the Japanese occupation.

He said he was glad to see this devastation with his own eyes because it was one thing to read about it and another thing to see it and that he knew it made a lasting impression on the Filipino people.

But Dulles said the problem of reparations is to a very large extent with economically can be properly done. It is easy, he said, to write a peace treaty that writes in what a defeated country should pay in some many billion dollars, but it does not automatically follow that payments can be realized.

Dulles said whether such payments could be obtained depended

upon economic realities and could be brought about only by certain economic conditions.

He said the United States was dubious as to how ways could be found so that reparations could be collected but that it would support any sound idea if there should be any.

Dulles also discussed the question of security for Japan and the island nations extending southward off the Asistic mainland and the need for mutual confidence among the democracies in meeting the Communist threat to the free world.

Dulles said the United States has no program of its own for a security alliance for the Pacific notwithstanding some newspaper reports. He said the question was a difficult problem and the initiative probably lay with the island nations interested in such an arrangement.

He said upon his return to Washington he and other officials would study the possibility of formalizing such an arrangement.

Dulles said President Quirino and he discussed some constructive ideas on this subject in their conference this morning. He said that while the United States had no proposal it would be ready to listen sympathetically to any proposals on that subject.

Dulles warned that the free world today faces great peril. He said never before in the history of the world had there been a peril to freedom greater than that which faced the free world today.

He said this peril is posed by the combination of the force of great Russian empire combined with political power, propaganda, penetration and infiltration which the Communist leaders had developed further than anything history has ever known.

He said that 33 years ago the Communists had no political power but now already expended their power over about 800,000,000 people. He said the Communists soften up peoples or frighten them by actual invasion by Red armies.

Dulles said two areas the Communists want most to get are

Japan and Germany with their industrial capacities. He warned that if they should succeed, the combination of Russia, China, Japan and Germany would put the Communists in position to dominate the rest of the world and complete their program of conquest.

Dulles said the United States is trying to exert leadership in the world to save freedom from the "diabolic" menace of the Communists.

He said the United States will make mistakes but they will not be due to lack of feeling of comradeship for its allies. He warned if the democracies should fall part due to lack of confidence, the enemy would overcome them one by one.

Dulles said his mission is to canvass opinions on the Japanese peace treaty in the nations concerned such as the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. The latter two countries are next on his itinerary.

Dulles said he already had sounded out Japanese leaders and that Americans had some ideas on the treaty but he emphasized on formal text has been written.

He said in his belief there was good probability that Japan could become a good neighhor and a bastion against Soviet and Chinese communism.

He said the danger to Japan would be if a peace treaty led to complete withdrawal of United States forces. He said that would create a "vacuum of power" into which the Communists certainly would move.

He said this problem had been discussed with Gen. Douglas MacAuthur and Japanese leaders and the Japanese indicated approval of provisional security arrangements under which the Uuited States would maintain forces in Japan even after a peace treaty was concluded.

TEXT OF MR. DULLES' STATEMENT IN MANILA

Manila, February 12, 1951

I am happy to be again in the Philippines. I was last here in March, 1938. Already then we sensed the rising tide of axis aggression which shortly overran this commonwealth. The United States does not forget the combined effort that it took to roll back that wave of aggression, the cost in blood and treasure, and the shambles left here in its wake.

The American people are resolved that neither Japan nor any other nation shall repeat such a history of crime. The people of the Philippines, who were our gallant partners, can be confident of our dedication to that purpose. Our loyalty is unalterable.

As regards Japan, our purpose is to seek a peace settlement which will best assure that in the future, Japan will be a good neighbor to all who practice freedom and bulwark against the new tide of despotism which threatens from the Asia mailand. That is what General MacArthur and I have been studying and that is the outcome which, I know, the Philippine people also realize to be essential.

That result is not easily assured. It depends not upon power alone, but upon a wise use of power. Because the problem is difficult of solution, we seek the benefit of collective judgement. Already in Washington and Lake Success we have consulted with your Minister of Foreign Affairs and our Presidential Mission looks forward to further consultations here with your President and other leaders.

TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON MR. TRUMAN-MR. DULLES TALK

Washington, February 27, 1951

Mr. John Foster Dulles, accompanied by the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Webb, gave the President in oral report, supplementing earlier written reports, of the activities of the Japanese peace mission in Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

In particular, Mr. Dulles reported upon his full exploratory talks with General MacArthur and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in Tokyo; with President Elpidio Quirino in Mania; with Prime Minister Robert Menzies and Percy C. Spender, the Australian Minister for External Affairs of New Zealand, who participated both in the Canberra talks and in the talks with Prime Minister Sidney George Holland of New Zealand at Wellington.

Mr. Dulles told the President that in his opinion these conversations had gone far to promote a better understanding and closer agreement as to a Japanese settlement which would not only liquidate the old war, but erect a bulwark against new war and new aggression in the Pacific.

The President expressed himself as gratified with the preliminary results of the mission and he instructed the mission to carry on with a view to achiving the earliest practicable consummation of the objectives which he had entrusted to the mission last January.

TEXT OF MR. DULLES' BROADCAST REPORT ON TRIP TO FAR EAST

Washington, March 1, 1951

Last January the President asked me to head a Japanese peace mission. Our mission has now visited Japan and also the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. We returned this week. We went with many questions in our minds. We come back with answers that give us hope and confidence.

That does not mean that the task ahead is easy. On the contrary, the problems we face in the Pacific are very difficult. It is not merely a matter of liquidating the old war with Japan, but of building a strong bulwark against the threat of communist aggression from the East.

To do that is vital to our own safety. Many seem to think that our safety is linked only to the West, meaning Europe, and that the East can be ignored. Of course Europe is important. But just as the United States would be in peril if Europe were overrun, so also we and Europe would be in peril if the East were overrun. We should never forget that Stalin long ago laid it down as basic communist strategy that "the road to victory over the West" lies through the East. That is still taught in the communist "bible".

The second world war created a vacuum of power in Europe which Stalin had not foreseen and.....unexpected opportunity to move into that vacuum. Bnt military communism has never abandoned its eastern strategy. Asia is where the Soviet communists have pushed most persistently, most violently. They threaten war in Europe, but they practice war in China, Korea, Indochina and Tibet. Today Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines,

Australia, New Zealand and Southeast Asia stand between the United States and the vast manpower and natural resources of northeast Asia which are already being exploited by the new Russia imperialism.

In the still free area, that communism has not conquered, Japan occupies a key position. Japan's industrial potential is great and unique in that part of the world. That fact, of course, increases the danger, for Japan's industrial capacity is something that Russia covets. If Japan should succumb to communist aggression, there would be a combination of Russian, Japanese and Chinese power in the East which would be dangerously formidable. Therefore, the FEC nations face the task of turning what was an enemy into a dependable friend and uniting separate and discordant elements into a hormonious whole. That is not easy. But our mission new feels confident that it can be done.

A peace settlement is one essential step in this essential process. Five and one-half years have passed since Japan surrendered unconditionally. During this period she has been occnpied by American troops and political authority has been largely exercised through General MacArthur as supreme commander for the Allied powers. The Japanese people have scrupulously and loyally complied with the Surrender Terms. They have been completely disarmed. They have eliminated the militaristic leaders who caused Japan's downfall and have liquidated the vicious police state system. They have adopted representative government with universal suffrage. They .....freedom of the press. Labour has won, and exercises, the right to organize.

All of this has been welcomed by the Japanese nation. Since July last, United States combat troops have been totally withdrawn from Japan for service in the Korean war, and for eight months the Allies have had, in Japan, no means of compulsion whatsoever. Nevertheless, the Japanese people, without compulsion, have whole-

heartedly supported the authority of the supreme commander. That is a good measure of the transformation that has occurred. Also, the Japanese, within the limits permitted by the Surrender Terms, have in Japan voluntarily cooperated with the United Nations effort in Korea.

It is the unqualified judgement of General MacArthur that the Japanese people have won the right to be restored to a positiou of equality within the society of free nations. Our mission wholly endorses that conclusion.

How shall we bring Japan into this new estate? The answer is not simple. The United States and Japan are not the only parties concerned. We have Allies, some of whom suffered relatively more than we, and we cannot honorably ignore their points of view. Also, if Japan's admission to a place in the free world, is to be meaningful, it must be a free choice and not a choice made under the coercion of any threat or the inducement of any economic bribe.

In our talks with Japanese leaders we always had these necessities in mind. Our goal is not to get a mere piece of paper beginning with the word "peace" and ending with a red seal. We seek deeds which will in fact enlarge and invigorate the whole free world.

The terms of Japanese peace which we have first discussed with our Allies, and have now discussed with Japanese leaders, involve the following basic element:

1. The peace should restore Japan as an equal in the society of nations.

That means that Japan should not be subjected to restrictions on her sovereignty of a kind which other sovereign nations do not accept for themselves. These if imposed on the Japanese would understandingly hurt their pride, as seemingly designed to make them forever a second-class nation.

2. The peace should give Japan a chance to earn her way in the world and become self-sustaining.

Japan faces, of course, a difficult economic problem and during the occupation the United States has given help to a total of 2,000,000,000 dollars. A few Japanese with whom we talked felt that the United States should continue to subsidize Japan's economy. That point of view we discouraged. In the final statement which we made on leaving Japan we said:

"We have come to the view that Japan can develop for her people a satisfactory and rising standard of living by her own efforts and by the resourcefulness and industry of her people, on the assumption that the treaty of peace does not place upon Japan heavy economic or financial burdens or major commercial disabilities."

That means, of course, not continuing indefinitely the United States subsidy. Also it means no artificial impairment of Japan's industrial activity. Other nations must be willing to face up to Japanese competition subject to normal tariff restrictions and to Japan's adherence to fair trade practices, Japan must have the opportunity to earn the means to buy abroad the food and raw materials necessary to enable her people to live and to work. Otherwise communism will take over.

We believe that there is work the Japanese can do which will be useful and acceptable to the rest of the world. Under these conditions we do not thing that the Japanese people should be encouraged to depend upon American charity, but rather to seek a self respecting independence.

The peace should encourage close cultural relations between Japan and the West.

Japan has a great national culture, drawn in large part from China and India. Japanese pictorial art, their drama, their gardens, their arrangement of flowers and of food show an appreciation of

beauty which illustrates how the Western world can enrich itself. The West, in turn, can contribute much to the culture and science of Japan.

Our mission made a special effort to explore ways of developing cultural and intellectual interchange. We believe this will be mutually advantageous and lead to increasing understanding and respect.

The great quality of the free world is that it combines unity with difference. In that respect it contrasts with communism, which seeks a society of abject conformity. We seek, in peace, a relationship with Japan which will benefit both Japan and the other members of the free world by finding richness in diversity.

4. The peace should give Japan a reasonable degree of security.

In these times none of us can enjoy absolute security. Our mission did, however, discuss with Japanese leaders how to give Japan a large measure of protection. With the authority of the President, and following conversations last January with committees of Congress, I stated publicly in Japan that if the Japanese wanted it, the United States would sympathetically consider the retention of United States forces in and about Japan so that the coming into force of a treaty of peace would not leave Japan a vacuum of power into which Soviet communism would surely move.

In this connection, however, we emphasized two points.

First, we made clear that this suggestion was genuinely an invitation, which Japan could accept or decline. It was important to make this clear, because a voluntary act of committal by Japan was needed as a test of the Japanese nation. We wanted a free choice, not a forced choice, because, as I said to the Japanese: "The United States is not interested in slavish conduct. That is the stock in trade of the Communist world. We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice."

The second point we made was that any United States protection now offered could only be on a provisional basis because, under the Surrender Terms, Japan is not now in a position to undertake what the Senate "Vandenberg resolution" refers to as "continuous and effective self help and mutual aid." We emphasized that this is basic United States policy and accordingly we cannot permanently give any nation a "free ride," so far as security is concerned.

The Japanese nation reacted honorably to both of these points that we made. The Prime Minister, in answer to my suggestion, said that "the Japanese Government and a preponderant majority of the Japanese people warmly welcome the Ambassador's (Dulles) invitation to a security arrangement with the United States for the protection of unarmed Japan by the stationing of United States armed forces in and about the country."

We ourselves were convinced that the Prime Minister correctly interpreted the will of the Japanese nation, because we received the same impression from representatives of various Parliamentary groups, from representatives of labor, industry and education and from the mass of correspondence and editorial comment that came to our attention.

In response to our warning that there could be no definite collective security system for Japan without Japan's own continuous self-help and mutual aid, the Prime Minister said: "We realize fully our responsibilities to defend our own land, and do what we can in this respect. When we recover our independence and join the council of free nations as a free member, the circumstances and scope of the Japanese contribution will be determined according to the extent of our economic and industrial recovery."

Since Japan is an island, its security is strongly influenced by sea and air power, power which the United States is in a position to exercise in the Pacific. The defense of Japan need not require, either from the United States or from Japan, the large ground

forces which might be thought necessary if Japan had land boundaries with the Soviet Union or Communist China.

At the present time only legal and practical security measures which can be taken by Japan relate to internal security. There is much here that needs to be done. But in due coures, as the Japanese Prime Minister pointed out, Japan will face up to the problems of sharing in the collective defense of its area.

Following a stay of a little over two weeks in Japan, our mission proceeded to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

In the Philippines we found much concern with the promblem of reparations. The Philippines had gravely suffered from its cruel invasion and occupation by Japan. Although much has been rebuilt, there are signs of devastation on every hand and almost every hand and almost every family has had one or more members killed by the Japanese. It is only natural that there should be bitterness and a demand for at least material reparation. The amount sought reached $8,000,000,000. The mood is like that of the French at the end of World War I.

We sympathized totally with the Philippines sentiment. We had no argument to make against the justice of reparation claims. We had to point out, however, that reparation is not merely a matter of justice, it is a matter of economics.

The fact is that a nation situated as is Japan can barely pay for its essential imports in food and raw materials. To require reparation payments means either that the United States must pay the reparation bill or there will be default preceded by widespread starvation and unemployment. This would assure the conquest of Japan by communism and not be in the real interest of the Philippines.

After World War I the United States, through loans to Germany, did for a time pay the German reparations bill. But our mission indicated that the United States would not be prepared to repeat

that in the case of Japan. We are helping largely in the task of Philippine reconstruction; but we are not prepared to pay a Japanese reparation bill.

This was not an easy or a pleasant point of view to present to our brave comrades-in-arms who have suffered grieviously. It is attributed to the Philippine leaders, in both the executive and legislative branches, that they nevertheless gave us a courteous hearing in an atmosphere of genuine hospitality.

In Australia we had four days of uninterrupted conference with Prime Minister, Menzies, with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Spender and other members of the Australian Government. Also the New Zealand Foreign Minister, Mr. Doidge took part in our discussions.

The principal problem discussed was how to prevent a possible recurrence of Japanese aggression. The anxiety of the governments of Australia and New Zealand was quite understandable. Their peoples had felt the hot breath of Japan's war effort and in northern Australia our mission saw for itself the scars of Japanese bombing. In that part of the world, the threat of Russian and Chinese communist invasion seemed rather remote, while the possibility of another Japanese invasion seemed a reality to those who had recently experienced that danger at first hand. The peoples of Australia and New Zealand did not like to contemplate a future where they might stand alone against a Japan which might be rearmed in collusion with Russia and communist China. Public opinion favored a peace treaty which would prescribe sever limits on any future Japanese rearmament.

This attitude, like the Philippines demand for reparations, was quite understandable. Again, it corresponded with the mood of the French after World War I. We pointed out, however, that the Versailles Treaty experience indication the surest way to induce rearmament is to forbid it. Treaty restrictions of that kind are inherently unenforceable except by war, and they are discriminatory

because they do not reflect a general program of disarmament. Heretofore, they seem to be a challenge to a nation's dignity and stature.

They.....give nationalistic and militaristric leaders a chance to incite the people and to arouse them to demonstrate their sovereign equality by throwing off the unequal restrictions. It was on such slogans that Hitler rode to power in Germany.

In an address which I made in Australia, I said that it was demonstrable folly to try to rely, for peace, on the very methods which had led up to Germany's second war. The better way was to inculcate the spirit of collective security, the United Nations ideal of force not used save in the common interest. Then armament becomes a matter of collective, not national, decision.

It did, however, seem reasonable to try to meet the desire of the Australian and New Zealand people for an ending of their apparent state of isolation in the Pacific area through some arrangement which would make clear that an armed attack on them from any quarter would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and security.

No decisione were made. But we continue receptive to proposals for adding to the unity and strength of the area of which Australia and New Zealand from part.

Our three-power talks at the Australian capital enahled us to explore all aspects of the western Pacific problem in an atmosphere of cordiality and frankness. In Mr. Spender's own words, the discussions "represented consultation at its best." We are confident that, in one form or another, good results will follow.

We went on from Australia to New Zealand where we had the welcome and useful opportunity of conferring with Mr. Holland, the Prime Minister, and with members of his cabinet.

The trip of our mission to the East represented, in essence, a continuation of the talks begun with our allies last September, while

the United Nations General Assembly was in session. We have now reached a point where it ought to be possible to draft promptly the actual text of a Japanese peace treaty which would genuinely promote peace in the Far East.

That this is possible under the difficult and delicate conditions that exist, is above all due to the conduct of the occupation by General MacArthur. His adminisiration has been characterized by a combination of justice and mercy such as victors have rarely shown toward a vanquised and guilty nation. He so used victory that we do not today face in Asia the overpowering hostility which could be represented by a combination of Soviet Russia, of Communist China and of a Japan bent on revenge.

The occupation policies give us one solid foundation stone on which to build. Another vital contribution is the courage, kill and fortitude being shown in Korea by those who are serving the cause of the United Nations. If the Republic of Korea had been overrun by communist armies and if there had been only verbal protests or defense merely of a token and ineffectual character, that would have marked the beginning of a series of disasters which might have included Japan and never have stopped until they reached the homes of each one of us. But the north Korean communist aggressors were destroyed. And when, in replacement, the Chinese communist hordes came in, they have been checked with losses which, in terms of dead, wounded, prisoners and disabled, may now mount to several hundred thousand men.

United Nations forces in Korea have forged a fiery furnare into which nearly one million communist troops have now been fed by their ambitious and despotic rulers. That operation represents in a real sense a defense of our own homeland and it provides the opportunity to win peace in the Pacific. For that we must be eternally grateful not only to General MacArthur, General Ridgway and the high command, but particularly to the rank and file of the

troops of the United States and the other nations who sacrificially respond to the call of duty, often at the price of life itself.

Finally, as another foundation stone, we have the present effort of the American people to create a great force-in-being, so as to make it apparent that Russia could not quickly, or at all, win a general war.

I have often said that there would never be lasting peace until nations were prepared, in them of peace, to make sacrifices for peace such as they make, in time of war, or victory. For the first time in all history there is such an effort. The United States is making sacrifies such as no free nation has ever made except in war for survival. We can hope we are not making that effort too late. We can know, on the basis of our missions contact with peoples of other lands, that these others are moved to respond in kind, and that they feel a new confidence in the capacity of the United States to lead the free world out of the present morass of peril and conflusion.

All in all, General MacArthur in Japan, our fighting men in Korea and the American people here at home have laid a good foundation upon which to build a lasting peace in the Pacific. Our recent mission has pnt the scaffolding for that building. The work of filling in with bricks and mortar is now to be done. If that is well done there will be in Japan and related area a new sense of security and well-being. That will help to thwart the Stalin strategy of conquering the West via the East, and indeed it can so spectacularly demonstrate the worth and capacity of freedom that the example will loosen the present hold of communist despotism upon its captive world.

Liberation is a goal we must never relinquish. This nation of our's was founded by men who delivered that their conduct and example could be a great force for political liberty throughout the world. They looked outward, not inward. As President Lincoln

said, their declaration of independence offered "liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope for the world for all future time." In their time much of Europe and of this American hemisphere was held by despotic power supported by the Russian Empire and its Holy Alliance. That grip was pried loose. In that process, our nation played a powerful, yet peaceful, part. That can be done again. It will be done again if in the free world men use freedom so well that they set up and influence that is contagious. That is the great goal to have in mid as we and our friends build peace in the Pacific. It is the goal which, if we are resoluted, we shall attain.

MR. DULLES' TEXT ON DRAFT PROPOSALS

Los Angeles, March 31, 1951

I am grateful to Whittier College for giving me this opportunity to make a progress report on peace in the Pacific. That subject is, I suppose, of particular interest to Americans who live on our west coast. Actually, peace in the Pacific if equally important to all of us, for danger and effort can no longer be localized.

Two principal postwar goals of the Soviet communists are Japan and Germany. If Russia's rulers could exploit the industrial and human potential of either Japan or Germany, it would be a sad day for peace. That would involve such a shift in the balance of world power that these new imperialists might calculate that they could start a general war with good prospect of success. They know that Japan, even alone, was able seriously to menace the free world in the Pacific and they imagine vast possibilities out of a combination, under their direction, of the Asiatic power of Russia, China and Japan.

Fortunately, the Japanese people do not want that combination, which would make them the front line of a new aggression which in the end would mean disaster far greater than that which they have already suffered. They are in a mood to respect militarism in all of its aspects, and they want fellowship with the nations which genuinely seek peace through collective security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations. Thus there is the opportunity to make a Japanese peace which will not only end the old war, but give new strength and hope to those who strive to prevent another war.

To achieve that kind of peace is the President's mandate to

the mission which I have the honor to head and President Truman, Secretary Acheson and Secretary Marshall are each of them giving this effort their close personal attention, to the end that this great goal shall be achieved.

Since our mission was established last January, we have had a busy time. All or some of us have been to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and England, have consulted in Washington with ambassadors of other nations and also with the many in the executive and legislative branches of our government whose wisdom, judgment and special knowledge can be helpful. The foreign relation committee of the Senate, its Far Eastern sub-committee and the foreign affairs committee of the House have extended the utmost cooperation. As a result of all this, we have seen the possibility of formulating peace terms which should command general support here at home, which should involve no insoluble differences with our allies, and which should be acceptable to Japan, which we consider has now earned the right to be consulted.

So, this week, we have begun to discuss, with our allies principally concerned in the Pacific War, actual texts which might be incorporated in an eventual treaty. These texts are still "working papers," tentative and suggestive only.

We contemplate a simple document, limited to the essentials of peace.

Our present thought is to have a preamble to the treaty which would afford the Japanese people the opportunity to express their intentions as to matters which are important, but which for one reason or another do not lend themselves to absolute contractual undertakings.

For example, Japan might indicate its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations. There is no doubt about the reality of that intention, but we think that Japan's application for membership, when it comes, should bear the unmistakable imprint

of Japan's own desire, without the slightest taint of external compulsion. Similarly, the Japanese may want to express their intention to carry forward the new ideals as to human rights and like matters which are largely embodied in Japanese legislation under the occupation and which are the subject of the United Nations universal declaration of human rights.

They may want to declare their intention, in public and private trade and commerce, to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.

Japan's intentions in these respects are vitally important and go to the heart of our future relations. But except as these matters have already been spelled out in international conventions which Japan could and would adopt, they do not lend themselves to peace treaty obligations, which should only be such as can be precisely formulated so that the parties will clearly know just what are their rights and duties.

The treaty proper would prescribe the territory over which the Japanese will hereafter the sovereign. It is contemplated, generally speaking, that Japan's sovereignty should be limited in accordance with the agreed Surrender Terms. That would mean sovereignty over the four home islands and minor adjacent islands. There would be a renunciation by Japan of all rights, titles and claims to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores and the Antarctic area. Also the treaty might contemplate that in the Ryukyu and Bonin islands there could be United Nations trusteeship and continuing United States administrative responsibility.

The South Sakhalin and Kurile islands were alloted to Russia at Yalta and are actually in Russian possession. Any peace treaty validation of Russia's title should, we suggest, be dependent upon Russia's becoming a party to that treaty.

The security of Japan itself should, we think, be worked out through individual and collective self-defense arrangements author-

ized by the United Nations character. Thus the peace treaty it-self need only affirm that, upon the coming into force of the peace, Japan would in fact possess what the charter of the United Nations refers to as the "inherent right" of sovereign nations in these respects.

As regards commercial arrangements, we do not think that the treaty of peace should it-self attempt to define what should be the future permanent relations between the Allies and Japan. These might better be left for subsequent negotiation between a free Japan and other friendly nations. However, to prevent confusion and to minimize discrimination immediately following ths coming into force of the treaty, Japan might, for such a period as three years, agree to accord most-favored-nation treatment to the Allied Powers, except that Japan would not, in any matter, be required to extend more favorable treatment than is accorded it. Similarly, as regards civil air traffic rights, Japan might for three years, and pending the conclusion of civil air transport agreements, grant the Allied Powers not less favorable conditions than those prevailing at the time of the coming into force of the treaty.

With respect to property and claims, the treaty of peace might give the Allied Powers the right generally to vest, retain and dispose of Japanese property within their territory, while Japan should return prewar Allied property in Japan and validate prewar claims belonging to Allied Powers and their nationals.

The foregoing matters can, we believe, now be dealt with considerable precision. There are others which are still subject to exploration and development.

Since Japan is now thoroughly disarmed and materially and legally unable now to maintain armed forces, there is need for provisional security measures. Accordingly with the authority of the president, and following conversations with committees of congress, I stated publicly in Japan that, if the Japanese wanted it,

the United States would sympathetically consider the retention of United States armed forces in and about Japan, so that the coming into force of a treaty of peace would not leave Japan a vacuum of power and, as such, an easy prey to such aggression as has already shown it-self in nearby Korea.

This suggestion of mine was warmly welcomed by the Japanese Government and the people generally, so that it is now in order to study the implementation of such an arrangement.

Since Japan is an island, its security is strongly influenced by sea and air power, power which the United States is in a position to exercise in the Pacific. The defense of Japan need not require, either now from the United States or ultimately from Japan, as large ground forces as might be thought to be necessary if Japan had common land boundaries with militaristic powers.

Bound up with the problem of Japan's security is the broader problem of security in the Pacific. Japan should hereafter make some contribution of its own to security, but this should never be the pretext for militarism that could be an aggressive threat. Thus, the problem has a dual aspect.

No nation able to make a dependable contribution to security should get a "free ride." In our Senate, the Vandenberg resolution has laid down, for the United States, the basic proposition that collective security arrangements should be based upon "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." The United Nations charter also establishes that all peace-loving states should stand ready to contribute armed forces, assistance, and facilities for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. That is one aspect of the problem. The other side of the problem is that Japan should never again develop armament.....peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations charter. The peace we seek is one which will for all time liberate Japan's

neighbors and indeed the Japanese people from the nightmare of militarism.

When we were in Canberra, Australia, our mission had significant discussions on this subject with the governments of Australia and New Zealand. They made convincingly clear the attitude of their peoples on this subject. Now we are working actively to find the ways to secure the desired results.

We believe that out of our discussions, which are now well advanced, there will emerge a series of arrangements which on the one hand will enable the Japanese to make their own indispensable contribution to preventing their nation's being forced into the service of the new imperialism that ominously threatens from the mainland, and which on the other hand will effectively assure that there will be no unbridled rearmament which could become an offensive threat.

The United States is able, and daily growing more able, to exert a mighty influence for peace and to make peace in the Pacific more secure than it has ever been before. We can see the way to remove the pall of fear which results from Japan's past conduct and from the present communist menace. But that is not a task which we would or should undertake single-handed and alone. In the Pacific, as elsewhere, security is a cooperative enterprise. Those who wish to cooperate for security can share the protection of immense deterrent power which, in the words of the United Nations charter, "shall not be used, save in the common interest."

Since the arrangements for peace and security in the Pacific will in part be outside of the peace treaty and since the whole problem is not yet fully explored, we consider that any presently suggested treaty provisions are to be supplemented in the light of the outcome of the promising exchange of views which are now taking place, and to which we attach the utmost importance. No one should assume that the United States takes this problem lightly or that we shall accept solution that will be illusory.

As regards reparations, the United States does not question the inherent justice of the proposition but Japan should make good the damage done to others by its aggression. Reparation is, however, not merely a matter of what is just, but of what is economically practicable without disastrous consequences.

We have closely examined this problem. Considerable industrial machinery has already been removed from Japan and given to countries having reparation claims. Also, there is substantial Japanese property within allied countries which, as indicated, should be applicable to the satisfaction of claims. It is, however, not easy to see the possibity of Japan's providing future reparation out of her remaining capital assets or as a surplus from her current economic activity over coming years.

One of the gravest problems which confronts Japan, and it equally concerns the reparation creditors, is whether Japan, deprived of its formerly-owned sources of raw materials and with a population of eighty-five million on four relatively small and barren islands, can maintain the standard of living and employment necessary to prevent widespread social unrest. This, if it occured, would inevitably give rise to dangerous expansionist and explosive tendencies, which Japan's communist neighbours would joyously exploit.

The United States, to prevent social and economic unrest within Japan since the occupation began, has advanced about 2,000,000,000 for relief and economic assistance. That is a realistic measure of how seriously the United States views this problem and its responsibility as principal occupying power. However, the United States is not prepared, after the occupation ends, to continue indefinitely such economic relief. Neither is it willing in effect to pay Japanese reparations by putting into Japan what reparation creditors would take out. The United States considers indeed that its postwar advances have a certain priority status.

We doubt that it is practicable to get the essential overall and

long-range results which are sought, if the treaty also seeks to extract reparation payments other than in terms of the Japanese assets already received from Japan or within the territory of the allied powers. However, the United States has not closed its mind on this subject and it is, with an open mind, actively exchanging views with countries which were most grievously damaged by Japanese aggression.

Some suggestions have been made as to imposing upon the Japanese economic disabilities as, for example, requiring a dismantling of a part of Japan's industrial plant, particularly her shipbuilding capacity. As experience in Germany has shown, such provisions cannot be carried out without arousing great public bitterness. If the peace treaty required the first post-war Japanese Government physically to decimate Japan's industrial equipment, it would impose an almost inhuman burden, and the consequences would almost surely be against the best interests of the Allied Powers.

It has been snggested, particularly along the Pacific coast, that the treaty of peace might itself attempt permanently to regulate the problem of Japanese participation in high-seas fisheries. To attempt that would almost surely postpone indefinitely both the conclusion of peace and the obtaining of the results which are desired.

There is I believe a considerable possibility of agreement between the United States and Japanese fishing interests. However, the treaty of peace is not a treaty merely between the United States and Japan; it is a treaty which we hope will be signed by all of the fifty-three allies. Most of these nations have their own fishing problems and their own theories of solution, which differ widely. No quick results can be won by attempting to make the peace treaty into a universal convention on high-seas fishing.

When I was in Japan, the Prime Minister advised me that the

Japanese Government stood ready to negotiate fisheries agreements as soon as peace restores to Japan the possibility of independent sovereign action.

He said that in the meantime the Japanese Government would prohibit Japanese nationals and Japanese vessels from going into conserved fisheries in all waters, and he mentioned speciffically those off the coasts of the United States, Canada and Alaska.

The Japanese now see the importance of avoiding practices which in the past brought Japan much ill will, and if we can hold to our tentative time-table, there can, I believe, be an early and equitable settlement of this thorny problem.

From the foregoing it can be seen that the Japanese peace settlement we seek, while it would confirm the cut-back of Japan's territory to her home islands, would contemplate that Japan would be a sovereign and sustaining member of the free world. She would contribute in due course to collective security in accordance with her means, but without developing armament which could be an offensive threat. Also, from an economic standpoint, Japan would be expected to get along without such subsidies as the United States has been providing during the occupation.

On the other hand Japan would be restored to a position of equality, free of burdensome and discriminatory conditions. In essence, the peace would be one of reconcilitation.

That is not the kind of a peace which victors usually grant to a vanquished nation which has committed armed aggression on a vast scale. It is not surprising that some, made bitter and distrusting by Japan's past conduct, would like to impose upon Japan continuing burdens and restrictions. Some of these taken separately, seem to have justification and perhaps no one of them alone would be of decisive historical significance.

In the aggregate, however, they would fundamentally change the character of the peace settlement.

The major objective of any Japanese peace treaty is to bring the Japanese people hereafter to live with others as good neighbors that does not require that the Japanese people should be pampered. It does mean that the victors should not take advantage of Japan's present helpless state to impose, for the future, unequal conditions. It means that the peace settlement should restore the vanquished to a position of dignity and equality among the nations.

The peace would be a peace of trust, not because the past justifies trust, but because the act of extending trust usually evokes an effort to merit trust. It would be a peace of opportunity, in that it would afford the Japanese people and their international relations as are enjoyed by most of the other free nations of the world.

In proposing that kind of a peace, the United States assumes a serious responsibility, for the results cannot be guaranteed. We have, however, a duty to exercise our best judgment as to the kind of peace which will endure. Circumstances have made our duty inescapable.

In the great war in the Pacific, we had valiant allies who, through long, hard years, poured out life and treasure according to their means. But the United States possessed most of the means required for victory in the Pacific. The United States has carried the responsibility of occupation, and the accomplishments of General MacArthur as supreme commander represent a moral investment to which his countrymen cannot honorably be indifferent. The United States has contributed the economic aid which has prevented the post-war misery which would have exposed Japan to capture by communist. The United States is the member of the free world which possesses large present and prospective military power in the western Pacific, and today we are the principal contributor to the United Nations effort in Korea, which fends off danger to Japan, to our Pacific allies, as well as to ourselves.

These are some of the circumstances which require the United States to exercise an initiative for peace; to do so while there is still time, and to shape that initiative with all of the wisdom and and all of the vision that is available. For a misjudgment as to timing or as to substance, can bring incalculable disaster to all mankind.

The United States does not consider that it has any monopoly of responsibility, nor any monopoly of experience, wisdom and enlightenment that are required. We have no desire to "go it alone" nor have we the slightest thought of dictating. We continuously have sought and shall seek the views of others and, indeed, our present suggestions are a composite, not deriving from any single source. They reflect the ideas of many, and the United Kingdom and Australia are two important sources of actual language that we acecept.

However, in the last analysis, the United States cannot, in justice to our own people, or indeed to others, become co-sponsor of a peace settlement which in our judgment, made after ample consideration without arrogance and in humbleness of spirit, would throw unnecessary and intolerable burdens of a military or economic character upon the United States, and jeopardize the lasting peace that the war was fought to win.

Happily, the exchanges of views which have taken place have, with one exception, been altogether cordial and no basic disagreements have developed. The Government of the Soviet Union is, perhaps, an exception. For three months its representative joined with us in full and frank discussions. But now that a peace treaty with Japan seems actually to be in the offing, the Soviet leaders seem to have taken fright. The Soviet Government has publicly announced that it will not resume discussions with us.

When peace is far off, the Russian leaders speak lovingly of

peace. But when peace comes near, they shun peace like the plague.

We continue to hope that the Soviet leaders will join in a treaty of peace which would cost them nothing and which would start a relaxing of tensions which would be felt all around the globe. We are ready to give scrupulously full consideration to any views they may express. We shall steadily urge that they join in the Japanese peace. Fortunately, however, Soviet participation is not indispensable. The Soviet Union has no legal power to veto. It has no moral due-bills, for its vast takings in Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, Sakhalin and the Kuriles repay it a thousand-fold for its six days of nominal belligerency. Japan, unlike Germany and Austria, is not divided by zones of occupation.

In relation to Japan there is the opportunity to show which of the allies of World War II now have the genuine will for peace. There is the opportunity for them to make a peace so righteous that the example will hearten and uplift men everywhere. That is the opportunity; and to its challenge we are determined worthily to respond.

TEXT OF REPORTED PEACE TREATY DRAFT

WASHINGTON, Apr. 5—(UP)—The Japanese peace treaty prepared by Special Presidential Representative John Foster Dulles "will come into force" when the United States and six other members of the 13-nation Far Eastern Commission have signed it.

This was revealed Thursday in an official copy of the treaty text secured by the United Press which also disclosed the United States will insist that any post-treaty reductions of the sentences of convicted Japanese war criminals must have the approval of the majority of the Allied Powers.

Here is the text of the proposed treaty which Dulles has given to the 15 other countries most actively engaged in the Pacific War:

Preamble—The Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations, which as sovereign equals shall cooperate in a friendly association to promote their common welfare and maintain international peace and secutity.

Japan declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and under all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to strive to realize the objectives of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to create internationally conditions of stability and well being as envisaged by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by postwar Japanese legislation, and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair paractices.

The Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan in these respects and will seek to facilitate their realization.

In order to put their future relations on a stable and peaceful basis, the Allied Powers make this treaty with Japan;

Chapter I. Peace. The state of war between the Allied Powers and Japan is ended.

Chapter II. Sovereignty. The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.

Chapter III. Territory. Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to Korea, Formosa, and the Pescadores and also all rights, titles and claims in connection with the mandate system or deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals in the Antarctic area.

Japan accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, in relation to extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific islands formerly under mandate to Japan. The United States may propose to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system with the United States as the administering authority the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 degrees north latitude, the Bonin Islands including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parce Vela and Marcus Island.

Japan will concur in any such proposal. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereunder, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Japan will return to the U.S.S.R. the southern part of Sakhalin Island as well as all islands adjacent to it and will hand over to the Soviet Union the Kurile Islands.

Chapter IV. Security. Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article Two of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, obligations.....to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered; to refrain in its international relations from threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent

with the purposes of the United Nations; to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations make a preventive or enforcement action.

The Allied Powers undertake reciprocally to be guided by the principles of Article II of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

The Allied Powers recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses what the Charter of the United Nations refers to as inherent right of individual or collective self-defense and Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements or arrangements participated in by one or more of the Allied Powers. Such arrangements shall be designed solely for security against armed attack.

(The foregoing suggestions are recognized as being not in themselves complete in respect to security and are to be supplemented in the light of the outcome of current exchange of views designed to maintain security in the Pacific and enable Japan hereafter to contribute to its security without developing the arragement which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.)

Chapter V. Polical and Economic Clauses. Japan will continue to be a party or if not now a party will seek adherence to existing multilateral treaties and agreements designed to promote fair trade practices, prevent mis-use of narcotics and conserve fish and wild life.

Japan agrees to enter promptly into negotiations with parties so desiring for formulation of new bilateral or multilateral agreements for regulation, conservation and development of high seas fisheries.

Each of the Allied Powers within a year after the present treaty

has come into force between it and Japan will notify Japan which of its pre-war bilateral treaties with Japan it wishes to keep in force or revise and such treaties shall continue in force or be revised except for any provisions thereof not in conformity with the present treaty, which provision shall be deleted. All such treaties not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China.

Power to grant clemency, reduce sentences, parole and pardon with respect to war crimes sentences imposed by military tribunals of the Allied Powers on persons who are incarcerated in Japan, may not be exercised except jointly by Japan and the government or governments which imposed the sentence in each instance.

In the case of those persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except jointly by Japan and the majority of governments represented in the tribunal.

Japan declares ita readiness promptly to conclude with each of the Allied powers treaties or agreements to put on a stable and friendly basis commercial and trading relations between them.

In the meantime, the Government of Japan will, during the period of three years from the first coming into force of the present treaty, accord the most-favored nation treatment to each of the Allied Powers with respect to customs duties, charges and all other regulations imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation of foods and will accord national treatment or the most-favored nation treatment, whichever is most favorable, with respect to vessels, nationals and companies of the Allied Powers and their property, interests and business within Japan. National treatment shall not be deemed to include Japanese coastal and inland navigation.

In respect of any of the above matters, the Government of Japan may withhold from any power application of more favorable treatment than such power, subject to exceptions customarily in-

cluded in commercial agreements, is prepared to accord Japan in that respect.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph of this article, the Government of Japan will be entitled to apply measures to safeguard its external financial position and balance of payments or its essential security interests and to reserve exceptions customarily contained in commercial agreements.

Pending conclusion of civil air agreements, Japan during a period of three years, shall extend to each of the Allied Powers not less favorable civil air traffic rights and privileges than those they exercise at the time of coming into force of the present treaty.

Japanese submarine cables connecting Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present treaty shall equally be divided.....Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and the adjoining half of the cable and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

Chapter VI. Claims and Property. The Allied Powers recognize Japan lacks the capacity to make paymenta in bullion money, property or services which would enable Japan to maintain a viable economy to meet its obligations for relief and economic assistance furnished since September 2, 1945 in furtherance of the objectives of the occupation and also make adequate reparations to the Allied Powers for war damages.

However, Japan grants to each of the Allied Powers the rights to vest, retain and dispose of all property rights and interests of Japan and Japanese nationals which between December 7, 1941 and September 2, 1945 were within territories renounced by Japan or within territories administered by any of them under trusteeship except,

1. Property of Japanese nationals permitted to reside in territory of one of the Allied Powers and not subjected to special measures before September 2, 1945.

2. Tangible diplomatic or consular property, net of any expenses incidental to its preservation.

3. Property of non-political, religious, charitable, cultural or educational institutions.

4. Property located in Japan despite the presence elsewhere of paper or similar evidence of the right to title or interest in such property or any debt claimed with respect thereto.

5. Trademarks identifying products originating in Japan.

In the case of any Allied Power which has taken property rights or interest of any industrial character of Japan or Japanese nationals from the territory of another Allied Power, it will account to the other.

Reparations claims of Allied Powers and their claims for direct military costs of the occupation shall be deemed satisfied out of Japanese assets, subject to their respective jurisdictions in accord with the foregoing and out of assets received from the Japanese home islands during the occupation.

(Note: The foregoing suggestions regarding reparations are made subject to current exchanges of views.)

Japan will return upon demand within six months from the first coming into force of treaty, property, tangible and intangible, and all rights and interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud.

In the case of war loss or damage to property of nationals of Allied Powers in Japan, compensation will be made in accordance with Japanese domestic legislation in yen, subject to Japanese foreign exchange regulations.

Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers for action taken during the state of war, hereby ended, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers

in Japanese territory prior to coming into force of the present treaty.

Chapter VII. Settlement of Disputes. Any dispute between an Allied Power and Japan concerning interpretation or execution of the present treaty, which is not settled through diplomatic channels, shall, at the request of the party to the dispute, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice.

Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the statute of the International Court, will deposit with the registrar of the court, at the time of their respective ratification of the present treaty and in conformity with the resolution of the Security Council dated October 15, 1946, a general declaration accepting jurisdiction without special agreement of the court generally in respect of all disputes of character referred to in this article.

Chapter VIII. Final Clauses. The Allied Powers for purposes of the present treaty shall be deemed to be those states at war or in a state of belligerency with Japan and which become parties to the present treaty.

Except for provisions of Article XI (note: fourth paragraph of Chapter V referring to China), the present treaty shall not confer any rights, title or benefits to or upon any state unless and until it signs, ratifies or adheres to this treaty nor with that exception shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced hereof in favor of the state which does not sign and ratify or adhere to this treaty.

Japan will not make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any state which would grant that state greater advantage than contemplated by the present treaty to be granted to parties thereto.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the Allied Powers and by Japan and will come into force as between Japan and other

ratifying states when the instruments of ratification by Japan and by the majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying power of the states which are members of the Far Eastern Commission, have been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

If such coming into force has not occurred within nine months after ratification by Japan, then any Allied Power may at its election bring the treaty into force as between it-self and Japan by notification to Japan and to the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the United States of America shall notify all signatory and adhering states of all ratifications deposited and of all notifications received pursuant to this article.

Any state not a signatory to the present treaty which is at war or in a state of belligerency with Japan may adhere to the present treaty at any time within three years after the treaty has come into force as between Japan and any ratifying state.

Adherence shall be effective by deposit of instrument of adherence with the Government of the United States of America which shall notify all signatory and adhering states of each deposit.

TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT ON MR. DULLES VISIT TO JAPAN

Washington, April 11, 1951

In view of the importance of concluding a Japanese peace settlement as recognized by the leaders of both (U.S.) political parties, at the request of the President, John Foster Dulles, who is acting as the special representative of the President in this matter, will return to Tokyo over the coming weekend for the dual purpose of consulting with General Ridgway and Japanese leaders.

The President has made clear that it is the firm policy of the United States Government to press forward to conclude a peace settlement with Japan as soon as possible. The principles underlying the treaty were set out by Mr. Dulles in his Los Angeles address of March 31, 1951. They have been developed with the closest consultation with leaders of both parties in both Houses of Congress and with General MacArthur (General Douglas MacArthur, whom Ridgway succeeds), and have the full approval of the President.

TEXT OF MR. DULLES' STATEMENT ON LEAVING U. S.

Washington, April 13, 1951

I am flying to Japan to discuss with General Ridgway and Japanese leaders on the present state of the Japanese peace treaty.

There will be some differences to be ironed out, but nothing that has transpired leads us to doubt the practicability of an early agreement by most of the Allied powers upon the peace treaty which will in general follow the lines indicated in my Los Angeles address of March 31.

Whatever may be the differences of opinion here at home as to other matters, I have found agreement by leaders of both of our political parties that we must proceed without regard to partisanship to strength peace and defense of freedom in the Pacific.

That is the result which the American people are unitedly determined to achieve and I shall contribute to it to the best of my ability.

I am glad to be accompanied by Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson and Colonel Stanton Babcock and Robert Feary who were part of the earlier mission to Japan.

My deputy John Allison is remaining in Washington to carry on current discussions with representatives of the Allied Powers. We expect to return from our present mission to Tokyo in about 10 days.

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. RIDGWAY

Tokyo, April 14, 1951

The President of the United States, only two days ago, reiterated that it is the firm policy of the United States Government to press for the conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan as soon as possible.

The principles around which it is proposed that this settlement be built were clearly enunciated by Ambassador Dulles in his Los Angeles address of March 31, 1951. Those principles, developed in close consultation with the member nations of the Far Eastern Commission, with the leaders of both parties of both Houses of the Congress of the United States, and with Generel MacArthur, have the full approval of President Truman.

The Japanese people, through their leaders, have given full expression of their accord with our desire for the early consummation of a treaty, along the lines already initiated by Ambassador Dulles and General MacArthur.

I desire to inform the Japanese people that I am wholly in sympathy with this plan and that with the full powers and authority of my office, I shall do my utmost to assist in accomplishing the objectives outlined in the statement of the President of the United States.

It is a source of great satisfaction to me that I am able to secure in person from Ambassador Dulles, almost at the moment of assuming my new duties, the great benefits of his rich experience and of his wise counsel and guidance. It will be a personal pleasure to renew an association, which it was my great privilege to have begun in our service with the United Nations.

In Japan, I shall encourage continuation of the work of strengthening and broadening solid political foundations in conformity with Japan's democratic constitution and with full acceptance of the premise that there has been built a lasting edifice of democray in Japan. In this work the Japanese people should not be diverted from their task or misled by the doctrines of subversion preached by some that this is a time to profit by seeming division and change of policy. There is no division. There is no change of basic policy.

With full recognition of the difficulties involved, it is my firm purpose to work toward the completion of the masterly task already largely accomplished under the consummate leadership and guidance of General MacArthur. Only thus may the Japanese people expect soon to claim their right to face the world with dignity and self-reliance as a full partner in the free world.

TEXT OF MR: DULLES' STATEMENT ON ARRIVAL IN TOKYO

Tokyo, April 16, 1951

On this day of General MacArthur's departure from Tokyo, the Japase nation rightly thinks only of him. Therefore, I withhold, for the moment, any statement of my own.

The Japanese people are, however, entitled to know that a few hours ago I had the drama of an unforgettable radio conference with General MacArthur.

About noon, Tokyo time, as General MacArthur's departing plane passed our arriving plane, we spoke of what was foremost in our minds; namely, peace for Japan.

I explained to General MacArthur the bipartisan backing of the present mission; our adherence to the policies upon which he and we had previously agreed and my personal sense of need for his continuing counsel and support.

In answer, General MacArthur urged me to continue to work to complete a fair and just treaty at the earliest, no matter what obstacles arose. He assured me that I could count completely upon any help and assistance that he could render.

I replied that his assurance reinforced our determination to carry on.

That conference fifttingly opens our mission's new visit to Japan and I take it as a good omen of success.

TEXT OF MR. DULLES' STATEMENT ON ASSURANCE OF PEACE SETTLEMENT

Tokyo, April 16, 1951

Our peace mission returned to Japan on a day saddened by the departure of General MacArthur. His lofty dynamic character has always impressed those about him and, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, he has made an indelible impression upon the Japanese nation.

During five years of occupation, human freedom in Japan has been enlarged through such measures as women's sufirage, land reform, organization of labor, liquidation of militarism and of police terrorism, freedom of the press and, broadly, giving a sovereignty to the people.

There has been resolute resistance to Communist imperialism, which would destroy the new-won freedoms and degrade human personality by seeking to break man's bodies, minds and spirits to the service of aggressive and militaristic dictatorship.

Now, in recognition of Japan's scrupulous compliance with the surrender terms, steps are under way to consummate an early and just peace which will restore Japan as an equal member of the society of free nations.

For his great contributions in each of these respects, General MacArthur is rightly honored by the American and Japanese people. These policies with which he has become identified are and will remain the policies of our nation. You can be sure of that.

You can find assurance in the character of the man chosen to be General MacArthur's succesor. General Ridgway is one of America's outstanding leaders who possesses moral qualities, vision,

and unquenchable love of freedom which will assure that the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers will continue in its high tradition.

You can find assurance in the reaffirmation by President Truman of the determination of the United States to work earnestly for the prompt conclusion of the Japanese peace settlement. These were his parting words to me as I left Washington. That is equally the determination of all our national leadership, irrespective of political party. Our mission's return to Tokyo is tangible evidence of that unity of purpose.

You can know that the great reforms which your nation has adopted are, in American eyes, the worthy and enduring monument to all who laid down their lives in the Pacific conflict. You may be confident that, in peace, the American people stand ready to extend their friendly cooperation to the end that this monument of freedom shall not crumble but shall develop in impressive grandeur.

You can be sure that the American people remain determined that liberty shall not perish from the earth, and that peace and justice shall be protected by collective power. I said here before, on the authority of my government, "We are prepared to combine our power with that of others in mutual committals in accord with the United Nations Charter, so that the deterrent power which protects us will also protect others." That offer stands, backed by our unshaken resolution and by the immensity of strength we are developing.

When our mission left Japan two months ago we said: "We shall go forward hopefully in the further advancement of our mission of peace." We have gone forward, with energy and resolution. Now, we shall discuss with General Ridgway and your leaders the good progress laready made and the program for the days ahead that lie between us and the great goals of peace and justice we seek together.

TEXT OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S STATEMENT ON PACIFIC SECURITY

Washington, April 18, 1951

The United States is moving steadily forward in concert with other countries of the Pacific in its determination to make ever stronger the position of the free world in the Pacific Ocean area.

In connection with the reestablishment of peace with Japan, we are discussing with the Japanese Government implementation of its expressed desire for a post treaty security arrangement pursuant to which United States armed forces might on a provisional basis remain in and about Japan.

The United States maintains and expects to continue to maintain its armed forces in the Ryukus, particularly at Okinawa.

In the Philippines, the United States is accorded certain military operating rights and facilities pursuant to agreement with the Government of the Philippines, and the whole world knows that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.

The Governments of Australia and New Zealand, in connection with the re-establishment of peace with Japan, have suggested an arrangement between them and the United States pursuaut to Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter which would make clear that in event of an armed attack upon any one of them in the Pacific, each of the three would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes: and which would establish consultation to strengthen security on the basis of continuous and effective selfhelp and mutual aid.

The possibilities of such an arrangement were fully explored by Mr. Dulles at Canberra, Australia, and Wellington, New Zealand, and have since been informally discussed with the appropriate subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.

I have now asked the Secretary of State the Secretary of Defence and Mr. Dulles as my special representative in relation to the Japanese peace settlement and related matters to pursue this matter further concurrently with the prosecution of other negotiations necessary to bring the Japanese peace settlement to an early and satisfactory conclusion.

The series of arrangements and dispositions outlined above will strengthen the fabric of peace in the whole Pacific Ocean arsa, where security is strongly influenced by sea and air power.

They constitute naturally initial steps in the consolidation of peace in that area and also will contribute to the building of universal peace as sought by the United Nations, and toward which great goal efforts of our nation are now being largely dedicated.

PRESS STATEMENT BY MR. DULLES ON PACIFIC SECURITY

Tokyo, April 19, 1951

The President has stated that the United States contemplates a security arrangement with Australia and New Zealand, so that in the event of an armed attack upon any of the three in the Pacific each would act to meet the common danger. This development grows out of conversations which I had in Canberra last February with the Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand. The President's announcement has great significance from the standpoint of Japan. The following points may be noted:

1. The arrangement between the United States, Australia and New Zealand is to be made "in connection with the re-establishment of peace with Japan." Thus it is apparent that all parties contemplate an early Japanese peace settlement on which they can agree.

2. This new step contemplated by the United States refutes the thesis some have advanced that there may be a weakening of the United States determination to resist aggression in the Western Pacific. It is evidence indeed of a determination to solidfy the structure of peace by adding a new link to the contemplated security pact with Japan and the existing relationship of common committal as between the United States and the Philippines.

3. The presently announced program has been worked out with the cooperation of the United Kingdom. This shows that our two countries can and do work together for peace in the Pacific, and it should diminish the fear which some have held that there was a basic cleavage between United Kingdom and United States policy particularly in Asia.

MR. DULLES PRESS' CONFERENCE*
(APRIL 19, 1951, 11:30, RADIO TOKYO BLDG.)

Tokyo, April 19, 1951

QUESTION: Is there a target date for the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty?

ANSWER: I can only say what I said before that if the terms of the peace treaty are not generally agreed to by this summer, I shall be disappointed.

QUESTION: It is reported that the United Kingdom Government has produced a new draft of the Japanese peace treaty. If that is correct, what bearing will it have on the treaty negotiations?

ANSWER: It is correct that the draft was given to us in Washington about a week or ten days ago. The draft embodied ideas on which the Foreign Office has been working for some time. I have not yet studied the draft carefully, but it seems to indicate the thinking of Foreign Office experts over some years. A number of ideas have been put together. It will be carefully considered by the United States. My impression is that it is a normal development which will not retard appreciably the target date. On the contrary, it may accelerate it because most of the ideas are now down on paper.

QUESTION: Could you tell us whether the British propose any restraints which are not in accord with full sovereignty for Japan?

ANSWER: I do not feel at liberty to make a disclosure at this time of this document which has handed to us in confidence. The deduction from my statement as well as examination of the

* This is not verbatim.

document does not indicate that the differences are irreconcilable. Assuming that there is a real desire for a Japanese peace treaty and good will, the differences are not insuperable.

QUESTION: Have you had any discusssons on territorial matters with the Japanese during your present visit?

ANSWER: No, none at all. I had a meeting with the Prime Minister yesterday, and this afternoon I shall start meetings with representatives of the principal political parties.

QUESTION: I believe that you met Mr. Hatoyama on your previous visit. Will you be meeting him again?

ANSWER: According to my present plan, I will not have time to meet anyone other than the representatives of the principal parties.

QUESTION: I have been requested to have you clarify Nationalist China's participation in the peace treaty negotiations. How will it be worked out over the objections of the United Kingdom?

ANSWER: So far, the United States has been carrying on the negotiations on a diplomatic level and therefore has dealt with the governments with which it has diplomatic relations. In the case of China, only the Nationalist Government is recognized by the United States. Some countries concerned, like the United Kingdom have relations with the Communist government. How the differences are to be resolved has not yet been determined, but I am confident that they are not insuperable obstacles. But I am not now in a position to indicate how they will be resolved.

QUESTION: Will the United States be paying for the bases it retains in Japan?

ANSWER: There is no intention on the part of the United States to retain bases. As I said when I was here before, the United States is willing to maintain armed forces in and about Japan so that Japan would not become a vacuum of power. It is not a question of retention of bases with extraterritorial rights. The

arrangement would probably be similar to those with the United Kingdom and member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty group, where individual efforts are combined so that the maximum force may be secured. It does not involve acquisition of bases.

QUESTION: Will you be going to Australia and New Zealand?

ANSWER: No, I am due to leave directly for the United States on the evening of the 23rd.

QUESTION: Do you intend to go to Britain?

ANSWER: I have no plans at present to do so. But it would not be unnatural if I should go at some stage in the negotiations.

QUESTION: You indicated that the United States military arrangement with Japan would be similar to the North Atlantic Pact. Do you then contemplate the use of Japanese military units?

ANSWER: There have been no discussions on that subject. The first reason is that under the surrender terms and the directives of the Far Eastern Commission, Japan is not allowed to maintain military establishment. The second reason is that the Japanese Constitution forbids the maintenance of armed forces. But you may recall that when I left Japan in February, both Prime Minister Yoshida and myself issued communiques. I said on that the United States did not extend the benefits of protection of a permanent basis except under the terms of the Vandenberg resolution which refers to continuous self-help and mutual aid. It is not the policy of the United States to give a free ride to any nation by guaranteeing its security except on the basis of reciprocity. Prime Minister Yoshida stated that after Japan had fully become a member of the council of free nations, then the question of the extent of Japan's contribution to her own security would be determined in the light of her economic capacity at that time. The matter was left there.

QUESTION: With respect to the projected security pact with Australia and New Zealand, are there any plans for other nations

to join, such as the Philippines, Indo-China and Malaya?

ANSWER: As pointed out in the President's statement, not only a triangular arrangement is contemplated, but also a bilateral arrangement with Japan. And also there is the present understanding with the Philippines under which the United States is accorded operating rights and facilities in the Philippines. The position is that a series of arrangements, if they go through, will develop with the United States as the common denominator of security with Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

QUESTION: Has there been any final proposal for resolving the Philippines demand for reparations?

ANSWER: There had been no final understanding on that point at the time the draft text of the United States was circulated. That text provided, that reparations claims would be deemed satisfied out of assets in Allied countries. A note appended to the draft stated that negotiations on the subject would be carried on with the nations concerned and that there had been no final decision. That is where it still stands. I had a talk with the Philippines Foreign Minister on the subject just before leaving for Japan. There is, however, an increasing area of understanding on the economic limitations on Japan's capacity to pay reparations, but there is no indication as yet that the Philippines have abandoned its reparations claims.

QUESTION: Will the Japanese peace treaty be delayed if a satisfactory Pacific security arrangement has not been concluded?

ANSWER: No. It is contemplated that the two will be concurrent and become operative at the same time. Presumably, the peace treaty and the security pact with Australia and New Zealand would go before the Senate at the same time and their ratification would be simultaneous.

QUESTION: Could you comment on whether the Pacific security arrangement is for defense against the Communist forces or is it

due to the imaginary fear of a resurgence of Japanese militarisms?

ANSWER: As for the United States, the arragement is primarily concerned with the danger from the Communist-controlled areas on the mainland. It does not consider that Japan is a danger or likely to be a danger unless by some mischance which we do not foresee fall under Communist domination. We do think Japan's position as a democratic state and a member of the free world would be in danger. That is the point of view of the United States. But it is natural that in countries like Australia, which was near invasion and whose Port Darwin was hit in the last war, there should still be fears. When I visited Australia I found that such fears existed. But that is a reaction to the past. I think the future danger will not come from Japan but from the Communist areas.

QUESTION: Have you handed the draft of the treaty to the Japanese Government?

ANSWER: Yes. I understand a substantial part of the draft appeared in the press in Japan, but I don't know from what source.

QUESTION: You said that the United States Senate would ratify the peace treaty and the Pacific security arrangement together. Does that mean that the security pact with Japan will come after that?

ANSWER: They would come before the Sanate at the same time. There might well be three documents before the Senata at the same time: One, the peace treaty; two, the bilateral security pact with Japan, and three, the triangular pact with Australia and New Zealand.

QUESTION: You said that Japan is not in a position to discuss military agreements. Then there would not be enough time to prepare a bilateral pact with Japan for simultaneous ratification.

ANSWER: No. I said that the initial security pact between the

United States and Japan would not deal with Japan's contributions to her own security. I pointed out that this initial pact would be a provisional one because the United States cannot agree to a long term agreement except on the basis of self-help and mutual aid. The process would presumably be: One, a bilateral treaty under which provisionally help would come only from the United States. It would therefore be only provisional. Two, the discussions on the help Japan would provide for its own self-defense, might well become the basis for a permanent arrangement based on the Vandenberg resolution.

QUESTION: How far have the negotiations for a provisional pact gone?

ANSWER: They are still tentative. About the same as the peace treaty negotiations with Australia and New Zealand.

QUESTION: In your talks with Soviet representatives, what have you found to be the primary objections of the Russians?

ANSWER: Insofar as I can infer, the desire of the Russians was that Japan should continue forever to remain totally disarmed and not be allowed to participate in any security pact with any other nation, so that Japan would be a total vacuum of power. I shall leave it to you to guess why the Russians want Japan to be unable to defend herself for her own benefit.

QUESTION: You said that the United States would be the common denominator in the Pacific security arrangement. Can it be presumed that in view of the fact that the United States would guarantee against any attack on Japan, Australia and New Zealand would undertake to help the United States to guarantee Japan's security?

ANSWER: There is no guarantee for Japan involved. It may not be easy for me to make myself clear on the point, but the bilateral pact would provide provisionally for the stationing of United States forces in Japan for *de facto* protection of that

country. As long as United States troops are here, an attack on Japan would involve an attack on United States troops. The United States is not prepared to guarantee Japan's security permanently until it is clear what Japan's own contribution will be. The protection would be *de facto*, not a legal guarantee. The United States is not willing to undertake that except under the terms of the Vandenberg resolution.

QUESTION: Will the triangular arrangement provide for mutual assistance?

ANSWER: According to the President's statement, in the event of any attack on any one of the three, each would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. In the event of an attack on the United States, the others would act.

QUESTION: You said that a *de facto* guarantee arrangement.....

ANSWER: I wish you would stop using that word "guarantee." There is no guarantee involved. The arrangement would be like that in Germany. American forces are stationed there. If the Soviets invaded Germany, they would be attacking United States troops.

QUESTION: If Japan were attacked by some external force while United States troops were here, would Australia and New Zealand come to their aid?

ANSWER: An attack on United States forces in Japan, or for that matter in the Philippinea, would be deemed an attack on the United States in the Pacific, assuming that this is made clear in the final agreement. But this is my interpretation of the situation as expressed by the President.

TEXT OF ADDRESS BY MR. DULLES AT U.N. ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN

Tokyo, April 23, 1951

PEACE WITHOUT FEAR

The United States, in association with its Allies and in consultation with Japan, is seeking a prompt peace, a just peace, a peace insured by collective power.

These three principles have solid bipartisan support in the United States. If that were not so our Mission would not be here today. The change in the Supreme Command has left United States policies untouched in so far as relates to Japan. That is good news, for policies which depend upon the vicissitudes of individual fortunes are always fragile. Policies which surmount personalites are the policies which are dependable. All the world can now know that our Japanese policies have that quality of dependability and of survival.

Prompt Peace

The fact that the United States is seeking a prompt peace is shown by the energy with which our Government has been moving forward. Our Mission was established by the President on January 10, 1951. We left for Japan on January 22, 1951. After nearly two weeks of intensive activity here, we went on to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. We laid the foundation for an Australian-New Zealand-United States security arrangement related to the Japanese peace. My Deputy, Mr. Allison, went to England. We completed the task of drafting, as a working paper, the complete text of a suggssted Japanese peace treaty. We circulated that

text to the fifteen other governments principally concerned, and we have given personal explanations to fourteen of them.

In all of these matters we have maintained close working relations with our Congress.

We availed of the presence in Washington of the twenty other American States, all belligerents, to explain to them the principles of the Japanese peace we sought.

Within a few hours following the retirement of General MacArthur as Suppreme Commander, and after confirming that there was continuing bipartisan support of established policies, we returned to Japae so that the new Supreme Commander, General Ridway, might be fully informed. He has been informed and already his great ability, tested not only in war but in the counsels of the United Nations, is being dedicated to the attainment of peace.

We have taken advantage of our presence here to inform your Prime Minister and other Japanese political leaders of the progress made, of the obstacles surmounted, and the problems that remain.

The record of the past three months admits of no doubt as to our intention to seek an early peace. It is not necessary, in this respect, to rely upon what we say. You can see what we do.

Just Peace

The peace we seek is a just peace which will promote reconciliation between those who have been enemies. When I spoke in Tokyo last February, we talked of a peace of trust and of opportunity. The treaty terms which we have now tentatively formulated were described in an address made in Los Angeles on March 31. I shall not describe them here again because they are familiar to you. I am confident you have found that our detailed proposals fully conform to what we forecast here. The peace treaty we envisage would in fact restore Japan as a free and equal member of the society of nations.

There is always the temptation to take advantage of a defeated nation's helplessness to impose restrictions of a kind which are not applicable to other sovereign nations. The United States is opposed to that. We are convinced that the welfare of all concerned, the victors as well as the vanquished, will best be served by a peace which will erase the wounds of war, not keep them festering.

General MacArthur, who largely inspired our concept of peace, said that it "brings a new spiritual idea to mankind and evokes a new standard of morality in international relations." That is worth doing. Though the value of that is intangible, it is not, on that account, less real.

Secure Peace

We seek a peace that will be insured by the deterrent of collective power. When I last spoke here on February 2, I referred to the United Nations concept that there should be "effective collective measures for the prevention of threats to the peace." Veto power in the Security Council has prevented the United Nations itself from setting up an effective security force. But the United Nations principle is nevertheless being applied through regional collective security arrangements, which are contemplated by the Charter. In that way there is being built up collective power to deter aggression.

Today the material might to deter aggression resides largely in the United States. But, as we said here before, the United States is prepared to combine its power with that of others in mutual committals so that the deterrent power that protects us will also protect others. Japan can, if it wishes, share in that protection.

The Obstacle of Fear

Since we have been here, many have asked us about the obstacles that lie in the way of the prompt, just and secure peace we seek. Of course there are obstacles. That is a normal incident

of every great achievement. There are, however, no obstacles that seem to be insurmountable except perhaps the obstacle of fear. Fear is a paralyzing, a corroding emotion. It destroys men's capacity to think clearly and it makes them irresolute in action. Fear is a negative rather than a positive force. The most important task, to clear the way for the peace we seek, is to dispel the fears that harass us.

United States Stands Firm in the Pacific

Some seem to fear that the offer of the United States to establish collective security for Japan and for other Pacific areas means little because, they suggest, the power we possess will only be used to protect the members of the North Atlantic Pact, leaving Asia in a position of neglect. That suggestion is wholly without foundation. I do not ask you to believe that merely because I say it. I ask you to consider such indisputable facts as the following:

1. Of the armed forces of the United States which are outside of our homeland, a large part are in Asia.

2. The Far Eastern Air Force has been expanded in numbers and facilities, fresh United States Army Division has in the last few days arrived in Japan to strengthen the position here while still another is en route.

3. The United States stands ready, by bilateral arrangement with Japan, to continue after the peace a screen of protection which could not be breached without placing upon the United States grave responsibilities, which we publicly accept.

4. The United States has, and expects to maintain, armed force at Okinawa, and new construction there is steadily going forward.

5. The United States has in the Philippines military operating rights and facilities pursuant to agreement with that Government, and President Truman only last week has affirmed that an armed