

attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety and that it would act accordingly.

6. The United States, as the President further announced last week, is prepared, in connection with re-establishment of peace with Japan, to make an arrangement with Australia and New Zealand providing for common action to meet the common danger inherent in an armed attack upon any of them in the Pacific.

7. The bulk of United States power, and notably its strategic air power, remains, of course, within the United States itself. But there it also serves others. An armed attack upon any of the areas, East or West, where there are such pre-arrangements as I have described, could bring into play this immense retaliatory striking power. That is known, and that knowledge exerts a powerful influence for peace. The Japanese nation can share the security which the United States itself and others derive from the fact that potential aggressors know that they cannot attack without subjecting themselves to the risk of great disaster.

8. Secretary Acheson, speaking in Washington on April 19, in discussing the contemplated arrangements between the United States and Japan for the continued security of Japan, said, "Japan's safety is of vital concern to us both."

In the light of all these facts, it is ridiculous to pretend that the collective security which is offered to Japan is illusory.

#### Fear of Indirect Aggression

Let us turn now to a second cause of fear, the fear that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party (Bolshevik) may not leave Japan alone.

As I pointed out in speaking here last February, international danger has two aspects. There is the danger of direct aggression and also of indirect aggression.

I cannot in honesty say to you that the menace of indirect aggression is illusory. That is a danger that is ever present and all pervading. In every free country of the world there exists, partly in the open but also invariably underground, a Bolshevik organization working to gain political control so as to add that country to the list of those which are subject to the will of international communism. Their avowed goal is to achieve a universal state under the domination of the Soviet Communist Party as the leader of the world proletariat. In their efforts, they accept the direction of the Moscow Politburo as being what they call the "General Staff" of the world proletariat.

This is a danger which, as I say, exists everywhere. It is, however, a danger which, when it is recognized, can be met. That has been proved time after time.

Communism wins its internal victories by using fraud and terrorism to win converts, and by then using these converts first, to break down orderly government and then to seize power through revolutionary effort. Those methods fail utterly when falsehood is met with truth; when secrecy is confronted with exposure; and, above all, when the society is so sound and healthy that there are not mass discontents which furnish Communism with recruits. Confronted by these conditions, the tactics of Bolshevik Communism cannot prevail.

The consequences of Communist conquest are now so demonstrably evil that to abet the conquest is a supreme crime. We see these consequences in China and North Korea. There the Communist rulers, like all true Communists of the Bolshevik school, proclaim and protest loyalty to the Politburo at Moscow, and now the destitute and war-weary peoples of North Korea and China are being fed into the fiery furnace of a war of aggression to gain control of all Korea, an area which has been a strategic objective of Russia since the days of the Czars. The total casualties of

North Korean and Communist Chinese forces in Korea between June 25, 1950 and April 17, 1951, are officially estimated by the United Nations Command as being 827,186. This awful ascription is so sickening that all peoples in their senses will take the necessary measures so that they will not in turn become victims of Communist despotism and be made to pour out the lives of their youth to promote the fanatical Bolshevik dream of world domination.

The danger is real. It is a danger that confronts every nation in the world, but it is a danger that can be dealt with and which will be dealt by all who see the danger, for the consequences of neglect are disastrous.

#### The Danger of Direct Aggression

There is, of course, some risk of general war, but I personally doubt that the rulers of Russia now want it. I may be wrong. No one can be certain of what goes on within the dark recesses of the Kremlin. But experience to date indicates that the rulers of Soviet Russia spread fear of general war primarily because that helps the Communist Parties in non-Communist countries to strengthen their position so that they can take over from within.

I recall that in 1948, the Prime Minister of France told me that the Communist Party within France had been greatly strengthened numerically by rumors that France would be invaded by the Red Armies of Russia. The Communists deliberately spread those rumors and sought to capitalize on the resultant fear by urging membership in the Party as a means of getting safety as against liquidation when the Red Armies moved in.

That is standard technique, and I should be surprised if it is not practiced in all other countries within reach of the military power of Russia.

Also I recall the furor that Soviet Russia raised when the North Atlantic Security Pact was made two years ago. The Rus-

sian leaders cried to high heaven that this security arrangement constituted in fact an offensive threat and that it involved the United Kingdom and France in violation of their treaties of alliance with Russia. Communists intimated that this might be a cause for war.

Some timid souls were paralyzed with fright and saw, in nightmares, the Red Army marching into Western Europe. Those who were calmer and more experienced saw that the Red Armies would not march on the basis of some legalistic pretext. They saw that it was better to gain strength than to succumb to blackmail which would mean permanent weakness and the living in perpetual fear. So the Atlantic countries went ahead. They made their security pact, they began to implement it, and the Red Armies did not march.

There is always a danger of war when there are ambitious despots who control a great military establishment. That has been so since the beginning of time. However, the evidence to date suggests that the present program for world conquest is primarily the program of the Communist Party, that it is being pursued primarily by methods of indirect aggression and that the fear of direct aggression and armed attack is being spread to frighten the free peoples into a condition which will make them vulnerable to conquest from within.

#### "Overall" Peace

Those who seek alternatives to collective security are the victims of a great illusion.

Some seek safety in what they call an "overall" peace. That means, I take it, that they do not want peace until it is offered jointly by the free nations and also by Soviet Russia.

It is, of course, highly desirable that the Soviet Union should become a party to the kind of peace we seek for Japan. The

United States has sought earnestly to bring that about, and we shall continue to do so. We have been scrupulous to seek to keep in touch with the representatives of the Soviet Union precisely as with the other Allies principally concerned.

For some months, the Soviet Government, through Mr. Yakov Malik, carried on discussions with us. Before coming to Japan last January, I explained to Mr. Malik the exploratory nature of our Mission; that no final decisions would be taken, and that we would discuss the situation with him when we returned. In accordance with that promise, immediately upon our return, we sought to see him to report the good prospects ahead, and to exchange views about future procedure. Thereupon, Mr. Malik, presumably under instructions, announced to the Press that he would not "resume negotiation on a Japanese peace treaty." "I do not conduct any discussions with Mr. Dulles on a Japanese peace treaty," he said.

We were not willing to rely on a press announcement on so important a matter. Therefore, we personally approached Mr. Malik to find out whether the press statement must be accepted at its face value. He confirmed that his Government was unwilling to resume our Japanese peace treaty discussions.

Even so, however, we do not accept the rebuff as final. We have submitted our suggested text of treaty to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and in this way informed the Soviet Government that the United States would appreciate its consideration of the draft and an early expression of its views. We have further informed the Soviet Government that thereafter the Government of the United States would expect again to get in touch with the Soviet Government with a view to concerting future procedures.

Our approach has so far elicited no response, and it may be that the Soviet Union intends to disassociate itself from the Japanese peace. If so the reasons will not be hard to find. The Soviet

Government talks much of peace but in fact, when peace comes near, they avoid it like the plague. They do so because they desire to deny the reassurance which peace would bring and to keep alive the fear upon which the Bolshevik Communist Party capitalizes in its efforts at indirect aggression.

If that attitude persists, then those who advocate a so-called "overall" peace are, in effect, advocating no peace at all.

"Neutrality" and "Friendship"

There are some who feel that "neutrality" is safer than collective security. Neutrality would, of course, be normal if we were living in a world where aggression was permanently banished. But in a world where there are still aggressors, neutrality is no protection, rather it encourages aggression.

No one has spoken more clearly or eloquently on this point than Stalin himself. Speaking on March 10, 1939, Stalin bitterly reproached what he called "the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the United States" because, he said, they "have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of 'neutrality'." That policy, he said, "might be defined as follows: 'Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can'.....But, actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression."

We should all be well advised to remember these words: History is full of examples of how illusory it is to seek security through "neutrality" and pacts of "non-aggression," and of "friendship."

Let us recall the experience of the National Government of China.

As part of the Yalta arrangement of February, 1945, Stalin

agreed to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of Friendship and Alliance. Six months later the Soviet Union did in fact make such a pact. The National Government of China, in accordance with the Yalta proposal, agreed to surrender to Russia effective control of Manchuria, Port Arthur and Dairen. But in return, as was stipulated by the Yalta proposal, the Soviet Union made with the National Government of China a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and solemnly promised that for twenty years, it would "render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China."

A few days later, the Japanese surrender having been concluded, the Russians moved into Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, North Korea, Soth Sakhalin and the Kuril and Habomai islands, thus cashing in on a formal belligerency that had lasted six days. In Manchuria they acquired not only Japanese industrial investments but vast amounts of Japanese armament and ammunition dumps. These latter they turned over to the Chinese Red Armies, despite the explicit agreement, they had just made, to give military supplies only to the National Government.

In October, 1949, in another direct violation of its twenty-year treaty of 1945, the Soviet Government withdrew its recognition of the National Government and recognized the Red regime of Mao Tse-tung as the Government of all China.

The lessons are clear. As Stalin said, the only reliable security policy is the policy of collective resistance to aggressors and a policy of neutrality means in fact "coniving at aggression."

#### The Road to Peace

I have spoken of fears in the hope of allaying fear. Fear itself is usually far more dangerous than what is feared, for it destroys the capacity to surmount danger.

As we have seen, the actual danger that confronts us, the danger of indirect aggression, can be dealt with. The danger of direct aggression is a kind of danger that has been constant in the world as it has existed for thousands of years. There is today much more chance to overcome that type of danger than ever before in the history of mankind. Now, for the first time, there is a possibility of collective measures adequate to assure that victims will not be plucked one by one. Therefore, we can face the future with courage and confidence and act to seek the kind of peace that the nations envisaged when they met at San Francisco and drafted the United Nations Charter which should always be our guide.

#### Collective Security

That Charter, you will recall, rejects the thesis of pacifism that there should be no armament and no resistance to aggression. On the contrary, the Charter imposes upon every member the obligation to stand ready to provide armed forces for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter recognizes that there is a right of individual and collective self-defense and that this is what it calls an "inherent right." It recognizes the need for "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." It contemplates regional arrangements as an agency for peace.

It is in pursuance of those principles that the President of the United States last week outlined his plans for strengthening the fabric of peace in the Pacific Ocean area by a series of steps which initially would include (a) a post-treaty security arrangement between the United States and Japan; (b) the maintenance of armed forces at Okinawa; (c) recognition that an armed attack on the Philippines would be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety; and (d) the conclusion with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand of an arrangement whereby, in the event

of an armed attack upon any of them in the Pacific, each of the three would act to meet the common danger. These measures, he pointed out, were "initial steps" and as Secretary Acheson pointed out the following day, they will not interfere in any way with such broader arrangements as nations in the Pacific area may wish to develop—arrangements which he said would receive the sympathetic interest of the United States.

The series of measures thus outlined, taken in the aggregate, represent major steps in the exercise of regional and collective security rights which are authorized by the United Nations Charter, and which all of the members of the United Nations have by the Charter recognized to be in the interest of peace, security and justice.

Let us also recall that the United Nations Charter, while it recognizes the necessity of there being armed force to resist armed attack, lays down another principle, namely, the principle that "force shall not be used, save in the common interest." This great principle, if given practical expression in arrangements for collective security, automatically gives hope that armed force created for security will not serve to create insecurity. As this principle is embodied in practice, it will mean that individual nations will be less inclined and less able to use national force to promote purely national ambitions. It is a principle which operates against the militarism which neither Japan nor its neighbors want.

#### Economic Well-Being

Let us also recall Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations, which recognizes that stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations and which calls upon the nations to promote higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development.

The leaders and people of Japan are, I know, concerned with their economic problems and that is a natural concern. It is because of the difficulty of the Japanese economic position that the United States stands against imposing such economic burdens and disabilities as would make it improbable that Japan would realize the conditions which the Charter of the United Nations recognizes to be necessary for lasting peace.

If the Japanese conform in public and private trade and commerce to internationally accepted fair practices and if the industry, the aptitude and the ingenuity of the Japanese people are devoted to developing mutually desirable trade and commerce with the rest of the world, that should assure the possibility of a rising economic standard.

In this connection, it is useful to recall that trade and commerce are apt to flourish where they have the protection of a common security system. If there is concluded between Japan and the United States such a post-treat security arrangement as the President of the United States has suggested, that in itself will promote the confidence which will encourage business and finance within our two nations to work together in cooperation for mutual advantage.

#### Human Rights

Let us also recall that the United Nations Charter calls for universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for cultural and educational cooperation.

In Japan, human freedom and opportunity have already been vastly enlarged during the Occupation through such measures as women's suffrage, land reform, the organization of labor, the liquidation of militarism and police terrorism, freedom of the press, and, broadly, the giving of sovereignty to the people through a truly representative government. Japan is today one of the nations which are in the forefront of those seeking to conform their conduct

to the high ideals enunciated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

You are eager for cultural and educational cooperation and in this respect, you have much to give, for your people have demonstrated over the centuries the capacity to appreciate and create beauty and culture.

The free world, in turn, welcomes cooperation with Japan in the field of education and culture and our Mission is perhaps unique in the history of peace missions in that one of its members was specifically charged with finding ways to promote cultural and educational cooperation.

#### CONCLUSION

We stand at a threshold beyond which lies a vista of opportunities that are immense and glorious. The door is not yet open, but we hold in our hands the key. Let not our hand be paralyzed by fears and doubts. Let us dare to use that key to open that door and go forward on the road to peace.

#### TEXT OF MR. DULLES' STATEMENT UPON RETURN TO U.S.

Washington, April 24, 1951.

Our mission returns from a week in Japan. One of our tasks was to inform the new Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, regarding the United States policies and program for a Japanese peace settlement. This has been done. General Ridgway is quickly mastering the subject and there can be complete confidence that he will deal effectively with the Japanese phase of this new responsibilities. The Japanese themselves are already beginning to appreciate that and they will soon appreciate it fully.

Another task was to reassure the Japanese nation that the change in the Supreme Commander did not involve a change in the basic policies with which General MacArthur had been particularly identified in Japan. These policies were an early and just Japanese peace settlement, the unwavering will to resist Communist aggression in the Western Pacific and the implementing of that will by deeds to save Japan from being left defenseless upon consummation of a treaty.

We met with many Japanese political and civic leaders and I made a public address which was widely reported to the Japanese people.

In such ways we are able to provide a large measure of reassurance and as our nation continues to translate these basic policies into effective action, we are confident the Japanese nation for its part will continue to place confidence in the United States and desire close association with us.

The third task was to discuss with the Japanese Government

the present status of our negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty. We had full exchanges of views with the Prime Minister and his associates. We reported substantial progress made on the obstacles encountered and our program for bringing the peace settlement to an early, successful conclusion.

In this connection, we also had useful talks with some of the diplomatic representatives in Tokyo of the Allied Powers.

There is unmistakable evidence that the Communist parties of Russia, China and Japan are working intensely and with renewed vigor to spread distrust and fear in Japan and to block the peace settlement on which the hopes of the Japanese people center.

We return confident their design can be frustrated if the free world acts promptly, unitedly and with enlightened recognition of its community of interest with the peace-and freedom-seeking people of Japan.

#### TEXT OF U.S. REPLY TO SOVIET PROPOSALS

Washington, May 20, 1951

The Government of the United States has carefully considered the remarks of the Government of the Soviet Union of May 7, 1951 relative to the draft of a Japanese peace treaty which the Government of the United States submitted on March 29, 1951. These remarks show the persistence of a major difference of opinion as regards procedure. However, as regards substance, the Government of the Soviet Union raises objection only to the proposed treatment of (A) Formosa and the Pescadores; (B) the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands; (C) Japan's future security; and even here the differences are only partial, not total. The Soviet Government's analysis would seem to constitute a genuine, if unintended, tribute to the regard for balanced justice with which the draft treaty was prepared.

The paragraphs of the Soviet Government's remarks number 1, deal with procedure.

The Soviet Government asserts that under the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, "The drawing up of a peace treaty with Japan has been laid upon the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain," constituting for this purpose the Council of Foreign Ministers.

This view of the Soviet Government has been put forward on several occasions and has as often been rejected by the Government of the United States.

The Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945 contemplates that the Council of Foreign Ministers thereby established would, "as its immediate important task," draw up "treaties of peace with Italy,

Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland" and propose "settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe." It is then provided that the Council "shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany." It is finally provided that "other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the member governments."

Thus, the Potsdam Agreement between the Government of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States did not mention the Japanese peace treaty. This was natural, for the war with Japan was then in full vigor and the Soviet Union was then neutral, in that war.

The Council of Foreign Ministers can, of course, deal with "other matters" than the European matters specified, but only "by agreement between the member governments."

The United States has not agreed and does not agree to the reference to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the matter of making a Japanese peace treaty. The reason, among others, is that the systematic mis-use in the Council of veto power militates against the speedy achievement, through the Council, of an early peace treaty. Furthermore, the procedures of the Council would give a secondary role to Allied Powers which bore a greater burden of the Pacific War than did the Soviet Union.

The Government of the Soviet Union urges that the peace making procedure should fully take account of the interests of China in a Japanese peace treaty. The procedure being presently followed does that. It is true that the United States does not seek guidance from a convicted aggressor, but the real interests of China are fully reflected in the present draft treaty. For example, by Article II, "Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China" and Article 19 makes this renunciation automatically effective. It is noteworthy that the Soviet Government, which in parts II and III of its remarks, deals fully with substantive issues, suggests

no modification or addition in favor of China except in relation to Formosa and the Pescadores, as to which it is suggested that Japan should do more than liquidate its own title. This large measure of acceptance by the Government of the Soviet Union of the substantive provisions dealing with China testifies to the scrupulous regard for China's interests with which the draft treaty was prepared.

The paragraphs of the Soviet Government's remarks numbered II deal with the substance of the draft treaty.

(A) As to territorial matters, the Government of the Soviet Union suggests that the draft treaty does not faithfully reflect the Surrender Terms because it does not provide that "the Island of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to China."

The territorial clause of the Surrender Terms stipulated "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." The draft treaty would, in fact, limit Japanese sovereignty accordingly.

The Cairo Declaration provided that "Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."

The Government of the United States notes that the remarks of the Soviet Government fail to quote accurately the Cairo Declaration. The word "Manchuria" is deleted and "China" is substituted for "the Republic of China."

In view of the known acquisition by the U.S.S.R. of zones of interest in Manchuria, the United States Government is prompted to inquire as to the significance of the present avoidance by the Soviet Government of reference to the restoration of Manchuria.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that the Government of the Soviet Union has it-self pointed out on numerous occasions that the "Republic of China" is not identical with what the Soviet Government now refers to as the "Chinese People's Republic," the Govern-



ment of the United States inquires of the Government of the Soviet the whether it in fact now desires that Manchuria, Formosa and Union Pescadores should be restored to "the Republic of China."

The draft treaty proceeds on the assumption that Japanese sovereignty "shall be limited" to exclude sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores, according to the Surrender Terms and that if this is done by Japan, Japan will have done all that can be required of her and the Japanese people ought not to be denied a state of peace because of a difference of opinion among the Allied Powers as to the subsequent disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores.

The Government of the Soviet Union criticizes the provision that the Ryukyu, Bonin and certain other islands may be placed under United Nations trusteeship with the United States as administering authority.

It is true that the Surrender Terms, neither by themselves, nor by the incorporated reference to the Cairo Declaration, mention by name South Sakhalin or the Kurile Islands, now occupied by the Soviet Union, or the Ryukyu, Bonin Islands or other islands mentioned in the remarks of the Soviet Government. Since, however, the Surrender Terms provided, as indicated, that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the four main islands and such minor islands as may be determined, it is consonant with the Surrender Terms for the Allied Powers by treaty of peace with Japan to deal with Japanese islands other than the four main islands mentioned.

(B) As to demilitarization, the Soviet Government complains that the present draft does not guarantee against the restoration of Japanese militarism and does not limit the size of armed forces in Japan. It is said that this cannot be reconciled with "known agreements of the powers concerning demilitarization of Japan."

The Soviet Government does not attempt to identify the so-called "known agreements" in fact there are none, outside of understandings dealing with the occupation period.

Of the agreements mentioned by the Soviet Government's remarks, neither Cairo nor Yalta touch on the subject. The Potsdam Surrender Terms provide that "until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied," and that "the Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives."

The United States Government is satisfied that "Japan's war-making power is destroyed." Apparently the Soviet Government shares that conviction, since it says that the occupation of Japan has "impermissibly dragged on." Furthermore, the United States, so far as it is concerned, has in fact completely disarmed the Japanese military forces under its control and has assured that they now lead peaceful and productive lives. Of the belligerents, only the Soviet Government has failed to comply with this provision and, in violation of the Surrender Terms, withholds from return to their homes and peaceful lives approximately 200,000 Japanese soldiers. The people of Japan, eagerly await the return to peaceful pursuits of these thousands of Japanese soldiers, as promised by the Surrender Terms.

With respect to the avoidance of any future offensive military threat from Japan, this is a matter of profound concern to the United States, which bore the burden of Japan's war of aggression for nearly four years, as against six days of Soviet Union belligerency. It is the belief of the United States Government that the most effective means to the desired end is to make the future security of the Japanese area a matter of collective international concern, which would as a practical matter assure that the measures which the Japanese might take for their own security, would develop as a cooperative rather than as a purely national project.

The President of the United States indicated in his statement

of April 18, 1951, that the United States Government is prepared now to take what the President referred to as "natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace" in the Pacific Ocean area and, as one of such steps, to enter into a post-treaty security arrangement with Japan. The United States Government contemplates that this arrangement would accept the principle that Japan should not possess military forces which could become an offensive threat.

The United States Government is not disposed to rely upon the dependability of treaty limitations on armament such as were imposed upon Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary by the treaties of peace and which limitations already are being grossly exceeded.

(C) As to ending the occupation, the Soviet Government alleges that the present draft does not establish any period for the withdrawal of occupation troops from Japan. On the contrary, under the draft treaty, the occupation would cease upon the coming into force of the treaty. If, after the treaty comes into force, any Allied troops are in Japan they will not be there as occupation troops but pursuant to such collective security arrangement as Japan may make voluntarily. Such arrangement would carry no offensive threat.

The Government of the Soviet Union refers to the fact that the territory of Japan and its natural and human resources are even now being utilized in connection with what is referred to as "armed intervention in Korea" by which is presumably meant the efforts of the United Nations to repel armed aggression in Korea.

The assistance which the Japanese in fact are rendering to the United Nations action in Korea is within the demilitarization limits established by Far Eastern Commission decisions, is non-belligerent in character, and is in accord with the Charter and recommendatoin of the United Nations.

According to Article 2, Paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Charter even "states which are not members of the United Nations are" required

to "give the United Nations every assistance so" far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, and General Assembly Resolution No. A/1771 adopted February 1, 1951, calls upon all states and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to United Nations action in Korea.

(D) As to Japan's peacetime economy, the Soviet Government alleges that the draft treaty "ignores the necessity of removing limitations with respect to the free development of the peaceful economy of Japan." In reality, the draft treaty, by restoring to Japan complete sovereignty without any limitation upon the development of its peaceful economy and without imposing burden-some current reparation liabilities, would accomplish completely the result which the Government of the Soviet Union professes to desire.

The paragraphs of the Soviet Government's remarks numbered III contain certain proposals designed, in the words of the Soviet Government, to bring about the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

(1) The Government of the Soviet Union suggests, as to procedure, the calling of a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in June or July of 1951 to be composed of representatives of the United States, China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to embark upon the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. For the reasons earlier stated, and because all experience shows that this procedure would not in fact achieve a "speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan," the United States Government can not agree to this procedural proposal.

(2) The Soviet Government proposes that in drawing up a Japanese peace treaty the powers concerned should be governed by certain basic aims. With one qualification, these basic aims are, in fact, reflected in the present draft treaty, namely:

A. "Japan should become a peace-loving, democratic, independent state."

Japan already is a peace-loving and democratic state and the treaty would give it independence.

B. Democratic rights should be guaranteed and organization to deprive people of their democratic rights.....should not be allowed.

These matters are taken care of by the Japanese Constitution and by the declaration, contemplated by the present draft treaty, that Japan will strive to realize the objectives of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to create internally conditions of stability and well-being as envisioned by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post war Japanese legislation.

C. "As guarantee against a revival of Japanese militarism, limitation should be established in the treaty on the size of Japanese armed forces in order that they may not exceed the requirement of self-defense."

The proposal of the Soviet Government seems to assume that Japan will have to depend, for defense, solely on its own armed forces; and that its requirement, in this respect, can now be measured definitely, for all time. But the charter of the United Nations recognizes the inherent right of collective, as well as individual self-defense. Generalissimo Stalin, in his memorable address of March 10, 1939, pointed out "adequate defense against aggression requires collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors" and, he says, the policy of "let each country defend itself from aggressors means "conniving at aggression."

The present suggestions of the Soviet Government that the Japan shall have armed forces as required for its self-defense, coupled with the further Soviet proposal (4) that there can be no other troops in Japan, seems a reversion the principle of "let Japan defend itself" and consequent as Generalissimo Stalin said, a "conniving at aggression."

Furthermore, to define "the size of Japanese armed forces"

needed for "requirements of self-defense" as the Government of the Soviet Union now proposes, would not only be difficult, but might be dangerous. Japanese land, sea and air forces adequate for self-defense under present [troubled circumstances might also, under other circumstance be adequate for offense.

It is the hope and expectation of the United States Government that application of the policy of collective security envisaged by Article 7 of the draft treaty will provided Japan with effective security with much less Japanese armament than would be required if the treaty reflected the policy of "let each country defend itself."

D: "No limitation in the matter of development of a peaceful economy should be laid on Japan."

The present draft contains no such limitation.

E. "All limitations with respect to trade of Japan with other states be removed."

The present draft imposes no limitations on the right of Japan to trade with others.

(3) The Government of the Soviet Union suggests providing in the treaty that "Japan will not enter any coalition directed against any of the states taking part with its armed forces in war against militaristic Japan."

It is the view of the Government of the United States that Japan should not enter into any coalition directed against any state, whether or not it was a belligerent in the war against Japan. This is provided for by Article 6 of the draft treaty whereby Japan would agree, in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

(4) The Government of the Soviet Union suggests that the peace treaty should provide that "all occupation forces will be withdrawn from Japanese territory in the course of not more than one

year and no foreign state will have troops or military bases in Japan."

It is contemplated by the draft treaty that the occupation will end immediately upon the coming into force of the treaty of peace. It will not be prolonged even for one year thereafter.

With respect to the presence in Japan of the troops of any other state the United States Government would not be willing to deny to Japan what the Charter of the United Nations refers to as the "inherent right of.....collective self-defense."

(5) The Government of the Soviet Union suggests that "the states signing the peace treaty with Japan will support the entry of Japan into the United Nations."


The present draft contemplates that Japan will promptly apply for admission to the United Nations and the Government of the United States welcomes the recognition by the Government of the Soviet Union that Japan is qualified for membership.

The Government of the United States earnestly urges that the Government of the Soviet Union should continue to cooperate in the Japanese peace-making already in process and now far advanced the United States Government does not seek, as is alleged, to make a "separate" peace treaty with Japan. On the contrary, it seeks the participation of all concerned.

The Soviet Government complains because the United States Government has taken the lead in the initial stages of formulating peace treaty terms. That complaint seems not well taken by a state which, in the hour of victory, joined in recognizing the unique position of the United States in relation to Japan and in placing upon the United States the sole responsibility for naming and issuing directives to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in an occupation which was designed to prepare Japan for a "new order of peace, security and justice." The United States Government accepted that responsibility and has invested in the

occupation not only large resources and much effort, but hopes and aspirations for a Japan which would hence-force live with others as a good neighbor. The United States Government would fail utterly in the discharge of the occupation responsibility which the Government of the Soviet Union, among others, placed upon it if it did not take a timely initiative in transforming that occupation into a peace which will be just and durable.

Already the views of the governments principally concerned have been thoroughly canvassed through discussions initiated last September and continuously pursued ever since. The draft submitted on March 29 to the Government of the Soviet Union, as pointed out in the covering memorandum, to a considerable extent reflects views which the Government of the United States had obtained as a result of cooperation manifested by other governments. Among the views taken into account were the views of the Soviet Government.



BRITAIN

0113

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY MR. CLUTTON  
UNITED KINGDOM ACTING POLITICAL  
REPRESENTATIVE IN JAPAN

Tokyo, April 19, 1951

My attention has been drawn to a report by AAP-Reuters to the effect that the draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty recently communicated to the United States Government represents a reversal of "earlier understandings" as between the members of the Commonwealth. This statement is attributed to authoritative sources, but is not true. The draft communicated as a preliminary working paper incorporates the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as expressed at the various Commonwealth Conferences and in no way cuts across understandings reached there.

The report goes on to suggest that "Whitehall" is not impressed by a sense of urgency regarding the conclusion of a Treaty. In this connection I would draw attention to the statement of the Minister of State, Mr. Younger, in the House of Commons on the 9th April:

His Majesty's Government have for some time past been urging on other Governments the need for a very early peace treaty, and they are pressing ahead with preparations for this, consulting Commonwealth and other Governments as necessary.

This represents the policy of His Majesty's Government.

AUSTRALIA

0115

MR. SPENDER'S STATEMENT ON JAPANESE  
PEACE TREATY

Canberra, November 28, 1950

This is an excerpt from the statement made in the House of Representatives, Canberra on November 28 by Mr. Spender on a peace treaty for Japan.

On 14th September, 1950, President Truman made a statement on the Japanese peace settlement in which he said that it had long been the view of the United States Government that the people of Japan were entitled to a peace treaty which would bring them back into the family of nations. He had therefore authorised that the State Department institute informal discussions as to future procedures in the first instance with those governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission, the ones most actively concerned with the past war. He said that no formal action could be expected until opportunity had been had to assess the result of these informal discussions. Subsequently he had discussions in New York with Mr. John Foster Dulles who since 18th May had been giving special attention on behalf of the Secretary of State to Japanese peace treaty problems. Mr. Dulles presented a document outlining these views on the type of treaty envisioned by them as proper to end the state of war with Japan. The object of such a treaty in the United States would be to restore Japanese sovereignty and bring Japan back as an equal in the society of free people.

The Minister then outlined Dulles's seven principles which have appeared in the press. He continued that similar approaches were made by Mr. Dulles to other member countries of the Far Eastern



Commission, including the U.S.S.R., for a preliminary exchange of views. He went on "In my consequent discussions with Mr. Dulles I bore in mind not only the views of the Government in regard to Japan as expressed in my speech on foreign policy on 9th March, 1950, but also the discussions which took place on this subject in London in May, 1950, between representatives of members of the British Commonwealth. Without elaborating in detail the precise matters which are still the subject of discussion, I feel that Honourable Members would wish me to indicate the basic approach of the Government towards the problem of a Japanese peace settlement. It is our view, as has been stated by us before, that an early peace settlement with Japan is desirable. This settlement must be of such a kind as to contain appropriate safeguards against any resurgence of Japanese militarism. We cannot lightly forget that it is five short years since Japanese military imperialists attempted to dominate Asia and South East Asia by the ruthless use of force. It is asking too much of any Australian to believe that in this short period of time all the basic factors which made it possible for Japanese aggression to be as successful as it was, until checked, have already disappeared.

Our approach to a Japanese peace settlement must therefore be one of the most careful scrutiny of any proposals under which there could result a resuscitation of Japanese militarism. Having said this, however, it is equally necessary for me to add that it is in our own interest to develop and maintain relations with Japan such as normally exist between two countries at peace. It is necessary, in addition, that Japan should be permitted and encouraged to become economically viable. It is, moreover, in our interest to see that Japan does not become a military vacuum which might be filled by forces or controlled by influences antagonistic to us. The problem of security in relation to Japan, therefore, is twofold. In the first place, we must ensure that our own security is not im-

periled by the nature of the peace settlement with Japan. Secondly, we are concerned that the security of Japan itself should not be endangered because in the latter event our own security too might be affected.

It is impossible at the present time to attempt to draw the precise dividing line between the two factors which I have outlined above. I can assure the House, however, that the Government will give the most careful consideration to the results of the conversations now taking place between the United States and other countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission, and that our general approach to the problem will be as follows, without vindictiveness but also without wishful thinking and without forgetfulness of the past.

We shall endeavour to facilitate acceptance of a peace settlement which, after first providing adequately for what we regard as our legitimate security requirements, would restore to the Japanese Government and people control over their own affairs. It is our earnest hope that the Japanese will show themselves capable of exercising such control in a spirit of responsibility, and that Japan will show by her conduct that she can safely be brought into the family of nations in the earliest practicable period. We must, however, repeat that we regard it as vital that safeguards against Japanese militarism should be forthcoming, and we shall be on our constant guard to provide against any possible mis-use of powers restored to Japan. The problem posed by Japan for us is a difficult one. Let us be frank and say that we have objectives which to some extent overlap. This problem might be expressed in the form of questions: How can we prevent a resurgence of a militaristic Japan, whilst at the same time allowing her to qualify for admission to the society of nations as a sovereign power? How do we prevent her from becoming again a threat to the security of Australia, whilst permitting her sufficient strength to resist the threat of inter-

national Communism? How do we, in short, impose the conditions essential to secure Australia against future Japanese aggression, whilst moving towards normal international relations between our two countries? This is the basic problem which we have to face, and which we have to do our best to solve in the most appropriate way. It can only be worked out in close discussion between all countries which are concerned in the Japanese peace settlement. I need hardly add that in this the Government's duty is to interpret the will of this Parliament. We will welcome any view which Honourable Members may care to put forward.

Philippines

0118

## MR. ROMULO'S STATEMENT

New York, September 18, 1950

(UP)—Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo Monday said in a statement:

The Philippine Government has from the first strongly favored early conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. We have held this view from considerations dictated by our proximity to Japan and from larger considerations arising from the urgent necessity of determining the position of Japan relative to Asia and the Far East and the whole international community.

During the past four years the post-war policies of the victorious Allies relative to Japan have been formulated by the Far Eastern Commander for Allied Powers in Tokyo. This arrangement was clearly intended to be provisional in character pending the conclusion of the peace treaty.

Despite repeated proposals, supported among others by the Philippines, to hold a peace conference at the earliest possible moment, no agreement on the matter could be reached and plans have had to be deferred.

The Philippine Government, therefore, welcomes the announcement that the United States Government is now ready to discuss plans for holding a conference with other interested countries. The reasons which demanded such a conference two years ago still remain but with a note of extreme urgency arising from the recent developments in East Asia and the Pacific.

A nation of 80,000,000 occupying a strategic group of islands off the mainland of Asia and possessing group of islands off the mainland of Asia and possessing the strongest industrial base of

any country in the region, Japan was bound to play a vital role in any major developments there.

The objectives of the peace treaty with Japan were,

1. To place on a permanent basis the program decided by the Far Eastern Commission to demilitarize and democratize Japan..... that she may never again become a threat to the peace and freedom of her neighbors.

2. To regularize her relations with the victorious Allies and regulate her participation in international affairs.

Those objectives have now become mandatory by reason of the situation in China and the Korean war. If Japan is to be admitted to the common tasks which the Allies need to undertake in East Asia and the Pacific, it is .....essential that the views, interests and consent of the interested states be first secured and embodied by a common agreement in the terms of the treaty of peace.

Any other procedure could almost surely give rise to differing influences between the United States and its Allies in East Asia and the Pacific and thus nullify and advantages which would be gained by fuller participation of Japan in those common tasks.

U. S. S. R.

## TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE TO U.S.

Moscow, November 24, 1950

On November twentieth J.A. Malik on instruction of Soviet Government handed to Mr. Dulles aide-memoire of following content:

## Aide memoire.

On October twentysixth of this year Mr. Dulles in course of talk with J.A. Malik handed to latter memorandum on question of peace treaty with Japan, containing brief general statement on what kind of treaty in opinion of United States Government would be suitable for ending state of war with Japan.

In this connection Soviet Government would like to receive explanation on certain points of this memorandum.

ONE. As is known, United States of America, Great Britain, China, U.S.S.R. and number of other states who had signed on January first Nineteen-Fortytwo in Washington United Nations Declaration pledged not to conclude separate peace with enemy states.

In view of existence of aforesaid pledge, it is desirable to receive explanation whether conclusion of peace treaty with Japan is intended, parties to must be United States of America, Great Britain, China and U.S.S.R., on whose behalf articles of surrender of Japanese had been signed, as well as any country which had taken active part in war against Japan, or whether possibility is admitted of concluding separate peace treaty with Japanese with participation of only some of above mentioned powers.

TWO. Cairo declaration of December first Nineteen-Fortythree signed by United States of America, Great Britain and China, and

Potsdam Declaration of July twentysixth Nineteen-Fortyfive signed by same countries, to which Soviet Union subscribed, have decided question of returning Formosa and Pescadores islands to China, equally so Yalta Agreement of February eleventh Nineteen-Fortyfive signed by United States of America, Great Britain and U.S.S.R. has decided question of returning to Soviet Union southern part of Sakhalin island with adjacent islands and transfer of Kuril islands to Soviet Union.

Inasmuch as aforesaid agreement exists, how to understand proposals contained in memorandum on referring question regarding states of Formosa, Pescadores island, south Sakhalin and Kuril islands for new decision by United States of America, Great Britain, China and U.S.S.R., and in event if no decision is reached by aforesaid states in course of one year for decision by General Assembly of United Nations.

THREE. Neither Cairo Declaration nor Potsdam Declaration state that Ryukyu and Bonin islands must be withdrawn from Japanese sovereignty, while states who withdrawn signed this declaration declared, that they 'have no designs whatever for territorial expansion'.

In this connection question arises,—what is basis of proposal contained in memorandum on transfer of Ryukyu and Bonin islands to United Nations trusteeship with United States of America as administering power.

FOUR. It is universally known, that Japanese people are greatly interested in whether occupation troops will remain in Japan after conclusion of peace treaty the more so as Potsdam Declaration (point twelve) envisages that occupation troops will be withdrawn from Japan.

In this connection Soviet Government would like to know whether it is intended that peace treaty with Japan must provide definite date for withdrawal of occupation troops from its territory,

as provided for by peace-treaties which have already been concluded with other states.

FIVE. Decision of June nineteenth Nineteen-Fortyseven agreed upon among member states of Far Eastern Commission, adopted on instance of United States of America, envisages that Japan will not dispose of army, navy, and air force. Nevertheless memorandum setting forth United States position with regard to security in Japan area, speaks about cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and United States and perhaps other forces for maintenance of international peace and security in Japan area.

Inasmuch as memorandum speaks about aforesaid cooperative responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security in Japan area, Soviet Government would like to receive explanation of following two questions.

Firstly, does aforementioned cooperative responsibility presume creation of Japanese armed forces, that is Japanese army, Japanese navy and Japanese air force as well as respective general staffs.

Secondly, does aforementioned cooperative responsibility signify that American military, naval and air force bases will be preserved on Japanese territory also after conclusion of peace treaty with Japan.

SIX. Memorandum does not say anything about necessity of assuring Japanese people of possibility to freely develop their peaceful economy.

Soviet Government would like to receive explanation whether it is intended to include provisions in peace treaty, which would provide for repeal of all restrictions on development of Japanese peaceful economy and for affording Japan access to raw material resources and also its participation on equal rights in world trade.

Inasmuch as it is utterly obvious that China is particularly interested in question of peace treaty with Japan, China who had precisely been subjected to aggression of Japanese militarists in

course of number of years, Soviet Government would like to know what is being done in order to ascertain viewpoint of Government of Chinese People's Republic on this question.

It goes without saying that explanations may be required on those or other questions which will perhaps arise in particular after position of other governments with regard to United States Memorandum will become known.

**TEXT OF MR. MALIK'S STATEMENT ON  
DENIAL OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS**

New York, March 3, 1951

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik issued following statement at the Soviet Delegation:

With regard to the statement of Mr. Dulles of February 28 about his talks with me, I feel it necessary to state that I do not conduct any talks with Mr. Dulles on the Japanese peace treaty and that the statement of Mr. Dulles at the press conference regarding his message to me on this matter as well as my willingness to resume negotiations on a Japanese peace treaty is absolutely groundless.

TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE TO U.S. ON  
TREATY DRAFT

Moscow, May 23, 1951

On March 29th this year Government of U.S.S.R. received from Government of United States of America draft peace treaty with Japan. In this connection Soviet Government deems it necessary to make following remarks:

Notwithstanding fact that more than 5 years have passed since end of war with Japan, question of peace settlement for Japan remains unsolved. Such situation has been created first and foremost due to stand taken by Government of United States who under various pretexts has been postponing not only conclusion but very preparation of peace treaty. In doing so Government of United States has repeatedly rejected proposals of Soviet Government to prepare peace treaty with Japan jointly with other governments, as is envisaged by respective international agreements. As result of this, occupation of Japan by foreign troops has been inadmissibly prolonged.

I. Remarks of Soviet Government deal first of all with incorrect preparation of peace treaty with Japan.

In memorandum accompanying American draft peace treaty with Japan, United States Government declares that mentioned draft has been formulated following exchange of opinions between representatives of United States Government and representatives of governments of number of other states, including also Soviet Union. It should be noted that latter statement is incorrect, because Soviet Government yet in beginning of March of this year published statement about refusal to conduct separate negotiations

with representatives of United States with regard to preparation of peace treaty with Japan. In doing so Soviet Government proceeded from premise that preparation of peace treaty with Japan cannot be affair of some one government and its poll of opinion of other governments concerned, but must be joint affair of all those governments, as this is envisaged by respective international agreements. Nevertheless United States Government has not abandoned separate preparation of peace treaty with Japan, seeking to appropriate this right for it-self exclusively, which violates obligations it assumed regarding preparation of peace treaty with Japan jointly with U.S.S.R., China and Great Britain, with participation of other states concerned.

In conformity with Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, Council of Foreign Ministers of 5 Powers—United States, U.S.S.R., China, Great Britain and France—was established, and Potsdam agreement states directly that Council of Foreign Ministers is being set up in first place for "preparatory work for peace settlements" and that in drawing up respective peace treaties "Council will be composed of members representing those states which were signatory to Terms of Surrender imposed upon enemy state concerned". In conformity with this, peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland have been prepared and concluded. From above mentioned Potsdam Agreement it also follows that drawing up of peace treaty with Japan is entrusted to United States, U.S.S.R., China, and Great Britain who, as is known, signed Act of Surrender of Japan. Yet in 1947 Soviet Government proposed to convene special session of Council of Foreign Ministers composed of representatives of China, United States, U.S.S.R. and Great Britain in order to commence preparation of peace treaty with Japan. It was envisaged to draw into preparatory work of drafting peace treaty with Japan all states that had participated with their armed forces in war against Japan.



But this proposal, like other, repeatedly resumed efforts of Soviet Government directed at expediting conclusion of peace treaty with Japan, have not yielded positive results because United States Government is ignoring necessity for convening both Council of Foreign Ministers for preparing peace treaty with Japan and peace conference for discussing this treaty.

Soviet Government deems it necessary especially to point to inadmissibility of removing China from preparation of peace treaty with Japan. It is known that China for many years was subjected to cruel aggression of militaristic Japan, that it waged protracted bitter war against Japanese imperialism and sustained biggest losses from Japan's aggression. It is natural therefore that Government of Chinese People's Republic being sole lawful representative of Chinese people is especially interested in preparing peace treaty with Japan and establishing lasting peace in Far East. It is perfectly evident that real peace settlement in Far East is impossible without participation of Chinese People's Republic in work of preparing peace treaty with Japan.

From this it is apparent that United States Government seeks to remove U.S.S.R., Chinese People's Republic and other countries from preparing peace treaty with Japan and to take this matter exclusively into its own hands in order to impose on Japan unilaterally, by way of diktat, terms of this treaty desirably by United States Government, utilizing for this purpose dependence of present Government of Japan on American occupation authorities.

II. Remarks of Soviet Government secondly refer to fact that American draft peace treaty with Japan contains from standpoint of substance of matter number of incorrect provisions incompatible with existing agreements among powers.

In such well-known international documents as Cairo Declaration of 1943, Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and Agreement of 1945 Governments of United States of America, Great Britain, China

and U.S.S.R. assumed definite obligations as regards future peace treaty with Japan.

These documents define territorial frontiers of Japan and point out that there must be in Japan "in accordance with freely-expressed will of Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government", after which occupation troops should be withdrawn from Japan.

These documents as well as subsequent agreements of powers state that "all obstacles to revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among Japanese people" must be removed in Japan and that broad opportunities for development of country's peaceful economy should be opened. They speak at same time of necessity to put end to power and influence of militarists and of realizing demilitarization of Japan.

American draft peace treaty with Japan to one degree or another ignores these obligations of powers which follow from above mentioned documents.

This must first and foremost be said with respect to territorial questions. For example, Cairo Declaration of 1943 states directly that Taiwan Island and Pescadores Islands must be returned to China. American draft however merely says that Japan renounces all rights to Taiwan and Pescadores Islands, but remains silent about transferring Taiwan and Pescadores Islands to China. From this it may be concluded that present situation as regards Taiwan and Pescadores Islands, which are actually wrested from China, is left unchanged by draft, in violation of Cairo Agreement on return of these islands to China.

American draft further envisages removal from Japan's sovereignty of Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcanó, Parece Vela and Marcus islands and placing them under United States administration on pretext of establishing over them trusteeship allegedly on part of United Nations. Inasmuch however as taking away from Japan of

above mentioned islands is provided neither by agreement among powers nor by decision of United Nations as represented by Security Council, there is no justification whatever for such wresting.

Of still greater importance are digressions from above-mentioned international agreements, contained in American draft peace treaty with Japan, on military question. Suffice it to state that American draft not only does not contain guarantees against restoration of Japanese militarism but in general does not put forth any limitations as to size of armed forces of Japan.

It is known that peace treaty with Italy, which together with Japan was one of main aggressors in Second World War, contains exact limitations of contingents of Italian army, numerical strength of personnel of navy as well as air force. Yet American draft contains no limitations whatever of armed forces of Japan. Japan is thus placed in privileged position as compared with Italy, although there are no grounds whatever for this. From this it is seen that Japan itself will decide question of size of its armed forces for so-called "self-defence". Soviet Government considers that this is tantamount to allowing Japan to restore militarism. Naturally, such situation is in no way compatible with well-known agreements of powers regarding Japan's demilitarization.

Nor can fact be ignored that American draft does not set any date for withdrawal of occupation troops from Japan and is directly designed to leave American occupation troops and military bases in Japan also after conclusion of peace treaty. Consequently, even after "peace settlement" which United States is preparing for Japan, military occupation of Japan will not be terminated and United States will remain actual master in Japan.

As is known, peace treaty with Italy envisages withdrawal of occupation troops from Italy within three months after conclusion of peace. Thus Japan is put in worse position as compared with Italy, while United States receives unlimited right to continue occu-

pation of Japan for unlimited period after signing of peace treaty with Japan. Naturally, all this is in no way compatible with Potsdam Declaration of 1945.

To this should be added that already now United States Government utilizes Japan's occupation by American troops not for aims agreed upon among states who signed Act of Surrender of Japan. American occupation troops stationed on Japanese territory are using territory of Japan, its material and manpower resources for armed intervention in Korea, which is incompatible with international agreements that granted American troops right of occupation in Japan only to effect measures for demilitarization and democratic reconstruction of Japan.

Lastly, American draft ignores necessity for removing restrictions as regards free development of Japan's peaceful economy. It is understood that without development of country's peaceful economy and without normal trade with other countries it is impossible to establish reliable foundation for economic advance of Japan and for rise in well-being of Japanese people.

Soviet Government has also other remarks concerning draft treaty which it expects to outline at conference of powers concerned.

III. Soviet Government which has invariably insisted on earliest conclusion of peace treaty with Japan holds that peace treaty must be drawn up on basis of international agreements, concluded among powers during Second World War and that preparation of draft treaty must be carried out jointly by representatives of U.S., Chinese People's Republic, U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, drawing into this matter all states—members of Far Eastern Commission.

In conformity with this Soviet Government proposes:

1. To convene in June or July 1951 session of Council of Foreign Ministers composed of representatives of United States, China, Great Britain and U.S.S.R. in order to commence preparing treaty with Japan, having in view to draw into preparatory work