

of drafting peace treaty with Japan representatives of all states that participated with their armed forces in war against Japan, so that draft peace treaty be submitted for consideration of peace conference.

2. Drawing up of peace treaty with Japan is to be conducted on basis of Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Declaration and Yalta Agreement, with following main aims serving as guide:

A. (Japan must become peace-loving, democratic, independent state;)

B. (Population of Japan must be ensured democratic rights, and existence of such organizations, whether political, military or paramilitary, whose aim is to deprive people of their democratic right, must not be permitted, as is provided for in peace treaty with Italy;)

C. (As guarantee against revival of Japanese militarism treaty must set limitations on size of Japanese armed forces so that they should not exceed requirements of self-defence, as this has been established in peace treaty with Italy;)

D. (No restrictions are to be imposed on Japan as regards development of its peaceful economy;)

E. (All restrictions with regard to Japan's trade with other countries will be removed.)

3. To provide in treaty that Japan does not enter into any coalitions directed against one of states that had participated with its armed forces in war against militaristic Japan.

4. To precisely stipulate in treaty that within one year after conclusion of peace treaty with Japan all occupation troops are to be withdrawn from Japanese territory and no foreign state is to have troops or military bases in Japan.

5. To come to agreement that states signing peace treaty with Japan will support admission of Japan to United Nations.

Moscow, May 7, 1951

Copies of above document have been sent also to Governments

of Chinese People's Republic, Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan, Burma, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Holland, Mongolian People's Republic and Korean People's Democratic Republic.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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## TEXT OF MR. CHOU EN-LAI'S STATEMENT

Peking, December 4, 1951

After studying the memorandum, which Mister Dulles, advisor to the United States State Department, handed to Minister Malik, the Soviet representative to the Security Council, on October 26th, Nineteen-Fifty, and the memorandum handed by Mister Malik, on Nov. 30th, to Mister Dulles on the instruction of the Soviet Government, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has authorized me to make the following statement concerning the question of the peace treaty with Japan.

ONE. Beginning from Sept. 18th, Nineteen-Thirty-one, Japanese imperialism waged armed aggression against China and devastated a large area of our country, inflicting great loss of life and property on the people of our country. After eight heroic years of resistance war, the Chinese people defeated Japanese imperialism and won victory in the anti-Japanese war. Naturally, therefore, our People's Republic of China must take party in preparing, drawing up and concluding the peace with Japan.

I solemnly declare that the Central people's Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of the Chinese people, and that it must take party in preparing, drawing up and concluding the peace treaty with Japan. The reactionary remnant clique of the Kuomintang has absolutely no qualification to represent the Chinese people, and because of this, it has no qualification to take party in any discussion or conference regarding the peace treaty with Japan. The Central People's Government consider all preparation and drafting of a peace treaty with Japan, no matter what their contents and results, as illegal and invalid unless

the People's Republic of China has taken party in them.

TWO. According to the February 14th, Nineteen-Fifty Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the governments of the two countries, China and the Soviet Union, agreed to strive for the earliest conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan jointly with other powers which were Allies during the Second World War. This shows that the basic policy of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is to strive for the earliest conclusion of a Joint peace treaty with Japan, so as to end the state of war with Japan and enable the Japanese people to achieve democracy and peace at an early date. In contrast, the United States Government adopted a policy of procrastination with regard to peace treaty with Japan in order to carry out its long term military occupation of Japan. The United States Government has, since Nineteen-Fortyseven, repeatedly attempted to upset the procedure for conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, has undermined the principle under which the peace treaty with Japan should first be jointly discussed and prepared by the Foreign Ministers Conference of the Four Countries, China, the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain and has also undermined the principle of unanimity of the great powers. Now the United States Government is not only attempting to wreck the basis of a joint peace treaty with Japan.

THREE. The Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement, the Potsdam Proclamation and the basic policies toward Japan after her surrender which were agreed upon and passed by the Far Eastern Commission countries on June 19th, Nineteen-Fortyseven—international documents in the signing of which the American Government took party—are the principal basis for joint peace treaty with Japan. But the first article of the memorandum which the United States Government sent to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics has gone so far as to stipulate: "Parties. Any or all nations at war with Japan that are willing to make peace on the basis proposed and as may be agreed upon." That is to say, the American Government has openly renounced the basis for the joint peace treaty with Japan laid down in the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement, the Potsdam Proclamation and the basic policies of the Far Eastern Commission towards Japan after her surrender. The memorandum of the United States Government evidently attempts to use its own proposals and the so-called attainable agreement. Otherwise, the United States Government will brazenly go ahead with preparation for a unilateral peace treaty according to its own plans and excluding the other Allies.

FOUR. With regard to Taiwan and Penghu Islands, it has been decided that they be restored to China in accordance with the Cairo Declaration. With regard to the southern part of Sakhalin and Kuriles Islands, it has been decided that they be restored and handed over to the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the Yalta Agreement. There is absolutely no reason for renewed discussion of these questions of territories which have already been decided. The demand of the United States Government for a renewed decision of these territorial question is a flagrant violation of established international agreements, a deliberate violation of the legal rights and interests of the People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. and an attempt to attain its aggressive aims in the process. This is clearly proved by the fact that the United States Government has already engaged in armed aggression against China's Taiwan. As to the Ryukyu Archipelago and the Bonin Islands there is no decision of trusteeship in the Cairo Declaration or the Potsdam Proclamation, much less to talk of such things as appointment of "the United States as the administrative authority."

Such ambitions of the United States Government constitute nothing but false borrowing of the name of the United Nations to

carry out the long term occupation of Ryukyu Archipelago and the Bonin Islands and to establish military bases for aggression in the Far East.

FIVE. Occupation troops should be withdrawn from Japan, according to the Potsdam Declaration. But the United States Government has not shown the slightest expression from beginning to end that the American occupation forces have any intention of withdrawing from Japan at an early date, but, instead, have been using Japan as the war base to invade Korea and China.

The United States Government, in its memorandum to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics demand the inclusion in the Japanese peace treaty of permission to continue co-operative responsibility between Japanese facilities and United States forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. This is identical with coercing the Japanese people into accepting that United States troops would be station for a long period in Japan to carry on aggression against the people of Asia.

SIX. In the Far Eastern Commission's basic policy regarding Japan after her surrender, it was originally set out that Japan would not dispose of an army, navy and air force, secret police or gendarmerie, that is to say, Japan must not be rearmed. Nevertheless, just as the United States Government has today openly rearmed Western Germany, it is now openly rearming Japan. As is generally known, the United States occupation troops are rebuilding the Japanese army under the pseudonym of the Japanese police; rebuilding the Japanese navy by means of the maritime security bureau; preserving and reconstructing Japanese naval ports; rebuilding the Japanese air force by the training of Japanese aviators, and preserving and reconstructing Japanese air bases. American occupation authorities are rebuilding the aggressive forces of Japan by releasing a large number of top war criminals, lifting the purge, and restoring a large number of fascist elements to their activities.

The United States Government, through its military control, attempts to make Japan a United States colony, and drive Japan forward as the United States tool in aggression against the Asian peoples.

SEVEN. In order to improve the livelihood of the Japanese people, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China strongly desires that Japan's peaceful industry develop on the basis of serving the Japanese people. At the same time, in accordance with the basic policies stipulated in regard to Japan after her surrender by the Far Eastern Commission, the economic basis of Japan's military strength must be destroyed and not allowed to revive. But actually, working in the interests of American monopoly capital, the American occupation authorities are reviving Japan's war industry and developing and utilising it in order to carry out aggression against Korea and China's Taiwan. At the same time, Japan's peaceful industry is deteriorating. This policy of the United States Government of stifling Japan's peaceful industry and encouraging her war industry, only results in undermining the peaceful life of the Japanese people and intensifying the exploitation of the economy of the Japanese nation.

EIGHT. The plan envisaged in the memorandum of the United States Government regarding the peace treaty with Japan flagrantly violates the common war aims of the Allied nations which opposed Japan, violates all national agreements on policy towards Japan, and, furthermore, utterly disregards the fundamental interests of the Chinese people who fought a heroic war against Japan and also disregards the aspiration of the Japanese peoples for the future. The United States Government has only the utterly selfish aim of forcibly occupying Japan, enslaving the Japanese people and transforming Japan into an American colony and military base for aggression against the peoples of Asia. Therefore the proposals set forth in the memorandum of the United States Government on

the question of peace treaty with Japan do not conform to the interests of the Chinese and Japanese peoples. The Chinese people strongly desire the early conclusion of a joint peace treaty with Japan together with the other Allied Nations of the Second World War period. But the basis of the peace treaty must entirely conform to the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement, the Potsdam Proclamation and the basic policies towards Japan after her surrender. Only a peace treaty with Japan based on such international agreements can bring about the democratisation of Japan, can eliminate the aggressive forces of Japan and prevent the resurgence of the aggressive forces of Japan. Only a democratic Japan, free from the control of foreign influence, can contribute to the peace and security of Asia.

MR. CHOU EN-LAI'S NOTE TO U.S.S.R. ON  
JAPAN PEACE PACT

Peking, May 25, 1951

PEKING RADIO, May 25--Foreign Minister Chou En-lai Tuesday sent a note to Soviet Ambassador Roschin stating China's support for the Soviet Government's views on the American draft peace treaty with Japan and the concrete Soviet proposals for preparing the peace treaty with Japan.

In the note the Foreign Minister made three points. In the first place, the Central People's Government of China supports the Soviet proposal that all the states concerned and not merely the government of any single state should take part in the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. The Potsdam Agreement stipulated that the drawing up of a peace treaty with Japan should be done by the United States, Britain, China and the Soviet Union with the participation of the other states concerned.

But the United States Government has acted arbitrarily on its own, and prepared alone a draft peace treaty with Japan and under the pretense of consulting the views of the governments of other states concerned is forcing the other allied nations to accept it. The United States Government thus violates its international obligations on the Japanese peace treaty.

The note emphasized that China has refused and will refuse to consider a draft peace treaty with Japan drawn up by the government of any state alone. It said that in eight years of heroic war of resistance, the Chinese people defeated Japanese imperialism. Therefore, it is absolutely proper and just that the People's Republic of China should participate in the preparation, drawing up

and signing of a peace treaty with Japan. The United States Government has tried hard to exclude the People's Republic of China, Soviet Union and other Allied Powers from the work of preparing the peace treaty with Japan. It has tried to monopolize the preparation and drafting of the Japanese peace treaty so that it may utilize the dependence of the Japanese Government on the United States occupation authorities to dictate to Japan and force her to accept peace treaty terms favorable to the United States Government. It is very obvious that the Japanese Government, which is now utilized by the United States occupation authorities, cannot represent the free will of the Japanese people and that the peace terms which the United States Government imposes upon Japan can only bring calamity to the Japanese people.

Secondly, the Foreign Minister stated in the note that the Government of the Soviet Union very properly points out that the contents of the United States draft peace treaty with Japan flagrantly violates the important international agreements—the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and the Yalta Agreement of 1945. As far back as the victory of the Allies over Japan, the United States Government had begun its act of undermining important international agreements of the Allies concerning policy towards Japan.

In accordance with the above mentioned international agreements, the United States armed forces were authorized by the Allies to occupy Japan with the sole purpose of eliminating Japanese militarism and carrying out the democratization of Japan. But the policy carried out by the United States occupation authorities in Japan has been to do their utmost in preserving Japanese militarism and preventing the democratization of Japan, and is therefore incompatible with the above mentioned international agreements and illegal.

The above mentioned international agreements, the note con-

tinued, also clearly stipulated the return of Taiwan and the Pescadores to China, and the freedom and independence of Korea. But the United States Government, on the contrary, had made illegal use of the territory, material resources and manpower of Japan to conduct unlawful armed intervention in Korea and illegal armed occupation of our Taiwan. The United States draft peace treaty attempts to legalize this series of illegal acts of the United States Government, the note declares.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has long since declared in its statement of December 4, 1950 that there is no reason at all for discussing again the settled territorial question concerning Taiwan and the Pescadores which already revert to China according to the Cairo Declaration. But the United States draft treaty only mentions the renouncing of all rights to Taiwan and the Pescadores by Japan, and there is nothing about the return of Taiwan and the Pescadores to China.

The aim of the United States Government is evidently to carry out long-term unlawful occupation of our Taiwan and make it a military base for the further invasion of the People's Republic of China. Also no international agreements between the Allies have ever provided for the inclusion of the Ryukyu islands, the Bonin islands, Rosario island, Volcano island, Parece Vela and Marcus islands within the trusteeship system with the United States as the administering authority. Nevertheless, the United States has openly proposed on the pretense of United Nations trusteeship to place the above mentioned islands under the administration of the United States, that is, to occupy them for it-self. Nothing demonstrates more clearly than this the ambition of the United States Government to persist in aggression and territorial aggrandizement in defiance of international law.

The Chinese people suffered most from the aggression of militarist Japan, and fought longest against the Japanese aggressors.

They are, therefore, most determined in opposing the revival of Japanese militarism. It is well known that the above mentioned international agreements of the Allied Powers regarding Japan more than once mentioned the necessity of eliminating Japanese militarism, but the United States draft peace treaty with Japan provides no guarantee at all for preventing the revival of Japanese militarism, nor does it place any limitation upon the size of the Japanese armed forces. The aim of the United States Government is clearly not to eliminate but to revive militarism in Japan and with its territory as war base and its people as cannon fodder to make Japan a tool of the United States in continuing and expanding aggression in Korea, China and the other Asian countries.

Apart from all this, the note continued, the United States Government does not plan to withdraw its military occupation troops from Japan after the signing of the peace treaty. On the contrary, it has already gained the unlimited right of continuing indefinitely the occupation of Japan after the signing of the peace treaty. The United States Government is attempting to legalize its unlawful occupation of Japan by United States forces in order to place Japan in a state of long-term occupation. From this it can be seen that the United States Government's draft peace treaty, judging by its content, completely contravenes the war aims of the allied powers towards Japan, destroys the international agreements of the Allied Powers regarding Japan, damages their national interests and is in violation of the will of the Japanese people.

In this draft peace treaty, the United States Government pursues only central aim, namely, the revival of Japanese militarism in order to continue and expand its aggression against the Asian countries. The Chinese people and hundreds of millions of other Asian people who have been attacked by Japanese militarism will never tolerate this.

Finally, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai declared that the Central

People's Government of China completely endorses the five principal aims proposed by the Soviet Government which should serve as a guide in the completing of a just and fair peace treaty with Japan on the basis of the Gairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Yalta Agreement. These are:

A. Japan must become a peace loving, democratic and independent state;

B. The population of Japan must be insured democratic rights and existence of such organizations whether political, military or para-military whose aim is to deprive the people of their democratic rights must not be permitted as is provided for in the peace treaty with Italy;

C. As guarantee against the revival of Japanese militarism, the treaty must set limitations on the size of Japanese armed forces so that they should not exceed requirements of self-defense as this has been established in the peace treaty with Italy;

D. No restrictions are to be imposed on Japan as regards development of its peaceful economy;

E. All restrictions with regard to Japan's trade with other countries will be removed.

In order to insure concretely the realization of the above mentioned principal aims, the Central People's Government of China fully agrees to and supports the proposals put forward by the Government of the Soviet Union that the peace treaty should provide that Japan must not take part in any alliance which is aimed against any of the allied powers, that all occupation troops be withdrawn from Japan not later than one year after the signing of the peace treaty with Japan, that no foreign power should maintain armed forces or military bases in Japan, and that all signatory states of the peace treaty should jointly support Japan's entry into the United Nations Organization. The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has always held that the peaceful set-



tlement of the Japanese question is a vital issue in settling the various existing problems in the Far East.

The work for the conclusion of an over all peace treaty with Japan has become a task which can no longer be put off. Therefore the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China fully agrees to the proposal of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that a special session of the Council of Ministers, composed of representatives of the United States, China, Britain and the Soviet Union, be convened in June or July of 1951 in order to commence preparation of a peace with Japan.

It should be envisaged to draw into the preparatory work of drafting the peace treaty with Japan all states that have participated with their armed forces in the war against Japan so that the draft peace treaty will be brought to the peace conference for consideration.

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WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT ON MR. DULLES'  
TRIP TO BRITAIN AND FRANCE

Washington, May 28, 1951

(The following announcement was made orally at the White House on May 28, 1951.)

The President discussed today with Secretary Acheson and John Foster Dulles the trip to England and France to be made by Mr. Dulles next month.

The discussions covered matters likely to come up in the course of Mr. Dulles' contemplated talks with Foreign Secretary Morrison in London, and Foreign Minister Schuman in Paris concerning the Japanese peace treaty.

Mr. Dulles is the President's personal representative in this matter.

MR. ACHESON'S TESTIMONY ON JAPANESE  
PEACE TREATY

Washington, June 2, 1951

(Following is the pertinent part of the text of the exchange between Hickenlooper and Acheson on the Japanese treaty, in the Senate's MacArthur Inquiry Committee.)

Hickenlooper: "Is it our object to negotiate a treaty that returns Japan to the state of a sovereign nation with as few inhibitions upon her future activities as possible?"

Acheson: "Sir, I should say that, we made that very clear in our recent answer to the Russian note. Dulles made it very clear in a speech which he made in Tokyo on two occasions."

Hickenlooper: "How many nations are participants eligible under former or existing agreements to participate in final settlement?"

Acheson: "In the view of the United States, arrangements or discussion . . . should take place first of all with . . . Far Eastern Commission nations. Of course after the treaty has taken form there might be a great many other nations who would participate in the matter."

Hickenlooper: "Is it our policy at the present time . . . that we insist there be no economic restrictions on Japan in connection with the peace treaty, such as restrictions on their ability to build ships and their ability to go into textiles and matters of that kind?"

Acheson: "Yes sir, we have taken a very strong position against restrictions of the sort mentioned."

Hickenlooper: "And have we—has it become our policy—communicated to the Japanese and other participating nations that we do not want to include the question of military alliances or military bases in Japan in a peace treaty?"

Acheson: "I think in the outline of the treaty which has been made public it provides that the matter of the security of Japan should be the subject of a separate treaty between the United States and Japan and possibly some other countries."

Hickenlooper: "Yes, but that treaty or that statement would connote the negotiation of such treaty by Japan as a sovereign nation, would it not, and not as under its restrictions as a conquered nation not yet readmitted to sovereignty or full sovereignty of an independent nation?"

Acheson: "Well both Dulles and I made it very clear that this is a

matter which is not thought of in any way as being imposed upon the Japanese, but in which they will have a perfectly free choice."

Hickenlooper: "How do the Japanese feel about restrictions placed in a peace treaty of the kind we have been discussing, that is, restrictions on their economic development or restrictions in connection with the surrender of base rights or obligations for alliances, of something of that kind?"

Acheson: "I think that all people, whether they be Japanese or otherwise, would feel averse to having put in treaties restrictions upon their economic activities. I hope and believe that the Japanese people and government look with favor upon security arrangements which they and the United States will work out together as equal partners which would be mutually beneficial to the security interests of both countries and to the entire Pacific area."

Hickenlooper: "Yes. How are our allies, the occupying powers in Japan—those who compose the committee or the group of nations that are SCAP—are they all agreed that we should not place economic restrictions on construction of business in Japan, the building of ships and textile field, and other things of that kind?"

Acheson: "The final agreement on those matters has not yet been worked out. We had a great many preliminary talks and I think we made excellent progress, and see no difficulties in the way of working out an accord with most of the countries concerned. The publication of the Soviet note to us and our reply to them indicates there may be difficulty in that area. But these are matters that are now under discussion. In fact, Dulles is leaving today to go to London and Paris to discuss them. I should not like to anticipate his discussions."

Hickenlooper: "I do not want to anticipate his discussions at this time myself but I would like to secure your views on this particular situation. Suppose we and some of our associates in SCAP such as the British or perhaps the French, should force upon the Japanese—and we have the power to force upon the Japanese any terms we want so far as force is concerned—suppose we forced upon the Japanese a treaty which restricted their industrial operations. I am not talking about war industries or making war. But suppose we forced upon them restrictions in the extent to which they could develop worldwide textiles business if they wanted to and matters of that kind, and compelled them to take it. It is my feeling that they would not like it. They might have to take it but they would not like it. But if Russia for instance stayed out of that treaty and came along at a later date and said to Japan, 'We will negotiate a treaty with you without any restrictions on it whatsoever industrially or otherwise. We will permit you to develop all the industries you want. We join with Red China and we will give you access to all the raw materials you want,' is it not possible that the Japanese if they have been

forced to accept a peace treaty which put what they believe to be burdensome limitations on them by U.S. and the other allies, that they would have a great tendency to orient themselves toward Russia and the Red Chinese, of an unlimited, uninhibited peace treaty, together with the customary promise of raw materials and the full cooperation in the manufacturing and sales of all these things?"

Acheson: "I think, Senator, that both Dulles and I made it clear the reasons why we think such a treaty would be unwise and think it would have adverse effects.

"I think that is enough for me to say about the situation at the present time."

Hickenlooper: "Would you care to comment on this question except I would like very much to have it—that the British thus far have been quite adamant in their demands that the economic restrictions be put on Japan in any peace treaty that is developed?"

Acheson: "I think I should limit myself to saying I do not think that is a correct statement of the British position."

EXTRACT FROM MR. DULLES' ADDRESS AT ENGLISH SPEAKING UNION, LONDON

London, June 7, 1951

I am happy to be here on a mission from the President which gives me the opportunity to discuss with your Prime Minister, your Foreign Secretary and others, the problem of a Japanese Peace settlement.

There are few postwar problems of comparable importance. It seems that Germany and Japan are two principal goals of Soviet Communists. Without Germany or Japan, the Soviet bloc is hopelessly outclassed in what it takes to fight a prolonged general war, and therefore there is good reason to hope that there will not be any such war. But if the rulers of Soviet Russia could exploit the industrial and human potential of either Germany or Japan, that would involve such a shift in the balance of world power that these new Imperialists might calculate that they could then start a general war with good prospect of success. They know that Japan, even alone, was able seriously to menace the free world in the Pacific and they imagine vast possibilities out of a combination, under their direction, of the Asiatic power of Russia, China and Japan.

Fortunately, the Japanese people do not want that combination. I have been to Japan three times within the past year and can confidently affirm that the Japanese are presently in a mood to reject militarism and aggression in all of its aspects. They want fellowship with the free nations which genuinely seek peace through collective security. Thus there is the opportunity to make a Japanese peace which will not only end the old war, but strengthen the fabric of peace as against a new war.

That result is so vital that we must spare no effort to achieve it. Fortunately, we start with general agreement by the governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission that there ought now to be a peace treaty. The Occupation, now nearing its 6th year, has reached the point of diminishing returns. If it is arbitrarily prolonged it could paralyze the promising beginnings of representative government in Japan; it could turn the incipient good will and friendship of the Japanese people into sullen hostility; it could even create the illusion that Soviet Russia could be a liberator rather than the cruel jailer it is in fact.

We should have a prompt peace settlement which will restore to the Japanese the management of their own affairs. That is agreed by all. How do we get it?



Fortunately, in the case of Japan, this is easier than in the case of Germany. In Germany the Soviet Union has a major role. It contributed largely to the defeat of Nazi Germany, it occupies the eastern part of Germany and it obtained at Potsdam agreement that the German Peace would be a responsibility of the Council of Foreign Ministers, where the Soviet Union has veto power. In the case of Japan, the peace is not a matter for the Council of Foreign Ministers; the Soviet Union is not in occupation of any part of the four Japanese homeland islands, and Soviet Russia has no moral due bills. Its vast takings in Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles repay it a thousandfold for its six days of nominal belligerency.

We hope the Soviet Union will join in a Japanese Peace and we have been patient and long-suffering in seeking that. But it is not indispensable. In the case of Japan, those of the Allies which have the genuine will for peace can proceed, knowing that they cannot be prevented.

The United States began last September to take steps toward formulating Japanese Peace Treaty terms. The Soviet Union recently complained about our initiative. We replied that that complaint did not come well from a state which, in the hour of victory, recognised the unique position of the United States in relation to Japan and joined with the other Allies in according the United States the primary responsibility for conducting the Occupation. As the principal Occupation power the United States has made a major effort on behalf of all the Allies to start Japan on a new and honorable course, and we would have failed utterly in the discharge of the responsibility which all the Allied Powers placed upon us if we did not seek a timely transformation of that Occupation into such peace as would enable our hopes for Japan to mature into realities.

The United States has not, however, assumed to act alone. We have sought a common programme with the other governments principally concerned.

From the beginning there has been close contact between the British and American governments. In Washington we confer regularly with your Ambassador and last winter in Tokyo, through your Chief of Mission there, we had a full exchange of views before we started our talks with Japanese leaders. In Australia and New Zealand, our Mission kept in constant touch with your government's representatives, and last month your government sent a group of officials to Washington to confer with us. Now our Mission is here.

As a result of all that has taken place we now see the prospect of a peace treaty which will represent an overwhelming consensus of judgment as to the essentials. Even the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists have found little to complain of. In their comments on the tentative draft of treaty which the United States submitted, they expressed a

large measure of agreement with the substance of the proposed treaty terms. Their principal objection relates to procedure. They demand the procedure of the Council of Foreign Ministers which would enable them to veto the consummation of peace with Japan just as the Soviet Union has vetoed an Austrian Treaty four years after a complete text was virtually agreed on at Moscow in 1947.

The substance of the peace we seek for Japan would give the Japanese what the Surrender Terms describe as "the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives" with "access to raw materials and participation in world trade." That basic decision, first taken at Potsdam in 1945, to allow Japan opportunity to become strong again, carries with it certain consequences. Once you agree that your defeated enemy may recuperate, you must not impose inequalities and indignities which make it likely that the new vigour, when it comes, will be used in a mood of vengefulness rather than of friendly co-operation.

An imposed peace treaty might reflect a judgment that the enemy people are permanently untrustworthy. If that be the judgment, then the peace should be a Carthaginian peace, designed ruthlessly to keep the nation weak and impotent. Once, however, it is decided to trust an ex-enemy with strength, then you must trust him with some other things, too, notably a status of equality and dignity in the world community.

I served on the United States Delegation which, in 1919, helped to draft the Treaty of Versailles. That treaty failed because it was a mixture of contradictory and irreconcilable philosophies. To an extent it reflected the hopeful vision of Wilson. To an extent it reflected Clemenceau's implacable fear and hatred of Germany. The result was a compromise treaty, sufficiently liberal to enable Germany again to become strong, and sufficiently illiberal to enable the Nazis to climb to power to erase what, to the Germans, seemed humiliations and inequalities.

I doubt very much that the American and British peoples are capable of sustaining, over the years, a harsh and repressive peace. In any event, the Japanese surrender terms and the ensuing occupation have already committed us to another course, and the peace our governments seek for Japan is a peace of reconciliation which will extend trust and provide opportunity.

No one can guarantee that kind of a peace will succeed. But it can be guaranteed that if we now seek any other kind of a peace we shall surely fail.

If Japan is to be judged merely on her past record, it is easy to conclude that Japan is unworthy of trust. I know that you have not forgotten Singapore and Burma and the cruel fate of many of your soldiers. I can assure you that we also have not forgotten Pear Harbour, Bataan and the March of Death. But also we have not forgotten that human

nature has the capacity of regeneration and that the act of extending trust usually evokes an effort to merit trust.

The United States knows that people of the Japanese races can be trustworthy. Along our West Coast and in the Hawaiian Islands there are many Japanese who are second to none in loyal and useful service to our free society and in the last war, our Nisei troops fought under the American flag with sacrificial devotion and special distinction. Today, that spirit is taking root in Japan itself. The peace must appeal to that spirit and encourage it. That is our hope for the future and it is a good hope, particularly in the environment which we expect to create.

One of the dangers, is of course, that the peace might leave Japan a vacuum of power into which aggressive power would move, or that Japan, ostensibly for defence, might rearm to a degree that might be again dangerous to us. The United States, and indeed the Allied Powers generally, are determined that neither of these things shall happen, and I am glad to say the Japanese are in full accord. They want security, but they want it without militarism. So, the Japanese government has invited the United States to enter into a security arrangement with it so that upon the coming into force of the treaty of peace, Japan will not be a vacuum of power but United States Armed Forces will be stationed in and about Japan for an indefinite period of time. The United States has indicated that it would accept this proposal.

Under it, the United States would presumably, as its contribution to the security of Japan, provide the bulk of sea and air power, while Japan might in due course be in a position to provide the bulk of land power. Hence, Japan would not possess a national force which, of itself, could be an offensive threat, and the relationship between victor and vanquished would be so intimate and integrated as to make incredible a war of revenge.

We are convinced that co-operative working arrangements for collective security such as we contemplate with Japan are greatly to be preferred to treaty limitations. These read well, but the hope placed in them usually is illusory. The recent peace treaties with Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary are an illustration. Within less than five years, the limitations are grossly violated.

In the case of Japan we seek not the form but the substance of Security, both for Japan and for Japan's neighbours.

The territorial clauses of the Treaty would reflect the Potsdam surrender term that Japan would be reduced to the four main islands and a few adjacent minor islands. This automatically deprives Japan of control of the sources of raw material which enabled Japan to conduct its war of aggression, and would mean that Japan cannot be a future menace so long as it is not dominated by the Communist mainland.

Economic and commercial terms of the Treaty would reflect the surrender terms which required that the peace afford Japan economic opportunity through access to raw materials and participation in world trade. That decision was made six years ago and we cannot now honourably evade it. Indeed, there is no disposition in any quarter to do so. Of course, in so far as concerns access to raw materials, this must be subject to such controls as affect us all in relation to strategic materials in short supply. Also, as regards participation in world trade, we shall welcome Japan's declared intention hereafter to conform to internationally accepted fair trade practices.

The peace we are considering would not subject Japan to continuing reparation liabilities which however just in principle, are beyond the economic capability of the densely populated and naturally poor Japanese islands.

These, broadly, are the substantive provisions of the Treaty of Peace we are considering here, and we have found, on these matters, a very large measure of agreement can be reached without compromises which would involve any sacrifice by anyone of basic principles. We do not ourselves expect to make that kind of sacrifice, nor do we expect it of others.

Our peoples hold in common certain basic concepts of righteousness, justice and mercy. That is why we can work together. There may be, and there usually are, some differences between us. But our differences are not like the differences we have with Soviet leaders. They, as atheists and materialists, deny the existence of any standards of righteousness, justice or mercy. They deny the existence of any moral law to which individuals and rulers should conform. Therefore, with them, we find no common premise, whereas as between our two peoples there are common premises. Our differences are due to misunderstandings as to what we mean or as to what are the facts. Once these misunderstandings are cleared up we find agreement which reflects the free working of reason and conscience, not the pressure of superior power or of temporary expediency.

Your Government and our Government and other Governments are working together in relation to a Japanese Peace, and as a result of free discussions over the past nine months we are clearing up misunderstanding, we are learning what are the real facts and in consequence we are near to agreement within the free world. If we can consummate and publicly register that agreement in terms of a treaty of peace with Japan, that will not only promote peace in the Pacific but will exert a great influence for world peace. The Bolsheviks, particularly in Japan, are now conducting a war of nerves against the Treaty. They are blustering and saying that if we make peace with Japan that will be the cause of dire consequences. That is utter, complete nonsense.

World War I came about when the aggressive despots felt that the free world, with its overwhelming power, was hopelessly divided. World War II came about under the same circumstances. There will be no World War III so long as we show the capacity to work together and that we cannot be frightened or blackmailed into disunity. If we do not show that, we invite World War III.

The best insurance for peace is for us to act together. The more we do it, the more significantly we do it, the greater will be the likelihood of peace. We know that basically we are inspired by a common faith and united by a sense of common destiny. Sometimes that reality is obscured by indulgence in superficial differences. To-day it is dangerous to do that. Let us resolve our differences in order to show unity. We have done that before in time of peril and it is time to do it again.

TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON MR. DULLES' REPORT TO PRESIDENT

Washington, June 15, 1951

Mr. John Foster Dulles, accompanied by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, reported to the President on the results of his visit on a Japanese peace mission to Great Britain and France, from which he returned this morning.

His report covered his talks with officials of the French Foreign Office which had enabled the Foreign Office publicly to announce there were no differences between the two countries as regards all questions of principle involved in preparation of the peace treaty.

Mr. Dulles also reported fully on the full exchanges of views which he had with representatives of the British government including the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of State.

These talks resulted yesterday in full agreement between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Morrison on the draft treaty and all other main problems outstanding. This agreement is subject to governmental confirmations.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that although there have been initially considerable differences of opinion on important matters these had all been cleared away as the result of better understanding of facts and that reasoning which underlay the attitudes of the two governments.

The agreement reached did not require any compromise of principle by anyone but represents a free agreement based upon mutual understanding and community of purpose.

The President expressed gratification at the progress which had been made and enlargement of the area of agreement in relation to prompt conclusion of a fair and just Japanese peace treaty.

He expressed the view that this progress strikingly indicated the capacity of free nations to work together and to prove that in matters of great moment they were able to unify on the basis of free working of reason and judgment.

TEXT OF MR. DULLES' STATEMENT ON JAPANESE  
PEACE TREATY

Washington, July 12, 1951

We now have a draft Japanese peace treaty which we hope will be generally acceptable to the 50 odd nations at war with Japan. No one will be 100 per cent satisfied but almost everyone should be about 95 per cent satisfied.

There are some unique features. One is procedure. We have used diplomatic discussions instead of a general conference because some of the nations concerned are not on speaking terms with each other and could never be brought together in a conference. This has meant many separate discussions and personal visits. I myself have been to seven of the countries principally concerned in the Pacific. And my deputy Mr. Allison has been to two more. Our procedure while perhaps slower than a general conference has given every country an even better chance to present its views.

The second unique fact is the proposed treaty does not put Japan under any permanent restrictions or disabilities which will make her different or less sovereign than any other free nation. The treaty will in fact restore Japan as a sovereign equal and the treaty is truly one of reconciliation.

Never in modern times have victors in a great and bitter war applied this principle. They have in the name of peace imposed discriminations and humiliations which have bred new war. The present treaty would avoid that great error.

Another unique feature is the proposed treatment of the so-called problem of Japanese rearmament. Usually victors impose treaty limitations upon rearmament of their enemy. These restrictions are rarely enforced, and because they are discriminatory they often provoke the very result sought to be avoided.

We are planning a new and modern approach inspired by the principle of the United Nations. That principle is to seek security on a collective basis. A byproduct of that is that national forces are so combined with each other that no national force alone is an aggressive menace. That is what is contemplated in relation to Japan. Under a collective security treaty there will be a combination of United States and future Japanese forces and perhaps others so that it would be materially impossible for Japan to wage a war of revenge. That is a modern and enlightened way to deal with the problem.

The present draft is sponsored not just by the United States but also by the United Nations. That is appropriate. Of 15 nations principally concerned seven are members of the British Commonwealth.

The French government is also in accord. So we have evidence of unity as between our three great democracies. Also we have reason to hope that the new independent nations of Asia will want to go along with the kind of peace treaty which we have evolved and which largely takes their views into accord. India and Pakistan for example have both taken a lively interest in the evolution of this text.

In relation to the international unity, there is a unique measure of domestic unity. As the President's representative and with his full backing I have had complete cooperation from the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We have kept in close touch with appropriate Congressional committees and despite sharp differences of opinion as to many aspects of the Far Eastern policy, Democrats and Republicans have united behind the principles of this treaty.

I believe that the peace conference scheduled for San Francisco in September will more than any other yet held reflect the ideals of the United Nations which was born at San Francisco.

**TEXT OF DRAFT JAPANESE  
PEACE TREATY**

July 13, 1951

(Note: Text printed under separate cover)

TEXT OF U.S. REPLY TO U.S.S.R. MEMORANDUM  
OF JUNE 10

Washington, July 14, 1951

The Department of State, having transmitted to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington a revised draft of the prospective treaty of peace with Japan, takes this occasion to allude to the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union on June 10, 1951, dealing with the earlier draft of March 29, 1951.

Section One of the memorandum dealt with the substantive terms of that draft. It failed to cite any language of the draft as objectionable. In essence, the Soviet memorandum objected not to anything contained in the draft treaty but because the treaty would not restrict Japan with respect to the right of individual or collective self-defense, the right recognized by the United Nations Charter as "inherent."

The Government of the Soviet Union would have the peace treaty to deny to Japan the right hereafter to enter into collective security arrangements with other countries of its choosing. This is a viewpoint which the Government of the United States cannot accept.

Section Two of the Soviet memorandum dealt with procedure. It again "insists on observance of the Potsdam agreement" which, according to the Government of the Soviet Union, means "preparation of a peace treaty with Japan is placed upon four countries, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain and China," constituting the Council of Foreign Ministers.

This would commit preparation of the treaty to veto-bound processes of that Council and would exclude from preparatory work France and many Pacific and Asiatic countries which bore a far heavier burden in the Japanese war than did the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government's memorandum does not attempt any reasoned reply to an analysis of the Potsdam agreement contained in Section One of the United States aide-memoire of May 19 which proves irrefutably the Potsdam agreement between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States neither mentions nor relates in any way to Japanese peace, probably because the Potsdam agreement was made on August 1, 1945, before Japan's surrender and when the Soviet Union was still a neutral in the Pacific war.

In concluding Section Three of its memorandum of June 10, 1951, the Soviet Government says the "peace treaty with Japan should be multilateral and not separate" both as to preparation and as to the signing.

The July 3, 1951 draft reflects the operation of those very principles. Many interested nations have participated in its preparation. The fact they have done so through diplomatic channels makes their participation no less real than if they had participated in some other manner.

The terms of the treaty would recognize and protect equally legitimate interests of each and every state which took part in the Japanese war. At the same time, the terms embody not merely the formality of peace but the spirit of peace.

The Government of the Soviet Union will further observe that as it desires, the text is prepared as a multilateral instrument. The Soviet memorandum, after having first demanded that preparation of the draft treaty should now be started over again by the Council of Foreign Ministers, suggests in its final paragraph that when there are available drafts there should be a conference of all active belligerents in the Japanese war for consideration of these drafts.

The Government of the United States anticipates there will be a general conference in early September to conclude peace on the basis of the draft of July 3, 1951. It will welcome the participation in that conference and adherence to the resultant treaty by the Government of the Soviet Union.

TEXT OF LETTER FROM MR. SEBALD  
TO MR. YOSHIDA

Tokyo, July 21, 1951

Tokyo, July 20, 1951.

Excellency:

The Government of the United States has the honor to acknowledge your letter of July 13, 1951 with reference to your government's readiness to participate in an international conference which might be called for the signing of a peace treaty between allied powers and Japan. The Government of the United States appreciates the assurance that the Japanese Government is prepared to send duly accredited delegates to such a conference.

I now have the honor to advise you on behalf of my government that the proposed conference will be convened at San Francisco, United States of America, on September 4, 1951 for the purpose of signing a treaty of peace on the terms of a text jointly sponsored by the Government in the United States and His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom. This text will be finalized on August 13, 1951 on the basis of the draft of July 20, 1951, enclosed herewith, and such changes, if any, as may result from further consideration up to that date.

The Government of the United States has the honor formally to invite the Government of Japan to be represented at that conference for the purpose of signing, on behalf of Japan, such a treaty of peace. The Government of the United States will appreciate being advised in due course of the names of the delegates who will attend and act on behalf of Japan.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON PHILIPPINE REPARATIONS CLAIMS

Washington, July 20, 1951

It is apparent there is a serious misunderstanding regarding the true meaning of the reparations clause of the draft treaty of peace with Japan.

In the opinion of the United States Government, the clause as drafted makes it possible for the Philippines to receive reparations, although it seemingly has been interpreted in Manila as giving the Philippines no such opportunity.

After discussions with the Philippine Government, it has been decided more time should be given to the study of the draft treaty before issuing the final text. It is now contemplated such a final text will not be issued until August 13.

In the meantime, it is hoped a special study of the meaning and practical operation of the reparations clauses made in cooperation with United States experts will serve to clarify the true situation.

TEXT OF INVITATION TO JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE

Washington, July 20, 1951

The Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have the honor to enclose herewith two copies of the draft of the peace treaty with Japan, of two declarations by Japan and of the protocol.

The draft peace treaty and the two declarations have been prepared on the basis of earlier drafts and observations thereon by the countries which actively were concerned in the Japanese war.

The draft protocol which is open for signature at any time has been proposed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and is circulated for information and comment of those countries whose domestic law permits them to sign it.

It is believed the enclosed draft treaty and the declarations combine and reconcile, as far as is practicable, the point of view of all Allied powers which were at war with Japan and will establish with Japan a just and durable peace.

The Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be happy to receive comments on the enclosed draft which should be addressed to the Government of the United States of America as promptly as it is convenient. After receipt of these comments, they propose to circulate the final text of the peace treaty on August 13, 1951.

The Government of the United States of America has the honor to invite your Government to a conference for conclusion and signature of the treaty of peace with Japan on the terms of that text.

The conference will convene at San Francisco, United States of America, on September 4, 1951.

Concurrent and identical invitation is being sent to the other Allied powers at war with Japan except where special circumstances exist.

The Government of Japan advised the Government of the United States of America it will be represented at San Francisco by duly accredited delegates empowered to sign the treaty and declarations on behalf of the Government of Japan.

It will be appreciated if your Government will in due course notify the Government of the United States of America at Washington, D.C., whether it accepts this invitation.

Any inquiries relating to the organization of the conference and provision of facilities for duly accredited delegates, their advisers and staff may be addressed to the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

0150



TEXT OF MAYOR ROBINSON'S STATEMENT

San Francisco, Aug. 7, 1951

San Francisco is proud that it will be the scene of one of the major milestones in world peace when delegates from many nations meet here September 4 for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace between the people of the United States and the people of Japan.

It is most fitting that our city will play host to these nations since San Francisco is the birthplace of the United Nations.

Here likewise the peoples representing many nationalities, colors and religions live in symbolic peace and friendship and out of the many nationalities has grown a spirit of brotherhood.

Our people have long recognized the traditional friendship between the people of Japan on the far side of the Pacific and the American people on the near side with San Francisco the gateway for their relationships.

We can look forward with confidence to renewed inspiration which will be represented by a complete peace treaty.

I send greetings to the people of Japan and express on behalf of our peoples our earnest hope that together we may join with other free peoples of the world in reestablishment of world brotherhood.

**TEXT OF TREATY OF PEACE  
WITH JAPAN**

August 15, 1951

(Note: Text printed under separate cover)

TEXT OF MR. DULLES' ADDRESS ON AUG. 15  
DRAFT PEACE TREATY

Washington, Aug. 15, 1951

Last Monday was the day which ended eleven months of negotiation regarding the Japanese peace treaty.

A final text has been circulated by the British and ourselves to over forty Allied countries and they have been invited to attend a signing conference to be opened at San Francisco on September 4 by the President.

The Soviet Union has now told us that they expect to send a delegation to San Francisco. We are not yet clear as to what this means. We hope that it does not mean that the Russians are sending a wrecking crew to try to demolish a structure of Japanese peace which has been built carefully and soundly until now. It is complete save for the formal dedication.

If such tactics should be tried we are confident that they would fail. Responsible nations will not be parties to attempting now to demolish what already is, on the theory that some more pleasing structure could quickly be made to take its place. The fact is that there must be peace now on the terms which have been negotiated; otherwise Japan would share the unhappy fate of Germany and Austria where Russia, because it is an occupying power, has been able to impose treaty procedures of futility.

The invitation to the San Francisco conference is an invitation to conclude peace "on the terms" of the present text. We and others intend to stand by that invitation.

The present final text of the Japanese peace treaty is the product of a unique cooperative effort. It began last September when the Allies principally concerned were attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York. After the United Nations delegates returned home, there were conferences of diplomats at the capitals. A United States presidential mission visited ten of these capitals, including London and Paris and the capitals of six Pacific and Asian countries. The Commonwealth had three conferences which brought together Australia, Canada, Ceylon, England, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and South Africa.

The first round of discussions related to the basic principles to be applied. Then, in January the United States undertook to make the first draft of a text which would translate the agreed principles into

treaty words. We took that initiative because all of the Allied powers had joined in giving us a special duty to direct the occupation which was to prepare Japan for the peace.

The draft we prepared was circulated last March. The United Kingdom shortly afterwards produced a text of its own, in the light of the Commonwealth conferences.

Our March draft was subjected to intensive study by about twenty countries. These included not only the western members of the Far Eastern Commission—France, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, but particularly Burma, Ceylon, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines. The draft was largely revised by their suggestions. Then, last June, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly drafted a text to reflect still more fully the different views that had been developed. This text was circulated to Allied Powers and was kept open for further changes until last Monday. During this July-August period, no less than thirty additional changes were made, each of some significance to some nation.

Throughout this period, the Soviet Union took an active, though non-cooperative, part. I had several conferences with Yakov Malik and our governments have exchanged 10 memoranda and drafts.

Every nation which has constructively interested itself in the treaty can claim authorship of important parts of the final text. Also each of these nations can claim the equally honorable role of voluntarily subordinating some special interest so that a broad base of unity might be found.

There has been no deviation from the basic principles which General MacArthur largely inspired as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The treaty is a non-punitive, non-discriminatory treaty, which will restore Japan to dignity, equality and opportunity in the family of nations. As shown by successive drafts, it has been found increasingly possible to do justice to particular situations without violating these basic principles.

I emphasize these negotiating processes because Communist propaganda in many countries is vilifying the treaty as arbitrary dictation on the part of two great powers. Nothing could be further from the fact. The Soviet Union has been persistently trying to get the treaty-making into the Council of Foreign Ministers where four nations alone would draft the treaty with the Soviet Union having a right of veto. Communist propaganda has been conducting a war of nerves against the peace, even suggesting that it may be countered by their violence. While this has been going on from the Soviet side, the other Allied Powers have been conducting what, in effect, is an eleven months' peace conference participated in by so many nations as to make this treaty the most broadly based peace treaty in all history.

Because we have been conferring quietly and courteously, as befits free men who respect each other, communists pretend that we have not been conferring at all. It seems that, to them, no conference rates as such unless violent insults are publicly hurled.

Those who suggest that the United States and United Kingdom have dictated the final text may be challenged to compare that text with the earlier texts. Our March text had twenty-two articles. Everyone of these articles has been substantially rewritten to meet the wishes of others. The twenty-two articles have grown into twenty-seven articles and two accompanying declarations.

The United States, which for six years has been and is the occupying power, could practically do much as it wanted. But we have not used our power in that way. The final treaty is not the treaty of the United States. It is not the treaty of any single nation. No nation is 100 per cent satisfied and that applies to the United States and United Kingdom which sponsor the present text. But such dissatisfactions as exist are inherent in the situation. There cannot be squeezed out of it the total of all Allied wants and irreconcilable wants must be compromised. Those realities cannot be made to vanish by any procedural sleight-of-hand.

As is usually the case with peace treaties, the most difficult problem has been that of reparations. Japan's aggression caused tremendous costs, losses and suffering. If the treaty validated all of the just claims against Japan, Japan would be submerged by liabilities of more than 100 billion dollars. Under that weight Japan would sink into hopeless misery; its people would become an easy prey to exploitation, and totalitarian demagogues would not doubt promise relief through renewed aggression with the help of those nearby who are already aggressive. Also, under these conditions, the effort of various creditor nations to get the largest possible percentage of an illusory pot of gold would spread dissension and bitterness as between Allies in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Any peace treaty which sets loose these evil forces would squander the opportunity which many died to give us.

On the other hand, we realized that the treaty could not ignore the principle of reparation for damage and suffering caused by Japan during the war. But Japan cannot pay in dollars or other foreign money. Since the surrender she has been two billion dollars short of the money required to pay for the food and raw materials she had to import for survival on a minimum basis. The United States has made good that two billion dollars, as an occupation responsibility. But we are entitled to look forward to Japan becoming economically self-sustaining, so as to end dependence on us; and we are not disposed, directly or indirectly, to pay Japan's reparations.

Japan does have, however, certain assets which could be put to

work to help those who suffered from her war-time acts. Japan has an industrially trained population and industrial equipment, both of which are partly unemployed. If the devastated countries want to send into Japan the raw materials which many of them have in abundance, the Japanese could process them and by these services, freely given, provide appreciable reparations. The arrangements could cover not merely consumers goods but machinery and capital goods which would enable underdeveloped countries to speed up developing their own industry, so as hereafter to be less dependent on outside industrial power.

This process would not throw foreign exchange burdens upon Japan, or other economic burdens of a kind which would impair her credit or deny her people the opportunity to raise their living standards.

The reparations negotiations, involving particularly the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma, have produced a treaty which gives moral satisfaction to the position of the invaded peoples and, while its terms probably will not produce vast economic benefits, they will make possible some substantial indemnification from Japan.

The negotiations on this point, particularly with the Philippines, exhibit the total falsity of the communist-inspired myth that the United States treats the Philippine nation as a puppet subservient to its power. When this young republic voiced criticism of the March draft of the peace treaty, it never occurred to the United States to invoke pressures to stifle that criticism. Nor would that have succeeded as against the independent spirit of the Philippine people. What we did was to pay heed to their criticism. The result is, we think, a better treaty.

In the ways I have outlined, there has been patiently and scrupulously fashioned a pattern of peace for Japan. When the San Francisco conference has been held, one historical chapter will have been closed.

Some few nations may denounce the result; some may prefer acquiescence to formal signature; some may prefer to use article 26 of the proposed treaty which, as a novel, liberalizing feature, authorizes bilateral treaties similar to the main treaty. But so many Allies, including the principal contributors to victory, will have signed the treaty, that there will be no doubt in any quarter as to either the fact of peace or as to the terms of peace.

Also, we can be confident that future generations will judge that this peace, both through procedure and through substance, represents the best tradition of those who believe in processes of sovereign equality and in the rule of justice.

## TEXT OF U.S. NOTE TO U.S.S.R.

Washington, August 16, 1951

The Government of the United States acknowledges the note of the Soviet Union in response to the United States invitation of July 20, 1951, whereby the Government of the Soviet Union advises it will send a delegation to the San Francisco Conference to be convened on September 4, 1951 and will present proposals on the question of a peace treaty with Japan.

The Government of the United States welcomes the acceptance of its invitation by the Government of the Soviet Union. In order, however, that there should be no possibility of subsequent misunderstanding, the United States recalls the invitation set out that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would "circulate the final text of the peace treaty" which has been done and the invitation was "to a conference for the conclusion and signature of a treaty of peace with Japan on the terms of that text."

The San Francisco Conference is no conference to reopen negotiations on the terms of peace. The terms of the prospective treaty have been arrived at by intensive multi-partite negotiations which, in effect, constituted an 11-month peace conference which began in mid-September, 1951, and the final conclusions of which are embodied in the August 13, 1951, text.

The Soviet Union has participated in this process, both through oral exchanges of views and through exchange between our Governments of not less than 10 drafts or memoranda relating to the terms of the Japanese peace treaty. Thus, the Soviet Union had an equal opportunity with other Allies to shape the various revisions which have now resulted in the final August 13, 1951, text.

The August 13 draft is part of a unique cooperative effort. The treaty, both through procedure and substance, represents the best tradition of those who believe in the processes of sovereign equality and the rule of justice.

The United States will welcome an opportunity to explain fully at San Francisco the nature of the treaty and every nation represented will have an opportunity for exposition and statement. In that conference, we welcome the participation of the Soviet Union.

B:4.1.O.16

BRITAIN

0155

TEXT OF ANGLO-U.S. COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY  
FOREIGN OFFICE ON DULLES-MORRISON TALKS

London, June 14, 1951

Herbert Morrison, His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and John Foster Dulles, special representative of the President of the United States, at the conclusion of conversations on a Japanese peace treaty announced the talks resulted in full agreement between them on a draft treaty and on all main problems outstanding. This provisional agreement is subject to final approval on both sides.

The fact such an agreement has been reached in the talks between the United States and the United Kingdom on this important and complex subject, emphasizes again the deep essential unity of purpose of the two countries.

The meetings in London, like Dulles' recent discussion with the French government in Paris, are part of a long process of consultation with the governments of countries closely concerned with the Japanese war, including the Commonwealth countries. Though these governments are at present in no way committed to the draft, its main outlines are understood to be in accordance with the views held by a great majority of them.

If finally approved, the draft will first be rediscussed with the powers principally concerned in the war against Japan and shortly afterwards circulated to the other powers at war with Japan with a request for comments at the earliest convenient date. Thereafter, it is hoped to proceed with the drafting of the final treaty.

Both governments still hope the Soviet government, which has been consulted at the earlier stages of the negotiations, will sign the peace treaty. They consider, however, the treaty should be prepared on a wide basis of consultation among the powers at war with Japan. They cannot accept the Soviet government's continued insistence that the treaty must be prepared at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China.

During Dulles' talks in London, he has seen the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of State. The United Kingdom Ministers were accompanied in the talks by officials of the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade and the Commonwealth Relations Office. On the United States' side, Dulles was accompanied by John Allison, Col. Stanton Babcock and Messrs. Livingston Satterthwaite, Robert Fearey and Stanley D. Metzger.

B:4.1.O.16

FRANCE

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REPORT ON COMMUNIQUE RE FRANCO-U.S. TALKS

Paris, June 11, 1951

PARIS, June 12—(Reuter)—French-American talks here on the proposed Japanese peace treaty has left "problems in suspense" to be settled through diplomatic channels, an official communique said.

The communique, issued by the French, said there was no divergence between the two countries about questions raised by preparation of the treaty.



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## TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE TO U.S.

Moscow, June 10, 1951.

On May 19th of current year U.S.S.R. government received from U.S.A. government memorandum that represents reply to "Remarks of government of U.S.S.R. on United States draft of peace treaty with Japan" of May 7th of current year.

Soviet government takes cognizance of statement made by government of United States to effect that having examined remarks of government of Soviet Union to memorandum of U.S.A. government of March 29th, 1951, it considers that differences existing between views of U.S.S.R. government and peace terms contained in American March Draft are not so great as to prevent attainment of agreed upon peace treaty.

However inasmuch as American memorandum of May 19th alongside of aforesaid statement contains considerations concerning "Remarks of government of U.S.S.R. on United States draft of peace treaty with Japan" of May 7th which give incorrect and in many cases distorting interpretation of these remarks, to make matter quite clear Soviet government finds it necessary to state following.

1. On basic provisions of American draft of peace treaty with Japan.

A. It is of greatest importance both for Soviet Union and for other countries concerned for assuring durable peace in Far East to prevent Japan from again becoming aggressive state, to preclude revival of Japanese militarism.

It is known that little over ten years ago militarist Japan attacked Soviet Union near Vladivostok. Having invaded China, Japanese imperialism was preying upon Chinese people inflicting great sufferings on them for fifteen years. It attacked United States as well and then number of states in Asia including India, which attack unleashed war throughout Far East.

Does American draft of peace treaty with Japan contain guarantees against revival of Japan as aggressive state? Acquaintance with this draft shows that it contains no guarantees in this respect.

Therefore it was stated in "Remarks of government of USSR on United States draft of peace treaty with Japan" that "not only does American draft contain no guarantees against revival of Japanese militarism; it does not propose any restrictions on size of Japan's armed forces generally" as was done for instance in peace treaty with Italy al-