Part 1

Current Status of Countermeasures against Declining Birthrate
(Summary)
Trends and projections of Japan’s total population and demographic structure

The total population predicted to fall below 100 million by the year 2053

Japan’s total population is 126.71 million as of 2017: young-age (age 0 to 14), working-age (age 15 to 64), and old-age (65 or older) population are 15.59 million, 75.96 million and 35.15 million, respectively, being equivalent to 12.3%, 60.0%, and 27.7% of total population. National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, "Population Projection of Japan: 2016 to 2065," projects the trend of Japan’s future population structure, such as size and age distribution. According to its medium-fertility and medium-mortality projections, the total fertility rate is projected to change from 1.45 in 2015 to 1.42 in 2024, 1.43 in 2035, and 1.44 in 2065. When compared with the total fertility rates between the latest and previous (January 2012) forecasts, the previous forecast for 1.35 (2060) rises to 1.44 (2065) due to the recent years’ increased fertility rate by women in their 30s to 40s. If based on this result of the moderate-range of projection, total population is projected to fall to 99.24 million in 2053 and to 88.08 million in 2065. When compared with the previous projection (long-term projection), the previous number of 81.35 million for 2065 increased by 6.73 million to this time number of 88.08 million. The year when the population falls to less than 100 million is projected to delay by five years to 2053, in contrast with the previous forecast for 2048, thus the population declining speed will be slower. As for the population size and age classified into three age brackets, young-age population will fall to less than 10 million in 2056 and to 8.98 million in 2065, becoming 10.2% of total population. Working-age population will fall to less than 50 million in 2056 to be 45.29 million in 2065, becoming 51.4% of total population. Old-age population will peak to 39.35 million in 2042, thereafter reducing to 33.81 million in 2065, becoming 38.4% of total population in 2065. When comparing the projected result with the previous one, as a result of the elevated total fertility rate (a premise of the estimate), the working-age and young-age populations increase by about 10% and by about 20%, respectively, as of 2065. (Fig. 1-1-1)
Fig. 1-1-1  Trends and projections of Japan’s total population and demographic structure

Source: The results are based on MIC’s Population Census up to 2015; as for 2017, MIC’s “Population Estimates” (Final estimates as of October 1, 2017); and as for 2020 onward, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, “Population Projections for Japan (the 2017 estimate) for the medium-fertility and medium-mortality projections.”

Note: The population by age bracket in 2017 and onward does not include people of unknown age because it was calculated by dividing them proportionately, based on the Statistics Bureau, MIC, “The 2015 Population Census: Population divided people of unknown nationality and age proportionately (reference table).” In calculation of the population ratio for young-age children in the years from 1950 to 2015, the number of children with unknown age is excluded from the denominator.

Note: The number of foreigners 136 (55 males and 81 females) who were 70 years-old or older in 1950 in Okinawa prefecture as well as the number of people 23,328 (8,090 males and 15,238 females) who were 70 years-old or older in 1955 are excluded from the total number by age.
The ratio of young-age population is smaller in Japan compared to other countries

The ratio of young-age population in the world accounts for 26.1% (according to the UN estimate) while that ratio to the entire population in Japan accounts for 12.3%, which is small side worldwide. As for other countries, Germany, Italy, and Korea have the ratio of 13.1%, 13.7%, and 13.9% respectively, showing that the lower the total fertility rate is in a country, the lower the young-age population ratio is, relatively speaking (Fig. 1-1-2).

**Fig. 1-1-2 The population ratio by 3 age brackets per country**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>The population ratio by 3 age brackets (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 - 14 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia Federation</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers are as of 2015 for countries other than Japan while those of Japan are cited from “Population Estimate” published by the MIC (Final estimates as of October 1, 2017).
The number of births falling below 1 million per year

The annual number of live births in Japan was about 2.7 million in the first baby boom, about 2.1 million in the second baby boom, and in 1975, it fell below 2 million, and has continued to decrease every year since then. In 1984, it fell below 1.5 million, and has been on a gradual downward since 1991, with occasional increases and decreases.

The number of births in 2016, which was 976,978, fell below 1 million\(^1\) for the first time since records began in 1899. The total fertility rate\(^2\), which exceeded 4.3 during the first baby boom period, has rapidly fallen since 1950. Since then, it continued to stand at about 2.1, including during period of the second baby boom, but began to show a declining trend since it fell below 2.0 in 1975. In 1989, the rate was 1.57 which fell below the lowest figure 1.58 recorded in 1966 (Hinoeuma: one of the sexagenary cycles). Yet, in 2005, the rate fell to 1.26, the lowest on record. Although the total fertility rate has shown slight increase in recent years, in 2016 it decreased by 0.01 point\(^3\) from 1.45 of the previous year (Fig. 1-1-3).

---

2. The total of age-specific birthrate measured during a certain period of time is calculated over the course of reproductive age (normally the age between 15 and 49).
3. According to the “Summary of Annual Vital Statistics Report (Preliminary Data), 2017” by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the total fertility rate in 2017 is 1.43.
Transition of total fertility rates in foreign countries

The total fertility rates in foreign countries (France, Sweden, the USA, the UK, Germany and Italy) was more than 2.0 until the 1960s. Thereafter, it declined from 1970 to around 1980 as a whole. The background is pointed out that there was a cost increase in childcare, changes in sense of values on marriage and childbirth, and prevalence of contraception. In some countries the total fertility rates has been recovered since around 1990. (Fig. 1-1-4)

Fig. 1-1-4  Transition of the total fertility rates in foreign countries (USA and Europe)

[Graph showing the total fertility rates of different countries over time]

Source: The numbers regarding countries other than Japan were from sources including “Demographic Yearbook” by United Nations for the years up to 1959, OECD Family database for the years between 1960 and 2015, and the statistics in each country for the year 2016. Meanwhile the numbers regarding Japan were prepared by Cabinet Office with reference to the Vital Statistics by the MHLW.

Note: The numbers regarding France in 2016 were defined as provisional as of May 16, 2018.

Especially in France and Sweden, the birthrate, after dropping to 1.5 to 1.6s, tended to recover and most recently reached 1.92 in France (2016) and 1.85 in Sweden (2016). As for the characteristics of family policies in these countries, the emphasis had shifted from financial support such as providing family allowance to fulfillment of childcare after the 1990s in France. The policy was further directed to emphasizing on the establishment of environment where people would have wider choices with regard to childbirth/childrearing, and employment. In other words, the emphasis was more on “support work-life balance.” In Sweden, the government introduced in a relatively early stage a policy to “support work-life balance” including providing leave system for childcare and childrearing along with financial support. In

---

Germany, although the financial support still plays a central role in the family policy program, it is trying to shift from it to “support work-life balance” in recent years, by making proposals one after the other that aim to fulfil the childrearing leave system and the childcare¹. Also, the social expenditures related to families and children to GDP ratio is 1.31% (2015) in Japan. Although simple comparison may not be appropriate due to the differences in national contribution ratio², that is on a lower level compared to European countries such as France and Sweden. From this, it is pointed out that the financial scale for the overall family policy with cash benefits and in-kind benefits is small in Japan (Fig. 1-1-5).

Fig. 1-1-5 Comparison of social expenditures related to families and children to GDP ratio for each country

![Graph showing social expenditures related to families and children to GDP ratio for each country](image)


Note: 1. Social expenditures related to families and children: Cash benefits and in-kind (services) benefits spent to support families and children are allocated. Among those allocated benefits, the main items are as follows (Extracted from reference in “The Financial Statistics of Social Security in Japan” (FY 2015), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research)
   - Child benefit: Cash benefits, local operating cost for children/childrearing support
   - Social welfare: Special childrearing allowance, childrearing allowance, and operating cost for childcare center, etc.
   - Association health insurance, Union health insurance, and National health insurance: Childbirth/childrearing expenses, and childbirth/childrearing lump-sum payment, etc.
   - Mutual benefit societies: Parturition expenses, childbirth allowance, childcare leave allowance, etc.
   - Unemployment insurance: Childcare leave benefit, care leave benefit, etc.
   - Public assistance: Childbirth support, education support
   - Schooling support, Pre-school education: Expenses for promoting elementary and junior high school education, pre-school education

2. The number for Japan is as of FY 2015 while that for USA and Germany, UK, France, and Sweden are as of FY 2013.
Looking at the transition of the total fertility rate in Thailand, Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan among the countries and regions in Asia that have made significant economic growth and have longitudinal data available, they all had kept the level higher than Japan as of the year 1970. However, they have shown declining tendency and today the total fertility rate in these countries falls below the replacement-level fertility\(^1\). The total fertility rate in Thailand, Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are 1.4 (2013), 1.20 (2016), 1.17 (2016), 1.21 (2016), and 1.17 (2016) respectively levels of which fall below 1.44 (2016) of Japan (Fig. 1-1-6).

---

\(^1\) Part of the reasons for lower total fertility rate is because there are fewer cases of birth outside marriage in Asia, thus it is pointed out that the tendency to stay unmarried and the tendency to marry later may significantly contribute to this transition of the total fertility rate (Refer to “World Fertility Report 2013” by United Nations).
Rise of birthrate in women in their 30s

The age-specific fertility rate per woman in her peak age was 0.22 at age 25 in 1975, 0.16 at age 28 in 1990, and 0.10 at age 30 in 2005, thus their peak age increasing while the fertility rate decreasing; it slightly increased to 0.11 at age 30 in 2016.

The reason for shrinkage of the total fertility rate in 1970 onward is that the rate of 0.22 at age 25 in 1975 dropped drastically to 0.06 in 2005. And the reason for the total fertility rate slight increase in recent years is that the rate of 0.06 at age 35 in 2005 increased to 0.08 in 2016, reflecting the growth of the age-specific fertility rate at age 30 to 40. (Fig. 1-1-7)

Fig. 1-1-7 Women’s Age-Specific Fertility Rate


Note: Women’s age-specific fertility rate is calculated with the number of births of each age divided by each age of female population.
The number of marriages/marriage rate continuing to decline

The number of marriages exceeded 1 million annually between 1970 and 1974, when children of the first baby boomers reached the ages around 25, with the marriage rate (the number of marriages per a population of 1,000) of 10.0 or over. But after that, both the number of marriages and the marriage rate tended to decline. The number of marriages had shifted up and down between 700,000 and 800,000 from the year 1978 to 2010. Since 2011, it has shifted up and down between 600,000 and 700,000. The number of marriages in 2016 was 620,531 (14,625 less than the previous year) that reached the record lows. The marriage rate (5.0) was also at a historically low level, which was half of that in the first half of the 1970s (Fig. 1-1-8).

**Fig. 1-1-8  Trends in the number of marriages and the marriage rate**

Source: "Vital Statistics," by the MHLW
As for the percentage of unmarried people per 5-year age-group, in 2015 for example, about 1 out of 2 males (47.1%) and 1 out of 3 females (34.6%) for the “30-34 years-old” age group were unmarried. For the “35-39 years-old” age group, 1 out of 3 males (35.0%) and 1 out of 4 females (23.9%) were unmarried. The percentage of unmarried people are rising in the long term, however, the percentage of unmarried males in the “30-34 years-old” and “35-39 years-old” age groups as well as females in the “30-34 years-old” age group have remained at the same level more or less since the previous survey (Population Census in 2010) (Fig. 1-1-9).

**Fig. 1-1-9  Transition of percentage of unmarried people per 5-year age-group**

![Graph showing the transition of percentage of unmarried people per 5-year age-group](image)

Source: “Population Census” by the MIC
Trend toward less marriage

As for the percentage of unmarried people as of the age 50\(^1\), it was 1.7% for male and 3.3% for female in 1970. After that, while the percentage for unmarried males steadily increased, that for unmarried females remained at the same level until 1990 but continued to increase after that. And in the previous survey (Population Census in 2010), 20.1% of males and 10.6% of females were unmarried, while 23.4% of males and 14.1% of females were unmarried as of 2015, both showing an increase. According to the estimate based on the 2015 Population Census, if the trend of more and more people not getting married or married later in life does not change, it is predicted that the increase of the percentage of unmarried people at the age of 50 would continue to increase\(^2\) (Fig. 1-1-10).

![Change in percentage of unmarried men and women in their 50s and future forecast](image)

Source: As for 1970 to 2015, actual values based on the Population Census (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, "Latest Demographic Statistics"). The numbers in the year 2020 and later were estimate (prepared by Cabinet Office based on the "Household Projections for Japan: 2015-2040 (2018)", that were calculated based on the 2015 Population Census.

Note: The values show an average of the unmarried rates at age 45 to 49 and at age 50 to 54.

---

\(^1\) An average of the unmarried rates at age 45 to 49 and at age 50 to 54. The unmarried rate at age 50 is called a lifetime non-marriage rate.

\(^2\) Since it is still a minor case to give birth outside marriage in this country, the factors for birthrate decline may be divided into two reasons; changes in marriage custom (more and more people are unmarried) and changes in childbirth custom (decline in birthrate for married couples). It has been pointed out that the benefit of reducing the number of unmarried people may be significantly greater than the benefit of increasing the birthrate for married couples (Refer to Miho Iwasawa, Ryuichi Kaneko, and Ryuzaburo Sato, “Birth trend in the post era of the population turning-point,” 2016; and Ryuzaburo Sato, Ryuichi Kaneko, “Japan in the post era of the population turning-point”, published by Harashobo, Demography library-17).

\(^3\) More specifically, it is said that the representation in the changes from the figure 2.01 (equivalent to the total fertility rate between the late 1950s and the early 1970s) to 1.38 (the same in 2012) can be explained by the trend of getting married for the first time later in life (accounting for about 90%) and the declining childbirth in married couples (accounting for about 10%) (Refer to Miho Iwasawa, “More unmarried people and changes in couples’ behavior causing decline in birthrate,” 2015; Shigesato Takahashi, Hiroyoshi Obuchi, “Countermeasures for declining population and birthrate,” published by Harashobo, Demography library-16; Miho Iwasawa, Ryuchi Kaneko, Ryuzaburo Sato, “Birth trend in the post era of the population turning-point,” 2016; and Ryuzaburo Sato, Ryuchi Kaneko, “Japan in the post era of the population turning-point,” Harashobo, Demography library-17, including how one should view the rate in 2012).
Slowing progress of trend toward delayed marriage/childbirth

The average age of first marriage of men and women is getting higher, thus late marriage is going to increase. In 2016, men married at age 31.1 and women married at age 29.4, getting higher by 2.9 years in men and by 3.9 years in women as compared with those in 1985. In comparison with the previous year (2015), these ages remain flat in men and women.

Moreover, the average age for mothers to give birth the 1st child, 2nd child and 3rd child is 30.7, 32.6, and 33.6 respectively in 2016, showing a trend of age increase. They are 4.0 years for the 1st child, 3.5 years for the 2nd child, and 2.2 years for the 3rd child delayed compared to the year 1985. Furthermore, the interval between the birth of the 1st child and the 2nd child was 2.4 years while that for the 2nd child and the 3rd child was 2.3 years in 1985. The former was 1.9 years and the latter 1 year in 2016, showing the intervals of childbirth are becoming shorter (Fig. 1-1-11).

Fig. 1-1-11  Trends in the mean age of first marriage and mean age of mothers by live birth order

Source: “Vital Statistics,” by the MHLW
As for the transition of the first marriage rate per age group from 1990 and every 10 years after that to the most recent 2016, it was 68.01‰ for male spouses in 1990 that significantly declined to 48.02‰ in 2016 for the age group 25-29 while it was 8.25‰ in 1990 that increased to 13.38‰ in 2016 for the age group 35-39, showing an increase in the first marriage rate after 35-years of age although the degree of an increase was small. On the other hand, the first marriage rate for female spouses for the age group 20-24 in 1990 was 54.40‰ declining significantly to 25.55‰ in 2016 while it was 12.73‰ for the age group 30-34 in 1990 increasing to 28.07‰ in 2016, showing greater degree of increase at the age 30 or older compared to male spouses (Fig. 1-1-12).

**Fig. 1-1-12 First marriage rate per 5-year age group**

Completed fertility at an all-time low of 1.94

The completed fertility of a married couple (the average number of children born to a first married couple whose marriage duration is 15 to 19 years) continued to be stable at about 2.2 from the 1970s to 2002, but was declining from 2005, becoming 1.94 in 2015, the lowest. (Fig. 1-1-13)

**Fig. 1-1-13** Completed number of children of couples

![Completed number of children of couples](https://example.com/figure1.png)


Note: The survey includes first married couples with the marriage duration of 15 to 19 years (except for those whose number of children was unknown). The horizontal axis shows the years when the survey was conducted.
4 Intention of getting married

The Attitude toward Marriage

The percentage of unmarried people (of the age 18 to 34) who answered “I will marry some day in the future” was 85.7% for males and 89.3% for females according to the survey in 2015, showing that despite a slight decline in the past 30 years, still a high level has been maintained for both males and females (Fig. 1-1-14).

For a question asking reasons why they are unmarried, 45.3% males and 51.2% of females (of the age 25 to 34) answered, “Cannot meet a suitable partner,” 29.5% of males answered, “Do not feel the necessity,” 29.1% of males answered, “Do not have enough money for marriage,” while 31.2% of females answered, “Do not feel the necessity.” Moreover, when comparing the past surveys, “Cannot have a good relation with the opposite sex” as an answer has been increasing for both males and females. Furthermore, “Want to concentrate on work (studies)” and “Do not have enough money for marriage” as answers are also increasing for females (Fig. 1-1-15).

Fig. 1-1-14 Never-married persons’ intention to marry from lifelong perspective by survey

![Bar chart showing the percentage of never-married persons (18 to 34 years old) intending to marry over time.](image)


Note: The survey includes unmarried persons aged 25 to 34. The items show reasons (three can be chosen) why they remain single. The percentage at the top of each bar shows the results of the 15th survey.
Difference in family formation according to the mode of employment

Although the unemployment rate for young people (of the age 15 to 34) is higher than the level of all ages combined, it is decreasing in recent years for both males and females. In comparison of the highest period with the year 2017, the rate for males of the age 15-24 was 11.6% in 2003 that decreased to 4.7% in 2017 while the rate for males of the age 25-34 was 6.6% in 2010 that decreased to 3.8% in 2017. As for females of the age 15 to 24, it was 8.7% in 2002 that decreased to 4.5% in 2017 while the rate for females of the age 25-34 was 7.3% in 2002 decreasing to 3.5% in 2017 (Fig. 1-1-16).

**Fig. 1-1-16 Unemployment rate for young people**

Source: “Labour Force Survey” by the MIC

Note: The execution of Labour Force Survey became temporarily difficult in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures due to an influence of the Great East Japan Earthquake that happened on March 11, 2011. Therefore, the numbers for the year 2011 cited here are the complementary estimates (based on the Population Census in 2005).
The ratio of non-regular employment kept rising in the period of the 1990s and the 2000s for both males and females, and in the 2010s it has generally continued to be flat. The level for males of the age 15-24 was 47.3% in 2017, which was the same as 2016, but higher than 21.7% that was for all ages combined. The ratio of non-regular employment for both males and females of the age 25-34 was slightly lower in 2017 than in 2016, and in general the level in this age group is lower than that of all ages combined (Fig. 1-1-17).

**Fig. 1-1-17  Ratio of non-regular employment for young people**

![Transition of the ratio of non-regular employment per gender](image)

Source: “Labour Force Survey” and “The Special Survey of the Labour Force Survey” by the MIC

Note: 1. The ratio of non-regular employment is sourced from “Labour Force Survey Special Investigation” (conducted in February) up until 2001, and “Labour Force Survey (summary of details)” (average from January to March) after 2002. Attention needs to be paid in the time-series comparison since survey months vary (February every year up until 2001, or average from January to March after 2002).

2. The execution of Labour Force Survey became temporarily difficult in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures due to an influence of the Great East Japan Earthquake that happened on March 11, 2011. Therefore, the numbers for the year 2011 cited here are the complementary estimates (based on the Population Census in 2005).
Comparing the income distribution in 2012 and 1997, the ratio of employees with an annual income of less than 2.5 million yen increased for the people in their 20s while the ratio of employees with an annual income of less than 4 million yen increased for the people in their 30s. It shows that the income distribution for young generations is shifting toward bottom of the pyramid (Fig. 1-1-18).

**Fig. 1-1-18 Income distribution for the people in their 20s and 30s**

Source: “Employment Status Survey” by the MIC
Note: The people with undefined income is excluded from the calculation.
When looking at male workers by type of employment (as of 2012), 31.7% (25 to 29 years old) and 57.8% (30 to 34 years old) of regular workers are married, while 13.0% (25 to 29 years old) and 23.3% (30 to 34 years old) of non-regular workers are married, thus the percentage of non-regular workers is less than half that of regular workers.

Of non-regular workers, 7.4% (25 to 29 years old) and 13.6% (30 to 34 years old) of part-time workers are married, showing the percentage less than one fourth of that of regular workers, thus there being a great difference depending on the type of employment. (Fig. 1-1-19)

As for the ratio of males having a spouse by income bracket (as of 2012), the higher the income, the higher the tendency for one to have a spouse, up to a certain level of income, in any age group (Fig. 1-1-20).

**Fig. 1-1-19** Percentage of married male workers by type of employment

![Graph showing percentage of married male workers by type of employment](image)

**Source:** The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, "Current state of young generation’s employment, careers, and occupational skill development (2) — from the employment status survey, 2012 version." (2014)

**Note:** The classification of the employment status is based on the definition of the "Current state of young generation’s employment, careers, and occupational skill development" below:
Non-regular worker: Workers working under the name other than regular workers, such as part-time workers, occasional staff, dispatched employees from dispatching companies, contract employees, temporary employees and others.

**Fig. 1-1-20** Percentage of married male workers by income bracket

![Graph showing percentage of married male workers by income bracket](image)

**Source:** The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, "Current state of young generation’s employment, careers, and occupational skill development (2) — from the employment status survey, 2012 version." (2014)

**Note:** Due to a scarcity of samples, a calculation was not possible for the ratio of males of the age 25-29 within an income bracket of 8 million to 8.99 million yen who have a spouse.
Thoughts about childbirth

For a question about an ideal number of children to have as a couple (average ideal number of children), the number has decreased from 1987 to 2015 (2.32 children) to renew record low levels. Also, the number of children a couple actually plans to have (average planned number of children) reached a record low of 2.01 (Fig. 1-1-21).

**Fig. 1-1-21** Change in the average ideal and intended number of children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Survey</th>
<th>Ideal Number of Children</th>
<th>Intended Number of Children</th>
<th>Intended Number of Additional Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th survey (1977)</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th survey (1982)</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th survey (1987)</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th survey (1992)</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th survey (1997)</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th survey (2002)</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th survey (2005)</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th survey (2010)</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th survey (2015)</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Figures shown are for first-marriage couples (with wives under 50 years old). The intended number of children was calculated by adding the number of children already born and the number of additional children intended. The figures under “total” include data of couples whose duration of marriage is not known. The years of the horizontal axis labels represent the years in which the survey was conducted.
As a major reason why the expected number is lower than the ideal number, most couples state, “It costs too much to raise and educate children” (56.3%), though this is lower than 60.4% of the previous survey. Especially more than 80 percent of those age 30 to 34 state the same. The second highest reasons are, “Hate to bear children at older age” (39.8%) and “Want to have a child but cannot conceive one” (23.5%), these figures being higher than those of the previous survey. According to age brackets, the higher the age, the percentage of these reasons becomes higher: about 50% and about 30%, respectively, at age between 40 and 49. (Fig. 1-1-22)

Fig. 1-1-22 Reasons why married couples do not have the ideal number of children, by wife’s age


Note: Subjects were first-married couples with fewer planned children than their ideal number. The percentage of married couples with fewer planned children than their ideal number is 30.3%. 

(The upper figure shows the rate of multiple choices and the figure in the parenthesis shows the result of the 14th survey (2010).)
Increase in the percentage of females who continued to Work after Child Birth (by ages of child birth, composition of employment status before and after the first birth)

As for married women, those who were working before giving birth to their first child and continued working after the childbirth accounted for about 40 percent in the past. Such women giving birth to their first child between 2010 and 2014 accounted for 53.1%, showing a significant increase. The proportion of women who gave birth to their first child and continued working by utilizing the childcare leave has increased: the proportion of such women giving birth to their first child between 2010 and 2014 was 39.2%. (Fig. 1-1-23)

When classifying them by regular and non-regular workers, 69.1% of regular workers and 25.2% of non-regular workers have continued work (the 15th Annual Population and Social Security Surveys (Survey on Married Couples)) in 2015 by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

For a question asking for reasons to quit a job after pregnancy/birth of the youngest child, a majority of female regular employees answered, “I voluntarily quit to focus entirely on housework and taking care of children” (30.3%), and “I wanted to continue working, but it is difficult to balance working and raising children” (22.5%). The majority of non-regular employees answered, “I voluntarily quit to focus entirely on housework and taking care of children” (46.3%).

For a question asking for reasons why they answered, “I wanted to continue working, but it is difficult to balance working and raising children” to the above question, a majority of female regular employees answered, “The work hours didn’t look compatible to my lifestyle” (47.5%), and other answers include “It didn’t look physically bearable” (40.0%) and “It seemed impossible to take a childcare leave” (35.0%).

Major answers from non-regular female employees include, “It seemed impossible to take childcare leave” (41.7%), “I had nausea of pregnancy or was out of shape due to pregnancy/childbirth” (35.4%), “It didn’t look physically bearable” (33.3%), and “the work hours didn’t look compatible to my lifestyle” (33.3%) (Fig. 1-1-24).

Fig. 1-1-23 Change in employment status of wives before and after giving birth to their first child, by year of birth of first child

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Proportion of employment before childbirth: 61.4 (100)%</th>
<th>Proportion of continued employment after childbirth: 24.1 (39.2)%</th>
<th>Utilization of childcare leave: 6.7 (10.9)%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-98</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-01</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-04</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-07</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-10</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-14</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The couples for whom the current marriage is the first one for both husband and wife (less than 50 years old) with their first child aged one to less than 15 years were surveyed. The figure in the parenthesis shows the proportion to those who were working before giving birth.
Fig. 1-1-24 Reasons for quitting a job after pregnancy/birth of the youngest child

### Reasons for quitting a job after pregnancy/birth of the youngest child

- **Regular employees**
  - I voluntarily quit to focus entirely on housework and taking care of children: 30.3%
  - I voluntarily quit after pregnancy/childbirth, but the reasons are not directly related to that (or I was planning to quit anyway): 14.6%
  - I was laid off and encouraged to quit: 11.5%
  - It was difficult to continue working because of my husband's work location or issues related to his transfer: 12.9%
  - I no longer get job satisfaction (or it seemed) because my work and responsibilities changed after pregnancy/childbirth: 6.2%
  - Other reasons: 12.4%

- **Non-regular employees**
  - I voluntarily quit after pregnancy/childbirth, but the reasons are not directly related to that (or I was planning to quit anyway): 22.5%
  - I was laid off and encouraged to quit: 8.7%
  - It was difficult to continue working because of my husband's work location or issues related to his transfer: 6.2%
  - I no longer get job satisfaction (or it seemed) because my work and responsibilities changed after pregnancy/childbirth: 6.7%
  - Other reasons: 8.4%

### Regular employees

Reasons for the answer, “I wanted to continue working, but it is difficult to balance working and raising children”

- The work hours didn’t look (is not) compatible to my lifestyle: 33.3%
- It seemed (it is) impossible to take childcare leave: 35.0%
- It didn’t look (isn’t) physically bearable: 40.0%
- I had nausea of pregnancy or was out of shape due to pregnancy/childbirth: 27.5%
- There was no maternity leave/childcare leave system in the company: 27.1%
- It isn’t likely to (I can’t) find a spot for my child in a childcare center: 17.5%
- It is difficult to take a maternity leave: 18.7%
- There is no culture to support employees who have small children: 25.0%
- My family member(s) wants me to quit: 9.3%
- I didn’t know that the laws require to provide a maternity leave/childcare leave system: 5.3%
- Other reasons: 2.5%

### Non-regular employees

Reasons for the answer, “I wanted to continue working, but it is difficult to balance working and raising children”

- The work hours didn’t look (is not) compatible to my lifestyle: 35.8%
- It seemed (it is) impossible to take childcare leave: 36.0%
- It didn’t look (isn’t) physically bearable: 41.7%
- I had nausea of pregnancy or was out of shape due to pregnancy/childbirth: 27.6%
- There was no maternity leave/childcare leave system in the company: 27.1%
- It isn’t likely to (I can’t) find a spot for my child in a childcare center: 17.5%
- It is difficult to take a maternity leave: 18.7%
- There is no culture to support employees who have small children: 25.0%
- My family member(s) wants me to quit: 9.3%
- I didn’t know that the laws require to provide a maternity leave/childcare leave system: 5.3%
- Other reasons: 2.5%

Source: “FY 2016 Survey/research project report for reality check in relation to work-life balance, Survey results based on workers questionnaire (multiple answers)” (2017), Survey commissioned by the MLHW

Note: Non-regular employees include fixed-term employees, part-timers, contract workers, temp staff workers/employees
Long working hours for men who have families with small children

The ratio of men who work more than 60 hours/week is decreasing in general for all age brackets after 2005. However, as for the men in their 30s and 40s who have families with small children, 15.0% and 15.4% of respective age bracket work more than 60 hours/week, which level is higher than other age brackets (Fig. 1-1-25). The male workers who work more than 49 hours/week account for 29.5%, which is higher than other countries (Fig. 1-1-26).

Fig. 1-1-25 Transition of the ratio for male employed person who work more than 60 hours/week by age bracket

Source: "Labour Force Survey" by the MIC
Note: 1. The numbers represent a percentage of the total number of non-agriculture and forestry workers (excluding those who are on a leave of absence).
2. The numbers for the year 2011 are the national total excluding Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures.
The percentage of long work-hours for male workers (International comparison)

Men’s hours spent on housework/childcare

There is a positive correlation between men’s hours involved in housework and childcare on holidays and having the second and subsequent child. (Fig. 1-1-27) As for the time spent by men for taking care of children or housework, the men having children younger than 6-year-old in Japan spent 83 minutes/day (2016), which is a 16 minutes increase from the survey conducted in 2011, but remained at the lowest level among other developed countries (Fig. 1-1-28).


Note: 1. The “long work-hours” referred to above is defined as 49 hours or longer/week, which is commonly used in above countries as the longest workhour category in the ILOSTAT employment statistics by work-hours. All industries and employees are the subject, in principle.
2. The percentages for Japan, France, UK, Germany, Finland, and Sweden are as of 2015 while that is as of 2012 for USA.
Fig. 1-1-27  Second and subsequent childbirths by husband’s hours spent for housework/childcare during their holidays

Note: 1. Married couples living together that fall under (1) or (2), and (3) below were tabulated. However, couples without wives’ data of the survey before the childbirth was excluded from the tabulation.
   (1) Couples who answered to the 1st through the 14th survey
   (2) Couples who were unmarried at the time of the 1st survey but married by the 13th Survey and answered to the 14th Survey
   (3) Couples who have one child or more at the time of the survey before the childbirth
2. The housework and childrearing hours of couples “with childbirth” shows the situation at the survey before the childbirth, and those of couples with “no childbirth” shows the situation at the time of the 13th survey.
3. The data of couples with two or more childbirths during 13 years show about the youngest child.
4. The total includes couples whose housework and childcare hours are unknown.

Fig. 1-1-28  Housework/childcare hours spent by married couples with a child(ren) aged under 6 (international comparison per day)

2. Japan’s results about couples with children show total hours of husbands and wives involved in “Housework,” “Caring or nursing,” “Childcare” and “Shopping” (weekly average).
Source: Cabinet Office
Prefectural comparison

Trend of the total fertility rate by prefecture

The total fertility rate of our country was 1.44 in 2016. Among 47 prefectures, 36 prefectures exceeded while 11 prefectures fell below this level. Okinawa had the highest total fertility rate (1.95), followed by Shimane (1.75). The lowest was Tokyo (1.24), followed by Hokkaido (1.29) (Fig. 1-1-29).

Fig. 1-1-29 Total fertility rate by prefecture (2016)

Source: "Vital Statistics," by the MHLW
The birthrate by mother’s age bracket per prefecture

As for the birthrate by mother’s age bracket per prefecture, the birthrate for the age 20-34 in Okinawa and Shimane (with the highest and the second highest total fertility rate) is higher than the national level. On the other hand, Tokyo and Hokkaido (with the lowest and the second lowest total fertility rate) have inconsistent trend to each other. While the birthrate of the age 15-34 in Tokyo is lower than the national level, it is higher for the age 35-49. In Hokkaido while the birthrate of the age 15-29 is parallel to the national level, it is lower for the age 30 and older (Fig. 1-1-30).

Fig. 1-1-30  The birthrate by mother’s age bracket per prefecture (2016)

The ratio of unmarried at the age of 50 by prefecture

The ratio of unmarried at the age of 50 in this country was 23.4% for men and 14.1% for women in 2015. Among 47 prefectures, 17 and 13 prefectures exceeded this level for men and women respectively. Among those prefectures, the highest ratio of unmarried at the age of 50 was Okinawa (26.2%) for men and Tokyo (19.2%) for women (Fig. 1-1-31).

Fig. 1-1-31 The ratio of unmarried at the age of 50 by prefecture (2015)