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In earlier papers, you have heard about the way in which the role of human error contributes to reduced safety and how a system approach, bringing together road design and vehicle design, is now becoming recognised as the best way of maintaining a downward trend in road casualties. I am going to discuss how we might also manage road user behaviour more directly, both within and alongside this system approach.
Unsafe behaviour has traditionally been seen as one of the three contributors to accidents, alongside faults in the vehicle or the road environment. In this context, unsafe behaviour has been defined as behaviour leading to accidents. The model we now have is one which asks more clearly - does the behaviour fit within the bounds of the system we are proposing, or does it fall outside. If it falls outside it does so for two broad reasons, either skill or knowledge is not sufficiently good to meet the demands of the system, or the rules of the system are purposely not obeyed. I am going to discuss some issues that arise in developing policies to minimise the occurrence of both these situations. But equally important is to consider where the boundary is between behaviour appropriate to the targeted "safe system", and behaviour that falls outside it. This must also be an important consideration for policy makers.
The safety system principles that you have heard for better road design take as a starting point that vehicle occupants should be restrained, that they should not be impaired by alcohol, and that they should be keeping within the design speed principles on which the system is based. The same is true for setting standards for the passive safety of vehicles.
It might be simple to assume that lack of skill or knowledge should be treated through better education, that purposely inappropriate behaviour should be treated through enforcement, and that a set of system rules, once defined, should be the basis of normal behaviour. But the reality is more complex. Public attitudes have a strong influence on behaviour. It is therefore also important to understand what is influencing attitudes and expectations in terms of the safety of the road system. Where attitudes are out of step with the proposed system rules, then both education and enforcement policies may be needed, and system rules may need to be redefined.
So let us first consider each of the three areas of behaviour that are most commonly targeted by policy - seat belt wearing, drink driving, and speeding. The policies adopted in different countries are similar - a mixture of education and enforcement. Their overall success is strongly influenced by national cultures, but there is much in common in the way in which the policies operate. I am going to use particularly examples from Sweden, the UK, and the Netherlands - which were the subject of the SUNflower project (Koornstra et al, 2003). I shall also focus on general characteristics of policies, rather than specific details.
One important aspect of policies targeting behaviour is timing in relation to the state of public attitudes on the issue. Sweden and Netherlands introduced front seat belt wearing regulations much earlier than Britain, resulting in a gradual rise to high wearing rates, with Netherlands still below 90%. In Britain, the delayed introduction meant that public opinion was already much more in favour, and most cars were already fitted with belts, with the result that wearing rates rose very rapidly to a high level which has since been maintained. In comparison, rear seat belt wearing in Britain has been introduced gradually without any single high profile change with the result that wearing rates have risen only gradually.
A slightly different issue of timing is illustrated by the publicity against drinking and driving in Britain during the 1980s. Here, the important issue is to develop the message in line with the change in public attitudes. The publicity message was aimed at gaining public acceptance step by step of the following statements:Risk curves relating to alcohol impairment were established in the USA many years ago - a similar study has recently been repeated. Similar risk curves have been developing in several countries (eg Maycock, 1997). There are different views between countries as to how these should be used in setting national legislation. This is partly because the final outcome in terms of levels of drinking and driving that remain, and the resulting increase in road casualties, depends not only on the limit set, but also on enforcement levels and on the penalties applied by the courts. These latter in turn are influenced by more general public attitudes to the laws on drinking and driving. The Sunflower comparison showed that the legal blood alcohol limit is lower in Sweden and Netherlands than in Britain, and the enforcement rates are also higher, but the penalties if convicted in Britain are higher than in the other two countries.
Recent research in several countries (Taylor et al, 2000; Kloeden, 2002) has shown that similar risk curves can be developed for speeding. These relate to the risk associated with drivers who generally adopt higher speeds than the majority of other drivers on all roads. Further it can be seen that the added risk for those who drive at speeds around 20% higher than the average speed is of the same order as the risk level at which alcohol limits are set.
We also know from separate studies that the added risk for drivers choosing speeds above the average varies with road type and quality. Generally the proportionate effect is greater where roads are of poorer quality. So the effects need to be related to the different road networks in different countries. In Britain, for example, the greatest gains from dealing with speeding, in terms of reduction in total casualties, are to be found from enforcing speeding on urban roads, although significant benefits can be gained in reducing fatal and serious casualties, by targeting rural roads.
These data are important for both public awareness policies and enforcement policies. There is still a long way to go in most countries in changing attitudes to speeding, but progress can be seen (eg Stradling et al, 2003). In recent years in Britain, there has been a substantial increase in the use of speed cameras for enforcement. This has resulted in much public concern, particularly because the schemes are financed by the revenue they generate, and it is easy therefore for the public to mistake the motives of the scheme managers. Studies have shown clear benefits from the schemes, but their continuing acceptance requires constant positive publicity.
The broader acceptance of speed polices also needs the consequences for safety to be set alongside those for mobility and for the environment. While safety engineers can make a strong case for a speed reduction, the effects on other transport policies and on the transport economy must be recognised and a balance sought between potentially conflicting interests. Assessment procedures are currently being developed in Britain for revising speed limits on rural roads, using this approach.
An important aspect of enforcement policies is to achieve long term compliance. This is often attempted by offering re-education alongside punishment, or in some cases as an alternative to punishment. This is quite common in drink drive policies, and in some countries for more general driving violations. Again, clear benefits can be seen from this type of policy, but the extent of the policy will depend in part on the whether the target population is a small group of persistent offenders or whether the course are aimed more generally at influencing at views of a large proportion of road users. Removal of the licence of persistent offenders may be seen as an alternative solution, and may be necessary in cases where re-education fails, but it brings with it a further potential problem, of an increase in the number of drivers who use the roads without a licence. So the interaction of these policies needs to be treated with care.
If there are limits to what can be achieved with education and enforcement, what could be the added role of more direct control of vehicle users? In all three areas already discussed - seat belt wearing, driving while impaired, and speeding - technological solutions exist that could be applied to control behaviour more directly. Vehicle manufacturers have brought forward other systems aimed at, for example, lane keeping, collision avoidance, and enhanced vision. For some of these systems, more work is still needed on their technical capability and their potential use within the normal driving task. Their wider introduction also depends on their integration within an automated vehicle highway system, and the availability of, for example, satellite location systems built to a common architecture covering many countries. Progress is being made - the European Commission for example has just issued a document on Information and Communications Policy for Safe and Intelligent Vehicles (European Commission, 2003). At the same time there are experiments in progress nationally with these systems, but their effect on national casualty totals is unlikely to be seen for some years yet.
The biggest potential is likely to be from speed control systems. Experiments with voluntary speed control have been conducted in Sweden, Netherlands and Britain. These have shown the practicality and acceptability of the systems among the sample of drivers that have used them. But there remain considerable concerns among the public in general about both the practicality and the ethics of a system of mandatory control. It is likely to take up to 10 years further work to change these views.
There have also been experiments, notably in Sweden, in the use of Alcohol interlocks. The majority of these have been with professional drivers. But In Sweden interlocks have also been used to help drink dependent drivers to change their drinking and driving behaviour, with promising initial results.
Two of the biggest concerns that remain about any of the systems that directly intervene in the driving task areThe need to manage the effects of new technology is well illustrated by the issues surrounding the use of mobile phones. Some countries are now legislating or issuing advice to drivers not to use hand held phones. Use of a hand held device clearly has potential to interfere with the driver's control of the vehicle. The influence of hands free phones is less clear. Some claim that the possible reduced attention to the driving task is no difference from other potential in vehicle interactions such as talking or listening to radio. Several simulator studies have explored this issue. A recent TRL study (Burns et al, 2003) suggests that impairment of driving ability during a phone conversation can be greater for certain aspects of driving performance than impairment from alcohol, even allowing for the fact that drivers tend to lower their speeds when using the phone.
So far I have been focussing on reducing casualties resulting from behaviour that falls outside that on which the majority of the road and vehicle system is proposed to function. Let us turn now to the issue of trying to ensure that the behaviour on which that system is based is consistent with the behaviour of the large majority of the population. This is dependent not only on the public perception of risk but also the extent to which other objectives are in conflict with that perception.
For seat belt wearing and drinking and driving, the attitude for the majority is in line with behaviour consistent with a safe driving system. But for drinking and driving this has only been achieved by managing drinking behaviour, and for some countries this is still in conflict with traditional lifestyles. Adolescents will often have quite strong views about the dangers of drink driving, but as drinking becomes more prominent within their lifestyles, each generation needs to be helped to manage that behaviour. There is therefore a continuing need for drink drive publicity. For speeding, we have yet to see the same change towards personal management of behaviour even among mature drivers. Publicity campaigns are needed that move beliefs and behaviour in a series of steps towards that consistent with a safe driving system, if the full benefits of that system are to be realised.
Whilst a greater degree of control may be one way of achieving this change, it also brings other problems. Once some external control is applied, road users expectation of safety increases. This affects not only the level of safety they expect, but also the extent to which they see their own actions as being responsible for maintaining that level of safety. So it is imperative that any control system is sufficiently well integrated into the overall driving task to ensure its benefits are not eroded by an inappropriate reduction in the driver's contribution to avoiding risk.
The introduction of external control also has important implications for the managers of the system. In Britain, there is clear evidence of higher expectations of safety from publicly managed transport systems such as rail, than from systems which are based on individual behaviour. These expectations are expressed through the media and through politicians, and can result in pressure for policies which are then based on distorted valuation of casualties saved by one system compared with another.
In both urban and rural safety situations now there is a need for a close dialogue with representative road user bodies to ensure that safety measures that are introduced are fully understood and accepted. In Europe the DUMAS project (Wells, 1999) explored the processes for doing this for urban safety management. The European Road Assessment Programme (Lynam et al, 2003) is developing concepts that could be applicable to improvement of the interurban road network. A similar approach is likely to be important as the balance of control within the system is changed.
Finally, it is important to understand what others factors are influencing road user behaviour and how these might affect progress towards casualty targets. Monitoring progress in Britain has shown up that fatal accidents are not declining as quickly as serious injury accidents. This could be due to changes in reporting levels but this does not seem to be the case. Rather there are indications that the standard of driving behaviour may be declining. To monitor this properly, regular surveys of driver behaviour are needed which are not yet in place in Britain (or in many other countries). One aspect of this could result from the growing use of vehicles as mobile offices (Broughton et al, 2003). Another minor, but interesting factor is the evidence of a growing disparity in the size of vehicles, leading to more collisions between small and large vehicles, with resulting greater injury severity. Such changes are driven by other market forces; but safety strategies should try to take account of them.
In summary, there are a wide range of potential policies that can be applied and it is important to apply them so that they work most effectively together, taking account of the safety problem and the attitudes and culture of each country. How do the various policies relate to casualty reduction targets. The SUNflower project compared the policy areas expected to contribute to the national target over the next few years in Sweden, Britain, and the Netherlands. There is still a substantial saving to be gained in many countries by reducing alcohol impairment - in Britain up to 15% of fatalities but only a small proportion of this is being targeted. Achieving 100% seat belt wearing has much less potential. The potential gains from reducing traffic speeds depends on the balance between speed and mobility considered appropriate for different roads in each country, but practical policies effectively implemented are likely to achieve at least 10% reduction in fatalities. Fatality rates among novice drivers are well above those of experienced drivers, and you have heard some encouraging results from Sweden.
Particular road user groups may also need special attention. In Sweden, the dominant casualty group are car occupants, and this enables a clear focus on a safe road system designed around this mode. In Britain, 20% of fatalities are still pedestrians so it is crucial to decide what rights and facilities they should be given within the safe road system. Another major group are fatalities among two wheeled riders. In Britain these are mainly motorcyclists, but in the Netherlands cyclists and scooter riders. The Netherlands has shown that improved road environments can produce low risk per cyclist trip. But for motorised two wheelers, it is very difficult to decide what freedom they should be given within the safe road system, and the extent to which the system should protect them.
The challenge for Japan is to decide what behaviour is appropriate to the safe road system you wish to establish, and to create a programme of policies combining the wide range of tools that I have discussed in the most appropriate way to focus on those aspects of behaviour most relevant to safety problems in Japan.
References
Broughton J, Baughan C, Pearce l, Smith L, and Buckle G (2003) Work-related accidents. TRL Report TRL 582. TRL Limited, Crowthorne, Berkshire.
Burns P C, Parkes A, Burton S, Smith R K, and D Burch (2003) How dangerous is driving with a mobile phone? Benchmarking the impairment to alcohol. TRL Report TRL 547. TRL Limited, Crowthorne, Berkshire.
European Commission (2003) Information and Communications Technologies for Safe and Intelligent Vehicles. SEC(2003) 963. COM 542 final. Commission of the European Communities. Brussels
Kloeden C N, McLean A J and G Glonek (2002) Reanalysis of travelling speed and the risk of crash involvement in Adelaide, South Australia. Australian Transport Safety Bureau ATSB. Report No. CR207.
Koornstra M, Lynam D, Nilsson G, Noordzij P, Pettersson H-P, Wegman F, and P Wouters. (2003) SUNflower: a comparative study of the development of road safety in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. SWOV Institute for Road Safety Research. Leidschendam.
Lynam D, Sutch T, Broughton J, and S D Lawson (2003) European Road Assessment Programme (EuroRAP) pilot p[hase technical report. AA Foundation for Road Safety Research, Farnborough.
Maycock, G (1997) Drinking and driving in Great Britain - a review. TRL Report TRL 232. TRL Limited, Crowthorne, Berkshire.
Stradling SG, Campbell M, Allan I A, Gorell R , Hill J P, Winter M, and S Hope (2003) The speeding driver: who, how and why. Scottish Executive Social Research, Edinburgh.
Taylor M C, Lynam D A, and A Baruya (2000) The effect of drivers' speed on the frequency of road accidents. TRL Report 421 TRL Limited, Crowthorne, Berkshire.
Wells P (1999). DUMAS - developing urban management and safety. Proceedings of ROSPA 64th Road Safety Congress. ROSPA, Birmingham